

When the receipt of materials from the recruit was established, our recruiting brigade transferred the new agent to another brigade, the operational one. In those years, a nimble Italian Jew named Vinci, a dealer in fake antiques, constantly hung around wealthy American tourists in Italy and France - in Italy there is a whole industry that manufactures this fake antiquity for the needs of rich ignoramuses from across the ocean. In this untidy little man with a shabby suitcase in his hands, the most keen eye could not recognize the Soviet major general, head of the operational reconnaissance group. They called him Boris. We handed over Nosik to Boris. But while working with me Nosik

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he managed to introduce me to one seasoned French intelligence officer Lemoine - a sinister-looking old man, a dealer in other people's codes. The old man entertained me with stories about how, during the First World War, he personally shot various suspicious small fry on the French-Spanish border, and treated me to wine and oysters, trying to lure me to French territory. Reluctantly, for the sake of establishing friendly relations with Japanese intelligence, he sold me some very necessary ciphers: the pre-war years were going on, information from all sides was extremely necessary. And I tracked down Lemoine's date with an amazingly beautiful brunette in Zurich and managed to get to know her. She turned out to be the mistress of an important Romanian general who supplied his French masters with information of interest to us about the USSR and Romania! How did I manage to ingratiate myself with her? Money. A reference to Japan, which keeps secrets like a grave. Well, and his youth: the general, you know, was a very worn old man, and the killer from Singapore was an elegant insolent in his prime - such like many women, including couriers between Bucharest and Paris.

At the table, by a bottle of champagne on ice, we probably seemed like a very picturesque couple: she is in a deeply low-cut dress, I am in a tailcoat. We whispered like young lovers. "If you betray me, you will be killed as soon as you stick your nose out of Switzerland!" she said in my ear, smiling sweetly. I smiled even sweeter and whispered in response: "And if you betray me, you will be killed right here in Zurich, on this very veranda, over blue water with white swans!"

From all that has been said, you can see that the reconnaissance thread often branches off: you pull one fish, draw three, and our nimble dealer in fake antiquities always got the whole catch!

— And how was the work of the lord?

- The Lord appeared on the stage only at the moments of the most mortal danger.

In the pre-war years, the arms race always accelerates tremendously and turns into a crazy leapfrog. In such a situation, one day in Berlin, a resident called me and ordered me to urgently go to fascist Rome and deliver from there to Nazi Germany an army gas-protective overalls and a light machine gun. Through two borders! Crispy camouflage overalls and a machine gun (albeit without a handle!). It was a very serious assignment. I called Pepik and Erika, my young couple, Ted took over the operation, Boris volunteered to help.

In the morning in Rome, a pretty nun in the uniform of an order helping the sick of hospitals, and a minister from an American hospital, also in uniform, appeared on the luxury car of the Rome Berlin Express. They led by the arms a crooked patient, wrapped with his head in such a way that

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that only a yellow, shaking nose protruded from under the rugs. Behind this trinity was a well-trained, dashing servant who casually carried in his hand an elegant, seemingly half-empty bag, and on his shoulder a tall canvas bag lined with leather, from which the metal ends of golf clubs protruded. The sister explained to the conductor in Italian with an English accent that the patient was a mad lord suffering from violent seizures. He bites but

bites are safe, madness is not transmitted through saliva, you just need to take care of your eyes. Seizures may begin with a sharp knock and rattling.

The nun handed the conductor such a bundle of lyre that he looked, groaned and rushed to tie clean towels around all the rattling objects in the compartment - glasses, decanters, a chamber pot. The Lord was carefully seated and carefully covered with another blanket, the hospital attendant sat on one side, the nun on the other. The attendant stared at the lord like a hunting dog on a bar, and the nun opened the Gospel and began to read in a whisper, counting the pages on her rosary.

In the meantime, the athletically built servant casually placed a luxurious suitcase against the wall under the window, just opposite the door, and put the bag with clubs in a corner, saluted and left. And there was a lot of sense in his negligence - the bag with overalls was not heavy, but the bag with clubs and a machine gun weighed a lot - the exorbitant weight of the bag itself would have attracted the attention of any porter. But the main thing was that the muzzle treacherously stuck out of the bag and was clearly visible between the steel blades of the clubs: our idea was a psychological attack. The whole calculation was placed on the fact that neither the Italian blackshirts, nor the Swiss gendarmes, nor the Hitlerite SS men, amazed by the unusual appearance of his lordship, would pay attention to the bag and clubs: they would only look at the lord who bites! And so it happened: at the borders, the conductor hissed "sssss!" to the representatives of the authorities from a distance. and, choking, he talked about an unusual patient, the nun prayed without raising her eyes, the attendant sat in the pose of a dog ready to rush to the prey.

A short, nimble doctor in a white coat appeared in Zurich. Silently gave the patient an injection, silently listened to the report of the nun and left. On the German border, the SS only opened their mouths: "A real lord?" "Here is his passport!" - "And bites ?!" - "Like a dog!" "Herr Gott! Donner vetter noh mall!" Our death tiptoed past without even looking at the tip of the muzzle...

- Recorded, Dmitry Alexandrovich. And what did his lordship do?

— I will briefly tell one story, the whole meaning of which the reader must understand for himself: this is the topic for a complex psychological novel. Only Dostoevsky could truly appreciate and tell such material. [Preparing for war with the Soviet Union, Hitler

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The Russians spent a lot of attention, effort and money on getting information about the situation in our country. In Germany, several centers were organized, from where intelligence work began to unfold. One of these centers was outwardly disguised as the headquarters of the German chemical industry trust. The flow of information obtained was processed in a very secret room, and the finished material was placed in safes. As a technical worker, guardian and vigilant overseer, an elderly woman was assigned to the center, severely maimed in childhood in a car accident, deprived of family life and extremely embittered. She turned all the natural fervor of her soul into fanatical service to the Fuhrer and the Third Empire. Of course, she was an old member of the Nazi party and an ardent SS. It was a mad dog, growling from the chain at everyone approaching the cherished iron door. The domestication of this dangerous animal was entrusted to me.

There was no point in swearing love and falling on her knees - her repulsive appearance did not allow her to believe in such a crude lie. And I started from afar. At the first cheerful conversation, the frivolous count admitted that he did not know exactly who Herr Adolf Hitler was - it seems that he was an admiral or a professor or something ... The dog was horrified. He was interested - on what soil can such monstrous blasphemous ignorance grow? It turned out: on the basis of wealth, laziness, easy success in women. The dog realized that the count was by no means a fool by nature, and if he was worked on, he could become a useful pawn for Germany.

The dog was seized by the desire to make a real person out of a frivolous dunce. And the dog set to work. First there was a habit. Then, attachment. Finally, love. But what! Bloodthirsty dogs know how to love, I saw it myself ... And everything should have ended naturally

final - marriage. It was necessary only before the wedding to organize the count's funds to help him with some advice on the chemical industry, in which the count, due to his frivolity, invested money. And also to help speculate on the stock exchange... And one more thing...

In a word, after three years I turned in a tamed dog to our counterfeit jewelry dealer. Then the count went to his castle to prepare for the wedding, and suddenly - oh, horror! - was accidentally killed on a hunt: the saddened signor de Vinci showed the bride newspapers with a notice in mourning frames. What happened to her... The unfortunate woman was barely saved... Yes, dogs know how to love! And scouts know how to demand work from those with whom they are associated! In a word, everything went fine, only the inconsolable widow bride dressed in mourning dresses forever.

— Is that all? I said disappointedly.

- No. The main thing in this story is the end! The work required my arrival in Berlin. Looking around, I headed for the big

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cafe on Kurfürstendamm, where the meeting was scheduled, and was already grasping the sash of the revolving transparent door, when he suddenly saw that my widow-bride was grasping the same sash from the other side. We froze on either side of the door, unable to take our eyes off our pale faces. "Sorry!" I suddenly heard from behind me - it was a group of SS officers who approached the turntable and politely pushed me aside.

At that moment, my widow-bride suddenly screamed wildly, fell to the floor and thrashed in hysterical sobs. The officers quickly ran into the cafe and leaned over to the fallen woman. I got the few minutes that an intelligence officer needs to disappear, stay alive and give interviews to journalists later.

What a terrible life! I exclaimed.

- Yes. But a fire burned in my chest: I knew why such sacrifices were made. I returned home to Moscow for scientific work. But they didn't let me go - the war was already on the threshold, there was a rest once.

I was called to the drug addict. The head of our intelligence reported a plan: send me to Antwerp, where I join the Belgian fascist party, from there I go to the Dutch Indies, buy a plantation or a trading business there, and from there to South America, where the Nazis have a large center in Sao Paulo. There I am transferred from the Belgian to the German Fascist Party. I'm coming forward as a fanatic-activist. I move to Germany and stay there for the entire duration of the war as our intelligence agent, working in the General Staff of the Reichswehr. The People's Commissar took a blue pencil and across the report wrote: "I approve." He left the table. He said: "Not a fluff or a feather! Motherland and Stalin will not forget you! We are putting into your hands the best intelligence we currently have. Appreciate it! Be worthy of such trust!" He hugged him, kissed him three times, shook his hand tightly.

I opened a new notepad page.

- I look forward to listening, Dmitry Alexandrovich!

But my interlocutor burst out laughing.

Do you see the pile of folders? Do you notice that the girls no longer leave and crumple at the door? I had a dozen and a half passports, the same number of masks and many adventures - you can't tell everything. It's time for us to turn around.

"So at least add a few words about the evening when the Sturmbannfuehrer..."

- No, this is a big, serious and long story, and it should not be crushed - it's a pity! Enough for today! Thank you for attention. I want to write three books about the experience. The first one has already been written, in the manuscript it is conditionally called "Thunderous Dawn over Africa." The third one is ready too. Conventionally, it was called "Retribution". But here is the second one, under the title "Restless Love", so far only being considered. It serves as a bridge to the third, and I cannot begin to write it until windows

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I will not elaborate on a few details of the text of the first book. Someday you will read all three - you will learn a lot of unusual things.

We got up.

- You, Dmitry Alexandrovich, of course, are an old member of the party?

No, I'm non-partisan. One of those who in those years were called non-party Bolsheviks.

- But you came up with a pseudonym for yourself very well!

- No, Bystroletov is the real name of the mother. She was a Kuban Cossack.

- And who was the father?

- Count Alexander Nikolaevich Tolstoy.

We were silent.

- And the last question: how would you advise to call the report about the meeting with you?

"In the name of the protagonist of my story!"

The trip abroad did not take place: according to the testimony of the arrested employees of the NKVD GUGB, Bystroletov fell under suspicion, in February 1938 he was suspended from work, and in September he was arrested. During the investigation, under severe pressure, Bystroletov slandered himself, which he stated at the trial. The court did not take into account his statement and found him guilty in connection with an anti-Soviet terrorist organization and foreign intelligence services, condemning him to 20 years in labor camps.

In 1954, Bystroletov was released from prison due to illness, and in 1956 he was rehabilitated. The conclusion did not embitter him. When Bystroletov was asked if he regretted that he went into intelligence, he replied: "The best years of my life are connected with work in intelligence, I am ready to live it again the same way again."

Dmitry Bystroletov was engaged in translation and literary activities, in 1973, according to his script, the feature film "A Man in Civil Clothes" was created.

Died D.A. Bystroletov May 3, 1975, was buried at the Khovansky cemetery in Moscow.

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"The Feast of the Immortals" is the common title of 17 books by D.A. Bystroletova (each the book has its own title).

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SEAN

In the summer of 1937, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and the head of foreign intelligence were invited to the Kremlin for their next report. Stalin listened attentively to the information about everyday

on the affairs of the INO, about the documents obtained by undercover agents, and, ending the conversation, as if in passing, he inquired about the issues of training personnel for intelligence.

A few days later, a note was presented to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) by intelligence. It substantiated the proposal to organize a Special Purpose School (SPS) for the training of scouts up to 30 people. The School's budget (1.5 million rubles) included the cost of arranging the life of cadets, their boarding and paying for the teaching staff. At that time, this was a large amount, and intelligence leaders, knowing about the state budget deficit, did not really count on receiving it in full.

What was the surprise of the head of intelligence when, having opened the package brought by a special courier from the Kremlin, he saw on his note a bold, sweeping resolution: "The course of intelligence officers must be organized outside of Moscow. I. Stalin. July 8, 1937".

I.V. Stalin considered it important that the "fighters of the invisible front" be securely classified and disappear from the field of view of both relatives and friends for the duration of their one-year study at the SHON.

On October 3, 1938, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs issued an order to create a SEZ, and the scouts received five objects (village houses) in the Moscow region, hidden from the eyes of the uninitiated in dense forests. The modest facade of the traditional dachas near Moscow of that time was more than compensated by the interior decoration of the rooms for cadets. The rooms were carpeted, there was comfortable beautiful furniture, tastefully selected paintings hung on the walls, excellent linen and expensive bedspreads were on the beds. And it was all prepared

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It's a lot of fun for young people who only yesterday worked at factories, on collective farms, and served in the army. Special intelligence subjects, such as radio engineering, cipher business, acquiring and maintaining contact with agents, were adjacent to general educational disciplines: the Russian language, literature, and geography. Most of the study time was spent studying foreign languages. At first there were nine of them. At the East department, cadets studied Japanese, Chinese, Persian and Turkish, at the West department they studied English, German, Spanish, French and Italian. Knowledge of a foreign language did not yet guarantee a pass to "high society", so cadets were taught good manners, diplomatic etiquette, instilled taste and the ability to dress beautifully and fashionably.

The languages and manners of the cadets were taught by foreigners - former political emigrants, intelligence disciplines were taught by INO practitioners, and humanitarian subjects - by the best professors and specialists of Moscow universities. For example, lectures on international relations were given by the former participant of the Genoa Conference, Ambassador B.E. Stern, the economic geography of capitalist states - A.A. Crane. He was also the organizer of musical evenings, since he was rightfully considered an amateur musicologist and quite a well-known composer at that time. Academicians A.A. Guber, A.M. Deborin, I.M. Maysky and other specialists.

The intellectual baggage acquired at the School could serve as an excellent "visiting card" of graduates: it was interesting to communicate with them, make friends, flatter them to use their attention and entrust them with information that would never have been entrusted to people of a different type.

and upbringing.

Vladimir Kharitonovich Sharmazanashvili, a Georgian born in North Ossetia, in Dzauzhikau (Vladikavkaz), was appointed the first Head of the School. The age of the century, he joined the Red Army at the age of 18, and in 1921 he was sent to work in the state security agencies. The craving for knowledge led him to the Moscow Institute of Foreign Trade, where he studied German and French. He did not have much experience in intelligence work behind him, but he had good training, knowledge of two foreign languages, and most importantly, good organizational skills.

abilities, apparently, predetermined the choice of the leadership of the NKVD in the selection of candidates for the post of head of the SHON. As the graduates of the first intake recalled, Vladimir Kharitonovich was

“a wonderful Georgian, sociable, always optimistic and a democrat by nature”.

N.F. was Sharmazanashvili's deputy and the head of the educational unit of the SHON. Krupennikov, information about which, unfortunately, with

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little was kept. It is only known that he had a high sense of responsibility for the assigned work and tried, overcoming the enormous difficulties of the initial period, to organize the educational process. He succeeded. And there were really unusually many difficulties. Let's start with the fact that the School did not yet have full-time teachers of special disciplines, just as there were no corresponding departments. Professional training was carried out by operatives of the central apparatus of foreign intelligence, who had years of intense and productive work abroad.

Krupennikov often talked with students of the School of Education, finding out their opinion about the organization of the educational process, living conditions and study at the School facilities. Many graduates subsequently spoke about N.F. Krupennikov as a strict, but sensitive, intelligent, caring and demanding leader. In July 1941, he was included in the reconnaissance and sabotage group of the famous intelligence officer Vasily Ivanovich Pudín and died in battles near Moscow.

The leadership of foreign intelligence understood the importance of training intelligence personnel and provided the leadership of the SEON with all possible support in organizing the educational process. Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev, Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin, Evgeny Petrovich Mitskevich, Vasily Ivanovich Pudín, Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov and other experienced intelligence officers, who at that time constituted the golden fund of intelligence, were the first teachers of the SEON.

P.M. Zhuravlev had extensive experience in residencies in Europe and the Middle East. A man of an analytical mindset, in the pre-war years he carefully observed the development of the international situation, having concluded in advance that an attack by fascist Germany on the USSR was inevitable and preparing the people with whom he worked for this. In the post-war years, he continued to work in foreign intelligence, heading one of the leading departments. V.M. Zarubin is one of the first illegal intelligence agents whose activities took place in the Western and Eastern hemispheres. Walking along an unbeaten path, he accumulated grains of precious experience, which was later used and enriched by intelligence in new conditions. E.P. Mickiewicz is a legendary scout of the period of origin and development of intelligence. He successfully worked in many European countries. Valuable military-political information was received from his sources for a long time. IN AND. Pudín had the opportunity to work in the Far East, where he attracted agents for cooperation, from whom about 20 Japanese and Chinese ciphers were received. P.A. Sudoplatov was well acquainted with the activities of Ukrainian nationalists who collaborated with the German intelligence services to achieve their goals.

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As the students of the first set of SHON later recalled, they were all excellent teachers. Their classes on “mysterious” special disciplines for students were interesting and memorable. No one read a pre-written text from a piece of paper, did not lose contact with the audience. The classes were rather in the nature of lively conversations with the audience, when the operational worker, having formulated a general position, reinforced what was said with vivid examples from practice. The reconnaissance instructors intelligibly revealed the essence and technology of reconnaissance operations and instilled in the students a sense of respect for the reconnaissance profession. With bated breath, the cadets perceived their stories about life abroad, performing operational tasks, detecting surveillance and avoiding it, like a fairy tale.

The term of study at SHON was set at one year. The leaders and teachers of the School persistently instilled in the students that the knowledge and skills they received during the classes are only the basis for work in intelligence, which requires constant improvement.

professional skills, development of skills for independent decision-making in a complex and sometimes extreme environment. And the graduates of the first set of SEON soon felt the correctness of their mentors. Many of them happened to go abroad some time after graduation, where they were convinced of the wisdom of the advice they heard at the School. Most of the graduates of the first set of SEON turned out to be worthy of their mentors and carried the high rank of scout with honor through their lives.

Among them are Nikolai Mikhailovich Gorshkov, Vasily Mikhailovich Ivanov, Elisey Tikhonovich Sinitsyn, Vitaly Grigoryevich Pavlov. All of them went through a long and hard way of working in intelligence on the eve and during the war years, in the post-war period, they acquired a number of valuable sources, obtained information important for the country's leadership, and supervised residencies. Having accumulated great knowledge and work experience, they passed it on to the younger generation in the same intelligence school from which they began their life. Their names are well known to professionals. E.T. Sinitsyn and V.G. Pavlov later held high positions of deputies, head of intelligence.

Unfortunately, not all the graduates of the 1939-1940 SHON were so lucky. Despite the fact that during these years mass repressions began to decline, some of them nevertheless suffered a difficult and unfair fate. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, fewer experienced scouts from among the first pupils of the School for Special Purposes remained in the ranks than it could have been.

During the war, some of the graduates volunteered for the front, while others took part in organizing an underground partisan movement in the territories occupied by the Germans. SHON's science

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very useful during the war. It became a reliable basis for Soviet intelligence officers in the fight against a strong and insidious enemy.

During the existence of the SEON, its graduates have made a worthy contribution to ensuring the external security of the Motherland.

The name of this unique educational institution has changed many times. At first it was the School for Special Purposes (SHON), then the Intelligence School (RSh), then the Higher Intelligence School (HRSh, it also had an encrypted name - School No. 101), since November 1968 - the Red Banner Institute (KI), in the far - named after Yu.V. Andropov, since October 1994 - Academy of Foreign Intelligence of the Russian Federation. But the traditions of the SHON, laid down in the distant 1930s, and above all, loyalty to professional duty and selfless service to the Fatherland, continue to live.

Conditions have changed, the situation in the country and on the world stage, but, as before, the Motherland needs dedicated and trained intelligence personnel.

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V.P. Roshchin - partisan, intelligence agent, resident

On July 1, 1932, a new employee appeared in the Berlin residency under the pseudonym Tumanov. His real name is Yakov Fedorovich Tishchenko. As one of the most experienced and distinguished veterans of foreign intelligence, he is known under the name of Vasily Petrovich Roshchin.

Despite his youth (he was then 28 years old), Vasily Petrovich already had rich operational experience behind him. At the age of 15, while a seminarian in the Far Eastern city of Spassk, he began to take part in the partisan movement and in 1920 joined a partisan detachment. A significant role in the formation of views and the determination of the life path of Yakov Tishchenko was played by

one of the leaders of the partisan headquarters Sasha Bulyga, who later became a famous writer Alexander Fadeev.

As part of a partisan detachment, Yakov participated in many serious operations to eliminate various formations in the Far East that opposed the Soviet regime, in particular, the detachments of atamans Kalmykov and Semenov. While serving in the 3rd Amur Division, he made a severe winter transition of several hundred kilometers from Nerchinsk to Dauria. In this campaign, fate again brought him together with Alexander Bulyga. At the age of 19, he was the commissar of the brigade in which Ya. Tishchenko fought. In 1921, together with A. Fadeev and the future Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev Yakov was elected from the 3rd Amur Division as a delegate to the Tenth Party Congress, of which he had been a member since 1920.

At the end of hostilities in the Far East, Tishchenko plunged headlong into work. He belonged to the generation that sincerely believed in the revolution, in the establishment of social justice on earth. In 1922, Yakov was recommended for Komsomol work in Blagoveshchensk, then as secretary of the district committee of the Komsomol in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk. He did the same work in

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other Far Eastern cities, was elected a delegate to the ŸU and Y Komsomol congresses.

At the beginning of 1925, Yakov was promoted to party work as an instructor of the Primorsky Provincial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Vladivostok. But the same year was marked for him by an event that determined his whole future life. Being called up for military service and starting to pass it in the regimental school of junior commanders of the 1st Pacific Division, Yakov in November 1925, on the recommendation of the Primorsky Provincial Committee, was sent to the disposal of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Siberian Military District.

The civil war in the Far East had ended by that time, but the activities hostile to the Soviet state had by no means ended. Its center moved to Manchuria, from where, under the leadership of the Japanese, sabotage groups and paramilitary detachments, made up of representatives of the white emigration, were constantly thrown into the territory of the USSR.

The activities of the foreign intelligence agencies in such a center of emigration and the preparation of anti-Soviet sabotage as Harbin continued to be of great importance. It was here, in the residency of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, that Yakov, who became Vasily Petrovich Roshchin, was sent at the end of 1925. The change of name and surname was caused primarily by the active participation of Yakov in the armed struggle for a new power in the Far East, as well as concern for the safety of his relatives and friends.

In the Consulate General, under the cover of which Vasily Petrovich was supposed to work, he was entrusted with the department of diplomatic courier communications and diplomatic mail. As Roshchin later recalled, this area of work was "simple and stereotyped", with no prospects for the future. Therefore, a year after arriving in Harbin, he raised the question of seconding him to the disposal of the Dalkraikom in Khabarovsk.

This request was met, and at the end of November 1926, Vasily Petrovich was already packing his suitcases. However, the leadership of the residency of the INO OGPU in Harbin intervened in his fate. Roshchin was asked to stay in Harbin and go to work in the sector for the fight against the Whites, where he could use his experience. After some hesitation, the suitcases were unpacked. V.P. Roshchin became a foreign intelligence officer.

Almost all the work on the "white sector" was entrusted to Vasily Petrovich. Its task was to reveal the activities of emigrant groups, from which detachments were formed for withdrawal to the territory of the USSR for sabotage and reconnaissance purposes. And since Japanese intelligence played the main role in the creation of such detachments, the fight against its agents became Roshchin's daily work.



The activities of the sector were exceptionally multifaceted and rich in operational activities. Their description would take more than one volume. We confine ourselves to just one example.

Convinced of the futility of large-scale anti-Soviet actions, the Japanese decided to resort to a new method of struggle: for 1927-1928, they planned to transfer to Soviet territory under the flag of the "white partisan movement" 10 detachments of officers, 20 people each, in order to create a local panic moods among the population.

Through agents, the "white sector" managed to identify the names of emigrant officers who were chosen by the Japanese for the role of leaders of detachments, and use this information to infiltrate their agents into the emerging gangs. The agents were also selected from among the former officers of the tsarist army, who were closely acquainted with the leaders of the detachments from their past service and enjoyed their confidence. Such people were, in particular, the former colonel of the tsarist army, Alexei Andreevich Klyukanov and Valery Evgenievich Sotnikov, who in the past served in the armies of Kolchak and General Diterichs and became disillusioned with the "white movement". They managed to infiltrate the first two of the detachments that were being formed, to identify the routes of movement, the place and time of crossing the Soviet border. As a result, the gang formations were utterly defeated, which eventually led to the disbandment of the remaining detachments, and the plan of Japanese intelligence failed.

Vasily Petrovich worked in Harbin until November 1930 and was sent to the central intelligence apparatus in Moscow. He was received by A.Kh. Artuzov and at the beginning of 1932 he appointed him deputy head of the department. Here he was engaged in providing documentation for intelligence officers of illegal immigrants and secret communications with them.

It was this work that became his main task when, in the summer of 1932, Vasily Petrovich arrived at the Berlin residency. Explaining the reasons why he was sent to Germany with such a task, Roshchin later recalled: "At that time, it was believed that the Entente countries would launch a war against us. In Germany, there was the Weimar Republic, and the regime in the country allowed us to expand our work, including in passport and technical affairs and communications. Vasily Petrovich set about implementing this task with his inherent responsibility and thoroughness.

Terms of reference of V.P. Roshchina in residency, however, was wider. He worked actively with valuable agents, studied candidates for recruitment.

V.P. Roshchin closely followed the domestic political situation in Germany and often asked himself if we saw a sufficient threat from fascism. These thoughts occupied him even before leaving for Berlin. In the parting words of the leaders of the INO under

it was pointed out that the Entente countries could attack the Soviet Union, and possibly very soon. The threat from England and the allies in those years was indeed real. Even the German government of von Papen expected to join the Entente countries in their campaign against Russia and advocated an alliance with them. With the advent of Hitler to power, the source of the immediate threat to the USSR changed. Once in the country and finding himself directly in the thick of political events, Vasily Petrovich increasingly came to the conclusion that it was Germany that was becoming the main potential adversary. V.P. Roshchina.

At the same time, the intelligence officer saw that even among the Nazi activists at that time there were people who, at least in words, pretended to be friends of the USSR. Vasily Petrovich believed that this created the possibility of establishing trusting and even agency relations with them. "There were dozens of cases, especially in 1932-1934," Roshchin later recalled, "

when it was possible to start and establish such relations with active promising Nazis, but we did not always use them.

Life confirmed the fears of the intelligence officer, showing that fascist Germany had indeed become the main threat to the Soviet Union. It became more and more difficult for the residency to work, and the question arose of the need to carry out work in Germany from other countries. It was at this moment, in May 1935, that V.P. Roshchin is transferred from Berlin to Austria as a resident. Now he had to penetrate from here into the Nazi circles in Germany and receive information about their plans. The agent "legacy" inherited from his predecessors turned out to be very weak for solving such a problem, and Vasily Petrovich, with his usual scrupulousness and perseverance, began to search for new opportunities. During his work in Vienna - from 1935 until the Anschluss of Austria in 1938 - he managed to acquire a number of sources that provided the Center with information about the internal political situation in Austria, as well as about the political and military preparations of Nazi Germany for the annexation of Austria.

The most valuable of them were the employees of the General Directorate of Public Security of the office of the Federal Chancellor and the political police. Acquisition of one of them - "Rider", as Vasily Petrovich later recalled, was "the first and most difficult". First, he came from an alien environment, associated with hostile circles; secondly, he had chaotic ideological views: sometimes he spoke in a pro-communist spirit, sometimes in a pro-Nazi one. Professional experience and flair Roshchin

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allowed, after a thorough study of the Rider, to pick up the keys to it and agree on cooperation. "The Rider," wrote Roshchin, "worked well, every week he presented reports about everything that happened in the secret police."

Cooperation with another valuable source - "Kum" - was established by Vasily Petrovich on the basis of "Kum's" sympathy for Russia. Having established that "Kum" took a steam bath on Saturdays in the luxurious Viennese bathhouse "Diana-Bad", Roshchin also began to visit her and after some time found a reason to get acquainted with "Kum". The latter willingly made contact with an employee of the Soviet embassy, did not hide his interest and disposition towards the Soviet Union, and already during the second conversation an agreement on cooperation was reached with him.

From that moment on, "Kum" constantly transmitted documentary materials to the General Directorate of Public Security: reports on the situation in the country, circulars, orders. "I have never met such a hard-working and diligent assistant," Roshchin recalled, "neither before nor later. In my mind, Kum is the perfect example of an honest and sincere agent. There are many such people, but they are difficult to identify, and great patience is required from the intelligence officer to study them. Vasily Petrovich possessed all these qualities.

In February 1938 V.P. Roshchin returned to Moscow. Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, he worked in the central office, and in the period 1941-1943, in the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB (sabotage and reconnaissance), where he led a unit that was engaged in the formation, preparation and deployment of sabotage reconnaissance units to partisan bases in Belarus. groups and individuals for operations in the rear of the fascist invaders. In the summer of 1942, he worked for two months in besieged Leningrad, and after the Battle of Stalingrad, he worked for several months with captured generals and colonels from the army of Field Marshal Paulus.

At the end of 1943, Vasily Petrovich was again sent to intelligence work abroad - this time to Sweden, as a resident. It would seem that the way to Stockholm is not so long, but the wartime routes were difficult. Planes attempting to fly straight across the front were often shot down by the enemy. Therefore, Roshchin flew in a roundabout way through Stalingrad - Baku - Tehran - Cairo - Gibraltar - London - Edinburgh, he made the last part of the journey to Stockholm on the English ship "Liberator".

The main task of the resident in Sweden was to obtain up-to-date information on Germany and Finland. The working conditions were difficult, the Soviet representatives were constantly monitored, and an atmosphere of spy mania reigned in the country. Despite this, Vasily Petrovich managed to organize the receipt of information. Of particular value were data on the mood in the leadership

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in Finnish circles received from one of the sources who specially traveled to this country to collect intelligence materials. This and a number of information from other sources subsequently played a significant role in the development by the Soviet government of a position for concluding an armistice and preparing peace negotiations with Finland.

With information on Finland V.P. Roshchin constantly introduced the USSR Ambassador to Sweden A.M. Kollontai, who was preparing at that time for secret negotiations with Finnish representatives.

Being engaged in this work, Vasily Petrovich, of course, could not even imagine that soon, in May 1945, he would be in the post of the first post-war resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence in Helsinki. The work of Vasily Petrovich in this country was interesting and large-scale and contributed to the development of good neighborly relations between the Soviet Union and Finland.

V.P. Roshchin finished as a resident in Berlin in 1948-1950. After working for several years in the central office, he retired. V.P. died. Roshchin in 1988.

Vasily Petrovich Roshchin belongs to the galaxy of glorious veterans of foreign intelligence who faithfully served the Motherland. He was a sincere patriot of his country and people. The hard work of a scout was marked by high state awards.

In the last years of his life, Vasily Petrovich wrote a lot about those historical events in which he was a witness or participant. He left a large number of manuscripts that can tell future generations about the hard work of foreign intelligence officers.

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Austria on the eve of the Anschluss

Austria was the first in Europe to become a victim of Hitler's aggression. German militarism, dressed in the toga of National Socialism, worked out the tactics of future actions in this country: it figured out how effective the role of pro-fascist forces – the “fifth columns” – would be in the state that was the victim of the aggressor; what will be the reaction of the leading Western countries of Europe. It was still not entirely clear to Hitler whether he would be able to play on their hatred of communism and overcome the tendency to jointly repulse aggression. The events in Austria should have cleared up a lot.

The Soviet leadership also wanted to know what forces it could count on when it came up with the initiative of a collective rebuff to Hitler's aggression. Intelligence work in Austria in this direction was of considerable importance.

After the National Socialists came to power in Germany, the internal political situation in Austria became noticeably more complicated. Hitler began preparations for the annexation of Austria by planting members of the Austrian Fascist Party, which at that time numbered about 300 thousand people, into the country's central state administration.

The Austrian Chancellor E. Dollfuss, who was killed by the Nazis, and then his successor K. von Schuschnigg did a lot to preserve the independence of the country. The implementation of Hitler's intentions with regard to Austria was initially resisted by Mussolini, the Duce of Italy, who had his own plans for this country. According to intelligence, Mussolini relied on the prince

Staremborg, head of the Austrian paramilitary organization Heimwehr. In 1932-1933, the prince received 3 million Austrian shillings from Mussolini through hidden channels. Officially, the Duce awarded Staremborg with the Order "for special merits in strengthening Italian-Austrian friendly relations."

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The information capabilities of the Vienna residency in the early 1930s caused Moscow concern. An experienced employee, Karl Ivanovich Silly, who traveled to Vienna in 1933 on the instructions of the Center, reported to Moscow: "I will say frankly that our possibilities here are rather limited. We must first do a lot of work, acquire new sources and put the old network on a different track as well." However, this was not immediately possible.

The G-246 group was the most active during this period. Under this code was hidden a valuable source of residency, Franz Thaler. Having joined the Vienna organization of the National Socialist Party of Germany on the recommendation of the residency, Thaler gained weight there and established contacts in the Austrian ministries of foreign and internal affairs, in the General Directorate for the Protection of Public Order of the Office of the Federal Chancellor of Austria. He managed to create a network of sources from which he received abundant information on the internal political situation in the country.

For his pro-Nazi activities, F. Thaler was persecuted by the Austrian authorities and in the spring of 1934 was forced to flee to Munich, where the Nazis entrusted him with heading their intelligence bureau for Austria. In connection with the flight, Thaler entrusted the management of the network of sources he had created in Austria to his assistant "Meissner".

In 1933-1935, the Thaler-"Meissner" group obtained valuable documentary information: the correspondence of the Austrian Foreign Ministry with its embassies, circulars of the General Directorate of Public Security, materials of the Austrian Intelligence Bureau.

The residency also had other useful sources of information. However, in general, its activities did not satisfy the Center, and in the period up to 1935, several residents changed in Vienna.

A noticeable improvement in work came after in May 1935, an experienced intelligence officer Vasily Petrovich Roshchin was sent to the post of resident in Vienna from Berlin. In the Berlin residency for three years he went through an excellent school and knew German affairs well.

By this time, the nature of relations between Austria and Germany had changed. In 1935-1936, the Mussolini regime was thoroughly bogged down in military adventures in Ethiopia and Spain and was unable to pay the same attention to Austrian affairs. Hitler did not fail to take advantage of this and began to force things. He put harsh pressure on Chancellor Schuschnigg, demanding an amnesty for a group of arrested Austrian Nazis, giving them freedom of action in the country, and appointing members of this party to the posts of Minister of the Interior and Minister of War. The resignation of the "pro-Italian" Staremborg from the post of Vice-Chancellor followed.

The resident of foreign intelligence in Vienna informed Moscow: "The departure of Staremborg in 1936 from the political arena

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This is Mussolini, who had no other choice. Both leaders signed a special agreement, according to which the Italian dictator undertook not to interfere with relations between Germany and Austria.

The residency warned the Center: "It is now difficult to say with all certainty what direction further events will take. But in any case, the occupation of Austria is not ruled out. Our apparatus needs to prepare in advance for such a development.

events so that our interests and positions in this country do not suffer. A number of our assistants need to be switched to illegal communications. Illegal scouts are needed, at least one."

Upon arrival in Vienna, Roschin first of all established contact with the "Meissner" group. In 1935, there was a failure in working with Meisner, which, however, did not affect the work of his group. The resident had to establish contact with "Peter", who replaced "Meisner", who immediately handed over a bundle of intelligence materials that had accumulated during the forced break in communications. The work of this group continued actively until the Anschluss of Austria to Germany in 1938.

At the same time, in order to solve new problems, the residency needed to expand the network of valuable sources of information, and on the whole it coped with this successfully. During the three years in Vienna, a number of new assistants were recruited, among whom three were able to obtain information directly from the Directorate General for the Protection of Public Security and from the police authorities. With their help, the residency regularly got acquainted with the situation in the country and the situation in the National Socialist movement.

The Vienna residency also gained access to military-industrial information. With the help of the agent "Julia" it was possible to obtain verbatim reports on the tests of the latest types of aircraft of the well-known company "Junkers". This information was of particular importance for the army and the defense industry.

Thanks to promptly well-organized intelligence work, the preparations of the Germans in relation to Austria were not a secret for Soviet intelligence. Back in April 1936, a document was received from one of the Austrian secret services about Germany's preparations for the capture of Austria. This information was later confirmed by other sources. There was also information about the military preparations of the Germans on the border with Austria.

The lack of experienced scouts prevented a broader reconnaissance work. In 1937, Roshchin reported to the Center that he was practically working alone, and requests to send more workers remained unanswered. Curator of the Vienna Residency in Central

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In the intelligence apparatus, Mnatsakanov did not disregard the appeal of the resident. In a report addressed to Deputy Chief of Intelligence Spiegelglas dated June 25, 1937, he reported: "Roshchin alone is connected with the entire network of residency, but holds five or more meetings with agents daily ..."

In response, the intelligence leadership suggested that the residency maintain contact with only five agents, temporarily mothballing the rest. From the position of today, such an indication looks at least strange. But then a wave of repressions covered the Soviet intelligence, there were not enough experienced personnel.

In February 1938, Roshchin was recalled to Moscow and left Vienna without waiting for a replacement. Only the cryptographer, Alice, remained in the residency.

On March 12, 1938, the Wehrmacht troops, on the orders of Hitler, crossed the Austrian border, fulfilling the Fuhrer's dream of the "reunification" of the German and Austrian peoples.

After the Anschluss, Alice was given the task of destroying residency documents. On March 26, 1938, she was warned about the possible closure of the Soviet embassy in Vienna in the near future. On May 19, 1938, Alice destroyed the code and ciphers and left for Moscow. A difficult, eventful period in the life of the Vienna residency was interrupted.

Intelligence activities in Vienna froze for several years and resumed only in October 1940, after the opening of the Consulate General. Graduates of I.M. Spichkin (resident) and Buyanov. Time hastened and

the authorities demanded not to waste a single minute, to quickly get involved in the work. At the end of November, Spichkin reported to the Center that he had become accustomed to the situation and that the residency was ready to begin operational work in full.

From about the same moment, the Austrian special services took both intelligence officers under close surveillance. This could be explained both by the usual checking of newly arrived diplomats, and by the mistakes of insufficiently experienced people, for example, their increased activity or unwittingly demonstrated ability to detect surveillance.

The intelligence chief ordered that the task be sent to the Vienna residency, believing that the period of adaptation by the intelligence officers had basically passed. "Your immediate tasks," the directive of the Center said, "are the restoration of ties with the agents mothballed in Austria and withdrawn from the USSR; the creation of illegal groups led by the most valuable agents - G-58 and "Johann", who have direct radio contact with Moscow through the radio operator "Alberta"; the acquisition of new agents; penetration into German political and intelligence centers".

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M.I. Spichkin actively set about fulfilling the directive. However, he did not always work professionally, he made unfortunate mistakes. Already in March, the Center sent him a number of critical remarks.

The head of intelligence reported to the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov that the resident in Vienna was a young employee with no practical experience. His assistant Buyanov does not actually speak German. To fulfill the tasks assigned to the residency, it is necessary to send another well-trained employee to Vienna.

Instead, Spichkin was given additional tasks: to cover the situation in Germany and its policy by penetrating the all-German centers in Vienna and their branches in the provinces. There will be people for this, the Center believed. There are revolutionary traditions in the country, the separatist movement of the Slavic population, especially the Czechs, who sympathize with Russia, opposition groups in the National Socialist Party itself, and the positions of the Catholic Church are strong. Forgetting that Spichkin was a young and inexperienced worker, the Center offered him to renew old contacts, many of which were already "highlighted" or no longer confirmed their desire to continue working. And the new connections were not tested yet.

Lacking sufficient forces and capabilities, the scout, meanwhile, did not refuse to perform more and more complex tasks.

Along with the solution of operational issues, the Austrian resident increasingly received alarming information about the impending German attack on the USSR. After a conversation with one of the sources, he reported to Moscow in early May 1941: "The intensive preparation of the Austrian army, as well as the population for war against the USSR, continues. . The professors of the Viennese universities believe that the campaign against Russia will be as easy as the previous victories of the German army. In the same circles, it is believed that the Soviet government is allegedly split on the issue of relations with Germany. Between Germany and Turkey, according to Vienna, an agreement has been reached at the expense of transferring the Caucasus to it in the future. There is a great demand in the country for people who know the Russian language. Those who speak Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian are mobilized into the army

languages."

People's Commissar Merkulov, after reading Spichkin's message, wrote a resolution: "Let Spichkin not engage in chatter." On the basis of this resolution, on May 7, an order went to Vienna: "Take the transfer of information more seriously. Do not send chatter about the internal affairs of the USSR.

How things turned out for M.I. Spichkin, can be seen from Merkulov's unsent letter to Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky:

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"On June 19, 1941, at 6 p.m. in Vienna, Vice-Consul of the USSR Igor Mikhailovich Spichkin was detained and taken to the Gestapo while leaving the cafe after a meeting with an agent - a private detective. There were no compromising materials under Spichkin. The certificates he had about two Schutzbundists and a Ukrainian conducting propaganda hostile to the USSR were reviewed and returned to Spichkin.

V.P. Roshchin, curator of the Vienna residency in the central intelligence apparatus, wrote on the draft report: "Not reported to the leadership for signature due to the outbreak of war."

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On the western borders of the Fatherland

Work in the Baltics remained an important area of activity for foreign intelligence in the prewar period.

Until 1932, the main tasks of intelligence officers in the Baltic states were associated with countering the policies of their ruling circles to organize a "cordon sanitaire" on the borders with the USSR, as well as the subversive work of white emigre centers in these countries.

New accents had to be placed in connection with Hitler's coming to power.

In the directive of the Center to residencies in the Baltic countries for 1933, it was especially emphasized that "it is necessary to deepen the work on highlighting the activities of the Germans, namely: a) follow the German policy in the Baltics, and especially in Estonia, 6) identify the work German Nazis to create local fascist organizations and channels of their connections, c) to cover the influence of Germany on the foreign and domestic policy of the Baltic states and their relations with the German nazis".

Many future well-known intelligence officers went through the primary school of operational work in the Baltic countries.

The "legal" residency in Estonia in 1932-1934 was headed by D.G. Fedichkin, who was in contact with agents from local Germans, including from the Baltic Brotherhood organization. Together with him, V.V. worked as an operational officer. Ryabov, who later became one of the leaders of scientific and technical intelligence. In 1935-1936, the residency was headed by I.A. Chichayev, and from 1937 to 1940 - S.I. Ermakov.

The Riga residency in the activities of the foreign intelligence of the Soviet Union was given a special role, since there were centers of foreign intelligence working in the Baltics, and most

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active groups of white emigrants. In addition, at that time diplomatic mail was sent through Riga from the USSR to the countries of Western Europe and America. In Riga, there were meetings with agents who came to Latvia from neighboring countries. The resident of the "legal" residency in Latvia from 1938 to 1940 was I.A. Chichayev. Scouts E.I. worked with him. Kravtsov, first as an employee of the consular department of the embassy in Riga, and then as a consul in Libau, and Nikolai Lysenkov, as a TASS correspondent in Latvia. Subsequently, Chichayev, Kravtsov and Lysenkov became well-known people in intelligence, occupied responsible positions in the Center,

managed the residencies. Their names entered the glorious annals of the history of foreign intelligence. The Baltic States for them was a baptism of fire.

Before I.A. Chichaev, S.A. worked as a resident in Latvia from May 1935 to August 1937. Parents, then from February 1938, under the name Glebov, he headed the Kovno residency.

Our illegal groups were active in the Baltics, headed by an experienced Soviet illegal intelligence agent R. Birk, who was specially transferred there from Berlin.

Birk's reports were of such value that they kind of cut across the moods of various groups of the population, both pro-German and pro-Soviet. This allowed the leadership of the USSR to pursue a more balanced policy towards these countries, based on anti-German sentiments and fears of territorial seizures by Germany, and to propose defensive agreements to the governments of these countries.

As foreseen by foreign intelligence, Berlin made a bet on using the influential German community in the Baltics in its own interests. Even at a time when this region was part of the Russian Empire, the Baltic Germans were the largest industrialists and, as a rule, outnumbered the Russians among the local officials. In the Memel Territory and some other areas densely populated by Germans, Hitler's supporters, even before he came to power, created fascist organizations and came out with demands for the reorientation of the Baltic states towards Germany. Under pressure from Berlin and the "fifth column", the leaders of Lithuania eventually agreed to transfer Memel (currently Klaipeda) to Germany.

The process of nazification of the German population of the Baltic countries was accompanied by the planting of fascist ideology among the indigenous people. This was facilitated by the wide scope of nationalist and anti-Soviet propaganda in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia after secession from Russia, the restriction of democratic freedoms and the obvious desire of the ruling circles to carry out right-wing coups, as well as the presence of a favorable socio-economic base. In particular, with the budding from Russia,

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you were unable to adapt your industry to changed conditions and enter new markets (by 1940, industrial production did not reach the volume of 1913, with the exception of Lithuania, where, however, the initial level was very low). The army of the unemployed and the lumpen was also increased by the deep stratification of the peasantry.

As a result, there was a breeding ground for extremism in the Baltic countries, in which pro-fascist organizations began to emerge. In Estonia, for example, local fascists – Vaps (members of the Estonian Union for the Liberation Struggle) became more active.

In a special message from the Tallinn residency to the Center in August 1933, it was stated that "fascist sentiments had gone so far that the Estonian government decided to introduce martial law and close down some fascist organizations." But the very nature of the reactionary regimes that existed in these countries and German pressure quickly nullified such restrictive attempts. Berlin simply took measures of economic influence, taking advantage of its position as one of the main trading partners of the Balts, forcing them to make concessions. In addition, in the second half of the 1930s, Germany ousted England from its leading positions in the Baltic market.

According to intelligence data, a special intelligence center of military intelligence - the Abwehr - in Königsberg was directly involved in the development of actions of political influence on the ruling circles of the Baltic countries. The Germans were pushing the Balts onto the path of so-called neutrality, behind the seemingly decent formula of which was a refusal to rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which at that time actively advocated the creation of a system of collective security in order to curb Hitler's expansionist aspirations.



In this regard, in Moscow, on the whole, the efforts of the Baltic countries aimed at the formation of the Baltic Entente in September 1934 were approved with approval. On the eve of the conclusion of the agreement by these countries, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR indicated in a directive to missions abroad that "in the current international situation, we have a positive attitude towards the agreement of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, believing that its positive aspects outweigh the negative ones." The Soviet Union hoped that in the Baltic countries the positions of those representatives of political, military and economic circles who saw the threat of German aggression and spoke in favor of organizing a rebuff to the aggressor would be strengthened.

However, there were disturbing moments. The Baltic Entente could be used by the West, primarily by Germany, against the Soviet Union.

Of course, the leaders of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were aware of the danger of the game they were playing: it could lead to the occupation of their countries by the Germans, as happened in Czechoslovakia.

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However, they hoped that they would be able to negotiate with the Germans at the expense of the Soviet Union and become their allies, and were ready to give their consent if Berlin demanded that German troops be allowed through the territory of the Baltic states to invade the USSR

The residency in Riga informed the Center about the active attempts of the Germanophile circles of Latvia, with the participation of President Ulmanis, in secret negotiations to obtain Hitler's consent to the establishment of allied relations. In turn, the Germans focused on increasing the economic dependence of Latvia on Germany in order to connect the industry of the republic and its agriculture to serve the needs of the Wehrmacht. The residence in Tallinn, noting the shift of Estonian foreign policy towards Germany, recorded that Germany considers the Estonian oil shale industry as a base for fuels and lubricants for aviation and mechanized units.

Berlin, with its policy, pushed the Baltic nationalists to ambitious plans. For example, according to intelligence, the leaders of the "Estonian Union of Liberation Struggle" (VAPS) intended to create an independent Finno-Ugric state consisting of Estonia, Finland and Soviet Karelia, as well as the territory of Ingria - the northern part of Latvia and part of the Leningrad region. Vaps offered the Germans, in the course of implementing their occupation plans, to carry out the eviction of Latvians and Lithuanians as belonging to the Slavic group of peoples. This was one of the plans for turning the Baltic states into an anti-Soviet foothold. It was not destined to come true, since German intelligence considered that this project was not in line with Germany's own interests in the Baltics. German intelligence feared that although "the vaps are close to us in their ideology, there is no guarantee that, having come to power in Estonia, they will steadily follow us. In addition, Germany's support for the Vaps would untie the hands of the Latvian Perkokrasts ("Perkokrust" is a nationalist organization founded in 1931. – Auth.), would aggravate relations between Estonia and Latvia, which is not in Germany's interests."

In preparation for the attack on the USSR, the Nazis expanded military cooperation with the Balts. Plans were developed for conducting joint military operations against the Soviet Union. Contacts were also established between the secret services, which the Germans actively used to collect military, economic and other intelligence information about the future theater of military operations on Soviet territory.

All this did not escape the attention of Soviet foreign intelligence and was reported to the country's leadership.

A valuable source "Pechatnik" was acquired, from which information about the activities of the Königsberg

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Abwehr center. Subsequently, Pechatnik received an assignment to travel to Berlin, where he also obtained important information about the activities of German intelligence.

Nor did our intelligence go unnoticed by the strengthening of anti-German sentiment in the Baltics in the second half of the 1930s. Dissatisfaction was caused both by the uncereceremoniousness of the Germans in their treatment of the Baltic states and their population, and by the preaching of the need to expand "living space" for Germany.

Similar observations were made by foreign representatives accredited in the Baltic countries. For example, in a secret report of the Czechoslovak ambassador in Riga to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the text of which was received by the residency, it was emphasized: "The most numerous layer of Latvia - the peasantry - fears the USSR less than the authorities of the barons. The intelligentsia and the liberal professions fully agree with the sentiments and views of the peasant strata... The government, most likely, would go along with the army and the agrarians against the Germans.

Estonia shows sharply expressed anti-Russian sentiments. In the event of a war, however, it would most likely still take the side of Russia.

Lithuania still played on two strings - German and Russian. Lithuania would also decide in favor of Russia."

Taking into account this evolution of sentiments in the Baltic States, intelligence made proposals to the leadership of the USSR aimed at normalizing relations with the Baltic countries. Thus, in one of the memorandums addressed to Stalin, it was proposed, in particular, in the interests of expanding cooperation with the Baltic States, to increase the import of Estonian agricultural products and the export of gasoline to Estonia, open a branch of the USSR State Bank in Tallinn, publish a commercial printed organ. In relation to Latvia, along with considerations of developing trade relations on a mutually beneficial basis, there were proposals to open Soviet consulates in some cities, to create an Intourist branch in Riga for its work in all the Baltic states. On the recommendations of the Riga residency in Moscow, a warm welcome was given to the Latvian Foreign Minister Munters (1937), despite his pro-German sentiments. The Embassy of Finland in Riga, in a report to its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assessed his trip as follows: "Instead of 3-4 days, the visit lasted 10 days. Signs of attention to the minister were unusually great. Stalin himself, at breakfast at Molotov's, spoke with Munters for more than an hour. The latter told us that he was talking to Stalin not about foreign policy, but about the situation in Latvia. Moreover, Stalin asked what they think in Latvia about the landowners - the German barons?

In May 1940, the resident in Latvia I.A. Chichaev, employee of the residency E.I. Kravtsov and resident in Estonia S.I. Yermakov were you

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invited to Moscow. They were unexpectedly instructed to personally report to Stalin on the situation in the Baltic states, the mood of the population. They felt that the leadership of the USSR was on the verge of making important decisions regarding events in the region.

The capture of Poland by German troops increased the danger of the aggressor using the Baltics as a base for an attack on the USSR. The rapid collapse of Poland clearly showed that the small countries located on the western borders of the Soviet Union were not in a position to resist fascist Germany on their own.

Given the strategic importance of the Baltic direction for the security of the USSR, the Soviet government in the fall of 1939 proposed to the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to conclude mutual assistance agreements. As a result of the ensuing negotiations, such agreements were concluded. According to their terms, the Soviet Union received the right to keep

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania a certain number of troops and create naval bases and airfields at certain points. The Soviet-Lithuanian treaty also provided for the joint defense of the Lithuanian border.

At the same time, there is a lot of evidence that the governments of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania began to violate their obligations under treaties with the Soviet Union, delaying negotiations on the timing of the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the Baltic countries, created obstacles for their deployment there, did not stop the provocations of local fascists against Soviet citizens and institutions.

In the winter of 1939/40, the activities of the fascist forces hostile to the Soviet Union in the Baltic countries intensified due to the fact that England and France, despite the war with Germany, decided to intervene on the side of Finland in the Soviet-Finnish military conflict and for these purposes send an Anglo-French expeditionary force to Finland. Believing that things were heading towards a general war of the entire capitalist world against the USSR, the governments of the Baltic states were actively preparing to take part in it. Simultaneously with military training, public opinion was being processed. The Baltic Entente stepped up its activities. It was turned into an anti-Soviet military alliance of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Lithuania has now joined the Latvian-Estonian military alliance, concluded back in 1923. Other facts also testified to the military cooperation of the Baltic states directed against the USSR, in particular, the establishment of closer ties between the headquarters of their armies.

The situation in the Baltics was especially aggravated by the summer of 1940. Intoxicated by the quick victories in the West, the Nazis again began to turn their eyes to the Baltic countries. As it became known to our intelligence, the Latvian envoy in Berlin, Krievins, in his

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reports dated May 27 and 29, 1940, reported that maps of the "new Europe" were distributed in Germany, on which the Baltic states were included in the Nazi Reich.

Foreign intelligence also had data that German intelligence agencies were intensively sending their agents to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia with espionage and sabotage missions, and also sent emissaries to create insurgent and sabotage organizations from local nationalists.

The Germans were seriously preparing for the capture of the Baltic states and the war with the Soviet Union. The main cadres of the anti-Soviet formations created by German intelligence were members of nationalist parties and organizations: Shauly Sayunga and Jaunoi Lietuva in Lithuania; Peasant Party, Aizsargi and Perkokrust in Latvia; "Izamaaliit", "Kaitseliit" and "Vabs" in Estonia.

Under such conditions, the ruling circles of Lithuania, headed by Smetona, Latvia, headed by Ulmanis, and Estonia, headed by Päts, more and more openly took the path of cooperation with the Nazis. At the same time, gross violations of mutual assistance agreements with the USSR were allowed. The Lithuanian government agreed to assist the special services of Nazi Germany in transferring agents to our territory. As is clear from the report of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR dated May 30, 1940, the unceremonious anti-Soviet activities of the Baltic authorities went as far as organizing the abduction of Soviet servicemen who were tortured and some were killed. Provocative military exercises were held near military installations and cantonments of Red Army troops.

The threat of German aggression in the Baltics was real. The examples of Austria and Czechoslovakia confirmed this. After all, there, too, it all began with the revitalization of the activities of local fascists. The Soviet government put before the governments of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the question of removing from their membership persons openly collaborating with fascist Germany, and

the formation of governments that would be ready to ensure the honest implementation of the mutual assistance treaties signed by these countries with the Soviet Union.

In the face of the impending threat of German aggression, in accordance with mutual assistance treaties, units of the Red Army entered the territories of the Baltic countries. The entry of Soviet troops changed the balance of political forces in the Baltic countries and led to the restoration of Soviet power in them and reunification with the USSR. It was a painful process. It took place not without pressure from the USSR and was accompanied by a sharp political struggle, unjustified mass repressions and deportations of part of the population of these countries to remote and sparsely populated areas of the Soviet Union.

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Such was the situation in which foreign intelligence had to work in the Baltic countries at that time. The main direction of its activity remained the exposure of pro-fascist forces engaged in subversive activities, fraught with dangerous consequences - the armed intervention of fascist Germany.

In October 1940, intelligence reported to the leadership of the country about the new activation of the "Estonian Union of Liberation Struggle". According to intelligence data, their leaders turned to the German government for help in implementing their plans to create a "Finnish-Ugric state" on a purely racist basis.

One of its leaders, Heinrich Lang, offered the Germans the services of his organization in "creating an anti-Soviet youth organization of up to 60,000 people." For a practical solution of this issue, he met in Tallinn with the representative of the Gestapo in the German embassy in Estonia, Kubitz. Foreign intelligence received detailed information about this meeting.

After the Red Army entered Estonia in June 1940, resident S.I. Yermakov telegraphed to the Center that he had managed to acquire a valuable source in the local special services. In Moscow, Deputy Head of Intelligence P.A. Sudoplatov wrote on a telegram: "Let him tell about the joint work with the Germans against the USSR, about the agents transferred to our territory."

A few days later S.I. Ermakov reported to the Center: "I got the materials of the Estonian police: 1) lists of German, Italian, French and English agents, 2) persons who crossed from the USSR to Estonia and sent back to the Union, 3) Polish officers who are here."

The work of Soviet foreign intelligence was under the sign of a growing military threat, Hitler's imminent aggression against the USSR. The efforts of the Soviet intelligence officers, of course, contributed to the fact that in the very first days of the war in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, conditions were prepared for intelligence activities and partisan struggle in the event of German occupation. The results of this work became evident during the Patriotic War, when dozens of anti-fascist underground groups from Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians began to operate in the Baltic States.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, thus, have made a feasible contribution to saving the world from the "brown plague". There is also a certain merit in this of those who worked in the pre-war years in the Baltic states. vedchikov.

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In Lithuania on the eve of the war

Late in the evening the train carrying resident Roman (S.A. Roditelev) crossed the Latvian-Lithuanian border. The border guards leisurely checked his passport and entry visa, glanced lazily at two shabby suitcases, saluted and moved to the next compartment, where young German tourists were playing cards carelessly. In a few hours, Roman will step onto the platform

Kovno station, which will mark the next stage of his career. "Third foreign language in the last three years," the resident thought dejectedly. - Again cramming at the expense of sleep ... "

In the 1920s and 1930s, the Baltic countries were perceived in world politics as an Eastern European backwater. Interest in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia arose only when, due to regular geopolitical shifts, the "primary powers" began to sort things out, redistribute spheres of influence, markets, and consider the expediency of certain military-political alliances. The fate of war and peace was decided in Moscow and London, Paris and Berlin, Tokyo and New York, and in this constantly changing alignment of forces it was not easy to survive, to survive, to preserve the fragile sprouts of statehood.

One can only remotely imagine the emotions of resident Roman, who, after a number of years of work in Riga and Reval, was ordered by a short peremptory cipher from the Center to move to a new place of work - to the "temporary Lithuanian capital" Kovno (Vilna was in 1920 captured by the White Poles).

The Kovno residency, whose "personnel" never exceeded one or two operatives, "covered" Poland, Germany and, to the extent possible, the Scandinavian countries. The work of this point was of an auxiliary nature, and the information sent from it to Moscow was rarely reported to the Soviet leadership, all the more

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lee to Stalin. Even on the "fashionable" in those days, "white-monarchist" and "Trotskyist" topics, it was not easy to excel. The local Okhrana of the Baltic States had the strictest instructions from their superiors: in no way allow active actions of any emigrant organizations against the Soviet Union. Let them indulge in chatter of a theoretical nature, but nothing more. However, this was far from always successful, and white émigré organizations were looking for every opportunity to use the territory of the Baltic countries to work against the Soviet Union, while they carefully masked their activities, and it was not easy to work on them.

Glancing out the window of the Pullman car and slowly inhaling the tobacco smoke, Roman tried to put his thoughts in a calm direction. He reflected on the urgent tasks of his work in Lithuania and was increasingly inclined to believe that his predecessors paid little attention to East Prussia - the German outpost in the East. Roman was well aware of the operational materials that came to the Center from Lithuania before his appointment here: Königsberg and East Prussian cases were mentioned in them extremely sparingly, mainly in connection with German-Lithuanian friction over the Memel region. Of course, the Intelligence Department of the Red Army "plowed" deeply there, but, probably, for political intelligence there will be its own "information corner" in East Prussia. Moreover, alarming orientations about the need to "intensify efforts against fascist Germany" came to the Baltic residencies more and more often.

Already in 1934, the residencies in Kovno, Riga and Reval received a circular with the following content: "According to verified data, [Germany, stubbornly preparing for a war with the Soviet Union, is developing intelligence activities against us through the Baltic states. Their agents are focused on obtaining information about the mobilization plan of the Red Army, as well as identifying the composition of the NKVD and Intelligence Department residencies. The Germans consider these tasks shock. For their implementation, experienced emissaries were sent to the Baltic states. You need to take countermeasures, organize and organize operational work in the German colonies, recruiting reliable sources in them to counter the intelligence and espionage activity of the National Socialists. According to the documentary materials we have, in the Baltic countries the Germans have the following people, deciphering and development of which you will urgently deal with."

In Lithuania, about two dozen agents were included in this list. Among them:

Forner is a senior official at the German embassy in Kovno. Head of German intelligence in Lithuania. Before the war of 1914 he served as consul in Kyiv. In 1926 he worked in the German

consulates in Moscow. Presumably, his undercover number 2080.

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The German intelligence apparatus in Lithuania, which the Nazis must have taken over in 1933, also included:

"No. 2082. Resident intelligence of the Königsberg military district since 1929. Captain of the reserve (obviously, the German army);

No. 2090 Animal husbandry specialist, Lithuanian, was recruited in Königsberg, where he came to the annual agricultural fair. Lives in Kovno;

No. 2133. Agent of the Königsberg Military District. Head of the Lithuanian information department. Recruited between October 1933 - March 1934;

No. 2140. Journalist. It is possible that he is a representative of the Königsberg branch of the Telegraph Union in Lithuania;

No. 2139. Budrys - Lithuanian Consul General in Königsberg. After the formation of the Lithuanian state, he was for some time the head of the political police, then - the governor of the Memel region. Characteristics of the Germans: "Swindler, requires a tough hand."

Even before Roman's arrival in Kovno, his predecessor, Ter, sorted through the list and established the names and addresses of almost all the agents who worked in the traditional "respectable" manner for the Germans. Their "operators" were officers who had gone through the "school" of Walter Nicolai, the famous chief spy of Emperor Wilhelm P. In his time, he started in Königsberg, by the way. However, in peacefully patriarchal Lithuania, where foreign intelligence services surreptitiously watched each other and slowly (they won't go anywhere!) took possession of meager state secrets with the help of corrupt officials, a much more aggressive than the Abwehr intelligence service of the Third Reich - SD. Lithuania became one of the countries where the Nazis created their "fifth column" with particular haste. Under the guise of diplomats, trade representatives, correspondents, tourists, etc., employees and agents of the special services were sent in, around whom countless chains and chains of "companions" were formed, counting on their share of the bounty of the "thousand-year-old Reich".

It was up to Resident Roman, an intelligence officer of the NKVD, to understand the intricacies of the Baltic policy of Nazi Germany. In the Baltic states, he worked under the surname Glebov. Moscow knew that Glebov was Sergei Arkadievich Roditelev, born in 1903, a native of the Kaluga townfolk. He came to work in the Cheka on a Komsomol ticket at the age of 19. His difficult service took place in Belarus, Transcaucasia, then in Moscow. Already an experienced counterintelligence officer, he was invited to the INO OGPU and six months later was sent to Riga, where, having taken over cases and agents, he worked alone for a long time. A similar situation awaited him later in Reval (1937-1938) and Kovno. I also had to print official papers myself - there was no typist.

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In the Kovno reports of Roman, who was "at the forefront" in Lithuania in 1938-1939, the process of strengthening the German presence in the region was traced step by step in numerous ciphers and "mailers". The Center was not mistaken in sending to Kovno the most trained of its experts on Baltic problems. Future aggression against the USSR could not bypass the well-trodden path of invasions into Russia from the West. The Soviet leaders, above all, of course, Stalin, paid more and more attention to the suspicious activity of Germany in this dangerous area.

...So, in February 1938, Roman arrived in Kovno and, without hesitation, took up the affairs left by his predecessor Ter, recalled to Moscow without explanation. The promises of the Center to "send help" to Roman were never fulfilled: a monstrous situation was going on in the intelligence apparatus.

the scale and forms of cleaning operational personnel. One can imagine with what mood Roman went to Moscow in May of the same year, having received an unexpected call "for consultations." However, it passed ... He was instructed to prepare an analytical report "On the internal and external situation of Lithuania" and, along the way, "outline" promising tasks "to strengthen intelligence work on Germany, to identify the true nature of current Lithuanian-German contacts and the goals that set both sides in front of you. The certificate was studied by People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Yezhov, was satisfied with it and, after a slight revision, sent it to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks with his signature. On June 9, 1938, the People's Commissar personally received the resident, discussed Lithuanian and German affairs with him for a long time. "Work without mistakes, otherwise you will answer with your head!" - such was Yezhov's farewell.

Two weeks later (one can imagine how painful they were) Roman was allowed to return to Kovno.

In a matter of days, Roman resumed the work of the agent network. The key link in it was K-3, a kind of "veteran" of the operations of the GPU-NKVD in the Baltic States, who collaborated with almost all residents of Soviet intelligence who were sent to Lithuania. K-3 held an important position in the police, which allowed him to be aware of almost all government affairs. He knew almost everything about the activities of the Lithuanian political police. K-3 accounted for dozens of exposed Okhrana agents, including those who were hired by Soviet institutions in Lithuania. He gave timely warnings of imminent provocations, checked the police records of persons of interest to Soviet intelligence, guided through his installation capabilities, collected dossiers on local politicians and foreign agents, and gave reliable and, as a rule, unmistakable tips. With the help of K-3, Roman strengthened the intelligence apparatus, which included officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, employees from President Smetona's entourage, and journalists. K-3 did not believe that Lithuania would retain its independence, believed that the coming storms and upheavals would

will be able

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pass only with the help of the Soviet Union, and therefore worked without complexes and without giving up money. He was the most reliable source in the Lithuanian "top" and knew the ins and outs of any character here. K-3 hated the Nazis and their supporters, whose bible was Hitler's Mein Kampf, and was especially diligent in reporting data on this group of people.

"The Gestapo resident in Lithuania is Richard Sommer. He lives on a German passport and as a cover uses an export-import office, which he maintains in Kovno at Mishka gatva, No. 17. His apartment is located at Churlionis gatve, No. 23. Sommer's assistant for illegal work is Richard Kosman. He is a teacher by profession and runs the Kulturbund and the Deutsche Nachrichten magazine. Sommer's assistant for relations with the Nazi intelligentsia is Ernst Liechtensteinas, a lawyer, a Lithuanian citizen, through him "events" are organized to support various actions of the Hitler regime. In the area of economic espionage, Sommer is assisted by a certain Dolin, a former university assistant, a Lithuanian citizen, now employed by the Siemens & Schuckert firm. Direct communication with the German embassy is maintained only by Sommer and Dolin through commercial attache Pikot.

About German military intelligence in Lithuania:

"Until recently, it was led by an employee of the German embassy, Major Klein, who took care of the burial places of German soldiers who fell during the World War. He was recalled from Kovno due to the failure of one of the agents. Now the management of intelligence work is carried out by another employee who arrived from Berlin (installation data is attached). It should be noted that almost the entire "Kline organization" - watchmen, caretakers of the graves, inspectors - one way or another participates in intelligence work.

The illegal resident of the Abwehr in Lithuania is retired Colonel Oskar Urbanas, who lives at Franko Gatva, No. 4 (in his own house). Previously, he served as an inspector in the army. He kept in touch with Kline. Urbanas is also known to Sommer.

No less productive than K-3 was the Dainis agent. This especially valuable source had intelligence outlets to East Prussia and, moreover, to the secretariat of Erich Koch himself, an influential Nazi, Gauleiter of the province. Dainis took Adolf Hitler's rise to power extremely painfully. As a patriot, he understood that henceforth the danger to Lithuania had increased immeasurably. "The first thing the Führer will lay his paw on Klaipėda," predicted "Dainis" in conversations with friends. Dainis despised President Smetona, considered him incapable of protecting the interests of the country and its territorial integrity. Smetona's indecisiveness, slowness, naive "practicality" and the so-called "median line" strategy - equidistance from all possible participants

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of the coming conflict – all this led to the loss of time, pace, the gradual drawing of Lithuania into the power fields of major powers and the loss of freedom of maneuver. And it will not stand the test of "breaking", as, apparently, Poland.

The more Roman "Dainis" got to know, the more clearly he understood that he was a statesman-minded person, an anti-fascist who sympathized with the Soviet Union as the only possible support for Lithuania.

However, "Dainis" only told Roman about "his own man" surrounded by Erich Koch, having convinced himself of the reliability of the Russian intelligence officers, their secrecy and, most importantly, concern for the safety of the "wards". "Our Lithuania is so small, we are all so visible to each other that the precautions must be extraordinary. If they see us in the same area, not even together, that will be enough for someone to send a denunciation," "Dainis" once remarked. — Well, the chief of the political police Povilaitis will be able to get to the bottom of the truth. This is a rogue, of which there are few. His agents are crammed everywhere, probably a couple or two sat under the president's bed.

The man surrounded by Koch received the pseudonym "Lux". The undercover "duet" "Dainis" - "Lux" to a large extent removed the main concern of the resident to "cover" East Prussia. "Lux" knew a lot, because it was engaged in the "shadow" affairs of the super concern founded by Erich Koch. Under the control of the Gauleiter were dozens of industrial enterprises, shipyards, shopping centers, printing houses and newspapers. Business trips of "Lux" to various cities in the provinces, a wide variety of meetings, including with the local administration and the military, gave him the opportunity to receive useful first-hand information. Perhaps for the first time, Koch came under such a close "eye" of Soviet intelligence. And, I must say, he still did not guess that ruthless executioner of Poland and Ukraine, as he appeared to the world during the Second World War ...

In the Kovno residency, the personality of "Lux" could not but arouse the closest interest. His biography was known only in general terms. He lived for many years in Lithuania, felt involved in its fate (his father was German, his mother was Lithuanian). According to the documents, he was "one hundred percent Aryan." He studied at the University of Königsberg at the Faculty of Law. He served in the army during the First World War, was awarded the Iron Cross for participation in fierce battles near Baranovichi, where he met and became close friends with Erich Koch, who also suffered a lot of trench deprivation. Until 1933, he tried to establish his own business in Panevezys, but without success, and in search of good luck he moved to Königsberg, where, during one of his public speeches, Kokha managed to "accidentally" catch his eye. Koch, famous then

with their sympathies for the "left

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mu> wing of the National Socialist Party, from September 1928 he was in East Prussia, energetically recruiting new supporters of the NSDAP, whose number in a short time increased to 50 thousand. One of the main tasks of the Nazis, he considered the inclusion of the Baltic States in the sphere of influence of Germany. Particular attention was drawn to the search for supporters in Lithuania. Koch needed reliable,



personally devoted to him and, after several thorough conversations with a former comrade in arms, offered him the job of a "consultant". "These will be things close to you," Koch said. – Commercial character.

"Lux" accepted the offer, which a few days later he informed "Dainis", whose confidential orders "for the good of Lithuania" he had carried out more than once in the past. Both hated the Nazis, had seen enough of their atrocities in Memel and knew what threatens Lithuania with the "German order".

Hitler prepared for war in earnest. Built headquarters in the forest near Rastenburg. This meant that air raids were unavoidable in the future.

From Lux's post:

"Here, in Königsberg, there are strong pro-Soviet sentiments. In the leading circles of Germany, there are 3 approaches to military-political partnership in the near future: an alliance with France, an alliance with England at the expense of France, an alliance with Russia against the entire West. Koch is one of the leading proponents of this line. At the same time, the Institute for the Study of the Eastern Regions, under the leadership of Professor Grünberg, is rapidly developing the concept of a "new economic order", which implies the inclusion of European Russia and the Baltic states in the German sphere of influence. The military is also involved in the development of the concept.

experts."

Meanwhile, the growing pressure in the red-hot European cauldron was increasingly felt in Lithuania as well. President Smetona still zealously followed his "median line", despite numerous attempts to persuade him to accept the German protectorate. Smetona was still waiting, although he had no doubt that Hitler's ultimatum regarding the Memel region would not be slow to follow in the near future.

The Soviet resident traveled around the outskirts of Kovno in his Ford, getting rid of outside surveillance, holding brief but informative meetings with agents. Comparing the information received with the data of "Dainis" and "Lux", Roman felt that in the region of Poland and the Baltic states some strange dull game was being played, the meaning of which he could not yet understand.

understand.

In September 1938, the resident wrote to the Center:

"The wider deployment of our intelligence work is hindered by the lack of sufficient clarity on such a fundamental issue,

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what is the position of the Soviet Union towards Lithuania. What do we want? What goals and objectives do we set?

We have outlined a number of measures to create a large political agency that could carry out the policy we need here. But lately, on the basis of your letters, I have come to the conclusion that you want to make the usual agents of informants out of the big people planned for recruitment, although the selected candidates will not be suitable for these roles. I have established such relations with them that, without formally recruiting, I can talk with them on any range of political issues, and they, it seems to me, answer with the utmost frankness.

At the present time, not only they, but also many others with whom I came across on business, literally besieged me with questions: how can the USSR help Lithuania? Will Moscow still say its weighty word? The loneliness of Lithuania encourages it to take a pro-German position in the hope of maintaining at least the semblance of statehood.

Through the NKID, the embassy received a special instruction from M.M. Litvinova: "Do not conduct any conversations on the topic of Soviet-Lithuanian relations, avoid and refrain from them." Maybe it is in the interests of our country now to really abandon any kind of activity in Lithuania," Roman wrote to the Center, "then why do we need influential people? Let's focus on the average informant. We will only cover, not make politics."

To this letter, the resident received a very streamlined answer from the Center. He was given to understand that the questions were not addressed.

The Lithuanian police, however, did not leave the resident alone for a minute. Roman felt her insinuating footsteps behind him. Reporting on surveillance, he noted, not without humor: "Most likely, such a revival of local" tramlers "is caused by my recent Riga and Reval intelligence past, since" while going around the Baltic region, I'm terribly tired of everyone ... "Apparently, the Lithuanian police consider me important noah person. They have never met such restless guest performers in the Baltic capitals in their practice."

For several months, the indefatigable "outdoor" chased Roman on state-owned bicycles, but the dark blue "truck" helped the resident to keep a decent distance without much effort. In the end, the Ministry of Finance forked out and some of the "cyclists" moved to ... a Ford, but dark yellow with registration number 84 (there weren't many vehicles in the capital!). This event added dynamism to Roman's operational routine: now he was being chased through the narrow streets of Kovno, as in American action films.

The Soviet embassy located on Laisves Alley, not far from Vitovt Park, was also densely surrounded by spies. Among

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agents were both professionals and "amateurs" from students, who were paid by the police "for service" to study at the university. One of them, apparently with the makings of an artist, liked to make up like a "armless" beggar. Unlike the other beggars in Laisvys avenue, he was never chased by the police, and Roman, passing by, threw another coin into his tattered hat. Talents should be encouraged! Surveillance was also carried out from three closed posts, one of which, located opposite the main entrance to the embassy, was equipped with Zeiss optics and an autonomous communication line with the building of the Lithuanian secret police.

The fact that the clouds are gathering over him, Roman understood from a conversation with Vice-burgomaster Kovno Rusteika, who was invited "for tea" to the embassy. Being tipsy, in the presence of other high-ranking officials, he "friendly" shared his thoughts: "You are not a real secretary, but a representative of the GPU. Don't mind, I'm an old sparrow and you can't fool me on the chaff. Rusteika listed from memory all the Soviet diplomats and concluded: "Without a representative of the GPU, the embassy cannot work, and of all the staff, you are the most suitable for this role. Nevertheless, know that Lithuania has nothing to hide from you. You are all good guys."

"This is not a casual conversation," Roman concluded. "Maybe I'm being hinted that it's time to get out?"

The Center began looking for a replacement for the resident, and he wasted no time reporting on the ever-changing situation "in the country entrusted to him."

"Lithuania's position with regard to the Klaipeda region was, of course, greatly influenced by Hitler's seizure of Austria and the division of Czechoslovakia. Only now the Lithuanians are beginning to understand their mistakes in the development of this area. One of them is considered to be the use of the region as a place of "exile", where not serious patriots and efficient people were sent, but "oppositionists" and in general all those who were fined, often defecting to the side of the Germans. Having no influence and support in the Klaipeda region, continuing the policy of concessions, the Lithuanian government is now trying to resolve the conflict through direct negotiations with Berlin.

Many people in Lithuania are inclined to think that, at least in the near future, Germany will not take over the region. They hope that the Germans will prefer to leave the existing situation unchanged in order to preserve the region and Lithuania in general as their food and fodder base in the event of a military attack being prepared against the Soviet Union. The current aggravation in the Klaipeda region will be used by Berlin to put constant pressure on Smetona, which is already being done with some success. The Lithuanian government is inclined to satisfy almost all the "wishes" of the Germans, justifying that this is the only way to preserve the existence of Lithuania and its at least nominal independence.

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At the same time, they constantly come down and stubbornly repeat that Lithuania is small, poor and helpless."

Roman continued to work with Dainis and Lux. The situation in neighboring East Prussia became more and more complicated, the repressive police structures worked with might and main, catching, tracking down, destroying the last pockets of resistance to the Nazi regime. On the other hand, it became more and more lively in the recently half-abandoned garrisons, airfields, roadways, and new barracks were being built. A surprise attack on Poland became more and more likely. According to Lux, the 3rd Wehrmacht Army was supposed to strike from the territory of East Prussia. But even earlier, the Nazis were going to "solve" the Memel issue.

Sheets on tissue paper with intelligence data "Lux" "closed up" in the binding of some book and handed it to the agent-route of "Dainis". Sometimes this happened in Krantz or Rauschen - East Prussian "climatic" resorts, sometimes on the picturesque Humpback Bridge in Insterburg, but most often in Tilsit, at the boat station. From "Dainis" the materials came to Roman in different ways. Often they had to travel to Klaipeda along the terrible Lithuanian roads at that time, for the restoration of which there were no funds in the national treasury. Sometimes "Dainis" himself came to Kovno. He called by phone, apologized for the "mistake" and in the evening, at dusk, met with the resident in some secluded place (cafes and restaurants were not suitable for such purposes, they were stuffed with agents).

Based on the materials of the "duet", one could clearly trace how the recent wilderness of the Reich — East Prussia — developed its infrastructure, imported and modernized weapons, and trained officers. The most innocent pastimes, such as gliding classes on the Curonian Spit, suddenly turned into training courses for future Luftwaffe aces from teenagers. In the sections of sailing, future submariners were "forged". In tourist circles there were the personnel of the Jaeger units... Everything indicated that the fate of Poland had been decided. It will become the closest object of Hitlerite aggression. Hitler needed Poland to pave the way to the borders of Russia.

Roman did not have a chance to witness the collapse of Poland. By that time he was already in Moscow and was waiting for a new appointment. He knew that there was very little peace left, no matter what official propaganda might say. He was an experienced scout to understand without prompting: "Drang nah Osten" has already begun. And he believed that there, at the very top, they understood this much better, more fully, more irrefutably. And how I wanted to believe that everything is being done in Moscow to fully meet the coming thunderstorm ...

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Difficult roads "Externa"

The events described took place in 1940. Vladimir was approaching a small, neat German town. He left behind the Lithuanian border, which he crossed illegally, and more than a dozen kilometers of the way. Around the corner appeared a police post, set up since Poland, after its defeat by Germany, was formed by the General Government. The meeting with the police did not embarrass Vladimir. His documents were genuine, and the explanations were more than natural. He was confident that he would stand up to any test.

Having familiarized himself with the documents, the policeman asked Vladimir where he was from and where, for what purpose he was going.

— I am a Lithuanian citizen and a member of the Lithuanian branch of the All-Russian Fascist Party (VFP)! The NKVD destroyed our branch, few managed to escape. With difficulty, I managed to secretly escape to Germany.

The policeman was apparently satisfied with the answer, but considered it necessary to send Vladimir to the city police station to check everything again.

The police commissioner, asking pro forma questions, carefully looked at Vladimir, especially fixing his reaction to unexpected and sharp, or rather provocative, questions. Most of all, the commissar was interested in whom Vladimir was supposed to visit in Berlin and  
For what.

— In Berlin, I expected to meet with the referent of the All-Russian Fascist Party, Mr. Turli, who knew me well from Lithuania.

“I’ll urgently talk to Berlin now,” the commissar got up, “and the question about you will be immediately resolved if you told me the whole truth.”

A minute later the commissioner returned.

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— Mr. Turley is currently not in Berlin, and where he is is unknown. But you are known there and seem eager to see you. Perhaps you will shed light on what happened in Lithuania with the WFTU branch.

— This is the main purpose of my trip to Berlin. I would be grateful, Herr Commissar, if an instruction were given to the head of the railway station to assist me in acquiring a ticket to the capital of the Reich.

The commissar returned the documents to Vladimir, nodded his head, which obviously meant consent, and made a broad gesture towards the door.

..Soon, Vladimir, who is also an agent of the Soviet foreign intelligence “Extern”, arrived in Berlin and, in accordance with pre-agreed conditions, met with an operative worker of the “legal” residency. Back in mid-August 1940, the residency was warned about the arrival of “Extern”, which for a long time and quite successfully was engaged in the “development” of the fascist party in Lithuania. During the liquidation of the fascist underground, special precautions were taken, and no one had even a shadow of suspicion about Extern. In Berlin, the agent was supposed to try to re-establish contacts with pro-fascist emigration circles and collect information about them, their plans and contacts with the Germans. If for some reason this fails, then “Extern” should leave for Yugoslavia to continue the same

activities.

In the course of working with intelligence in Lithuania, “Extern” proved to be a resourceful and determined employee.

The personal file of “Extern” contains his autobiography, which, in particular, says:

“Vladimir Alexandrovich was born in 1904 in Moscow. Soon his mother married a Lithuanian gentry, Yendzhievsky, who adopted Vladimir and gave him the name Casimir. Mother and stepfather died when Vladimir-Kazimir was still a child, and he remained in the arms of his grandmother. But at the age of 14, Vladimir was left alone, he was forced to leave his studies and live by daily wages. Then he wandered around the countries of Central Europe. In Serbia, he got a job as a novice in an Orthodox monastery located in a mountain gorge. The monastic cell awakened

Vladimir's memories of the house, and he returned to Lithuania, where in 1924-1927 he served in the army, acquired the specialty of a telegraph operator. At the end of the army service, Vladimir was drawn to study. Thanks to natural abilities, in 1928-1929 he passed the exams externally according to the program of a real school and received a corresponding diploma. But finding a suitable job that would satisfy the young man was not easy. Vladimir worked as an assistant to a pathologist professor, then moved to the position of administrator at the dance school. Finally, he decided to try his hand at journalism and

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stepped into the publishing house of a newspaper in Russian, covering mainly issues of agriculture.

Sociable, energetic, with diverse interests, a noticeable attraction to the Russians, the young man could not help but attract the attention of intelligence.

In 1929, the foreign intelligence agent Sirius, who worked in the Lithuanian political police, told an intelligence officer from the Kaunas residence:

These guys are rare. If he agrees to help, he can do a lot. In the meantime, I will consider whether it could be useful to me, and therefore to you. Together we could give more than I alone.

– Of course, but first I need to get to know him and make at least a preliminary idea.

After a report to Moscow on his acquaintance with Vladimir-Kazimir, the Center agreed to cooperate with the novice journalist and recommended that he be used to infiltrate the circles of the local white emigration.

"Russia is my true homeland, and for its sake I am ready to do anything," Vladimir told a Kaunas station operative at the meeting that marked the beginning of his many years of work with intelligence. The Center assigned the pseudonym "Extern" to the new agent. The immediate tasks were explained to him. And it is recommended to act prudently, with caution, so as not to fail. "Extern" managed to successfully bypass all the pitfalls and entered into the confidence of the emigrants, who were oriented towards the Nazis.

By decision of the leadership of foreign intelligence, after the liquidation of the fascist underground in Lithuania, the Extern was transferred to Germany.

"The Berlin period of Extern's work was short, but productive. Waiting for the return of the emissary of the All-Russian Fascist Party Turli, the agent wasted no time and got acquainted with the chairman of the Russian National Socialist Movement (RNSD), or the Russian National Movement (ROD), Meller-Zakomelsky, also known as surname Mirsky. Nothing was known about the existence of this organization of Russian fascists in Berlin, penetration into its ranks and its study seemed to be a necessary and important matter. Meller introduced "Extern" to other leaders of the movement: Kudash, Bertrand, Skalon and Despotuli. The agent joined the organization and began attending its meetings, at which Meller regularly spoke with assessments of the situation in the world, spoke about the tasks of the organization, put forward for discussion specific measures to strengthen the RNSD, numbering several dozen people, as well as to overcome emerging internal conflicts and attracting new members.

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From Meller's speeches and conversations with him, "Extern" learned that this "Führer" of the Russian fascists staked on Hitler and the Nazis. He was confident in their victory over Russia and believed that with the help of the Nazis, a fascist regime would be established in Russia. RNSD could

the Germans to take their rightful place in Russia and become the backbone of the German fascists. For their part, the Germans knew Meller-Zakomelsky well, appreciated and supported him. He seemed to have some authority over them. It is easy to guess that the Germans provided assistance to Meller through the channels of the special services.

"Extern" obtained lists of members of the RNSD and found out its structure.

All information and materials received by the agent were sent to Moscow on October 18, 1940. The letter from the residency also stated that Extern met with the leader of the Union of Lithuanian Citizens (SLG) in Berlin, Colonel Grivas. Grivas appreciated the "patriotic" and "anti-Bolshevik" sentiments of Kazimir Endzhievsky and offered him to become a member of the SLG. Extern agreed.

In Moscow, the report of the residency aroused considerable interest and forced the leadership of foreign intelligence to take a fresh look at the state of affairs in Berlin and the possibility of using Extern in the work. By order of the leadership, an indication of the following content went to the residency: "Until recently, the residency in Berlin did not closely deal with white emigre organizations and their counterrevolutionary activities in Germany. "Extern" can fill this gap, and it should be used to "develop" the top of the White émigré and Lithuanian circles, especially closely associated with the German fascists.

At the end of November 1940, an additional instruction was sent to the resident in Berlin to work with Extern. "We are very interested," it said, "the representative of the Russian fascist union in Germany, Shelekhov, who is actively fighting against the USSR and sending his people to Soviet territory both to collect information and to carry out special actions. According to available information, Shelekhov was acquainted with Extern in Lithuania and maintains an acquaintance at the present time. Discuss with "Extern" the POSSIBILITY of "development" of Shelekhov through him." The Center emphasized the importance of this task.

For some reason, "Extern" failed to immediately restore acquaintance with Shelekhov. Perhaps the Russian fascist left somewhere or became more cautious.

In the meantime, Extern continued to meet with emigration representatives and study their possibilities. At a meeting with a residency officer in Berlin, he said that two of the emigrants he knew worked as translators: one in the General Staff, the other in the German Foreign Ministry. Acquaintances looked promising, and Moscow

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approved further meetings of "Extern" with them in order to gain a deeper understanding of their capabilities.

From "Extern" came other information, which could not but alert. The owner of a Russian book store, Kupchinsky, said that almost 80% of Soviet literature was bought up by German officers who visited the store in groups of 10-15 people. As a rule, they spoke good Russian. Each spent 100-150 marks on books and chose literature on the most diverse issues, up to and including breeding chickens. Kupchinsky remarked to Extern that it is not difficult to conclude from these facts what the German General Staff is currently concerned about. In connection with the inspection trip of General Brauchitsch to the East in December 1940, rumors spread in Berlin that the Germans had begun preparations for a spring campaign against the USSR and that in this connection they were taking aerial photographs of the border strip of the Soviet Union.

On February 24, 1941, "Extern" told the operative officer of the residence that he had learned the following from Kudash, one of the leaders of the RNSD. Soon after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact and the Treaty of Friendship between Germany and the USSR, the German General Staff ordered General Krasnov, who was in Berlin, an analytical review: "Napoleon's campaign against Moscow in 1812. Theoretical analysis of the question of the possibility of such a campaign in the twentieth century and the possible consequences of such an action.

This was something new in the usual German staff work. Deputy Chief of Intelligence P.A. Sudoplatov ordered to inform the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army about this.

At the last meeting with the operative worker of the residency E.I. Kravtsov "Extern" reported that he had heard from many that the war between Germany and the USSR could start at any moment. It is unlikely that these were empty words. In the event of a sudden loss of contact, the conditions for appearance and a password were agreed. "Extern" said that he would soon move to a new apartment, gave her address and a new phone number.

The war that began very soon cut off communication with the Extern.

According to archival data, in 1943 the agent "Extern" was accepted by an employee of the German Office for Russian Emigration, which was led by General Biskupsky, and Taboritsky was his deputy. The latter recommended "Extern" as an active member of the Lithuanian emigration and a "supporter" of national socialist ideas. "Extern" was ready to curse Taboritsky for his flattering recommendation. If he had a connection with intelligence, he could give her valuable information. And so, voluntarily or involuntarily, he turned into a German accomplice. Remaining in a hornet's nest, he increasingly compromised himself by collaborating with the Germans.

At the first opportunity, "Extern" left Biskupsky's office and left under a convenient pretext for Poznań. At the end of the howl

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he moved to France. The question arose: what to do next? Seek contact with Soviet intelligence? But is the scout with whom he agreed to keep in touch alive? Do they still know and remember him at the Center? Will they not treat him as a traitor and a traitor?

"Extern" failed to find a convincing answer to the questions that tormented him and, as in his youth, he set off on wanderings - the lot of many people who received the name "displaced persons" after the war.

Fate brought the "Extern" to distant Australia. He lived there for many years, got married, took holy orders and served in small parishes of the Russian emigration.

In his declining years, "Extern" nevertheless returned to Russia, where, having survived the sorrows and joys allotted to him by fate, he died.

! A small group of extremely extremist White emigration, oriented towards the German National Socialists.

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Terrible news from Warsaw

With the establishment of the Hitler regime in Germany, the task of obtaining information about the possibility of a German-Polish conspiracy against the USSR came to the fore before Soviet intelligence in Poland. There were grounds for such assumptions. The ruling circles of Poland treated the Soviet Union with obvious hostility. In January 1934, the German-Polish Declaration on the non-use of force (also called the Non-Aggression Pact) was signed. Soviet intelligence learned that when it was signed, the Poles sought to enlist the support of the Germans in the implementation of their plans to seize Soviet lands - from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

But the Germans had no intention of reclaiming land for the Poles. Their plans included the conquest for themselves of "living space" in the East of Europe, including Poland itself. In the meantime, playing on the anti-Sovietism of the Polish regime, they sought to neutralize its reaction to

the forthcoming Anschluss of Austria and the seizure of Czechoslovakia, to make maximum use of the anti-Sovietism of the then Polish leadership for their own purposes.

Berlin and Warsaw refused to support the draft Eastern Pact put forward by Moscow in 1934 as a development of the idea of French Foreign Minister Barthou. It provided for the conclusion of a regional treaty on mutual security in Europe with the participation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Finland, the Baltic states and the USSR. Polish Foreign Minister Beck in a special memorandum expressed Warsaw's readiness to become a party to the pact only if Germany joins it. At the same time, Warsaw refused to assume obligations with respect to Lithuania (in connection with the Polish annexation of the Vilnius region) and Czechoslovakia (with an eye to territorial acquisitions). The memorandum contains

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There was also a formal reference to the fact that the Polish side prefers bilateral agreements to multilateral agreements.

Germany, on the other hand, declared that it would join the pact only if its complete equality in the matter of armaments was recognized. Thus, instead of collective security measures and curbing a potential aggressor, he was encouraged. The Soviet proposals were frustrated by the efforts of Germany and Poland.

Close to the true position of the Polish leadership was revealed by the statement of the head of the Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland T. Shetzel to the Bulgarian attorney in Warsaw in mid-1934 that "if a war breaks out in the Far East, then Russia will be defeated, and then Poland will include in its borders Kiev and part of Ukraine".

Playing a double game with Poland and probing the possibility of using it in the upcoming war with the Soviet Union, Goering, during an unofficial visit to Poland in 1935, which he made under the guise of hunting, offered the Poles an anti-Soviet alliance and a joint military march on Moscow. According to him, "Ukraine would be the sphere of influence of Poland, while the northwest of Russia would go to Germany." Goering hinted at this in a conversation with Piłsudski, noting that a Polish-German march would bring benefits that Warsaw could realize in Ukraine. Piłsudski replied that Poland, which has a thousand-kilometer border with the USSR, needs peace. Our intelligence received undercover information about these demarches of Goering.

At the same time, the Polish concept of "two enemies", which implied maneuvering between strong neighbors - the Soviet Union and Germany, almost constantly tilted towards the latter. The German leaders assured the Poles of their location, saying that "a strong Poland needs access to the Black Sea." Warsaw did not in the least oppose the Anschluss of Austria, and then even supported Berlin in seizing part of the territory of Czechoslovakia, counting on its help in the annexation of Cieszyn Silesia. The Poles presented the corresponding demand to Prague immediately after the Munich agreement on the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany.

At the beginning of 1939, the Germans made a new attempt to involve Poland in plans for a military attack on the USSR. Soviet intelligence learned that on January 5, during the reception of Foreign Minister Beck, Hitler announced the existence of "the unity of interests of Germany and Poland in relation to the Soviet Union." At a meeting with Ribbentrop on January 26, Beck promised to consider the possibility of joining Warsaw to the Anti-Comintern Pact if Berlin supported the Polish intentions to take over Ukraine and gain access to the Black Sea. In this context, Beck, speaking on March 11 in

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the NATO Foreign Affairs Commission, indicated Poland's interest in obtaining colonies?



But the fate of Poland was sealed. It was easier for Hitler to occupy Poland than to support her claims and share the conquered territories. On April 11, 1939, he signed the plan for the attack on Poland under the name "Weiss". Soviet intelligence found out about Hitler's decision and promptly reported it to the country's leadership.

Negotiating with the military delegations of England and France in 1939, the Soviet side knew that the Weiss plan had already been signed and the fate of Poland was sealed.

Being in a world of illusions, the leaders of Poland clearly underestimated the German threat even after the denunciation of the 1934 Non-Aggression Pact by Berlin in April 1939. Still believing in Hitler, they refused to allow Soviet troops to pass through Polish territory in the event of German aggression, and this was precisely what saved Poland from disaster.

The report of the Chairman of the Commission for the Political and Legal Evaluation of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, presented on December 23, 1989 at the 2nd Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, said: "The fact that a German attack on Poland may occur at the end of August - early September, Soviet intelligence reported to the country's leadership in early July 1939. Information was received from Ribbentrop's immediate circle that, in Hitler's opinion, the Polish question must be resolved without fail. Hitler said, and I quote: "... what happens in the event of a war with Poland will surpass and outshine the Huns. This unrestraint in German hostilities is necessary in order to demonstrate to the states of the East and Southeast, using the example of the destruction of Poland, what means in today's conditions to contradict the desire of the Germans and provoke Germany to the introduction of military forces">^.

On August 7, 1939, intelligence reported to Stalin that Germany would be able to start armed operations against Poland on any day after August 25. On August 11, 1939, a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place, at which the situation that had arisen was considered. In view of the intelligence data on Hitler's attempts to restore direct contact with Chamberlain and the complete hopelessness in the success of the Moscow military negotiations, it was considered expedient to enter into a formal discussion of the issues raised by the Germans, of which Berlin should be informed.

Considering the prevailing conditions and taking into account intelligence data on secret negotiations between England and Germany, the Soviet side agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939. The secret annex to the treaty stipulated

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the limit of the advance of German troops to the East to the ethnic borders of settlement in the eastern regions captured by Poland from Soviet Russia in 1922, Ukrainians and Belarusians, which coincided approximately with the "line" proposed at the same time, in 1922, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of England Curzon. It was for the Soviet Union, in fact, a measure of self-defense. It is appropriate to quote here the words of Winston Churchill from his speech on October 1, 1940 in the House of Commons: "The fact that the Russian armies are on the Curzon Line is due to necessity. This will ensure the security of Russia in the face of the fascist threat."

Tensions in Europe demanded from the Soviet intelligence a special clarity in information about German-Polish relations. At the same time, she monitored the situation in the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus that had fallen to Poland after the Soviet-Polish war of 1922, where mass violations of the rights of the Ukrainian and Belarusian national minorities by the Polish authorities had previously been committed, up to and including punitive expeditions. . The majority of political prisoners and victims of police brutality in Poland were Ukrainians and Belarusians.

Counterintelligence units were concentrated in the eastern borderlands of Poland. The fact is that saboteurs were thrown into the territory of the USSR, including those equipped in the uniform of Soviet border guards and Red Army soldiers. Polish intelligence relied on the "Union of Settlers" in the eastern lands, from whose members a

agency network. This was confirmed during the operation in September 1939 to liberate the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. From October 10 to November 10, among the documents of Polish intelligence, data were found on 186 employees and agents who performed special tasks against the USSR. A lot of effort had to be expended to neutralize the activities of the Polish special services.

In connection with the almost complete loss of Soviet foreign intelligence positions in Poland after its occupation by the Germans, work in the Polish direction moved outside the country. The Polish government headed by V. Sikorsky, which first settled in France, after its capture by the Nazis, moved to England. Intelligence efforts were aimed at acquiring trusting connections among Polish emigrants and in British political circles in order to obtain information about the activities of the London government of Poland and the position of the allies on the so-called "Polish question".

Of great importance was the consent to cooperation with the Soviet intelligence of the minister of the Polish government in exile, "Heinrich". Having agreed, "Heinrich" in his letter indicated: "I completely sincerely and voluntarily assume the obligation to help the Council

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to the Soviet Union in its policies and work... As a patriot of my homeland - Poland, I am convinced that only the Soviet Union and its policies can bring liberation to the Polish people... My sincere desire is also to see close cooperation with England, so how it once guaranteed the integrity of Poland.

In the London government, our intelligence had other confidential contacts, in particular with the "Gardener" - one of its most informed members.

At the end of 1939 - the beginning of 1940, the Soviet intelligence was faced with the responsible task of at least partially restoring agent-operational positions on Polish territory. Archival materials allow us to tell in detail about the successful operation carried out for this purpose and its participants.

In view of the Germans' agreement to have a Soviet consular officer in occupied Warsaw, the intelligence sent a member of his staff to act as manager of Soviet property in Poland, who would not be burdened with troublesome consular duties. He had to keep in touch with Moscow through Berlin.

On October 25, 1940, a cipher telegram addressed to the resident left Moscow for Berlin. It said that an operative Gudimovich, pseudonym Ivan, was leaving for Berlin to go to his destination in Warsaw with documents in the name of Vasiliev.

A recent graduate of the School for Special Purposes, Pyotr Ilyich Gudimovich was born in 1902 in the city of Novgorod-Seversk, Chernihiv Region, into the family of a tailor. He graduated from the Rabfak, served in active military service for 5 years. In 1933 he became an employee of the state security agencies.

The resident was asked to discuss in detail with Ivan all issues related to his work on the cover line, as well as the detailed conditions for maintaining communication.

On November 30, 1940, the resident briefly reported to Moscow: "Vasiliev arrived in Berlin for further travel to Warsaw."

Pretty soon Gudimovich-Vasiliev acquired many useful contacts. From them - at first drop by drop, then in an ever-wider stream ~ interesting information began to flow to Ivan. He learned that there were relatively few Germans in Warsaw, mostly concentrated on the Soviet border. Their number by the spring of 1941 reached 2 million people. To Warsaw they

they come only to rest, have fun in cafes, restaurants, night cabarets. Although the city has suffered from the war, such establishments thrive and operate smoothly.

In Moscow, meanwhile, arrangements were underway for the departure of an assistant to Warsaw under the guise of Gudimovich's "lawful wife".

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Elena Dmitrievna Modrzhinskaya, pseudonym Marya, was chosen for this role. Before joining the NKVD in 1937, she graduated from a university with a degree in economics and foreign language courses and "grew up" to the position of deputy director of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce. Although Beria himself approved her candidacy, Modrzhinskaya categorically refused a business trip, citing family reasons for her refusal. However, on December 15, 1940, Ivan nevertheless met her with a bouquet of flowers at the Warsaw railway station. They not only took the first step in their joint work, Peter presented flowers to his future wife: the work brought the young people closer, they fell in love with each other.

Parting words to Marya, Deputy Head of Intelligence P.A. Sudoplatov emphasized that her behavior should be natural and not cause doubts about the strength of the Vasiliev family. It was necessary to show disposition towards the Germans, to be loyal to the local citizens. To be with Ivan more often in crowded places, to make acquaintances, invite him to his place and visit him yourself, notice and remember everything. After 2-3 months, I had to leave for Moscow under the pretext of a meeting with my parents to report on the possibilities of restoring contact with the previous sources, the prospects for acquiring new confidential contacts, and also on the information received regarding German preparations.

The first days of her stay in Warsaw, Elena Dmitrievna felt oppressed: an alien environment, the uncertainty of her personal situation, anxiety for the future. But, having started work, she gained confidence, became energetic and active. The scouts analyzed the possibilities of fulfilling the recommendations of the Center and came to the conclusion that it was inappropriate to get in touch with the Poles, who were noticed in establishing some kind of relationship with the Germans. The right decisions helped them quickly create a viable information network.

On the basis of their own observations and reports from Polish aides, they came to the conclusion that Germany was preparing to attack the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1941, Ivan received permission to arrive in Moscow, where he was received by Commissar of State Security Merkulov. He reported on the concentration of German troops in the eastern regions of Poland, active road work in these areas, the Gestapo compiling lists of Soviet citizens living in the country for their internment, as well as obstacles placed by the Gestapo in the performance of Vasiliev's duties.

However, in response to Ivan's statement about the preparation of the Germans for war, Merkulov remarked: "You are greatly exaggerating. All this needs to be rechecked. Only after that, your information can be reported to the leadership of the USSR."

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Upon his return to Warsaw, Ivan redoubled his efforts to collect the necessary information with the support of Marya. On April 20, he arrived in Berlin for the next report. "This is very serious," the resident assessed the report from Warsaw. "Take paper and write urgently to the Center."

On May 5, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Beria received a message emphasizing:

"Military preparations in Poland are carried out openly, and German officers and soldiers talk about the upcoming war between Germany and the Soviet Union as if it had already been decided. The war is allegedly supposed to start after the completion of spring field work. German soldiers from

According to the words of their officers, they claim that the capture of Ukraine by the German army is supposedly secured from within by the "fifth column" that works well on the territory of the USSR...

... From April 10 to 20, German troops moved through Warsaw to the east continuously both during the night and during the day. Due to the continuous flow of troops, all traffic on the streets of Warsaw came to a halt. On the railroads in an easterly direction are trains loaded mainly with heavy artillery, trucks and aircraft parts. Since mid-April, military trucks and ambulances have appeared on the streets of Warsaw in large numbers.

cars."

In June, intelligence officers received information about the Nazi attack on the USSR that was being prepared from day to day. On the evening of June 21, at a meeting with a Polish assistant, Ivan heard the exact date and time of the start of the war against the Soviet Union by Germany ~ tomorrow morning. The Pole expressed his readiness to securely hide the Soviet representatives in order to avoid their arrest by the Germans.

At noon on June 22, Ivan was taken to the Gestapo, and 6 Nazis made him a thorough interrogation. They were interested, for example, in what he was doing lately, his contacts among local citizens, what information he collected and how he reported it to Moscow. Ivan firmly insisted that he was diligently engaged in the performance of his duties as manager of Soviet property. The Gestapo, after many hours of interrogation, warned him about the ban on leaving the house and meeting with anyone.

On June 28-29, the Vasilievs were transferred to Berlin as part of a group of Soviet citizens living in Poland. There they reported to Ambassador Dekanozov the latest information about the situation in Warsaw, the ineffectiveness of the bombing by Soviet aircraft of German targets on Polish territory, and the mood in the German army. Together with the employees of the Soviet missions in Germany, the scouts returned to their homeland. For the successful completion of the task, Ivan and Marya were awarded military orders.

P.I. Gudimovich and E.D. Modrzynska worked in intelligence until 1953. Then, in connection with another campaign of downsizing

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Intelligence Elena Dmitrievna was forced to go to work at the Institute of Philosophy. She worked there for over 20 years. She became a doctor of sciences, published over 175 scientific papers and publications.

In the mid-70s, Elena Dmitrievna, recalling the days of her fighting youth, wrote:

Oh, my Warsaw, Warsaw, Restless craft...

You are the beginning of our maturity

Our courage triumph.

We were here with the Motherland in our hearts And, full of deep anxiety, We brought thunderous news Timely to Moscow ...

' Mihutina I.V. Soviet-Polish relations. 1931-1935. - M., 1977. - S. 200.

There. - S. 241.

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There.

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## Secret Mission to Helsinki

One of the most interesting and complex aspects of the policy of the Soviet Union in the prewar period was relations with Finland, which, as is well known, ended very tragically in the war of 1939-1940. Few people, however, know that before it came to war, the Soviet leadership took extraordinary steps to politically resolve the problems of bilateral relations.

Documents were found in the archive of the SVR, from which it follows that in 1938, on the personal instructions of Stalin, intelligence established secret contacts and negotiated with the top leadership of Finland. But why was this mission entrusted to intelligence? Wasn't it possible to use the usual diplomatic channels?

The decision of the Soviet leadership was dictated by a number of good reasons. He was very worried about the situation that developed in 1938 on the northwestern border of the USSR. Formally, the northern countries of Europe - Finland, Sweden and Norway - pursued a policy of neutrality. But the annexation of Austria, the capture of the Sudetenland and the subsequent occupation of Czechoslovakia, the policy in the Balkans clearly showed that Hitler would not take into account neutrality if the latter became an obstacle to achieving his goals. Small countries, one after another, became easy prey for Germany. Not the last role was played by the so-called "fifth columns" created in them. It was obvious that Germany sought to create an anti-Soviet front from the Barents to the Black Sea.

At the same time, German diplomacy gave Finland one of the first places, hoping to turn its more than 1000-kilometer border into a springboard for a future attack on the Soviet Union. Fascist organizations sprang up in the country like mushrooms after the rain, and the positions of supporters of the pro-German orientation were strengthened.

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Foreign intelligence had irrefutable information about the preparations for the entry of the German expeditionary force into Finland.

Considering all this, the Soviet leadership made an attempt to implement a bold plan - to persuade the leaders of Finland to cooperate, taking into account the interests of both countries. Naturally, such negotiations could not but be secret. With the greatest success, intelligence and its communication channels could provide this.

Information about the course of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations came from Helsinki directly to Stalin. Even the leadership of foreign intelligence did not fully know about them. For the purposes of conspiracy, the operation was coded as "April 7 Case".

Behind the dry lines of archival documents, images of living people appear. How did they live and work? What did you feel while performing such a responsible task and being in constant correspondence with the top Soviet leadership?

It was late on the evening of April 7, 1938. Zoya Ivanovna anxiously awaited her husband's return. Rumors were circulating around Moscow about numerous arrests of deeply respected people only yesterday. At the mere thought of this, my heart sank uneasily. You never know what could happen to Boris...

The Rybkins have just returned from Finland, where they have been for three years: he is the head of the "legal" residency under the guise of the post of second secretary of the embassy with a diplomatic passport in the name of B.N. Yartseva, she is a deputy resident under the "roof" of the head of the Intourist department.

The creak of an opening door was heard in the hall, then the well-known footsteps of Boris. Zoya rushed towards her husband. There were tears in her eyes.

- It's all right, Zoya! On the road again soon.

Boris considered in his mind how, without going into details, to convey to his wife the main thing and warn about the special nature of the upcoming trip. She was not only a close person, but also his deputy in the residency.

Boris Arkadyevich said that he was received personally by I.V. Stalin. The latter asked in detail about his life, about the service. As if by the way he asked the question, what kind of fleet do the Finns have. Rybkin replied that the Finns had one destroyer in service, the cruiser Väinemeinen, the cruiser Ilmarinen... "Väinemeinen and Ilmarinen," Stalin remarked, are the heroes of the Finnish epic." Rybkin did not expect such awareness.

According to Stalin, B.A. Rybkin was to meet with the Prime Minister of Finland for secret negotiations. It is very important that no one knows about them. The main goal of the negotiations should be to reach an agreement on moving the Soviet border on the Karelian Isthmus away from Leningrad.

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Rybkin noted that the Finns have recently been closely connected with the Germans and are unlikely to want to negotiate with us.

Stalin blew smoke from his pipe and calmly said that they should be interested in this matter, offering, for example, an exchange of territories, giving even more than they could concede. In the middle part of the country, the Finns have cut down almost the entire forest, the country's woodworking plants are standing. They should be promised additional supplies of timber.

Stalin asked Molotov and Voroshilov, who were present at the conversation, whether Rybkin should be entrusted with the negotiations. Both leaders nodded in the affirmative. After a short pause, Stalin said that the ambassador and adviser would be recalled to the USSR and Rybkin would automatically become chargé d'affaires, thus getting the opportunity to establish contact with the leadership of Finland.

– Boris, but do you have enough skills and experience to solve this problem?

"The gods don't burn pots, Zoinka. The main thing is that the negotiations are conducted in complete secrecy. 2-3 high-ranking Finns, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan and you and me will know about their content.

Zoya Ivanovna suddenly grew sad.

– Boris, if the task fails through no fault of yours, can you imagine what awaits us?

A day later, the Rybkins left for Finland.

- I, Boris, have a feeling as if we never left Suomi.

"At least, I didn't find any traces that the apartment was thoroughly searched during our absence," Yartsev replied.

- When to start work, comrade chief?

- What is our date tomorrow?

- 14th of April.

- So, dear deputy, tomorrow morning you will go to the Intourist office. Check everything. And I'm straight...

From the embassy, Rybkin-Yartsev telephoned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and asked to be connected to Minister Rudolf Holsti.

When a man's voice was heard on the receiver, Boris Arkadyevich greeted him in German. Many Finns knew this language, and the scout had a good command of it.

"Mr. Minister, could you urgently receive me and discuss privately a highly confidential matter?"

- Do you, Mr. Yartsev, have questions for me? Holsti was surprised.

"Consider that this is so and that it is in your own interest to hear them without delay.

Holsti hesitated for a while.

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"Would it suit you to meet today," another pause, "after dinner?"

- Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Holsti, not without curiosity, glanced at Yartsev as he entered and offered him a chair at the round table, on which small cups of coffee soon appeared.

— We have, Mr. Minister, to discuss the important problem of improving relations between Finland and Russia, taking into account the situation that is developing in Europe, and especially in its northern part, the situation. I have been endowed with the exclusive powers of my government for this.

"I don't doubt it, otherwise you wouldn't have come to my office.

- Mr. Minister, an indispensable condition for such negotiations should be their absolute secrecy.

- It is impossible not to agree with this, especially if concrete proposals follow from your side.

The conversation was not easy. Yartsev had to keep silent about many things for the time being.

Yartsev said: the Soviet Union is convinced that Germany is hatching such far-reaching plans against Russia that representatives of the extremist-minded part of the German army can carry out an amphibious landing on the territory of Finland for a subsequent strike on the Soviet Union. The Soviet side is interested in the possible reaction of the Finns in the event of a similar situation. In the opinion of the Soviet competent authorities, Finland could have responded to the violation of her neutrality in practically two ways.

I don't know if your sources are reliable. But I look forward to hearing with interest what you attribute to us Finns.

- Only what follows from specific and verified facts. First of all, it can be assumed that Finland, misinterpreting its national interests, will come out together with Germany and will not prevent the deployment of military operations from its territory against the Soviet Union.

Go on, I'm listening to you.

— I will not make secrets about how Russia will act in this case. You understand, Mr. Minister, that I am analyzing possible scenarios.

— I appreciate your frankness, Mr. Yartsev. What awaits us ahead?

- I want to assure you that in Russia they will not sit idly by and wait for the German military units to appear near Leningrad. The Soviet government will have no choice but to throw its armed forces as far as possible into the depths of Finnish territory, and there launch defensive battles against the Germans.

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- An unfavorable prospect.

“But, Herr Holsti, Finland may wish to resist the German landing. In this case, the Soviet government will provide all possible support. For example, Russia will allocate the necessary economic and military assistance, assume obligations to withdraw its armed forces from Finnish territory after the end of the war. With the development of political cooperation between both sides, the Soviet Union could seriously expand bilateral economic ties. It has practically unlimited opportunities to purchase its industrial products from Finland, especially cellulose, as well as agricultural goods to supply Leningrad in the first place.

— Very tempting, Mr. Yartsev, but you do not take into account Finland's external obligations to her friends, neighbors and sympathizing countries.

“Our proposals do not harm third countries. On the contrary, they are aimed at strengthening peace in the region.

— Do you understand, Mr. Yartsev, that the Finns have their own foreign policy pursued by the current government? You must have very strong arguments and concrete proposals to force the Finns to reconsider their country's foreign policy.

“I haven't finished, Mr. Minister. It is known that since the beginning of the 1930s, a wave of the Lapuan movement, a Finnish variety of fascism, has risen in Finland. His program included anti-Soviet demagoguery, agitation for the creation of a "Great Finland", which would include Leningrad and all of Karelia. Any attempts by the Soviet side to improve relations with Finland are met with hostility by the members of the Lapuan movement. Do you rule out, Mr. Minister, that the Finnish fascists are capable of revolting and forming a new pro-German government that will support the plans and intentions of the Germans? It only takes a small leak of information about our negotiations for the fascist elements in Finland and their friends abroad to try to stage a putsch.

- Are you sure about that?

“That's all I can say for now, Mr. Foreign Minister. Are you ready to continue negotiations on the questions I have touched upon without turning to Plenipotentiary Derevyansky and First Secretary Austrin?

“Mr. Yartsev,” Holsti slightly closed his eyes, “I cannot make a decision on my own to continue negotiations without obtaining the approval of my president. I will report to him about our conversation. But first I want to ask clarifying questions.

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- Mr. Minister, it makes sense to clarify the details only if there is confidence that the Finnish government will adhere to neutrality and will not abandon



proposed assistance to the USSR

Holsti was still considering how to detain Yartsev and get more complete information from him, but the scout interrupted his thoughts.

- Mr. Minister, we must start from the main point, from the essence of the issue, and we will discuss the details in detail later. I'm not saying goodbye, Mr. Holsti, I'm sure - see you soon.

Prime Minister Cajander and Holsti discussed the information received from Yartsev for a long time. It was clear that the government of the USSR feared an attack from Germany in the near future and hoped that with the help of the Soviet-Finnish treaty it would be able to strengthen the country's security in the northwest. The proposals, although not entirely clear, are of interest to Helsinki. But is it worth it to exchange the country's neutrality for a "military-political alliance" with the Russians, to question Finland's relations with France, England, Germany, as well as Sweden and Norway, who are unlikely to be pleased by the Soviet-Finnish agreements? But one should not rush to reject the Soviet initiative either: the situation in Europe

constantly changing.

— Therefore, let's pull, Mr. Prime Minister? summed up the conversation the Minister of Foreign Affairs. "We will try to collect as much information as possible and see how far the Soviets intend to go in their proposals for cooperation.

"You understood me correctly, Mr. Holsti. By the way, what strange form of negotiations did the Russians choose and whom did they make their plenipotentiary? Didn't it seem strange to you?

- At first, yes. But, on reflection, I came to the conclusion that in this way the secrecy of the negotiations is more completely preserved. And in the event of unforeseen complications, one can always say that they never saw or knew any Yartsev. His merit is that he openly says what he thinks. So we will get closer to the goal.

"Keep me posted, Mr. Holsti.

After meeting with Kholsti, Yartsev flew to Moscow to personally report to I.V. Stalin about the results, which he assessed as modest so far.

- The Finns are ready to listen, but they prefer to remain silent about their decision.

"The main thing is that they agreed to secret negotiations with you," Stalin said quietly. - Promise them new perspectives and, like a good fisherman, gradually pull them out of the water towards you. It is hardly necessary to show the Finns that we are more interested in

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dialects than they are. Let them understand that a hand has been extended to them, which it would be rather foolish to push away. We rely on you, Yartsev, and we are waiting for the results.

The pipe was taken out of his mouth, which meant the end of the conversation.

From Moscow, Yartsev returned to Helsinki via Stockholm, where he had a confidential conversation with Swedish Foreign Minister R. Sandler, who showed great interest in the security issues of the Åland Islands, as well as with a number of other relevant people.

At home in Helsinki, Yartsev hugged Zoya Ivanovna tightly. Sat down to drink tea. Boris told about trips to Moscow and Stockholm, asked what was heard in Helsinki.

One evening Rybkin remarked aloud:

— Almost two months have passed since my visit to Foreign Minister Holsti. You can't wait any longer. It seems that it is time to push the Finns to the next meeting. It is necessary to have a talk with our true friends and tell them that Russia has made Finland an offer to conclude a political treaty beneficial to both parties. However, the pro-fascist thugs and their foreign friends apparently want to disrupt the exchange of opinions that has begun.

In June 1938, the secretary, reporting to Prime Minister Cajander, remarked:

"Mr. Yartsev has not been seen for a long time, he is apparently disappointed with the conversation with Holsti. Your Excellency would probably do well to receive it yourself and hear what else the Russians promise Finland. This will put an end to the uncertainty that is becoming more acute every day. In addition, rumors are circulating in society that the government is falling under the growing influence of Germany.

- I will receive Yartsev one of the next days, let him know about it. But the conversation will be purely protocol in nature. Here's another thing - find out who is spreading rumors about the strengthening of German influence in Suomi.

On June 11, 1938, at the initiative of the Finns, Yartsev met with the prime minister. Both participants carefully prepared for it.

— Let me remind you, Mr. Prime Minister, that I have already spoken about the expansionist policy of [Germany and its attempts to use Finnish territory for the purpose of a subsequent attack on Russia. Much will depend on the choice of Finland's position in this difficult situation. Obviously, a rapprochement with Germany would involve Helsinki in dangerous adventures, while a political alliance with Russia, on the contrary, promises her national prosperity.

"Finland is a neutral country, and the path of military alliances is not for her," Cajander said pathetically. "Suomi will not allow anyone to violate her neutrality and territorial integrity, Mr. Yartsev.

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"I have no doubts about your noble intentions, Mr. Prime Minister," said Yartsev. — But how will Finland protect itself by acting alone?

Cajander shivered nervously. He had nothing to say on the merits, and it was premature to talk about possible plans for participation on the side of Germany.

"If a war, which the Finns do not want, still breaks out, then the Finnish people will maintain firmness of spirit and do everything in their power to save the fatherland. I draw your attention to the fact that Finland equally opposes the use of its territory by any major powers and hopes that the USSR, for its part, will also respect the inviolability of Finnish territory.

It was clear to Yartsev that Cajander wanted to divert the conversation away from the main issues.

"Mr. Cajander," Yartsev remarked with a kind smile, "you know perfectly well who is pursuing a policy of aggression and who is against it. On behalf of the Soviet government, I tell you that if the Soviet Union receives firm assurances, and not just promises, that the Germans will not be provided with strongholds in Finland, and that Finland itself will not be used as a springboard in the war against Russia, then the Russians immediately guarantee the inviolability of the territory of Suomi.

Cajander really didn't want to say yes or no to Yartsev. Uncertainty would leave the Finnish government a free hand and allow for benefits from both sides. As an experienced politician, Cajander tried to close the uncomfortable issue by putting forward a counter-option.

"Sometimes the goal is reached sooner if one moves towards it in a roundabout but more reliable way. For example, it would be important to stimulate Finnish-Soviet trade negotiations towards a common goal and mutual understanding.

"He's going off to the side again," thought Yartsev.

- A trade agreement between the USSR and Finland, Mr. Prime Minister, will be concluded if the political relations of our countries are clear and definite. Without the signing of a political agreement and the adoption of specific obligations by the parties, this is hardly feasible.

"Again about the Soviet-Finnish alliance? Cajander grimaced displeasedly. "But I told you that neutrality for the Finns is an unshakable principle."

"It looks like Cajander is pretty tired," Yartsev decided.

- Mr. Prime Minister, today we apparently have nothing to add to what has already been said and it is better to continue the conversation next time, but not next year!

- I agree with you, Mr. Yartsev.

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— I would like to remind you once again, Mr. Cajander, that our negotiations in Helsinki are absolutely secret. However, it became known to me that Derevyansky, the Plenipotentiary of the USSR, was pretending that he was the main person in this matter. His statements on this score are of no significance.

Yartsev wanted to emphasize that the threads of the negotiations are firmly in his hands. At the same time, this was a safety net in case information was leaked, as well as an attempt to cover up the people who organized the lobbying of the Soviet-Finnish agreement at the top.

— But is there a leak of information from the Finnish side?

Cajander was silent.

After Yartsev left, the Prime Minister invited Tanner, a member of the Cabinet, who was acting temporarily as Minister of Foreign Affairs in connection with the latter's departure to Geneva for a League of Nations conference, and discussed the situation with him. The Soviet side made it clear what it wants from Finland, but the Finns will try to prevent the entry of Soviet troops into their territory, since they doubt that after that it will be possible to restore the pre-war status, despite all the assurances of the Soviet representative.

"To accept the demand of the Russians," said Cajander, "would mean capitulating to them, and this excluded.

"Maybe it's not so bad and you can still find a way out, Mr. Prime Minister?"

Cajander instructed Tanner this time to continue negotiations with the Russian diplomat and clarify some unclear issues. This was brought to the attention of Yartsev. Tanner, in negotiations with Yartsev, continued almost the same line.

Yartsev wrote a cipher telegram to Stalin, in which he reported that the Finns were stubbornly resisting the conclusion of a military treaty. Already the third high-ranking person in the Finnish cabinet, Tanner, was instructed to negotiate with him. In practice, this means a wire. The Finnish government reacted relatively calmly to the attacks of the Soviet press, considering it "revenge" for its intransigence, and did not attach serious importance to the demarches of influential representatives of the Finnish public who insisted on the need for a Soviet-Finnish treaty. "In accordance with the instructions received

I will seek positive answers from the Finns to all the questions put to them," the resident finished the telegram.

Yartsev ensured that the telegram was immediately sent to Moscow and warned the cryptographer to "forget about it." |

On June 30 and August 5, 1938, regular meetings between Yartsev and Tanner took place. The Soviet intelligence officer again briefly described the situation, the possible positions of Finland in the folding

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situation and the reaction of the Soviet side to this. The security of Suomi and the benefits of trade and economic relations with the USSR are guaranteed by the Soviet government if the Finns meet Moscow's wishes.

- Do you have a good idea, Mr. Tanner, what all this holds for Finland?

Tanner, in turn, no less stubbornly began to insist on his own version of the settlement of Soviet-Finnish relations.

— Why, Mr. Yartsev, should we not reach our common goal through a series of intermediate agreements, for example, resolving border conflicts, signing a trade agreement, etc.?

— You are partly right, Mr. Tanner, and this issue has already been touched upon by Mr. Holsti. But where is the confidence that we will move beyond the first agreements and resolve the main issue of a military-political alliance? In addition, concrete talks should be held in Moscow on the issues you mentioned. I see the meaning of our talks with you in at least approaching the solution of the fundamentally important and topical issue of political cooperation.

Tanner retorted vigorously:

— Since the secret talks began in Helsinki, it would be expedient to continue them here. In Moscow, undoubtedly, there are more chances to attract the attention of prying eyes to them, and communication and consultations of the members of the delegation with the government of Finland would be difficult.

"I will report to Moscow about your opinion, Mr. Tanner," and Yartsev said goodbye.

On August 11, Yartsev met Tanner again. The scout handed over the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs that Moscow considers it necessary to discuss the issues additionally put forward by the Finns in Moscow and asks to clarify the composition of the Finnish delegation. Yartsev once again reminded that the discussion of important and mutually beneficial issues in Moscow would be fruitful if the fundamental issue of military-political cooperation could be resolved first.

- What, Mr. Yartsev, do you specifically offer us?

— I think I was unambiguous about this. If the Finnish government does not believe that it can currently conclude a full-scale secret agreement with Russia, then Moscow would be satisfied with Finland's verbal obligation to be ready to repel a possible attack by an aggressor and to this end accept military assistance from the USSR

— The construction of fortifications on the Aland Islands, — continued Yartsev, — is necessary from the point of view of the security of Finland. However, fortifications on the islands are no less necessary.

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us and to ensure the security of Leningrad. This is obvious, and Moscow can give its consent to the strengthening of the Aland Islands if Russia is given the opportunity to take part in this matter, and also if it is allowed to send its own observer there to control the progress of engineering and defense work and the subsequent use of the fortress according to her appointment. Of course, the activities of this observer must be secret.

Tension showed on Tanner's face.

"Moscow also hopes," the intelligence officer said, "that the Finnish government will allow the USSR to cooperate with Finland in using the naval and air base on Sur-Sari (Gogland Island).

Yartsev paused to assess the impression the interlocutor had made on the proposals he had made. But Tanner didn't make a sound.

— Acceptance by Finland of the proposed program of cooperation in the military field would be approved and actively supported by Moscow.

- How, Mr. Yartsev?

— The USSR would guarantee the inviolability of the current borders of Finland, primarily maritime ones, — the intelligence officer emphasized. - If necessary, I would provide the Finns with weapons on favorable terms. He will sign a mutually beneficial trade agreement with Helsinki, which would further stimulate the development of its industry and agriculture.

"Just a minute, Mr. Yartsev," Tanner clung to his interlocutor. — What is "Russian military assistance"?

- I'll try to explain. I do not mean by this term either the sending of Soviet armed forces to Finland, or any territorial concessions on her part. As you can see, Mr. Tanner, the Soviet side drew some conclusions from the previous remarks of the Finns and went to meet them halfway.

Tanner nodded his head in satisfaction.

"My personal point of view regarding the comments made by you, Mr. Yartsev, is such that Finland is unlikely to accept them," he said muffledly. — However, I am obliged to report them to the management.

Prime Minister Cajander understood from Tanner's words that although the Russians had made some concessions in order to get closer to the Finns, their position in the military sphere had changed little.

"Next time, tell this Yartsev," he said to Tanner, "that the USSR's proposals, even in a new version, undermine Helsinki's policy of neutrality, and more persistently strive to start trade negotiations as soon as possible.

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Acting in accordance with the orders received, Tanner invited Yartsev to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and reported Helsinki's response to the proposals of the Soviet government dated August 11. Tanner then launched into a discourse on the benefits of trade and the importance of settling border disputes.

"Is that all, Mr. Tanner?" For this you sacrificed your time and accepted me?

- What else could you count on, Yartsev ?!

Yartsev started toward the exit of Tanner's office, but suddenly stopped on the threshold and shook his head slightly.

September 15, 1938 Tanner received Yartsev again. According to Tanner, the Finnish side once again analyzed the Soviet proposals. It reaffirmed its negative attitude towards the construction of military bases by foreign states in the Baltic.

— We are not closing the door and curtailing secret negotiations, Mr. Yartsev. The Finns are even ready to buy from Russia such types of weapons that they may need, if their quality and price are acceptable.

"It seems that this is the first minor concession of the Finns to sweeten the bitter pill of refusal from full-scale military cooperation," flashed through the head of the intelligence officer.

"As for the strengthening of the Åland Islands and the island of Gogland," Tanner said firmly, "the Finnish government rejects these proposals without any counter considerations.

"It's bad," Yartsev decided, "it was then that we should have talked and looked for common ground. Does the Finnish leadership really not understand that by its refusal it only brings military events on a European scale closer?

In this spirit, Yartsev informed Moscow, which responded that although the talks seemed to have stalled and Finland's Western friends and allies had played a significant role in this, we should not yet advocate for their termination. The responsibility for the failure of the negotiations should be assumed by the Finnish side.

In mid-October 1938, Foreign Minister R. Holsti, who had just returned from Geneva, summoned Yartsev and reported that in Geneva, in the presence of Commissar M.M. Litvinov and Swedish Foreign Minister Sandler, an agreement was reached that the issue of strengthening the Åland Islands would be discussed by the parties to the 1926 agreement on their demilitarization (including Germans, British, French, Italians and many others, but there were no Russians). The Finnish minister also stressed that this is, in fact, a "comprehensive analytical" response from Helsinki.

"Mr. Holsti, this is probably the last time we see each other. I always went to meet you, hoping that I could move forward on the path

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to strengthen peace, to save our countries from the worst - war. The Soviet government, as one could see, took not only a principled, but also a flexible position during the negotiations, which the Finnish partners at that time failed to appreciate.

Holsti soon retired. On November 21, 1938, Yartsev was received by Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Vayonmaa. The question concerned the dispatch to Moscow of a Finnish trade delegation, which included trade advisers and two political experts.

In Moscow, they received information and a report from the intelligence officer about his last meeting with Holsti. B.A. Rybkin traveled to the Center to act as an expert if necessary and to receive further instructions.

Despite the apparent ineffectiveness of Rybkin's secret negotiations with representatives of the Finnish leadership, he nevertheless managed to draw the Finns into a delicate exchange of views and bring to their attention the position of the Soviet government.

On December 7, 1938, the Finnish delegation was received twice by the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR A.I. Mikoyan. It was not possible to agree on a draft trade agreement, since the positions of the parties were too different.

It became clear that it was not expedient for the resident to return to Helsinki. Soon he received a new appointment and left for Sweden as the head of the "legal" residency. There was a lot of work to be done to establish contacts, collect intelligence information and painstaking, hard work to ensure peace in the Scandinavian countries, whose neutrality was being subjected to a significant test.

Further negotiations between Finland and the USSR continued through diplomatic channels, starting on March 5, 1939. From the Soviet side, they were attended by People's Commissar M.M. Litvinov, from Finnish - envoy Irje Koskinen. The exchange of opinions proceeded sluggishly and irregularly. There were plenty of reasons for this, including events in Europe and the outbreak of a world war.

In October 1939, the Kremlin, taking into account the sharp change in the situation on the European continent, in a tough form put before the Finnish government the issue of ceding the island of Hogland, a coastal military base, a strip north of Leningrad in exchange for the same or much larger territory in Soviet Karelia. The Finns just as resolutely rejected the Soviet demands, hoping for the promised help and support from the West. The political circles of France and England were on the side of the Finns. Germany, which officially took a neutral position, at the same time secretly supplied the Finns with weapons and pushed the Finnish government to adventurous actions. This was not a secret for Moscow, since intelligence had the necessary

information.

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On November 30, Soviet troops crossed the Finnish border. As early as January 1940, the Finnish government of Ryti-Tanner began to probe the ground for concluding peace with the USSR and sending plenipotentiaries to Moscow to conclude a peace treaty. On March 12, 1940, a Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed in Moscow.

The winter war of 1939/1940 strengthened the security of the northwestern border of the USSR, albeit at a very high price.

Already in the post-war period, Finnish President U. Kekkonen, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, noted that back in April 1938, Russia had made an important attempt to establish Soviet-Finnish relations on a new political basis. Due to the then political course of the Finnish government, it was not given due importance and did not show the corresponding interest.

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## Two lives of Zoya Voskresenskaya

There are many gifted people whose names are widely known in any sphere of public life - in science, technology, politics, literature, art, sports. But there are those, although there are much fewer of them, whose creative life with equal success affects not one, but several areas. Zoya Ivanov-na Voskresenskaya rightfully belongs to them.

About the writer Z.I. Many people know Voskresenskaya, and the fact that she worked in intelligence for 25 years under the name of her husband, Rybkin, was almost unknown. China, the Baltics, Germany, Austria and finally Finland and Sweden - such is the geographic scope of her intelligence work.

About the meeting and friendship with Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya-Rybkina - the story of our employee.

- I met Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya in the winter of 1974. December. Snowy Moscow. With difficulty finding a bouquet of flowers (at that time in Moscow it was difficult with flowers, especially in winter), I went to the metro station "Airport" to look for Krasnoarmeyskaya Street. On the advice of my friend, who knew Zoya Ivanovna a little, I called her on the phone and asked her to "help the novice writer." I was listened to, and an even, official voice briefly said into the receiver: "Come." We made an appointment and gave an address.

Climbing up to the 6th floor of the house on Krasnoarmeyskaya Street, I suddenly felt a painful sense of awkwardness. A well-known throughout the country writer, winner of several awards, a person who had just published a three-volume edition of his works, and I, who had never published a single line anywhere... But it was too late. I called. Opened the door. In front of me stood a tall, slender woman in a dark, strict dress. Dark brown hair pinned up at the back of her head.

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And the eyes are gray, carefully studying. Now I can give a detailed description of it. And then ... then I saw almost nothing. Understanding my confusion, Zoya Ivanovna smiled with restraint and said:

- Come on, get undressed. Here is the hanger.

Her smile took away my shyness and stiffness.

In the middle of the room, which served as an office and living room at the same time, there was a desk. Opposite the window is a sofa-bed with removable cushions, upholstered in red embossed fabric. To the left and right of the window are shelves and bookcases. Closer to the door - a small magazine table.

They put me on the sofa. I timidly held out my literary creation, just a few pages long. Zoya Ivanovna took the sheets, sat on the edge of her chair, read the title, turned over the pages, put them on the desk, got up and said: "The nightingale is not fed with fables. Though you are not a nightingale," she smiled at the same time, "but I will give you tea to drink. And then we'll talk." Thus began our literary work.

Later, I learned that this apartment was visited by many visitors - both adults and children: writers, readers, military colleagues. Sometimes up to a dozen or more people at the same time. And all of them were received cordially, without any sweetness, all were given tea and fed. I myself repeatedly had to help Zoya Ivanovna at her request to receive guests, especially during the Children's Book Festival. Delegations of children, teachers and librarians came not only from regions close to Moscow, but also from the Far East.

We held several first meetings with Zoya Ivanovna at her city apartment. And suddenly, already in the summer, she calls me on the phone and offers to hold another meeting in Krasnaya Pakhra, where at that time she rented a summer house from the widow of the writer Alexei Musatov.

With accuracy characteristic of a scout, the writer explained how to get to the dacha village: "... after the second path, turn right (at that time we still addressed each other as "you"), you will see the dacha behind a large, high green fence. This is the dacha of Konstantin Simonov, and on the contrary - the third dacha, Musatov. I'll be waiting for you." And she asked sternly: "How much time do you need on the road?"

- 40-50 minutes.

- I'll be waiting for you in an hour.

Having bought flowers and a cake on the way, an hour later I drove into the writers' dacha settlement in Krasnaya Pakhra and without difficulty found the right address. He opened the gate, drove the car in and, inspired by the imminent meeting with Zoya Ivanovna, took flowers and a cake, and headed into the house. There is no one in the big room



was. Putting the box of cake on the table and clutching a bunch of red carnations to me, I waited patiently. Nobody. After about three minutes, he loudly called: "Is there anyone here?" To my surprise

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leniation, a woman unknown to me came out of the next room. I kindly started a conversation with her about living in the country, without letting go of the flowers, however. The woman supported my conversation with a smile, without asking anything. After talking for another five minutes, I cautiously asked: "Where is Zoya Ivanovna?" The stranger smiled even more affably and, looking slyly at me, pointed out the window: "Zoya Ivanovna lives in the next house." With apologies and embarrassment, I took the cake and drove the car to a neighboring yard.

Zoya Ivanovna, while arranging tea utensils on the table, listened without a smile to my enthusiastic story about the almost heroic invasion of someone else's house. She did not interrupt me while setting the table. But when I finished, she looked at me even more attentively and more sternly and said: "This does not do you credit," then she paused and added dryly, "neither as a man, nor as a scout." You can understand my condition. I was ready, as they say in such cases, to fall through the ground.

About three years ago I reminded Zoya Ivanovna of this conversation. A soft smile appeared on her face. Then she extinguished it, strictly, as 17 years ago, she looked at me, but cheerful lights still burned in her eyes, and, unable to restrain herself, laughed: "Of course, you scoundrel, - not only got lost in two pines, I almost gave the flowers to another woman, so I also boasted.

I learned about Zoya Ivanovna's work in foreign intelligence much later. She herself told me about it, when our relationship became not just friendly, but practically related, we were already on you, and I called her mom.

"You know," she said one day, "I want to tell you about something that few people know about - about my past life. - And with an attentive, as if once again evaluating look, she looked at me. - Well, I'll start with the fact that in intelligence there are unexpected and funny cases. Intelligence is life, and everything happens in life.

... The day was frosty and sunny. Sunday. The Garden Ring of Moscow is crowded. The winter of 1935 brought a lot of trouble to the janitors. Snow was not removed even on the main highways of the capital. Buses were behind schedule.

At the bus stop, a tall, slender woman got on the B trolleybus. I went to the conductor. She looked in her clutch bag for change coins, smiled embarrassedly. She took out a money note and loudly asked: "Comrades! Who can exchange 10 rubles?

Shrugs, barely audible: "I don't have." The woman repeated more firmly, "Who can change money?" And she added more quietly: "What should I do ?!"

A tall man in a hat-pie made of gray astrakhan got up from his seat, handed 15 kopecks to the conductor, took the ticket and handed it to the woman:

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- Take it!

- Thank you. Thank you very much. How can I return this money to you?

"Someday you will return," the man looked with interest at a young, attractive woman.

— Tell me, please, your address.

Why do you need my address?

- I'll send you money. Tell me, I'll be leaving soon.

"Tell me, what is your name?"

"Zoya Ivanovna," the woman answered and smiled.

The man took a closer look at his random companion.

— Zoya Ivanovna? ~ he repeated with irony. ~ Can't Zoenka?!

Zoya Ivanovna looked angrily at her interlocutor, measured him from head to toe with a stern look.

"You can't," and she went out the opened doors of the bus.

Three years have passed. The Soviet representative office of Intourist in Finland was headed by Zoya Ivanovna Rybkina. Work at Intourist gave her the opportunity to "legally" conduct intelligence work. Her duties, along with other tasks, included keeping in touch with our illegal employees.

Park on the outskirts of Helsinki. Undersized pines, huge, as if decorative, boulders left here from the ice age, cleanly cleaned paths. Zoya Ivanovna slowly walked into the depths of the park. In the hands - a small heavy suitcase, these are now called "attache-case". Breathe easily, the air is clean and fresh. And here is a lonely bench under a low, spreading pine. Here she must wait for the person who will come to meet her. They are unfamiliar. It is only known that it should be a man who will say: "Will you let me rest next to you?"

In a password, each word has its own meaning. Not only the meaning of the phrase, matched to a particular situation, but also the arrangement of words. After all, an ordinary person, a casual passer-by, will surely say: "You will let me rest ...", and this man should say: "You will let me rest ..." To this she should answer: "Please sit down, but I prefer loneliness".

A gust of wind rustled through the pine branches, and pine needles fell down onto the path. Zoya Ivanovna did not even notice from which side a tall, stout man appeared in front of the bench. He silently sat down next to her, carefully looked at her.

- Who is this? she thought warily. Why is he silent?

The man continued to stare at her, then, grinning, said:

- It's good to rest next to you.

"What is this? Only part of the password! Maybe it's a provocateur? No, he doesn't look like a provocateur..."

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And out loud, as sternly as possible, she said:

— What do you want?

"Will you let me rest next to you?"

"Please, sit down, but I prefer solitude," and added instructively: "Why did you mix up the password?"

- I didn't mix anything up. I just saw a pretty woman and decided to joke.

- Found a place for jokes! - Zoya Ivanovna pushed the suitcase towards the man and said: - This is money for you, check the amount.

The man put the suitcase on his knees, opened it, looked at the stacks of sealed banknotes and with a sigh said:

- This is not the full amount.

- How not complete? Zoya Ivanovna started up. – What we received from the Center, we completely hand over to you.

— No, — the man said calmly, but there were devils running in his eyes, — 15 kopecks are missing here.

– What 15 kopecks more?!

- Those same 15 kopecks that you owe me, Zoenka!

Suddenly hearing her name, and even spoken affectionately, with an arrangement, Zoya Ivanovna instantly remembered the snowy Moscow of 1935, the bus and the man who bought her a trolleybus ticket.

A tight lump rose in his throat. I wanted to throw myself on the neck of this person, who suddenly became so dear and close.

- What should I do? she said bewildered. - I again do not have 15 kopecks.

Zoya Ivanovna is a well-known writer, winner of the State and other awards, author of a large number of books translated into many languages of the world. In 1974, a three-volume edition of her works was published. She began her literary career only in 1955 after her retirement. Nevertheless, in 1979, in one of her diaries, she wrote: "To be generous in thoughts, meager in words, to look for my own paths to the heart of the reader, not yet traveled by anyone, to be always ahead of him - this is what I dreamed of and what I did not succeed".

Peru Z.I. Voskresenskaya owns the novel The Consul, two novellas, The Girl in the Stormy Sea and Zoya and Her Uncle Sanka, and many stories, such as, for example, The Nest on the Balcony, Orchestra, The Girl with braids", "Hawks", "Lazy Sun", "Petya the Mockingbird", etc.

Many of them have been reprinted three or even four times. Teachers and librarians in one voice pointed out that

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these small and large format books for preschoolers and primary schoolchildren with beautiful artwork were in the greatest demand among young readers.

I think that, despite the obviousness of her innate literary abilities, everything that Zoya Ivanovna wrote would not have been so deeply vital and truthful if it were not for the years devoted to intelligence. Let's take at least two examples. The time spent by Zoya Ivanovna in Finland before the war, and the novel "Consul" about the life of Soviet diplomats in this country. Or the difficult journey from England to Murmansk of a caravan of ships under fire from German aircraft and submarines, on one of which the writer had to be in the spring of 1944 - and the story "A Girl in a Stormy Sea", the heroine of which, under the funny boyish name Antoshka, is known for pain - for children and young readers.

The writer Voskresenskaya grew out of the scout Rybkina. The same irreconcilable, uncompromising character, the same sense of comradeship and loyalty to friendship. She didn't play tricks. And when in 1953 the question arose about the guilt or innocence of her friend Lieutenant General P.A.

Sudoplatova, she sacrificed her fate for the sake of the truth - she was sent (read: exiled) to further serve as the head of a special department in a prison camp in Vorkuta. It was there, in Vorkuta, that the writer woke up in Zoya Ivanovna. More and more often, she compared the usual ideas of the layman about intelligence with what she had to endure. Intelligence is not a dashing chase with a pistol in hand, not episodes in the spirit of the almighty Stirlitz, but a huge number of the simplest, everyday affairs, the hard, exhausting work of an analyst.

People who knew Zoya Ivanovna closely constantly advised her to write a book about her work in intelligence. But, according to her confession, secrecy always hung over her like a sword of Damocles. She said: "I don't know what to write about working in intelligence and what not." No wonder the literary critic I.P. Motyashov in his book about Z.I. Voskresenskaya "Zoya Voskresenskaya. Essay on Creativity" wrote:

"Now it's hard to remember exactly on what day Zoya Ivanovna put the typewriter on the table, tucked a blank sheet into the carriage and, thinking, typed the first phrase. Then, still not renouncing the surging thoughts, I read what was written and smiled. At the top of the sheet was printed: "Top Secret."

And yet, already being literally bedridden by illness, Zoya Ivanovna, carefully handling the same stamp "secret", writes a book about her life in intelligence, entitled it "Secret and Explicit". The book was published exactly one year after the writer's death.

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tsy, in January 1993, entitled "Now I Can Tell the Truth. From the memoirs of a scout.

I have no doubt that it was not the advice of friends and relatives that pushed the spy-writer to fulfill her old dream, but the numerous, large and small, truthful, and sometimes false articles and notes about her work in the KGB that appeared in the last years of her life. !. Zoya Ivanovna could not remain silent, and she told the truth.

Z.I. Voskresenskaya was born on April 28, 1907 in the city of Aleksin, Tula Region, in the family of a railway employee, assistant to the head of the Aleksino station. There were three children in the family: Zoya Ivanovna, the eldest, and two brothers, Nikolai (born in 1910) and Evgeny (born in 1913). Nikolai Ivanovich died at the front of the Great Patriotic War in 1944. Evgeny Ivanovich - Colonel, sapper by profession, lived in Vinnitsa in Ukraine. Father, Ivan Pavlovich, died in October 1920 from tuberculosis. After his death, the family moved to Smolensk, where Zoya Ivanovna lived until 1928, taking care of her brothers as a "junior mistress" of the house. She remembers how, together with her mother Alexandra Dmitrievna, she sewed coats for little brothers from her father's railway overcoat.

Already in 1921, at the age of 14, she went to work as a librarian in the 42nd battalion of the troops of the Cheka of the Smolensk province and became an employee of the ChON headquarters. The little librarian was proud of her work, and especially of the fact that the number of readers was gradually growing.

In 1923, Zoya Ivanovna went to work as a political instructor in a colony for juvenile delinquents in the village of Starozhishche near Smolensk. Although Zoya Ivanovna worked in the colony for only 4 years, many exciting episodes of the sensitive attitude of violators towards her were preserved in her memory ~ from the smallest to the oldest, 17-18 years old, while the teacher was 20.

At this time, Zoya Ivanovna had the idea to write a book about the life of juvenile delinquents in the colony. She collected the necessary material and set to work. But at that time, the famous "Pedagogical Poem" by A.S. Makarenko, and Zoya Ivanovna

burned all my notes.

In 1928, Voskresenskaya, already a candidate member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, went to work in the Zadneprovsky district committee of the party in Smolensk as the head of the accounting and administrative subdepartment of the organizational department. She was proud that she accepted party contributions from the future Marshal of the Soviet Union A.I. Egorova. And then...

Then the year 1930. Harbin. The summer humid stuffiness enveloped numerous shops and shops scattered throughout the city, made the passers-by, most of whom were Europeans, lethargic.

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Harbin is the center of the rich agricultural and forestry province of Heilongjiang in northeastern China on the Songhua River, a tributary of the Amur. The river near Harbin is very wide, muddy, with a large number of small and very tiny islands. At that time, one could still see blazing poisonous opium-poppy plantations along the banks of the river. In 1930, the population of Harbin barely reached 50,000 people.

Harbin appeared in 1898 on the site of a small fishing village. The impetus for the emergence and rapid development of the city was the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, initiated by Russia for strategic reasons. Here is located the administration of the CER, the Consulate General and other official representations of Soviet Russia.

Summer. Hot. It is humid near Songhua. A 23-year-old woman is riding a bicycle. She works as the head of the secret encryption department of the Soviet oil syndicate in Harbin. And her name, despite her youth, is by name and patronymic - Zoya Ivanovna.

The syndicate sold gasoline and other petroleum products to the Chinese. Its competitors are two Western firms: Standard and Shell. Zoya Ivanovna liked the emblem of the Shell company - a large beautiful shell. For a year now she has been living in Harbin with her mother and one and a half year old son Volodya.

When you pedal, you think well. I remembered Ivan Andreevich Chichaev, the head of the department in the Foreign Department of the OGPU, where before leaving for Harbin she was on an internship for two weeks. In 1928, she moved from Smolensk to her husband, who was attending party studies in Moscow. But she came to Moscow not just as a husband, but on a party ticket to work at the Pedagogical Academy named after N.K. Krupskaya. Then they took a job as a typist in the transport department of the OGPU at the Belorussky railway station.

In April 1929, he was accepted as a member of the party, and in August of the same year he was invited to the Lubyanka. She walked nervously, although she had been an employee of the OGPU for almost a year. I found the personnel department in the "gray" house, and an hour later I was already in the Foreign Department. Seeing Ivan Andreevich, she calmed down.

Ivan Andreevich, pouring tea, said: "Sit down at the table, scout," and grinned.

- What did you call me?

- Scout.

- I'm still a girl! – and, embarrassed, tilted her head.

- What a girl, that's right, - Ivan Andreevich stirred tea in a glass with a spoon and looked at her attentive eyes.

"Girl," he repeated seriously, "but intelligence will now be your profession, which means you are a scout." You will go to Harbin, - Chichaev took a sip of tea from a glass, - to work in the oil syndicate.

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The syndicate," continued Ivan Andreevich, "is your cover, it is only a legal opportunity for your intelligence work.

And so the training began. Passwords, testimonials, hiding places, safe houses... and other intelligence concepts. The internship was stormy, exciting, and passed quickly like a spring thunderstorm.

...biking becomes more difficult. Hard ground is increasingly replaced by rolled sand. Europeans are less common among passers-by, rickshaws appear. This is a suburb of Harbin, where the majority of the Chinese population lives. The Chinese are outwardly good-natured, smiling and bowing even to children. Women are not liked.

Zoya Ivanovna stopped and asked a passing European the street she needed. Sitting on the bicycle, she grimaced from the pain in her right leg, which was tightly bandaged below the knee. Just a week ago, she learned to ride a bike; neither in Smolensk nor in Moscow did she have to do this. And yesterday she fell and badly skinned her right leg. But this is exactly what will help her now to fulfill the task of the Center.

I remembered the celebration of my first birthday in Harbin. Her position and salary allowed her to support a domestic worker. But in Harbin, these duties were performed by men. They also had a housekeeper, who was called by the Russian name Misha. Meeting the guests, the Chinese Misha, addressing the men, constantly said: "Captain, captain ...", which meant "master" for him. He said to Zoya Ivanovna: "Madama Captain, Madama Captain ...", and this constantly made her smile,

"Here is the right street. House behind a small front garden. Having passed by, Zoya Ivanovna got off her bicycle. I looked around. I went into the bushes and removed the bandage. Tore it from the dried wound. And again, like yesterday, there was blood. She rubbed her leg around the wound with earth, hid the bandage in her purse, took the bicycle and, limping, headed for the gate of the house she had just passed. She entered the front garden, took a few hesitant steps towards the porch. A woman came out to meet. Zoya Ivanovna knew that she was 7 years older than her.

- God! What's wrong with you?

- Fell. Forgive me, for God's sake, I still don't know how to drive properly.

- Hurt?

- Mmm...

- Come over here. Sit down. I'll bring warm water and iodine now. Sit down, sit down.

Zoya Ivanovna sat down and saw the wide-open eyes of a girl of about four directed at her from the opposite side of the room.

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The girl held a large doll on her knees and, without blinking, looked at the guest. And she smiled at the girl, calmly looked around the room, shifted her gaze to her bleeding wound ... and turned cold: a small piece of thread from a torn bandage stuck to the dried edge of the wound. The girl asked as politely as possible:

- What is your name?

— Masha.

- Masha, what a beautiful doll you have! - and in her fingers she was already twisting a piece of bandage thread taken from her leg.

Mashenka's mother came in with a bowl of warm water in her hands and smiled:

"Now I'll clean your wound, and then...

... And then they drank tea, chatted like a woman about children, about life in Harbin, and did not say a word about their husbands.

Zoya Ivanovna returned to the city center at dusk. Not home, but to a safe house, to a house half of which was occupied by the head of the Harbin police. The task was completed - a good, friendly contact was established with a woman whose husband, one of the leading Soviet workers in Harbin, a month ago, leaving his family, fled to Shanghai, taking with him a large amount of government money.

..And then - frequent and truly friendly meetings with Masha's mother. Her confession to what her husband had done. Confessions of his illegal visits to Harbin to meet with his family. His agony and doubts. And finally, a meeting with him, the received consent to confess.

Zoya Ivanovna and her leadership fulfilled the promise given to the wife of the escapee that if he turns himself in, he will not be repressed. The money that he "carelessly" took from the state treasury was gradually paid out, and with his work, including for intelligence, the man restored his good name.

As she talked about this, Zoya Ivanovna clenched and unclenched her thin, senile hands into a fist.

"You know," she says, looking thoughtfully at her fingers, "once I could hardly unbend this fist.

"Tell me," I say.

— It was also in Harbin. My very first assignment. In the antique shop, the owner of which cooperated with us as a so-called mailbox, I was to receive a coded letter. I went there, called out the password, something related to porcelain Easter eggs, received a negative answer, examined the goods and left. And then one day the owner of the shop handed me a note. I clenched it convulsively in my fist and did not unclench it until I arrived at the residency. I'm not here for a long time

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could unclench her fist - her fingers became so numb that they could not unclench in any way.

"I returned from China to Moscow," recalls Zoya Ivanovna, "in February 1932. For some time she worked as the head of a department in the Foreign Department of the OGPU in Leningrad, supervised Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, but not for long, only a few months. Since that time, my whole life has been connected only with Europe. And you know," she brightens up, "when I worked in Leningrad, the head of the Foreign Department, that is, my immediate supervisor, was Andrey Pavlovich Fedorov. Yes, yes, the same Fedorov, who is so widely known for the sensational Trust case.

And Zoya Ivanovna, with tenderness, with unusual warmth, talks about Andrei Pavlovich, who in 1934-1935 personally prepared her for work in Finland.

From the East, fate transferred Zoya Ivanovna to the center of Europe - to Germany and Austria, and then to its north - to Finland and Sweden.

"The first time in Berlin," says Zoya Ivanovna, "I was in 1932. She stayed at Madame Rosa's boarding house on Unter der Linden near the Brandenburg Gate. The purpose of my trip was reconnaissance training and the study of the German language. I pretended to be my wife

non-Party specialist (as they used to say about technical specialists then), who came to Germany for medical treatment and entertainment”.

And in 1933, Zoya Ivanovna was already in Austria, living in Vienna in a hotel near Gedechniskirche.

“I was supposed to get married there,” Zoya Ivanovna laughs.

- How is it - married ?! I wonder.

- Fictitious, of course. I separated from my first husband, and met Boris Arkadyevich Rybkin later, already in Helsinki, where he came to work as a resident in 1936 under the guise of an embassy adviser. So, - Zoya Ivanovna tells further, - I had a legend: in Riga to get a Latvian passport, then to get married in Austria, to go with my “husband” to Turkey and quarrel on the way. After that, the “husband” must leave, and I was offered to stay in Turkey and open my own fashion salon there. I got to Vienna, but the marriage, although fictitious, did not take place: the “groom” did not come, - Zoya Ivanovna laughs.

Finland and Sweden are neighboring countries. In them, Zoya Ivanovna spent most of her overseas intelligence life: from 1935 to 1939 - in Finland, and from 1941 to 1944 - in Sweden.

Sweden has always maintained traditional neutrality towards the Soviet Union, although sometimes in some cases it retreated from it. In Finland, a few years before the start

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During the Second World War, German influence was noticeable both in politics and in the economy. The Soviet state made great efforts to maintain the neutrality of Sweden and Finland, but still failed to overcome the German influence on Finland.

By the time she left for Helsinki, Zoya Ivanovna had acquired considerable experience in intelligence work and had become a true professional.

Zoya Ivanovna was sent to Suomi as a deputy resident under the pseudonym Irina. Officially, she headed the Soviet representative office of Intourist in Helsinki and was known as “Madame Yartseva”.

“In 1936, Rybkin was sent as a resident to Finland. At that time, this state occupied, although not a key, but an important position in the strategic plans of Nazi Germany.

By this time, I had already been in Finland for 6-7 months, I managed to get acquainted with the country and our residency. The former resident was recalled to Moscow, and consul Yartsev, aka Rybkin, arrived instead. Came alone, without family. Very formal, fit, demanding.

At first, we didn't have a relationship. We argued about everything. I decided that we would not work together and asked the Center to recall me, in response I was ordered to help the new resident get in the know, and then return to this issue. But... there was no need to return. Six months later, we asked the Center to let us get married. I was a deputy resident, and we were afraid that the Center would not allow such “nepotism”. Moscow gave the go-ahead.

In Finland, Zoya Ivanovna maintained contact with our illegals and agents, collected information, including about Germany's plans for this country. Repeatedly for this purpose, she traveled from Helsinki to Stockholm.

The residency in Helsinki received a coded telegram instructing Irina personally to go to Stockholm and there to meet with an agent whom she did not know before. IN



The telegram indicated the password, identification signs of the agent, the time and place of the meeting - at the monument to Karl HP. And then: "We repeat – at the monument to Karl KhPI".

Zoya Ivanovna re-read the cipher telegram again and sighed with annoyance: is that right at the monument to Karl KhP or Karl KhPI? There is no time to ask Moscow, and is there a monument to Karl KhPI? After all, everyone knows the Swedish king Karl HP.

Arriving in Stockholm, Zoya Ivanovna checked herself and went to the square. Here it is, a monument to Karl HP. Stands in a sheepskin coat, shows

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with a sword to the east: from there, they say, danger threatens. The weather is good and sunny. There are benches around the monument, people are sitting. Almost all men read the Swedish newspaper Stockholm Tidningen (as in the cipher telegram), but no one has a German newspaper sticking out of his pocket (as it should be). The appointed time for the meeting came up, but the right person was not there. Zoya Ivanovna makes several circles near the monument to Karl KhP, so as not to attract other people's attention. And suddenly - oh horror! In the same square, 300 meters from the monument to Charles XII, there is a monument to Charles XIII. Having come to her senses, Zoya Ivanovna sits down on a bench near the monument to Karl KhPP. But even here there is no one who would read a Swedish newspaper, and a German one stuck out of his pocket. Zoya Ivanovna rushes back to the monument to Karl KhP. Nobody. Then back to the monument to Karl KhPI. Also no one. And so for half an hour with a stone on his heart from monument to monument.

Returning to the hotel, Zoya Ivanovna, as if after hard physical work, fell on the bed. In the evening — control meeting. Again she measures the distance from the monument to Charles XP to the monument to Charles XIII. Again he carefully looks to see if there are newspapers in the pockets and in the hands of men. Again, there is no right person.

And ahead is a sleepless night, a night of anxiety and self-flagellation: the task is frustrated. In the morning, Zoya Ivanovna goes to the Stockholm residency to confess what she has done. And there a new cipher telegram awaits her: "The task is cancelled. The agent won't show up. Go back to Helsingfors."

It's a shame!

The car slowly gathers dust in a sparsely populated wooded suburb of Helsinki. Here is a turn at a large boulder and a conspicuous rural fence made of poles. Andrew should be here.

Andriy is an illegal foreign intelligence officer who is on assignment from the Center to infiltrate the leadership of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). But Andrew is not there. The car makes another circle, and suddenly, sitting behind the wheel, Kin (Rybkin-Yartsev) laughs merrily when he sees a young guy with dark curly hair sitting on the poles of the fence and carelessly dangling his legs. Zoya Ivanovna was surprised at first by Kin's laughter and the appearance of a stranger at the meeting place with the illegal immigrant, but then she realized that it was Andrey and Kin knew him by sight.

In the future, Zoya Ivanovna independently held meetings with Andrei - Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, in the future a lieutenant general.

Once, while working in the library of Zoya Ivanovna, I drew attention to Anatoly Andreev's book "My Horse Runs", published by the publishing house "Political Literature" in 1987. On the first page of this book, I read the author's dedication to the mistress of the house:

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"In memory of dear Zoyushka, who took me off the fence. Pavel Sudoplatov.

While in Finland, Zoya Ivanovna studied Scandinavian culture with great interest, which gave the world many artists, writers and poets. She maintained good relations with the poetess Sinervo, the writers Martin Andersen-Nekso and Hella Vuolijoki,

journalist Miriam Rydberg and many other cultural figures. Zoya Ivanovna returned to Moscow before the winter war of 1939/1940. She was replaced by Yelisey Tikhonovich Sinitsyn as Deputy Resident in Finland.

After returning from Helsinki, Z.I. Voskresenskaya-Rybkina became one of the main management analysts. It was necessary to "guess" the date and direction of the developing Hitlerite aggression. The so-called "Zateya" case was opened. It got its name due to the fact that Stalin was skeptical about the information about the impending German attack on the USSR. This skepticism was intensified if the intelligence data was obtained by an intelligence officer declared an "enemy of the people". It was difficult, for example, to make sense of the contradictory information received from Berlin from Ambassador Dekanozov and from Resident Kobulov.

Hitler's Germany, wanting to refute the rumors about an impending attack on the USSR, decided to demonstrate loyalty to the Soviet-German treaty concluded in 1939 and sent to Moscow, which is very significant, not a political delegation, but a group of soloists from the Berlin Opera Ballet. In the middle of May 1941, the German embassy organized a reception on this occasion, to which the stars of our ballet were invited. Zoya Ivanovna was also present at the reception as a representative of the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. Here is how she describes one episode of that evening at the embassy in her book.

"... Dancing began. Schulenburg invited me to waltz nature.

A humorous mood came over me. My partner was attentive, polite, but could not hide his dejected state.

"Don't you think it's funny, Mr. Ambassador," I asked, "that we are dancing with you in the ballet troupe of the Bolshoi Theater?"

"Really funny," Schulenburg chuckled. "Unfortunately, this happens only once in a lifetime, and I am not ready for this."

"You don't like to dance?" I asked with naivety in my voice.

"I must admit, I don't like it, but I have to, I have to," Schulenburg emphasized once again.

And I suddenly felt some other meaning in his words, expressed with bitterness.

Dancing, we passed through a suite of rooms, and I noted in my memory that on the walls there were light, unyellowed squares from

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pictures taken. Somewhere at the end of the suite, just opposite the open door, there was a pile of suitcases.

Intuition did not deceive Zoya Ivanovna - less than a month later the war began.

I will name just a few of them: "Secrets of the KGB only for women" ("Interlocutor"), "Secrets of Trianon" ("Moskovsky Komsomolets"), "At the fatal line. Soviet intelligence on the eve of the war" ("Izvestia"), "I have grown in my heart to the Leninist theme" ("Working Way"), "Waltz on the Razor's Edge" ("Veteran").

2 Voskresenskaya Z.I. Now I can tell the truth. From the memories of times

witches. M., 1993. 3 Ibid.

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Before the storm

1933 In the political life of Germany, events took place that brought the world to the brink of the most bloody war in the history of mankind. On March 21, President Hindenburg officially handed over power in the country to Adolf Hitler. Fascism came to Germany.

By the beginning of 1934, the Nazis had established an authoritarian regime in the country. This entailed major changes in the organization of special services, primarily the police and counterintelligence, and led to a significant increase in their role in the state.

The significance of the events taking place in Germany for the security of the Soviet Union was growing.

After a relatively favorable environment for intelligence activities in the previous decade, determined by the Treaty of Rapallo, in new, more difficult conditions, a restructuring of the work of the residency was required. The task of revealing the specific plans of the Hitlerite leadership for preparing for a war against the USSR was put forward in the foreground in information work. By this time, the network of foreign residencies of Soviet intelligence in Europe had expanded significantly, and Berlin gradually ceased to play the role of a central intelligence base. However, the Berlin residence still remained one of the main ones for Soviet intelligence.

As early as November 2, 1932, the head of the INO A.Kh. Artuzov signed a decree on the reorganization of foreign intelligence. It said: "The restructuring of all intelligence and operational activities should be carried out on the basis of the possible switching of all work in the event of any complications from the "legal" rails (Berlin residency) exclusively to the underground.

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For this:

a) correctly distribute agents among illegal groups;

6) to organize intermediate points for the delivery of materials along the lines of both connection with the "legal" residency (Berlin) and the main connection with the Soviet Union;

c) prepare an underground leadership of illegal groups, providing for the creation of several illegal residencies.

As this work is carried out, the Berlin "legal" residency and the volume of its work are being gradually reduced. In this case, the center of gravity is transferred underground.

In fact, this work has already been carried out since 1931 with the active participation of resident B.D. Berman in Berlin, the head of the 3rd department of INO Steinbrueck - in the Center, as well as M.S. Kedrov, representative of the Center in Germany and other European countries. Steinbrück, in a memo addressed to Artuzov back in March 1931, proposed "to focus on the development and coverage of the activities of anti-Soviet parties and groups within Germany, in whose hands government institutions may fall."

Berman, in one of his first letters from Berlin in mid-April of the same year, recommended that "the (political) work on Berlin be transferred to the existing illegal residencies." The Center, responding, agreed that "everything purely

dangerous."

In September 1931, Berman reported: "It is necessary to create a group of recruiters of three people in the residency or with it. We must use this time to create large qualified agents, because events will unfold and, following the terror against the German Communist Party, the time may come when the relevant bodies will come to more concrete work with us. But then it will be too late to think about the organization of work."

On January 26, 1932, Steinbrück and Berman, in a joint note addressed to Artuzov, recommended: "Without delay, we reorganize all our work in Germany on completely different principles in order to take our entire apparatus as far as possible from counter-intelligence strikes (German, Polish, French). It was proposed, in particular, to create two posts outside Germany for the main workers of the Berlin station, who, according to the mobilization plan of the Center, should remain behind the cordon during the war.

Just a few days after Hitler came to power in Germany, on February 4, 1933, the Center sent a directive to Berlin, in which, based on the fact that "the new regime will do everything to reveal new evidence of our work as a trump card against the Union in negotiations in the West or with us", suggested the residency "to speed up the further restructuring of its activities".

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The results of this restructuring can be judged from the report of the 3rd (German) intelligence department for 1933, signed by Kedrov. It says: "As a result of the measures carried out by the National Socialist government (mass arrests, destruction of organizations and other repressions), our work was largely unaffected. We've lost two agents. Possaner, regardless of his connection with us, was arrested for his old sins against the NSDAP. Our source A-210, a former communist, was also arrested."

"Thanks to the timely measures taken," wrote Kedrov, "we avoided any complications in our work. All of our agencies work exclusively in illegal conditions."

Before the fascists came to power, coverage of Germany's foreign policy activities was not a primary task of intelligence, and therefore it was formulated in a general way - to develop and expose "nationalist work in Germany against the USSR" and to obtain political information. In this regard, by the beginning of 1933, the residency had good results. However, already in the first months of 1933, the work of the residency became extremely complicated, and it suffered the first losses among its connections and sources of information.

In this regard, the residency received instructions from the Center to limit work with sources of information. Nevertheless, as follows from the report of the INO OGPU for 1933, the Berlin residency received 12 most important documents and information from the German Foreign Ministry alone, including: Hitler's instruction to the German delegation in Geneva on the position regarding the British Hitler's conversations with Ambassador Nadolny, who was appointed to Moscow, on questions of Eastern policy, information about Hitler's intention to carry out the rearmament of Germany without permission, and a number of other materials. Some information about the Nazi Party also continued to come in.

In June 1933, Boris Davydovich Berman finished his work as a resident in Berlin. By the end of the year, he was replaced by Boris Moiseevich Gordon, who headed the residency until 1937. Boris Moiseevich had extensive experience in military and political work behind him. From 1918 to 1926, he held command and political positions in the Red Army, then until 1931 he was in party work, after which he studied at the Institute of Red Professors with a degree in world economy and world politics.

At the beginning of 1934, the army, the police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NSDAP were identified as the main objects of Soviet intelligence in Germany, and by the end of the year the Center set the task for the residency to infiltrate the entourage of Hitler, Goering and Minister of War Blomberg. In particular, it was pointed out that it was necessary to acquire sources of information about secret military

political agreements

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and agreements between Germany and other capitalist countries directed against the USSR.

The residency was also asked to acquire sources of information to cover the situation in the markets for bread, timber, oil, and furs.

Scientific and technical intelligence was considered as one of the main areas of work. The residency was supposed to obtain information about the latest types of military equipment, as well as to identify the plans of German concerns to deploy hostile activities on the territory of the USSR. For this purpose, the residency was recommended to ensure the creation of an agent network in the concerns Siemens, AEG, IG Farbenindustri, Krupp, Junkers, Rheinmetall, Bamag, Man, Zeiss.

The new resident energetically and professionally set to work, and under his leadership the decline in the work of the residency, caused by the aggravation of the situation in the country in 1933-1934, was rather quickly overcome. As early as 1935, work on the acquisition of new sources of information was noticeably intensified. And 1936 can be considered the peak of the residency. It had sources in the most important sites in Germany and obtained valuable information about the internal political situation in the country, the situation in the NSDAP, the Hitlerite leadership, aspirations and military preparations in the country. The residency covered the economic situation in Germany, contributed to the conclusion of profitable trade deals with German companies, and also carried out work to identify the subversive activities of German concerns against the USSR

In 1935 alone, the residency recruited 13 sources for political cooperation. Among them, an employee of the Ministry of Economy, Arvid Harnak, who became one of the leaders of the anti-fascist organization of the Resistance, deserved special attention. Later, through him, a number of other valuable sources of information were acquired, which made up the intelligence group, which became known as the "Red Chapel".

"Analysis of the work of the Berlin apparatus of the foreign intelligence agencies in 1933-1931," says one of the archival documents of that time, "shows that the operational combination of intelligence work from "legal" and illegal positions gave positive results in a difficult agent-operational situation in Germany after fascism came to power. Our intelligence apparatus not only managed to avoid failures and ensure the active work of the agents, but also to achieve positive results in the recruitment of sources of information ... The residencies acquired agents in the National Socialist Party, among the leadership of anti-Soviet emigre organizations, and employees of special services. Scientific and technical intelligence managed to acquire a lot of valuable agents.

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The revival in the work of the residency continued until 1937, until the moment when a wave of political repressions began in the USSR. In May 1937, the head of the Berlin residency B.M. Gordon was summoned to Moscow and soon repressed. At the same time, the head of the INO branch for Germany and many employees of this unit were dismissed from work. Almost all the residency staff were withdrawn from Berlin. Many of them suffered the fate of B.M. Gordon.

In this situation, in May 1937, the residency was headed by Alexander Ivanovich Agayants, transferred from the Parisian residency. Until 1926, Alexander Ivanovich was at party work in Azerbaijan, then he studied at the Institute of National Economy named after G.V. Plekhanov, and since 1926 he was a staff member of the OGPU. In 1934-1937 Agayants worked in Paris.

Berlin residency A.I. Agayants did not lead for long: in December 1938 he died on the operating table. He had a short but very difficult period of residency activity. It was in 1937-1938 that, as a result of political repressions in the USSR, the residency was drained of blood: if in 1935 the residency consisted of 16 employees, and in 1936 - from 10, then by 1938 only 3 employees remained in it. Work with sources of information, and above all with valuable ones, had to be carried out by the resident himself. Active assistance was provided to him by his wife Anna.

On the threshold of 1939, 2 operational workers remained in the residency without a resident. Work with almost all sources, including the most valuable ones, was terminated on the grounds that they were known to intelligence officers, "exposed" as "enemies of the people." The new resident arrived in Berlin only 9 months later - in September 1939. He was Beria's protégé A.Z. Kobulov. Kobulov worked in the authorities from 1929, and in 1938-1939, before being appointed to Berlin, he was Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR.

The new resident began work at the time when Nazi Germany attacked Poland and the Second World War began. At that time, Soviet foreign intelligence focused all its efforts on obtaining reliable information about the plans of Nazi Germany in relation to the Soviet Union and about its military preparations.

In the assignment of the Center to the Berlin resident in December 1940, it was stated: "You need to study and "develop" the personnel of the institutions of interest to us by all available official and undercover means ... the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ribbentrop Bureau, the foreign policy and foreign departments of the NSDAP, Ministries of Propaganda, Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Security Police, Party Leading Establishments, Organizations Studying the USSR or Created to Maintain Economic and Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union.

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Of great importance was the Center's instruction to restore the sources of valuable information mothballed in 1937-1938. At the end of 1940, an experienced intelligence officer Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov arrived in Berlin. He worked in the OGPU since 1928, spoke German and French, was twice illegally employed in Europe, and worked briefly in Germany in 1936-1937. He immediately fell on a significant part of the work from the source  
nicknames.

In the same year, another scout arrived at the residency - Boris Nikolaevich Zhuravlev. Only 4 intelligence officers worked with him in Berlin.

By the beginning of 1941, the residency managed to achieve some revival in work. A serious acquisition of the residency was an employee of the operational department of the headquarters of the German Air Force, Air Lieutenant Harro Schulze-Boysen, who, like Arvid Harnack, led the underground group of the anti-fascist Resistance.

Despite all the complexities of the political situation and the rigidity of the police regime, the Berlin station as a whole coped with the task of providing the country's leadership with information about Germany's preparations for war against the Soviet Union.

The reader will be able to learn more about how the Berlin residency worked in the pre-war years from a number of essays in this volume.

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Detective Bureau of Pan Kovalchik

On a small street in old Berlin, far from the city center, there is a two-story mansion, near the entrance to which you can see an old sign, green with time: "Pan Kowalczyk's detective bureau". A few passers-by pay attention to her: "Pana? Why? This is Berlin, not Warsaw!"

In the old house, which had not been repaired for a long time, there really was a detective bureau, in which, besides the owner himself, three people worked.

The owner of the detective bureau had an interesting biography. He was born in 1878 in the Ukraine into a family of German colonists and bore a German surname. Studied as an agronomist in Kyiv, Danzig, and

later in Belgium. Before the First World War, he was engaged in farming in Ukraine, owned a mill and an oil mill. In addition, he dealt with timber trade and stock exchange operations in Germany.

In 1914, as a German, he was expelled from Kyiv to Odessa. But with the arrival of German troops in Ukraine, they were enlisted in the field police and sent to serve as an interpreter to the head of the Kiev Criminal Investigation Department. From Kyiv, Kovalchik, who was then still living under his German surname, again moved to Odessa, where he also worked in the criminal investigation department, but no longer as a translator, but as a detective. Having gained experience as a detective, he left for Poland. In his statement to the representative of the League of Nations in Warsaw, he wrote on November 20, 1921: "I have certificates from the Odessa and Kiev Criminal Investigation Departments, as well as from the defensive section of the 2nd Polish Army, from which I was dismissed due to the liquidation of the institution. Drawing attention to my knowledge of languages (Polish, Ukrainian, French, German and Russian), I would ask for a position in one of the private bureaus of detectives in the West, because in Poland there are no such institutions, and private practice is not allowed".

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In the early 1920s, under the name Kovalchik, he settled in Berlin, where he opened an information and detective bureau, made useful and necessary contacts in the police presidium, police stations, consulates, and began to work.

In 1925, Kowalczyk, on his own initiative, established contact with our residency in Berlin. The basis for this was the fact that Kovalchik presented to the Soviet plenipotentiary materials exposing the falsifier of the so-called "documents of the Comintern" Druzhilovsky. At the same time, he reported it to the police presidium.

The residency became interested in Kovalchik. Why not establish a conspiratorial relationship with him and use a secret private detective agency? After all, one has so often to look for the right people, to carry out "installations"!, to conduct surveillance. In agreement with the Center, the decision was made.

Since then, for over 12 years, the Berlin residency has made extensive use of the capabilities of Pan Kovalchik on a material basis: it carried out "installations" and monitored persons of interest to it, and also checked through the detective bureau, which was headed by this experienced detective, many people leaving for work in the USSR.

Valerian, an employee of the Berlin residency, who met with him for a long time, described Kowalczyk in 1935 as follows: "Tall, regular and slender build, 57 years old, but looks much younger than his age, blond, blue or gray eyes." The intelligence archives preserved a description that Kovalchik gave to his assistant, recommending him to us as his deputy: "40 years old, married, has a son 5 years old, Catholic, member of the Union of Reserve Officers, owns his own intermediary bureau, was in prison for fraud, savvy, sly, resourceful, has good manners, knows how to use fictitious titles and titles as needed, is a rogue, but appreciates good pay.

He does not sympathize with the Nazis. As a Catholic, he is hostile to them, but outwardly he is their supporter, holding his fist in his pocket.

It can be defined by the words: [ipye] (a Berliner who has gone through fire and water).

In private life, on the side of relatives and close acquaintances, he is a dude, he likes to ask questions in fashionable cafes and restaurants in an elegant outfit, in white gaiters and with a monocle in his eye. He plays pranks with women, but keeps silent about this, he is not fond of them. He worked for me since 1929, was sent to Czechoslovakia and Austria, got the hang of intelligence. spy guy

suitable. How it will manifest itself, being an independent business without supervision, I can't say."

To a certain extent, this characteristic reflects the features of Kowalczyk himself.

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Pan Kowalczyk and his bureau carried out tasks not only for the Berlin residency, but also for the Center, and not only in Germany, but also in neighboring countries. For these purposes, the detective bureau acquired a car with the help of the Center.

On February 12, 1934, a telegram arrived from Berlin to the Center, which reported the results of Kovalchik's regular residency assignments and made a proposal to transfer him to the illegal residency, which was headed by V.M. Zarubin.

And suddenly, on January 21, 1935, while carrying out the task of installing an employee of the Anti-Comintern Bureau, the police detained one of the employees of the Kowalczyk Bureau. During interrogation, he said that he was interested in this man on the instructions of his boss. On the same day, Kovalchik was also arrested. He testified during interrogation that a certain Schroeder asked to carry out the installation. Why does he need it? The detective bureau is private, they don't ask such questions to clients there. Kowalczyk cannot say who Schroeder is or where he lives.

After sitting in the police for about a month, the bureau chief was released, giving a subscription that he would try to find this Schroeder, and this, at least in part, to make amends.

The arrest of Kovalchik alerted both the Berlin residency and the Center. After his release from prison, Valerian, an operative, was sent from the Center to Berlin, the same one who had previously kept Kovalchik in touch. The concern of the Center was quite understandable, given that before recruitment, all agents of the Berlin residency were checked through Kovalchik, including one very valuable agent in the Berlin Gestapo, nicknamed "Breitenbach".

Valerian met with Kovalchik and his staff, talked to them in detail, and reported the results to the Center. He expressed the idea that, despite what had happened, Kowalczyk could be trusted. The resident in Berlin reacted sharply to Valerian's report. He wrote from the Berlin Center: "We believe that Kowalczyk and his collaborator have been recruited, and we have no right to keep in touch with them, to jeopardize the work of the entire residency." At the end of the letter, however, there was a postscript: "If we get a case against Kowalczyk from Breitenbach from the police, then the situation will be much clearer. Then we will decide the issue of working with Kovalchik. Of course, you can't show distrust towards him."

In the future, the resident of the "legal" residency in Berlin reacted more calmly to the events that had taken place, especially after a personal meeting with Pan Kowalczyk. In his letters to the Center, he agreed that there were a number of suspicious moments in Kowalczyk's behavior, but one cannot but assume that Kowalczyk is telling the truth about his time in the police, cutting off only some sharp corners that are not of decisive importance. He even expressed the idea that it is possible to restore and even expand cooperation with Kowalczyk, without waiting for what Breitenbach might report.

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Breitenbach made the first inquiries about Kowalczyk very carefully. According to V.M. Zarubin, who was in contact with Breitenbach at the time, the Kowalczyk case should have been allowed to "cool down" in order to cope with the task with less risk.

Valerian remained in Berlin and met several times with Kowalczyk and his men, rechecking the details of what had happened. Before leaving for Moscow, he left Kovalchik and his assistant with the conditions of communication in case of an emergency.



By this time, Breitenbach had managed to make inquiries with the Gestapo. On June 27, 1935, he informed V.M. Zarubin that "there are no traces in the police about the arrest of Kovalchik and his friend. The case is not in the archive, as well as their names in the file cabinet. "Breitenbach", experienced in these cases, made an assumption: "It is possible that during recruitment the case was finally withdrawn from circulation. The investigation continues."

On July 9 of the same year, Breitenbach managed to look through the Gestapo dossier and reported that Kowalczyk became known to his employees in connection with the case of Druzhilovsky, who left a suitcase with false documents in his office, about which Kowalczyk informed the police. (Kowalczyk also reported the fakes to the Soviet trade representative, but the Gestapo did not know about this.) In addition, the police questioned the source of Kovalchik's income, and therefore he was under surveillance for some time. However, in the absence of other data, the "development" of the chief of the detective bureau by the Germans was soon stopped. Nevertheless, the residency also decided to temporarily mothball work with Kowalczyk.

After some time, they decided to continue working with Kovalchik, using the conditions of communication that Valerian had left. But no one came to the meeting. At the same time, letters began to arrive from Kovalchik to the USSR embassy in Berlin, in which he asked to settle relations with him. Naturally, this was reported to the Center, which offered to send Kovalchik a certain amount of money and invite him to Moscow, which was done. A few days later, Kovalchik sent a lengthy letter to Moscow through the embassy, in which he informed about his position and the position of his employees. The meaning of the letter boiled down to the fact that Kovalchik and his group were ready to continue to carry out the tasks of Soviet intelligence. And the letter ended with the following words: "I ask you to authorize an intelligent person to investigate the case in Berlin, and then, if necessary, demand me to Moscow. In vain there is nothing to take me to the expense. From the Germans, being guilty, he shrugged off, they did not hang him. It would be stupid if, for no reason at all, without understanding, they shot their innocent.

"And having figured it out, I ask you to give me a job or pay liquidation money, giving me the opportunity to arrange an existence for myself not on a wanted list and be useful to you along the way."

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Kowalczyk determined the liquidation amount for his bureau at 500 pounds sterling, that is, 1% of all amounts paid to him for the entire time of cooperation with us.

The opinion of the resident from Berlin, which accompanied Kowalczyk's letter, boiled down to two points. "The first is to try to continue working with Kowalczyk. The second is to pay him a certain amount and, in the words of Kowalczyk himself, break up with him on good terms. "I," the resident wrote further, "spoke out, while still in Moscow, for the first path." "After all, we must not forget," he continued, "that almost all of our agents with whom we worked here in the past and with which we are working now were established and checked through him."

Speaking in favor of continuing work with Pan Kovalchik, the resident, of course, had in mind work with him in Germany by the Berlin residency, but the Center decided otherwise and gave the command to Berlin: to transfer Kovalchik to the resident in Stockholm, Baevsky, who had previously worked with Kowalczyk in Berlin.

Reluctantly, the resident in Berlin, Rudolf, complied with this instruction. "I am very sad," he wrote to one of the leaders of the Center, Artyom, "to state that you did not find it possible to take into account my opinion, although I know better from here, and I remained at the same statement that one should not aggravate relations with this person."

In accordance with the instructions received, Kovalchik contacted Baevsky in Stockholm. However, it was not possible to arrange the work, although the resident tried with all his might to fulfill the instruction of the Center: "Under no circumstances should we give a reason to think that we do not trust him." Despite Baevsky's great respect for Kovalchik, the old detective felt out of place. He wrote bitterly in December 1935: "Suspiciousness, caution, circumspection, fear,

mistrust. These qualities, inherent in the detective and spy, necessary and useful in their work to identify the enemy, become disastrous for themselves, worming their way into their professional environment. The only thing Kowalczyk asked at that time was "to give him a job and make sure that it was carried out in good faith and of high quality."

And thanks to the sincerity of Kovalchik and his desire to work, things really got better. He skillfully conspired regular trips to Stockholm, although there was a certain difficulty in this. This continued until July 1937, when Baevsky left Stockholm for Moscow and contact with Kovalchik ceased altogether.

Already in 1941, before the war with Germany, Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev, head of the German branch of the INO, compiled a detailed report on Pan Kovalchik, which assessed his work for Soviet intelligence. The handbook specifically stated:

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"Kovalchik carried out our tasks with great skill, and his work with us was highly appreciated at the Center." In Moscow, they changed their minds: there was not a single failure of agents, to which Kovalchik would have been related to one degree or another. They decided to restore contact with him, but ... the war interfered, and only in June 1945 was it possible to do this. And again on his own initiative. It is amazing, but true: a German, born in Russia, who collaborated with Soviet intelligence for many years and was arrested by the Gestapo on suspicion of this, experienced distrust of those whom he served faithfully, survived the war while in Germany, again reached out to Moscow.

The collaboration, however, was short-lived. Kovalchik was in his 70s. His health was undermined, although he made far-reaching plans, he recommended new employees to his detective bureau.

In a short essay, it is impossible to describe everything that Kovalchik and his bureau did for Soviet intelligence over the long years of cooperation. But one example can show the nature of the work performed by him.

A young German woman named Dorothea came to the attention of Soviet intelligence officers in Berlin. At one of the parties, the girl had conversations, from which it was clear that she was related to the circle of Russian people involved in politics. At the beginning of 1932, the Berlin residency instructed Pan Kovalchik to "identify" this girl, find out her last name, first name, year and place of birth, and collect characterizing information. Kovalchik and his comrades set to work.

Dorothea's "installation" led to unexpected results: the center of Russian emigrants who were in the service of the Gestapo was opened. Some time later, Kowalczyk presented the following message: "Dorothea von Gossler, 22 years old, daughter of a former chamberlain of the court, owner of an estate near Zittau. He is the secretary of the secret political bureau, located in Berlin at Sedanstrasse, 26. The owner of the political bureau is a certain Kurt Jahnke. His bureau is a place for underground work, behind-the-scenes intrigues and intelligence. The case is being handled confidentially. There are many Russians among the employees of this political bureau. Janke's bureau is frequented by all sorts of people waiting for an appointment in a restaurant opposite the bureau, which bears the comical name "Across the way", apparently given to it by Russian people. During the last months, Janke traveled to Warsaw and Lvov several times. Janke is in constant contact with the Gestapo. He goes there every day in his car at 12 o'clock in the afternoon and spends 2-3 hours or more there. From the Gestapo people go to the Janke Bureau. The journalist Fenner, who is connected with the Reichswehr Ministry and, together with Sergei Vengerov, tries to establish contact with Ukraine, in particular with the city of Kharkov, visits the Janke political bureau almost daily. Fenner's financial situation is good. Fenner also frequents the Gestapo building."

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In response to this message, a request came from the Center: "We ask, through Kovalchik, to "develop" Janke, finding out his connections in the USSR and through whom he is working there." Kowalczyk later reported that "Janke is in touch with the big Nazi Rosenberg. Goes to meet him at the Adlon Hotel. Janke is working in favor of bringing Germany closer to Poland and Western Ukraine to the detriment of the USSR." to this was added a list of Russian people who fled after the revolution from Russia and collaborated with anti-Soviet organizations in [Germany and with the Gestapo.

Later, at the request of the Center, in addition to Kovalchik, Breitenbach was connected to the "development" of Janke. He was instructed to study the activities of Janke and his political bureau by the Gestapo. "Breitenbach" in 1933 managed to obtain a copy of the report of the crime commissar Geller, which, in particular, stated: "The Foreign Ministry informed Department 1 about the resumed activity of certain individuals in the manufacture of fakes since the middle of last year. Notified about this Kurt Janke, who works for the Foreign Ministry in the field of intelligence.

Janke links:

- Pavlovsky-Sumarokov;

- Former Russian captain von Petrov, calling himself Jonas, an editor associated with him is a certain Tatarinov-Tarr;

- Former Russian Captain Nepochny, who previously worked for the German "Eastern Bureau of Sievert" (a cover for the German intelligence unit that worked against the USSR - Auth.)."

And soon after the Nazis came to power in Germany, the Berlin residency received information from Breitenbach and Kowalczyk that "a whole group of former emigrants had been poured into the motorized units of the Gestapo." The Gestapo leadership expected that "these white Russians will show their devotion in the fight with special zeal."

Other messages came from Kowalczyk. All of them, as well as the letters to the embassy in Berlin and Stockholm, were boldly signed with a pseudonym: "Von der Goltz."

The case of using a private detective bureau in the work of the Berlin residency is, in fact, unique. In the future, despite the significant results achieved in the work with Kovalchik, foreign intelligence did not turn to such methods as insufficiently reliable and secret. What is told in the essay refers to the initial period of its history, when Soviet intelligence was undergoing its first tests.

! That is, to collect basic information on persons of interest to intelligence, including biographical data, characteristics at the place of work, find out marital status, etc.

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"Breitenbach"

At the end of June 1940, in darkened Berlin, which was expecting a British air raid, an unknown visitor threw a letter addressed to the military attache or his deputy into the mailbox of the USSR embassy. The author of the letter suggested restoring contact with him that had been interrupted in 1939. "If this is not done," he wrote, "then my work in the Gestapo will lose all meaning." The letter indicated the password for the phone call, the place and time of the meeting.

From the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, where the letter was received, it was sent to the leadership of foreign intelligence with a note: "Perhaps this is about a person who interests you." Deputy Chief of Intelligence P.A. Sudoplatov imposed a resolution on him addressed to the employees of the German intelligence department: "Zhuravlev, Korotkov. Do you know him? Did comrade Zarubin speak neo-nem?"

Zhuravlev, having looked at the case file, realized that he was talking about a very valuable agent who had long been associated with the Berlin residency. Based on the available materials, he compiled a certificate that stated: "During the time of cooperation with us from 1929 without interruption until the spring of 1939, Breitenbach handed over to us an extremely abundant amount of original documents and personal messages that illuminated the structure, personnel and activities of the political police (later the Gestapo), as well as the military intelligence of Germany. "Breitenbach" warned of upcoming arrests and provocations against illegal and "legal" residency workers in Berlin... interested in..." The certificate noted that, judging by the materials of the case, the intelligence never had any doubts about the honesty of the agent.

The GU Directorate - the secret state police, or Gestapo - occupied a key place in the imperial department created by Hitler.

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security ve RSHA (an abbreviation of the German name for this institution). The Gestapo was entrusted with the task of studying the enemy and fighting him. The RSHA was headed by the Reichsführer SS Himmler, and his right hand was Heydrich, who oversaw the work of the yU management. His office was in a room separated by a small lawn from the main Gestapo building on Albrechtstrasse, where Willy Lehmann, known in the Center as "Breitenbach", worked. Most of the documents [of the department, including daily reports, printed only in two copies (one for Heydrich, the other for the acquaintance of the leading employees of the department), passed through the hands of our agent.

Heydrich's closest assistant, Walter Schellenberg (later, in 1941-1945, the chief of German intelligence) in October 1939 created a new department of the IUE in the RSHA, which faced mainly counterintelligence tasks. He appointed Leman, a counterintelligence officer with twenty-five years of experience, as the head of one of the divisions in this department.

Lehman was entrusted with the counterintelligence support of the German military industry. In this capacity, he maintained contacts with many heads of defense enterprises, was aware of all their affairs.

In early 1941, Schellenberg, with the support of Himmler and Heydrich, began a deep restructuring of the German counterintelligence and intelligence services for waging war in the East. This work also took place in front of our agent.

Since the beginning of 1941, military installations under construction, including those in the East, were under the jurisdiction of Leman.

The intelligence leadership decided to resume work with the agent. Contact with Lehman was restored by leaving for Berlin in early September 1940, Korotkov. Thus began the second period of Breitenbach's work with Soviet intelligence. The importance attached by the Center to the restoration of communication with Breitenbach is evidenced by the fact that already on September 9, 1940, Beria personally sent instructions to Berlin on the main directions of work with him. The main attention in the telegram was drawn to issues of secrecy and security: "No special tasks should be given to Breitenbach, but for the time being, everything that is within its immediate capabilities should be taken, and in addition, what will be known about the work of various intelligence services. against the USSR in the form of non-returnable documents and personal reports of the source. At the same time, the Center offered the residency to select a messenger to deliver the materials, as well as organize their photographing on the spot.

In the 30s, Leman did a lot for our intelligence. His contribution to ensuring the security of intelligence operations and the activities of Soviet institutions in Germany was invaluable. Good

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giving him the work of our scouts was insured against any surprises. It is enough to carefully read the extensive report "On Soviet subversive activities against Germany", transmitted by Breitenbach, presented by Heydrich to Himmler on June 10, 1941, to make sure that the Hitlerite leadership did not have at its disposal any serious data on the operation - Walkie-talkies of Soviet intelligence in Germany.

It can be seen from the archival materials that Leman did not miss a single serious case of measures being prepared by counterintelligence against Soviet representatives and institutions and promptly informed the Soviet side about them. As a result, the Berlin residency actually had no failures - a very rare phenomenon in the history of intelligence, given that the work was carried out under a strict counterintelligence regime.

Who was Willy Lehman? How and why did he link his fate with Soviet intelligence?

Willy Lehmann was born in 1884 in the Leipzig region (Saxony) in the family of a teacher. He mastered the craft of a carpenter, and at the age of 17 he voluntarily entered the Navy, where he served for over 10 years and was demobilized with the rank of foreman-artilleryman. Been on many long trips. During one of them, he witnessed the naval battle of Tsushima.

In 1911, Lehmann was hired by the Berlin police. At first he was an ordinary policeman, but soon, as a capable employee, he was transferred to the counterintelligence department at the police presidium of Berlin. During the First World War, Leman proved himself to be a skilled counterintelligence officer. Having undergone special training, since 1920 he acted as the duty officer in charge of the department, was aware of all correspondence of the department, distributed cases between employees, reported to superiors on the results of work, held daily meetings with junior officials, and personally conducted especially important investigations. , traveled to military maneuvers for covert observation of foreign officers.

One of Leman's old colleagues and friends was fired from the department and left without a livelihood. Friends turned away from him, his wife left him. Leman did not leave his friend in trouble, he helped him financially. And one day he advised him, in search of a source of income, to offer his services to the Soviet embassy, which he did. A year later, having made sure that contact with the Russians was safe, Leman himself established contact with them.

On September 7, 1929, the Center informed the Berlin residency: "Your new A / 201 ("Breitenbach") interested us very much. Our only fear is that you have climbed into one of the most dangerous places where, with the slightest carelessness on the part of A/201 or A/70 (friend

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Leman) many troubles can come. We consider it necessary to study the issue of a special method of communication with A/201."

The residency replied: "... the danger that may threaten in case of failure is fully taken into account by us, and the receipt of materials from the source is furnished with maximum precautions." However, a problem soon arose, over which Artuzov, Berman and Seely had to rack their brains more than once. The thing was that Leman's friend used to, having received money, squander it in 2-3 days, losing it at cards, visiting nightclubs, and in the morning and pubs in the working-class districts of Berlin, where he generously treated the unemployed.

"Breitenbach" did not doubt his devotion, but expressed fears that he might break loose and let everyone down.

Leman had a detailed conversation with his friend. The latter, Leman reported, "despite his composure and self-confidence, is still afraid and is not averse to disappearing from Berlin."

In order to strengthen the conspiracy, the residency decided to completely take Leman away from his friend, who was picked up by a suitable cover - a store, and he began to complete tasks

of an installation nature, having nothing to do with the work of the residency with Lehman.

In the meantime, Leman's reconnaissance capabilities were expanding. In the spring of 1930, he was entrusted with the "development" of the Soviet embassy. It prepared consolidated reports on the subject on the basis of all submissions. At the end of 1932, all cases of Polish espionage, which at that time were of particular interest to Soviet intelligence, were transferred to his department. These cases were led by Captain Abt, who arrived from East Prussia. Abt also dealt with cases of "Soviet economic espionage". He often consulted with Leman. Good relations developed between them.

At the beginning of 1933, after Hitler came to power, a department was set up in Lehmann's department to combat "communist espionage" headed by Fischer, who gathered around him officials with old connections in the organizations of the German Communist Party.

By that time, the Berlin residency had carried out a serious purge of its agent network, first of all, getting rid of persons who were known for their left-wing views and could fall into the field of view of counterintelligence. Despite this, the work became more and more difficult. Lehman warned that caution is needed now more than ever.

On April 26, 1933, Göring established the state secret police (Gestapo), which was merged with the Lehmann department. So our agent ended up in the Gestapo.

After these changes, Lehman's positions were further strengthened. He was offered to join the Nazi Union of Officials. He didn't rush

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however, with an answer, very opportunely recalling that since the post-war years he has been a member of the union of former participants in the war in the colonies.

On instructions from the Center, in March 1933, Lehmann visited the Moabit prison where Ernst Thälmann was kept and informed the residency about the conditions of his detention. He also handed over a list of persons to be arrested by the Gestapo or deported.

The Nazis hinted to Leman that he would soon be promoted for his good service.

On April 20, 1934, Hitler's birthday, Lehmann was promoted and accepted into the SS.

At that time, an illegal immigrant officer, who was in contact with Leman, left the country without a replacement. Temporarily, an employee of the "legal" residency, Izrailovich, began to meet with him. Protecting the agent, the Center forbade Izrailovich to accept any documentary or printed materials from Leman. All information, prescribed by the Center, should be obtained only orally until the moment the agent is handed over for communication to illegal immigrants.

On June 30, 1934, in the morning, Izrailovich held an emergency meeting with Leman. It was on the eve of the "night of long knives" - the massacre of E. Rehm, G. Strasser and other former supporters, and now opponents of Hitler.

Goering that day invited Lehman, among other employees, to open his country villa, thus diverting them from participating in the massacre.

In 1934, V.M. arrived in Berlin. Zarubin, a new illegal resident. In the directive of the Center on working with Leman, Zarubin was asked to continue using his opportunities to cover the activities of the Gestapo, to recommend the agent to get closer to the Abwehr workers, to consider the question of how to obtain documentary materials from him again. Soon the Center received an order to obtain the texts of the Gestapo telegrams for our decryption service. Leman completed this task. At the beginning of 1935, in connection with the arrest of the rocket designer Zänker, the Center asked: "Can Breitenbach give us technical details about these

missiles? It is possible that drawings, descriptions, etc. were taken away during the arrest." Dangerous and urgent was Leman's task to find out whether the two sources of residency arrested by the Gestapo had been recruited. Leman also fulfilled these tasks conscientiously.

In the spring of 1935, at a meeting, Zarubin drew attention to Lehman's unhealthy appearance. He reported to the Center that "Breitenbach" had worsened kidney disease, which had taken on a rather serious character due to diabetes. He brought his information by calling Zarubin to an emergency meeting, being absolutely sick. Berman, the deputy chief of intelligence, replied: "Breitenbach, of course, be sure to help. He must be saved at all costs. Important

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only that the expenditure of large sums of money for treatment should be appropriately legalized or organized in such a way that large sums of money would not come to light during the inspection. Be sure to take this into account."

Treatment helped Leman overcome the crisis, but exacerbations of diabetes periodically made themselves felt.

At the end of 1935, at the request of the residency, a passport was made for Lehman, which gave him the opportunity, if necessary, to urgently leave the country. At the same time, conditional signals were worked out, which the agent would give in the event that a raid on the Soviet embassy or the arrest of an employee of the trade mission was being prepared.

Lehman's counterintelligence, military-technical and political information became increasingly important for the Soviet Union in connection with the marked turn of Nazi Germany to war.

On January 20, 1935, the Helm agent case was opened in the 5th department with the aim, as stated in the decision to open the case, "to reveal the development of personnel, activities, weapons of the Reichswehr." The file concentrated materials starting from 1927 into sections: the relationship between the command of the armed forces and the leadership of the NSDAP; army, navy, weapons, military industry. There were many documents from the highest state institutions of Germany, the intelligence services of France and England. Lehman's messages occupied an important place among them. It can be seen from them that throughout the pre-war decade he was aware of the most secret secrets of Germany's preparations for war and promptly informed our intelligence about them.

As part of his service, Leman periodically went to major military exercises, visited especially important military facilities under construction.

In November 1935, he, along with an extremely carefully selected group of counterintelligence officers, was sent to a meeting at the War Ministry, which was held in the strictest secrecy. Those invited to the meeting were taken to military factories. At the secret training ground, they were shown all the latest types of military equipment, both already adopted for service and being tested. Experts gave detailed explanations.

The organizers of the meeting emphasized that all this was the holy of holies of the German army and was shown to counterintelligence officers so that they knew what needed to be guarded.

Intelligence received from Leman descriptions of new types of artillery pieces, armored vehicles, mortars, including long-range guns, as well as armor-piercing bullets, special grenades, and solid-propellant rockets for gas attacks, which were on display. The most important was Lehman's information about the creation, under the leadership of the young engineer Wernher von Braun, of a fundamentally new type of weapon - liquid-fuel rockets for hitting targets at a distance measured in hundreds of kilometers.

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V.M. Zarubin, according to Lehman, in particular, wrote:

"In the forest, in a remote area of the shooting range, permanent test benches have been set up for testing liquid-propelled missiles. There are many casualties from these innovations. Three people died the other day."

Leman's report on 6 pages was sent on December 17, 1935 to Stalin and Voroshilov and on January 26, 1936 to Tukhachevsky. The head of the Intelligence Department, to whom this information was sent strictly for personal acquaintance, returning the document, attached a questionnaire on 3 sheets to it. The first paragraph of the questionnaire stated: "Rockets and rockets. a) Where does Engineer Brown work? What is he working on? Is there any way to get into his lab?"

6) Are there any opportunities to contact other workers in this area?

In May 1936, Lehman announced the deployment of 5 secret ranges for testing new types of weapons, including a specially guarded one in the Deberitz camp, near Berlin.

In June, the agent received a detailed description of a powerful system of fortifications under construction along the Polish-German border, which included a vast flood zone.

Later in the same year, Breitenbach sent messages to the leadership of the country about the creation of an armored personnel carrier by the Horch company, a new all-metal bomber from the Heinkel company, a new all-metal fighter, special armor that protects the aircraft from bullets and shell fragments. , a flamethrower tank, incendiary liquid, the construction of a submarine fleet at 18 German shipyards intended for operations in the North and Baltic Seas.

At the end of 1936, Leman reported on the special secrecy measures introduced by the Gestapo to protect state secrets in the development and production of new types of weapons. These measures did not prevent, however, our agent from continuing to obtain and transmit to us secret information about the military potential of Germany.

Thus, Soviet intelligence learned from Lehmann that in Naundorf (Silesia) at the plant of the Bravag company, under the personal supervision of Goering, secret experiments were being carried out to make gasoline from brown coal. This information indicated that, in preparation for the war, the Germans were persistently looking for substitutes for oil, which Germany was sorely lacking.

In November 1936, Leman reported on the channels for the transfer of German weapons to Spain for Franco. In February 1937, he passed on information about the construction of a new secret plant for the production of chemical warfare agents. Among the materials received from the agent was a report of particular importance "On the organization of the national defense of Germany", dated 1937. year.

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Even a brief and far from complete list of materials received from Lehman shows how valuable a source he has been for our foreign intelligence throughout the years.

However, it became more and more difficult to work with an agent in the face of a tightening counterintelligence regime. In May 1936, a tragicomic incident occurred. A certain Diltthey, who was arrested by the Gestapo, declared that the Soviet trade mission had its own person in the Gestapo. Leman was under surveillance on one of the Saturdays, which was confidentially told to him by a colleague - a participant in the operation. As the head of the Russian department of the Gestapo, Fenner, later told Lehman, Diltthey cohabited with a Gestapo officer, Lehman's namesake, and made a false statement in order to take revenge on her unfaithful lover. The center became alert and demanded to be even more careful in working with the agent.

At the end of November 1936, Zarubin reported: "" Breitenbach "for all this time, for the first time, began to express some nervousness. In connection with the emergency measures of control over foreigners, he seems to be afraid that we might get noticed and let him down."



In another message, Zarubin said that "recently Breitenbach has been sick, the situation in Germany is really terribly serious and tense, so sometimes it's normal to get nervous. Obtaining documents is very difficult, but Leman does it when he can. In particular, he promised an annual review of the Gestapo, and I am sure that he will give it.

In the same letter, V.M. Zarubin, it was pointed out that four Gestapo officers received awards on the occasion of the New Year, which were highly valued: portraits of the Fuhrer with an inscription and letters. Breitenbach was among those awarded.

In March 1937, Zarubin left the country. There was no replacement for him. I had to look for new channels of communication with the agent.

When leaving, the resident introduced Leman to a foreigner living in Berlin, the owner of the Clemens safe house. She spoke almost no German, so she was only used as a mailbox. Leman handed over the material in a sealed package to Clemens, from which one of the employees of the "legal" residency took them. The tasks were transferred to the agent in the same way.

In June 1937, the Center proposed, for greater secrecy and reliability, to use the wife of an illegal immigrant, A.M., to communicate with Clemens. Korotkova M.B. Vilkovysk (Marusya). Alexander Ivanovich Agayants then remained the only operative in the "legal" residency.

In August 1937, the Center informed Agayants: "The situation has developed in such a way that you will have to work for 1-2 months.

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tat on your own. At this time, we set before you only two main tasks:

1. Provide communication with Breitenbach through Clemens and Marusya.
2. We remind you that you personally must accompany Marusya to the meeting with Clemens each time. Before the meeting, you need to drive around the city for at least 1.5-2 hours and carefully check yourself. Marusya should arrive at the meeting punctually to the minute.

A month later, Agayants reported to the Center: "To Alexei. Personally. Breitenbach arrives at Clemens 1.5-2 hours before the meeting with Marusya. We informed Breitenbach through Clemens about the need to transfer the materials in such a way that they could be chewed on occasion ... Clemens does not speak the local language well, which makes it somewhat difficult to communicate with Marusya.

Here are some excerpts from Agayants' letters to the Center, which give an idea of further work with Leman in 1937.

October. "In connection with the departure of Marusya, I took over the connection with Clemens. We are not in a position to provide further translations, and perhaps even a printed text. In those cases when I myself manage to reprint the messages, I will send them on film ... In the future, Breitenbach's messages will have to be transmitted in the form in which they will come to us, since neither We have no one to translate."

November. "At the next meeting," Clemens "handed over from" Breitenbach "materials on tape, warning at the request of" Breitenbach "that these materials are especially important."

February 1938. "Clemens has acquired a typewriter, on which, as a rule, she herself will type materials from Breitenbach for us. Since "Clemens" does not speak German well enough, there will be errors in the text, which, as you know, I am not in a position to correct.  
condition."

In the autumn of 1938, Agayants went on vacation and for treatment. Worried about the situation, Lehman wrote through Clemens: "Just when I could make good deals, the firm there, in a way completely incomprehensible to me, ceased to be interested in business. connection with me."

V.M. Zarubin sends a second letter from Moscow, informing him of a high assessment of the agent's materials and asking him to continue his work.

At the end of November 1938 A.I. Agayants received Leman's materials from Clemens for the last time. In December, intelligence officer A.I. Agayants died on the operating table. Communication with Leman was interrupted for a long time.

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If someone, on the basis of official correspondence, tried to draw up a moral and psychological portrait of V. Leman, he would probably note that this energetic, medium-sized, strong man with blue eyes was the most ordinary person: he did not suffer from vanity, he had a sober attitude to money, did not have any harmful addictions. And, of course, did not share the Nazi views. When Hess flew to England and was officially declared insane, Breitenbach said: "Well, now it's clear who is in power. Everyone is laughing at us." At the same time, Leman did not have much sympathy for left-wing politicians.

Leman survived all the hardships of the First World War, did not want a repeat of the war with Russia, and until the last moment he hoped that it would not happen. "Sympathy for Russia among the Germans is very strong," he said in the spring of 1941 to the operative of the residency, "and not only among the communists."

Leman was a high-class scout and worked in such a dangerous place where he constantly had to be collected. He knew how to act independently and was ready to take risks. A sense of security emanated from him.

In 1940, the Lehmans celebrated their silver wedding. The marriage was childless. In the 1930s, his wife inherited a hotel and a restaurant at a junction station in Silesia. The couple hoped to move there after Lehman's retirement. Unfortunately, this dream did not come true.

And here is the end of 1940. After a long break, contact with one of the most valuable agents of Soviet foreign intelligence has been restored. "Breitenbach" is back in the ranks. At the beginning of 1941, Boris Nikolaevich Zhuravlev, a young residency worker who arrived in Berlin, was assigned to work with him. An acute shortage of personnel forced inexperienced workers to work with even the most valuable agents. I had to learn on the go. More than ever, information was needed. Meetings were held in public places in Berlin and outside the city. The agent again began to receive information about the activities of the Gestapo. Leman handed over separate documents for photographing. Zhuravlev returned them the next day before the agent went to work.

Lehman's messages became more and more disturbing. Increasingly, the word "war" was mentioned in them. So, in mid-March 1941, Willy told the operative that the Abwehr was urgently strengthening a unit to work against Russia. Mobilization activities were also carried out in the state apparatus. At a meeting on May 28, 1941, the agent told Zhuravlev that two days earlier he had been asked to draw up a schedule for the round-the-clock duty of the staff of his department. When he tried to inquire what it was for, he was told that it was a secret.

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Leman went on vacation and asked not to interrupt communication with him, offering to work out the conditions for emergency calls to meetings from both sides, since, according to him, at this decisive time, every day can bring a lot of new and unexpected things. However, after some deliberation, the Center decided to do otherwise. On May 28, an instruction came in which it was proposed to discuss with

"Breitenbach", if he could not stay in Berlin for the duration of his vacation. However, the agent had already managed to leave the city. The slowness of the Center led to a temporary loss of contact with it during the crisis period.

Lehman's last meeting with Zhuravlev took place on the evening of June 19, 1941, on the outskirts of Berlin. Willy had already returned from leave to work and came in very excited. The agent told the intelligence officer that his office had just received an order for German troops on June 22 after 3 o'clock in the morning to begin military operations against the Soviet Union. On the same evening, this extremely important information was telegraphed through the ambassador, which ensured its faster passage, was transmitted to Moscow.

More with "Breitenbach" Soviet intelligence did not meet. For a long time, intelligence did not know anything about the fate of Willy Lehman. After the war, Leman's surviving wife Margarita said that in December 1942 her husband was urgently called to the service and never returned. One of Breitenbach's colleagues told her later that Leman had been shot by the Gestapo.

According to the information available in the "Breitenbach" case, on December 4, 1942, the agent "Beck", abandoned in Germany, was informed by radio of the password for a meeting with "Breitenbach". "Beck" is a German communist who voluntarily surrendered to Soviet captivity. After a general check, he was sent to a reconnaissance school, after which he was thrown into the deep German rear with a special assignment. In the rush of wartime, "Bek" did not receive, unfortunately, sufficiently good and complete training, which resulted in its failure. Once in the hands of the Gestapo, "Beck", as agreed with him in Moscow, gave a radio signal "I work under the control of the enemy." But the Center, for technical reasons, could not accept him, and work with the agent was carried out as if "Beck" were at large.

On December 11, 1942, Moscow received a radio message from "Beck" stating that he had allegedly spoken to "Breitenbach" on the phone and exchanged passwords with him, but the next day he did not show up for the meeting. When I called again, the wife came up to the phone and said that her husband was not at home.

The certificate for the Special Meeting from the personal file of "Beck" says that "on instructions from the Gestapo from 10/14/42 to 04/12/44, he maintained contact with Moscow by radio, transmitting messages under the dictation of Gestapo officers, in resulting in December 1942

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was arrested and shot by an agent of the NKGB ~ 201st, i.e. Breitenbach.

In November 1945, a special meeting "Beck" was sentenced to death.

So tragically died as a result of betrayal and interception by the Germans of our radio communication channel, one of the best agents of Soviet intelligence, who for many years selflessly, at a huge risk to his life, honestly informed us about the war being prepared by the Nazis against our country.

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Agent "Winterfeld"

Christmas days in Western Europe, including Germany, are the most joyful. In 1930, Christmas was celebrated in Germany as usual - noisily, cheerfully, with geese and baked carps on the tables, with garlands of toys and explosions of firecrackers in the streets. The only exception was the weather - a light frost hit early, a snowstorm swept over, and the lawn in front of the building of the Soviet embassy in Berlin turned into a real winter field.

Aleksey Petrovich Nikultsev, an employee of the Berlin residency, left the building of the embassy and stopped in surprise. For several years of work in Germany, for the first time I had to see such whims of nature.

A German, a messenger of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had been known to the employees of the consular department of the USSR embassy for many years, was walking towards him with some kind of package. This man, the son of a carpenter, who himself learned carpentry, at the age of 16 entered the German Navy as a cabin boy. During the war of 1914-1918 he served on a submarine. In 1920-1926 he was a supporter of the Communist Party of Germany. In the difficult political situation of the 1930s, he sympathized with the employees of the Soviet embassy. For his good, calm character and kind, attentive attitude towards the Soviet people, many loved him and respectfully called him a "sailor" behind his back.

Alexey Petrovich invited him to drink a mug of beer. Nikultsev knew that the messenger of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a lonely man, had separated from his wife, who had two sons from him. He lived in furnished rooms, he liked to spend his free time in pubs, not shying away from unfamiliar companies. The messenger happily agreed: "I'll just hand over the package to the embassy."

A few days ago Aleksey Petrovich got acquainted with the directive of the Center: "to intensify work on undercover penetration

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innovation in the main state institutions of Germany, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Sailor", however, is not the person who is needed, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he is just a messenger. But why not try to start?

We went to a cafe. Once again, slowly, they congratulated each other on Christmas and the upcoming New Year, and Nikultsev decided to "take the bull by the horns." He asked his interlocutor whether it was possible to check whether one of his old acquaintances was still working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and gave a fictitious name. Sailor agreed. We agreed to meet in two days and in the restaurant to more thoroughly celebrate the approach of the New Year, 1931.

We met a couple of days later, and the "sailor" said that there was no such person in the German Foreign Ministry. And suddenly, unexpectedly for Nikultsev, he asked if he would have any more requests.

At one of the following meetings, the courier of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs himself suggested that Nikultsev bring reliable information about people leaving for the USSR, whose motives differ from the official ones. For these materials, Alexei Petrovich gave the "sailor" a small amount of money.

On January 24, 1931, the residency in Berlin reported to the Center about a new source it had acquired in the German Foreign Ministry, which, in memory of the beginning of cooperation, received the pseudonym "Winterfeld" (winter field - German).

Time passed. "Winterfeld" continued to work as a messenger, distinguished by diligence, successfully coping with the orders given by the authorities. Often the courier had to replace sick officials in other departments. In order to increase the secrecy in the work of "Winterfeld", they transferred to communications from the "legal" residency, in which A.P. Nikultsev, into an illegal one headed by V.M. Zarubin. Zarubin's wife, Gorskaya, began to communicate directly with him, putting a lot of effort and skill into training "Winterfeld" and making him a true professional. She told Winterfeld which of the materials passing through his hands were of the greatest interest for intelligence.

Replacing an official in the Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Winterfeld" had the opportunity to read the documents of this department, and Gorskaya taught the agent that the information he received would be valuable only when the sources and dates of receipt of these materials were indicated.

The center informed the residency: "From the materials of Winterfeld, we are interested in secret cipher telegrams, secret reports of embassies and other secret correspondence. In addition, we are interested in the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its relations, the relations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with other

institutions, etc." The case helped. An official of the cipher department fell ill, and "Winterfeld" was asked for some time to assist in the work of this department, as a result of which he received time

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access to cipher telegrams. In October 1934, the Center already reported: "The texts of German cipher telegrams received recently from Winterfeld are very valuable in content and at the same time can be used as ancillary material in the development of the code." In this regard, the Center simultaneously demanded "to increase the flow of cipher telegrams and diplomatic correspondence, especially to pay attention to the documents of Moscow, London, Paris and Rome." Subsequent correspondence with the Center stated: "We are extremely interested in receiving the most extensive documentary material on Franco-German relations. Instruct "Winterfeld" to select all the documents

highlighting these relationships.

In pursuance of these instructions from the Center, the residency in Berlin in the spring of 1936 began training "Winterfeld" in the technique of photographing documents. Mastering this new business for the agent progressed slowly, since he did not have a place at work where he could hide from prying eyes. But "Winterfeld" showed great perseverance and ingenuity. By the end of the year, he managed to learn how to get tolerable photographs of documents. In March 1937, the Center reported to Berlin: "The photographs of the Winterfeld are quite satisfactory. May he continue to do the same in the future."

However, the situation has become more complicated. In the summer of 1936, "Winterfeld", with the consent of the residency, joined the detachment of attack aircraft, which consisted of former military sailors, led by one of its commanders. In the same summer, Winterfeld completed a training course at the Assault Detachment School (SA) Berlin-Brandenburg and received the rank of Sturmführer.

At the request of the residency, "Winterfeld" outlined his impressions of staying at this school in a special note. In it, he made no secret of the fact that certain aspects of the National Socialist propaganda spread at the school, as well as the atmosphere prevailing there, made a strong impression on him. This, he wrote, cannot be brushed aside: the slogans about the return of Danzig and the "Polish corridor" to Germany, about the annexation of Austria, receive wide support from the course participants.

Having received this note, the deputy head of INO B.D. Berman wrote on it: "So our influence on the agent is weaker than that of the SA. The main thing is to correct this false impression of "Winterfeld". Zarubin replied to the Center: "We agree with your assessment of the change in the mood of Winterfeld. These sentiments demand from us persistent and methodical ideological work... Our influence on Winterfeld must be absolute."

In connection with the receipt of such information about "Winterfeld" and the fact that the resident of the illegal residency Zarubin was preparing to leave

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Germany and communication with the agent instead of Zarubina-Gorskaya began to be supported by the agent "Willy", in May 1937 the Center sent an instruction to Berlin: "Winterfeld should be mothballed, having determined appearances and a password to restore communication."

At the same time, Ruben (Alexander Ivanovich Agayants), an employee of the Paris "legal" residency, arrived in Berlin by transfer. In October 1937, he restored contact with Winterfeld through "Willy", and on November 4 of the same year, the Center, agreeing to the restoration of communication with him, wrote to Ruben: "Your meetings with "Willy" should not be more than one time in 3-4 weeks. Meetings between "Willi" and "Winterfeld" may take place more frequently.

The receipt of photographic materials from the German Foreign Ministry has resumed. At the end of May 1938, "Willi" reported: "Winterfeld expects that over time the strictness introduced in his institution will be relaxed and he will be able to get more valuable documents." However, "Willy" was worried that "Winterfeld" allowed himself to make statements in a nationalist spirit, in particular, regarding Hitler's plans for the Anschluss of Austria, the capture of the Sudetenland, the Memel region of Lithuania, etc.

At a meeting with Ruben, "Willi" said that "Winterfeld" more and more often speaks out on a number of fundamental issues in a fascist spirit. Informing the Center about this, Ruben noted that "at the same time, 'Willi' asserts that the attitude of 'Winterfeld' to work is positive for us and even for us in general. This, in the words of 'Willi', is partly due to the peculiar interpretation of 'Winterfeld' of our ideological positions.

However, in November 1938, "Willy" announced that he had cut off contact with "Winterfeld", finally convinced that he had gone too far in his pro-fascist sentiments. The Center reacted sharply to Ruben's information about this, accusing Ruben of putting the Center "in front of a fait accompli of a break with Winterfeld and that no educational work was carried out with the agent." "We hope," the letter of the Center dated December 4, 1938, stated, "to receive from you the most detailed reports on this issue by the nearest mail." To this, Ruben replied: "Communication with the Winterfeld has been interrupted on the basis of your directive given to me during negotiations before my departure from home. At the same time, you gave the intention to conserve Willy. Details by mail. If it is now necessary to restore contact with Winterfeld, then the possibility, as it turns out, is not completely ruled out. I ask you not to delay the answer." On December 8, Ruben was given a telegraphic order to restore contact with Winterfeld. However, Ruben did not have time to complete it - death in the operating room prevented table.

Fulfilling the instructions of the Center, operative Pavel, who was at that time in Berlin, taking part in the Soviet-German

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trade negotiations, re-established contact with Winterfeld. Since "Winterfeld" at that time worked in the Economic and Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through him it was possible to obtain a number of documents on trade negotiations [Germany with other partners.

In connection with Pavel's return to the Soviet Union, contact with Winterfeld was again lost. In September 1940, the Center made the final decision to restore contact with him, but this was not immediately possible. However, on June 3, 1941, the new resident in Berlin, Zakhar, announced that Winterfeld had been installed, was living outside the city, and was working at the same place.

The Center decided to send the already mentioned Gorskaya, whom the agent knew personally, to Berlin under official cover specifically to establish contact with Winterfeld. [Gorskaya traced the route of Winterfeld from work to home and held a meeting with him at the Köpenick station on June 14, 1941. Winterfeld told the intelligence officer that he had returned to his family, he was the secretary of the NSDAP cell in his village. His eldest son is a motorcyclist in the shock part of the SS, the youngest, 17 years old, is going to volunteer in the army. Winterfeld himself continues to work as a courier for the Foreign Ministry. Its capabilities have become more limited due to the strict control over the passage of documents by the security service of the ministry. However, he expressed his readiness, as before, to help us.

According to Winterfeld, the rumors about the war with the USSR caused bewilderment and some confusion among the people. Everyone knows that the USSR has no territorial claims against Germany, that the USSR helped Germany with food and raw materials, and therefore it is not clear why it is necessary to fight the Russians. In these words of the agent, his remaining sympathy for the Soviet people was clearly traced. At the same time, he noticed that the people had very strong faith in Hitler, and that his army was well organized and disciplined.

As it turned out, Gorskaya had already scheduled another meeting with Winterfeld on the eve of the war. It did not take place due to the fact that by this time the Gestapo had practically blocked all entrances and exits to Soviet institutions. No one could enter or leave the building of the Soviet embassy without the knowledge of the Gestapo. From the first hours of the war, employees of the USSR embassy were interned and transported in freight cars through Turkey to their homeland. Gorskaya was among them.

Due to the fact that they did not have time to agree on methods of communication with Winterfeld for an emergency period, the Center in October 1941 suggested that the residency in Stockholm try to establish contact with it again. However, this attempt failed.

More with "Winterfeld" our scouts did not meet.

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Fedor and "Marta"

Love and intelligence, like ice and fire, seemingly incompatible concepts. What sentiment can there be where sober calculation, caution, prudence and, at the same time, reasonable risk should reign? But this is only at first glance. Intelligence employs real people, not robots, and they have ordinary feelings. They, like everyone else, experience joy and sorrow, elation and despondency, depression. Perhaps, it is in such a specific field of activity as intelligence that feelings of friendship, affection, and sometimes love, are most acute, they determine the actions and behavior of people.

Yes, partners involved in joint dangerous work that requires internal composure, when emotional outbursts can lead to trouble and even death, are forced to hide personal experiences deeply and control them. And yet... Intelligence is, first of all, the relationship of people in unusual circumstances, and a lot often depends on the feelings they have for each other. Of course, duty is above all for a real scout, and if he, obeying momentary moods and passions, forgets about this, he ceases to be a scout.

Our story will go about one tragic and at the same time amazing, full of life story. This is a story of love, loyalty, self-sacrifice and duty.

Berlin, 1931 A young, tastefully dressed man sat at a table in a cozy cafe. On the table lay an illustrated magazine in a bright cover and newspapers. The visitor immersed himself in reading and leisurely drank coffee, occasionally glancing at the front door. He was clearly waiting for someone. Finally the door opened and an elegant, pretty woman of about thirty entered. She looked around, noticed a colorful magazine on one of the tables and, hiding her embarrassment, went to

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to him. The man stood up, politely introduced himself, pushed back his chair, inviting the lady to the table. She introduced herself, offered her hand, and took a seat opposite.

Fyodor and "Marta" - this is how these two will henceforth be referred to in correspondence with the central apparatus of foreign intelligence and will forever remain under these names in archival files. Their meeting in a sparsely crowded cafe was preceded by a number of events.

Political life was seething in Germany. Adolf Hitler made no secret of his claims to power. The Soviet government needed reliable information about the internal situation and foreign policy of Germany, about the position of the European states and the United States.

However, there were few experienced scouts at that time, and this gap had to be filled by young, purposeful and courageous employees who were infinitely devoted to the Motherland. For Fyodor, an illegal intelligence agent, a business trip to Germany was the first serious test of strength,

the beginning of operational work abroad. Settling in Berlin as a mediocre businessman, he appeared to be a successful young entrepreneur who was also involved in journalism.

Fedor understood that in order to receive the information necessary for the country's leadership, it was necessary to get to the "kitchen" where political decisions were prepared, to penetrate into the highest spheres of the German state. But how to get to the ruling elite? With the legend of a businessman, one can hardly count on success. It is difficult to approach leading politicians, high military and civil ranks, the intelligence officer reasoned. And what if you pay attention to the technical staff serving them? People in this category usually know a lot.

In the end, Fedor decided to place an ad in a Berlin newspaper with the following content: "A young entrepreneur is looking for a partner to spend time together and help in journalistic work. Complete confidentiality is guaranteed." Of course, he was overcome by doubts whether such an appeal through the newspaper would be of any use. What self-respecting woman would risk such an acquaintance? There is even less hope that she will be the bearer of secrets. And will it attract the attention of the local police? "Without happiness, don't go to the forest for mushrooms!" - Fyodor remembered the saying and began to anxiously await the results of his initiative.

A couple of weeks later, a letter arrived in his name. "I would like to meet you, if you are as modest as you promise," wrote an unfamiliar woman. – I am from the best society in Berlin, where I will gladly introduce you when we get to know each other. I am married, but very often I am alone, because I am too honest. You must decide for yourself if you want to meet me.

R.5. As soon as you answer me, you will know who I am. Of course, trust is necessary."

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"Is this just what you need? After all, risk is a noble cause!" Fedor thought. He was interested in the words about belonging to the "best Berlin society." Reading the lines of the letter, he felt that behind them lies a man suffering from loneliness, easily hurt and unhappy in family life.

The scout decided to act and called the phone number indicated in the letter. And now young people are sitting in a cafe, feeling awkward from an unusual way of meeting, but it quickly passes. A lively conversation ensues, and "Marta", after hesitating for a moment, says that her husband is a responsible official of the German Foreign Ministry.

Time flew by imperceptibly, and "Marta" kept talking and talking. She seemed glad to be able to pour out her soul. She frankly told a complete stranger about her life, about her husband, his constant busyness with official affairs, his callousness and dryness, about her mother, Berlin society.

Listening to Martha, Fyodor suddenly caught himself thinking that he liked this woman, he was pleased to sit with her over a cup of coffee and listen to an excited confession. He immediately tried to pull himself together: you can not relax. And in general, why is this lady so cunningly revealing her soul to him? Is there a trap here, is everything clean? But the sincerity of "Martha", her behavior and demeanor spoke in her favor. And in fact there was no trap. "Marta" just liked this fit, tall man, correct, respectful and at the same time strict. He skillfully maintained a conversation and did not show obsession. In the way he reacted to her story, there was participation, sincere interest, which contrasted sharply with the usual callousness of the people around her in high society.

Young people began to meet and very soon felt as if they had known each other for many years. Both understood that they were drawn to each other, but kept their distance, did not cross the line beyond which their mutual sympathy would develop into something more. They tried to carefully preserve the feeling of trust that had arisen. "Marta" behaved this way due to natural tact and upbringing,



and Fyodor, because he clearly understood that his desire to strengthen relations with her was far from disinterested: the documents that lay in the portfolio of her high-ranking husband remained the main purpose of the meetings.

Now, most of all, the intelligence officer wanted to get the necessary materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the help of Marta and at the same time not destroy their feelings. Fedor understood what a painful injury he could inflict on a woman who believed him, what a selfish greed he would turn out to be in her eyes. From conversations with "Marta" it was clear that she was not satisfied with her life. A charming, intelligent and active woman got bored with the role of a secular lady at receptions. Besides, she was

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short on funds. It was necessary to help "Martha" find her place in life, to captivate her with some occupation.

The first reaction of the Center to such an unusual and dynamically developing contact of an illegal intelligence officer was very restrained. The prospects seemed tempting - after all, the path from "Martha" led to the highest circles of Germany, but the nature of the acquaintance, its rapid development could not - and quite naturally - cause certain hesitation in the Center. Why did it suddenly happen that the wife of a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a secular lady, so easily went to meet a man through an ad in a newspaper? A comprehensive check was needed.

Fedor was given strict instructions: "Be careful in relations with Marta, continue her "development", but do not go for recruitment until verification activities are carried out ... Do not show interest in her husband and his work, in his available documents. Give "Martha" the impression that you are primarily interested in her as a woman, and also as a possible assistant in your journalistic activities.

The Center did not understand what was completely clear to Fyodor: "Marta" saw in him a friend, communication with whom became a need for her, opened a window to a new world for her. She had feelings of sympathy and respect for him. However, Fedor's rather dry reports about meetings with "Marta" did not reveal all the nuances of their relationship.

In conversations with his acquaintance, Fedor more and more often touched upon political issues, touched on the situation in Germany, Europe and the world, and she showed a keen interest in such conversations. In the judgments and assessments that he expressed, in his reflections aloud, "Martha" found answers to many questions that worried her. His words were strikingly different from what she heard from her husband and other government officials. She wanted to share with Fedor what she learned from conversations with her husband and his colleagues. She believed that her information would be useful to him in his journalistic work.

It soon became clear that "Marta" could become a serious source of political information, it was only necessary to organize work with it tactfully and competently. Fedor had no doubt that for his sake the woman would agree to the transfer of materials that her husband had. But it was necessary to wait for the results of the Marta check.

To Fyodor's satisfaction, they turned out to be positive, the information swept aside suspicions that his acquaintance was acting on instructions from the German special services. In a letter from the Center about checking "Martha", in particular, it was said: "She is a little over 30 years old, she was born in one of the cities along the Rhine in the family of a large businessman.

She graduated from the conservatory, and then attended music courses in order to improve, she likes to play music at home. After the death of her father, she spent summer holidays with her mother and sister. months on

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the southern resorts of Germany, where they made acquaintances with vacationers - Germans and foreigners. There she also met her future husband, a middle-aged diplomat, a typical Prussian official. People who know "Marta" characterize her as a cheerful, sociable person who loves to have fun, but within the limits allowed by etiquette. She knows her worth and enjoys a good reputation. A native of the Rhine region, she is distinguished by inspiration and love of life. Germans usually say about such women: "Easy living, but not frivolous."

In this characterization, Fyodor easily recognized his girlfriend: the Center was also convinced that "Marta" was the wife of a responsible employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but nevertheless it was decided, while communicating with "Marta", to adhere to the line of passive interest in the materials of this department. If, after a more thorough check, "we have no doubts about the possibility of a provocation, then it is necessary to take a course towards intensifying the "development" by coordinating the issue with us."

Meanwhile, meetings with "Marta" continued, and Fedor saw how her confidence in him was growing, how her feelings were revealed. His entries in the operational diary are interesting, reflecting the development of their acquaintance. In April 1931, he notes: "Relations have become much stronger, but it is difficult to catch their shades because of the extreme caution on our part ... Marta's husband, according to her, from the very first days of his marriage, out of careerist motives, began to demand for her to do intelligence work." "Marta" once told Fyodor such an episode. During one of the international conferences attended by her husband, the head of the German delegation asked her to help in a "delicate matter": she had to invite, under a plausible pretext, to a previously rented separate office in a restaurant a certain foreigner who invariably wore with a briefcase with documents of his delegation. These papers were of great interest to the Germans, and they arranged the matter in such a way that the foreigner was served wine, which was mixed with sleeping pills. The documents were, of course, retaken and then returned to the awakened "boyfriend", who, fearing exposure, was forced to support Germany's position in the vote. And the question was important - the removal of restrictions on the armament of the German army, provided for by the Treaty of Versailles.

The husband of "Martha", as it turned out, was aware of this operation, but apparently did not really value the honor of his wife if he agreed that she took on the dubious role of "bait".

By the way, "Marta" then used these skills of collecting information surrounded by her husband and sometimes obtained valuable information for Fedor.

The following entry in Fyodor's diary: <... Family life weighs on "Marta", and therefore she seeks satisfaction in any activity.

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... The husband is stingy, and the insufficiency of personal funds is undeniable." In a couple of days he will write: "Marta often speaks of insufficient funds. Once she asked for money to buy a coat. Given 150 marks. A little later we find the following lines: "Proximity already allows us to raise the question of gradually drawing it into work in our interests. He asked me to provide interesting information of an economic nature ... She dictated an unofficial report by a journalist over the phone. Finally, in May 1931, Fedor recorded: "Relations have deepened so much that it has become about the help that she can provide in my journalistic work, using her husband's materials for the May session of the Council of the League of Nations. We agreed that before leaving I would make a review, which I supposedly would serve as the basis for an article of a general scientific nature. She compiled a review and handed it to me."

Soon the Center was sent generalized information prepared by Fedor on the basis of Marta's materials, and a week later he received her assessment: "A preliminary acquaintance with the first materials received from her suggests that we are dealing, apparently, with a serious source". Some time later, the Center agreed to involve "Marta" in cooperation with intelligence, but for reasons of caution at first -

under a "foreign flag". She easily agreed with Fedor's offer to earn extra money by selling her husband's documents to some foreign state. He named America, but "Martha" thought for a bit and settled on Japan. Maybe it seemed to her that the Land of the Rising Sun would not be so dangerous. Who knows?

So in May 1931, the recruitment of "Marta" took place. Fedor wrote in a report: "Without resistance from her side, it was agreed that she would withdraw documents from her husband's archive or rewrite them ... She was given 400 marks for treatment." She completely trusted a friend and was ready to help him earn money together. They discussed in detail how best and safer to extract from the husband's briefcase the documents that he regularly brought home, where he worked on them. At the time, this was common practice. "Marta" said that she would take pictures of the documents herself, but for this she needed a camera. The apparatus was bought and Fyodor taught her how to use it. They agreed on a legend explaining why she got a camera: they decided that we should talk about the emerging hobby of "Marta" for amateur photography. Of course, we also discussed what materials could be of the greatest value. Marta started working.

At first, she was fascinated by the romance of the new activity, she liked to briefly meet with Fedor in small squares, in quiet lanes, cafes and restaurants remote from the city center, where they quickly exchanged a few words and "Marta" transmitted

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him films disguised as ordinary souvenirs. New in their relationship was the mysterious schedule of meetings, regular and reserve meetings, conditional phone calls.

or by mail for quick dates.

But then romance turned into everyday life, and she began to recall with longing the former pleasant meetings with Fyodor, when they talked sweetly and naturally about everything and nothing, when she could relax, pour out her soul, complain and hear words of sympathy. She needed normal communication with the person she loved and with whom she wanted to spend time. Fedor sensitively caught the change in the mood of "Marta" and tried to correct the situation. He picked up a few secluded places outside of Berlin, and they were able to meet again, take leisurely walks, dine in sparsely populated country restaurants. Such days became real holidays for Marta, it flourished.

Meanwhile, Hitler came to power in Germany, and the Nazis launched massive preparations for war. The direction of the future strike was guessed without difficulty - the USSR. Western countries looked favorably on the political games of Germany, approved of Hitler's activities and did everything to push the Nazis to the East.

Documentary information regularly received from Marta became more and more important. Her husband reported directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended meetings of the leadership of the Foreign Ministry, and sometimes at meetings with Hitler. He got acquainted with the directive documents of the Third Reich. Often the husband shared with "Marta" the problems that worried him, showed individual papers and discussed their content with her. He appreciated her point of view. She also visited his office at the Foreign Ministry, where, helping him, she performed technical work. If earlier "Marta" did not delve into the essence of certain official documents that fell into her hands, now she tried to remember the most important thing if there was no way to photograph or copy them. Sometimes she read documents that had been on Hitler's desk the day before.

"Marta" did not accept fascism, critically assessed the cooperation of her husband with the Nazi regime, although she understood that he was doing this solely for careerist reasons. She said that, being an experienced diplomat, he was well aware of the harm and perniciousness of Nazi ideas for Germany and did not share them, but for the sake of a career he was ready for anything.

Foreign intelligence received valuable information from Fyodor's assistant, but it was not easy for her. "Marta" was almost always in a state of nervous tension, which was aggravated by the growing distrust of her husband, who for some time felt that she had changed, that something was happening to her. It was increasingly difficult to find convincing excuses to leave home without arousing suspicion.

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spouse. It happened more than once that he unexpectedly offered to accompany her when she was going on a date with a scout. As a result, several meetings were cancelled. In addition, the regime of protection of secrets became tougher every day.

By the nature of his service, "Martha's" husband often traveled abroad as part of German delegations, and participated in the work of almost all international conferences. As a rule, she accompanied him and sought to use these trips to obtain up-to-date information on the progress of international forums. The information she obtained was especially significant.

Once, "Marta" turned out to be an unwitting witness to a conversation between her husband and a general from counterintelligence before leaving for another conference abroad. The general instructed her husband how to protect secret documents more reliably, and emphasized the need for constant vigilance, while "Marta" was in the next room and heard everything. You can imagine her state at that moment! But the brave woman continued to extract documentary information, sometimes acting on the verge of risk.

During one of the international meetings abroad, the secret materials of the German delegation were kept in a secure safe, access to which was restricted. "Marta" managed to make a duplicate of the key and, using every opportunity, opened it, took out the documents and copied them. This time she was afraid to take a camera with her - the impression from the counterintelligence briefing she heard had an effect. I had to rewrite the documents by hand, which took time and increased the risk.

But "Martha" was beyond suspicion. Due to her sociable nature, she enjoyed success with men who showed her signs of attention during foreign trips. The counterintelligence general, who was in charge of the secrecy regime and security issues of the German delegations, also decided to look after her. During one of the international meetings, he complained to "Marta" about the difficulties of his mission. He assured her that "every third is a spy" and therefore "one must be very vigilant so as not to miss the intrigues of Germany's enemies." She later told Fyodor about this with a laugh and admitted that she was tempted to correct her interlocutor and say that he was mistaken: not every third, but every second is a spy! Our scout, however, took her story seriously and asked to keep an eye on this general.

Having learned about the upcoming trip of "Marta" with her husband to one country or another, Fyodor each time went there in advance and selected places for secret meetings with her. It was also necessary to find suitable test routes by which his assistant would have to go to the meeting point. Having done this work, he returned to Berlin and carefully worked out the conditions with "Martha"

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connections in an unfamiliar city. Everything had to be taken into account: possible surveillance by local intelligence services, which did not disregard members of foreign delegations, as well as strict regulation of stay in the country, established by the German security service that took care of the delegation. Under such conditions, it was not always possible to meet with "Marta", and then, despite the danger, she brought copies of secret documents made by her to Berlin, where she handed them over to Fyodor.

The Center, stingy with praises, more and more often assessed Marta's information as "very important and interesting." It was necessary to take the next step in working with her: to start working already

directly from the positions of Soviet intelligence, and not in the interests of Japan. Then it will be possible to set before it the task of purposefully obtaining information affecting the interests of the USSR. But at the same time, of course, Fedor had to reveal himself to "Marta". He prepared for a conversation for a long time, looking for the necessary arguments and convincing arguments, and outlined ways of retreat if she suddenly flatly refused to work for Soviet intelligence. But his worries turned out to be in vain: "Marta" accepted the proposal to transfer the secrets she had obtained to the Soviet Union quite calmly. She didn't care whether it was America, Japan or the USSR: she worked for the sake of her beloved and therefore was ready to do everything in her power.

But this is exactly what worried the Center. They believed that Marta's attachment to Fedor was a weak point in working with the source, and they were afraid of losing contact with her in the event of unforeseen circumstances. And they did not keep themselves waiting: the husband of "Martha" was appointed to the post of German ambassador to one of the European countries. In order to ensure the continuation of work with her, it was necessary to prepare her for transfer to a connection to a stranger. This process in intelligence is never easy, and in the case of "Marta" it could be said in advance that it would be especially painful.

Fedor even earlier led her to the idea of the need to strengthen the security of their contact. The first step towards this could be the appearance of a third party - a reliable contact. He explained to "Martha" that he could always suddenly leave somewhere on business, but this should not lead to a break in their work, and therefore one more person who can be trusted should be connected to her. "Marta" agreed, and a new employee arrived in Berlin, acting as a liaison. So the three of them worked for several years, but "Marta" still saw Fyodor and communication was maintained uninterruptedly.

The situation became more complicated when "Marta's" husband became an ambassador and she had to leave Berlin. It was necessary to establish contact with her in the new conditions, and Fedor carefully started a conversation on this topic,

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by offering "Martha" to work during a business trip with another of our scouts, who will be in the same country as her. But for the first time, "Marta" answered with a categorical refusal and began to insist that Fedor come to meet her. She did not want to work with a stranger. I had to meet her halfway: for some time they continued to see each other during her visits to Berlin or other European capitals, where the wife of the German ambassador

could go about her business.

And although the system of appearances, addresses, mailboxes, and conditions for an emergency call to meetings was carefully worked out, communication with Marta was no longer smooth and clear: the system was malfunctioning for objective reasons. And Fyodor's frequent trips abroad could become dangerous for both him and her. This, of course, upset "Marta", had a negative effect on her mood, and on the whole work as a whole. But even greater unrest and trials lay ahead of her.

It was 1939, the war was raging in Europe, inexorably approaching the borders of the Soviet Union. Information about the plans of Nazi Germany was urgently needed by the leadership of our country, but it became more and more difficult to obtain it: the repressions of the 1930s weakened and bled foreign intelligence, many residencies were closed, the agent network was lost. Dozens of scouts were recalled from abroad and shot, others were sent to camps or fired. Was recalled to Moscow and Fedor. He was arrested on absurd charges. But, fortunately, a year later the case against him was dismissed "due to the lack of corpus delicti", and yet, before the start of the Great Patriotic War, he was not reinstated in the ranks of foreign intelligence. "Martha", of course, did not know all this, but her heart told her that something had happened to Fedor.

To restore contact with "Martha", an experienced intelligence officer Maria, the wife of the famous illegal intelligence officer V.M., was sent. Zarubina. The choice of the Center was not accidental: Maria had extensive experience in France and Germany, and Marta was one of the most valued

sources of political information, and the organization of constant communication with it was the first task of the Center. The war was just around the corner, its inevitability was becoming more and more obvious, and the materials obtained by "Marta" were very much needed.

Maria brought Fyodor's letter with her, but "Marta" suspected that it was not written by him.

Here is how Maria describes the conversation with "Martha": "My meeting with "Martha" took place on December 10th. The letter from Fyodor, which I immediately handed over to "Martha", greatly excited her. She said: why is the letter written on a typewriter, did he always write to me by hand? She clearly suspected that the letter was written not by Fyodor himself, but by someone else. She demanded, almost in an ultimatum, I immediately

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called Fyodor, by telegraph if possible, as she must see him before Christmas. At the next meeting a week later, I told Martha that Fedor could be sent to a country where he would not be able to visit her for a couple of years. "Martha" replied that she mainly believed only Fedor, did not want to part with him for a long time, and, moreover, she was afraid of imprudence on the part of new people.

Behind the above lines of Maria's report, one can see the genuine feelings, excitement and deep anxiety of "Martha".

True to her word, "Marta" continued to work with Maria, the flow of important information resumed, but thoughts about Fedor relentlessly pursued her and she stopped going to meetings. Communication was restored only after "Marta" finally received a genuine letter from him. Fedor asked her not to worry, to trust Maria and not refuse contact with her. This letter was written at the direct request of the leadership of foreign intelligence, although by that time Fedor had not yet passed through the purgatory of verification.

"Marta" continued to work, the information received from her was still highly appreciated in Moscow, but the intelligence officer did not leave her concern for the fate of her loved one. The archives preserved her letters to Fedor, in which she did not hide her feelings. She wrote, for example: "I see no other possibility of living in such an environment, except on the condition that we must be brave and strong. I have not received any news from my mother this week. Believe me, I love you as much as I love her. You gave me as much trouble as she did. No wonder they say: a child in trouble is especially close to the heart. It should be noted that "Marta" was attached to her mother and helped her in any way she could. On another occasion, she wrote: "I work in the most difficult conditions, I work like an automaton. You'll see it for yourself when you're in M. And you know I'm only doing this for you. If I get discouraged, I may become inactive."

In letters, "Marta" shared her thoughts about the future with a friend and expressed the hope that the war between Germany and the USSR would be avoided, that fate would still smile at her: "They want to use my husband again at work in the central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it will give us much more and will be much more important than his current post abroad. So far everything has been fine. And then everything will be fine. You just need to be smarter... I am very pleased that Molotov visited Berlin. It would be terrible if there were conflicts between our countries that would lead to war. I hope that good relations will resume."

But they did not resume, and fate no longer smiled at Marta. The Barbarossa plan had already been signed by Hitler, and the huge German war machine was preparing to "defeat Soviet Russia in a swift, fleeting campaign." Just when "Mar

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ta" hoped that there would be no war, General Galvder wrote down Hitler's words in his diary: "Russia must be brought to its knees as soon as possible..." On June 22, 1941, the Nazi hordes invaded

to the territory of the Soviet Union. The war began, which forever separated "Marta" and Fedor. They were not destined to see each other again.

On the eve of the attack by fascist Germany, Maria handed over to "Marta" the conditions of communication for an emergency period, but no one has ever used them. For a long time the fate of "Marta" was unknown. It was only after the war that it was found out that her broken psyche could not stand the trials and turmoil during the war years: she fell ill, ended up in a psychiatric hospital, from where she never left.

After returning to intelligence, Fedor worked fruitfully in it for many years, but working with Marta was, without a doubt, his finest hour. The scout never forgot her.

In the historical annals of Soviet intelligence, Marta remained one of the brightest sources of the most important information on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

She deserves the best memory.

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#### Improvisations of the Berlin "Musician"

Backgammon, with the undoubted successes of foreign intelligence, such as the recruitment of "Breitenbach", "Winterfeld", "Marta", there were also unfortunate blunders. At the heart of them, as a rule, were haste, the desire to report the results to the management even before a thorough check of the sources.

One such episode will be told in this essay ...

The summer day of 1934 was drawing to a close. Head of the Foreign Department of the OGPU A.Kh. Artuzov went to the window, drew the curtains, and turned on the table lamp under the green shade. Artur Khristianovich loved this watch. The dim light of the lamp had a calming effect on him. It was thought well and easily, despite the difficult, as always to the limit loaded, day.

They brought a telegram from Berlin about the alignment of political forces in the top leadership of Germany. It said: '<...according to information received from the inner circle of the Prime Minister of Germany von Papen...'. The source of the information was Muzykant. Artuzov thought for a moment. I recalled a similar telegram in which a reference was made to Hermann Goering's entourage. From the same source, information was received about the plans and intentions of the ruling circles of Germany about "tightening the screws" in the country and establishing a "new order" in Europe, about preparing for a war against the USSR

There was something to think about... In the past, in 1933, the intelligence leadership, having weighed the circumstances that arose with the advent of Hitler, sent to Berlin a list of the most valuable sources, which they proposed to work with exclusively by the illegal apparatus of the Berlin residency .

The illegal residencies and our intelligence groups in Germany were well organized and strong. Experienced professionals who worked in them created a well-thought-out system of connections, turnouts, routes

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trade and meeting places, safe houses and transfer points. So, one of the points for holding meetings and processing the materials received was a pharmaceutical store rented by our illegal intelligence agent, and its warehouse was used as a photo laboratory, where the materials received from the agents were re-shot, and the films were reliably camouflaged.

The "legal" resident carefully observed the activities of illegal groups, coordinated their work, and provided communication with the Center, including through neighboring countries. He was especially concerned about ensuring their safety.

Artur Khristianovich summoned B.D. Berman, his deputy, who returned only last year from Berlin, where he headed the "legal" residency, and inquired about the source who supplied the Center with such important information.

...Illegals in Berlin noticed an energetic and sociable musician named Carl Flick-Stegger. American of German origin, born in 1899, born in Vienna, conductor and composer. A very famous person in Berlin and the USA. A concerto of his works was performed in 1932 at the White House shortly after F.D. Roosevelt as President of the United States. Flick-Stegger's wife sang at the Munich Opera. My brother was the director of a popular local theater in Freiburg. In addition, Steger tried himself in the journalistic field: he published articles in the press. Only one artistic career, apparently, did not suit the ambitious American. From 1929 he was a freelance worker for a reputable American press agency in Berlin. Flick-Stegger moved in the highest circles of Berlin society, was a member of the salons of the Berlin aristocracy, liked women, had connections among high-ranking officials of the Third Reich, including the entourage of Hitler, von Papen and Goering.

B.D. Berman, being a resident, instructed Jim, one of the employees of the illegal residency in Berlin, to get acquainted with Carl Flick-Stegger. Getting to know each other was easy. After the first meetings, they became friends and addressed each other by name and "you". Moreover, when visiting another mistress, Flick-Stegger used his friendship with Jim as an alibi, telling his wife that he was going to a restaurant or cafe with him.

The scout, on the advice of Berman, took a wait-and-see attitude in studying Flik-Stegger, simply maintaining friendly relations with him. However, soon it was necessary to arrange a meeting between Flik-Steger and B.D. Berman in connection with the forthcoming departure of the resident to Moscow.

On October 20, 1933, on the eve of his departure, Berman reported to the Center: "Flik-Stegger has been recruited. He has access to places where we cannot go and cannot dream. Has its people in institutions, koto

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which are of particular interest to us. Over the course of two evenings, I agreed with him down to the last detail. He spoke German, introduced himself as our general. He undertakes to do whatever we need." Carl Flick-Stegger was given the pseudonym "Musician".

However, some time after returning to Moscow, Boris Davydovich admitted to Artuzov that, having received a call to the Center to take the post of deputy head of intelligence, he succumbed to the temptation to acquire another valuable source of information and unjustifiably forced work with Muzykant. He was let down by the ease, Berman justified himself, with which he acquired the most valuable agents from among the anti-fascists in Germany in the period preceding Hitler's coming to power.

At the same time, according to him, he did not take into account that such a person as "Musician" cannot but be in the field of view of local counterintelligence.

So it actually turned out to be. Intelligence learned about this from Breitenbach, who repeatedly warned her about the dangerous actions of German counterintelligence.

After Berman's departure from Berlin, Jim maintained contact with the "Musician". The American said that he was ready to recruit for us the Commissioner of the Criminal Police Nussbaum, who dealt with security issues in the field of the German economy. In addition, he gave



a list of 7 people, of which 4, including a policeman, worked for the Gestapo. "Musician" added that he would like to receive money to pay for their services by the end of the month.

In this regard, the residency wrote to the Center: "It is highly desirable that a person from Berman come with the money, or, even better, he himself. It seems that "Musician" is very scattered, and our instructions on this matter are ignored.

Some time later, one of Jim's close acquaintances, who had contacts in the Abwehr, told him that the Gestapo asked the military counterintelligence about whether they knew of any suspicious Flick-Stegger connections among the officers. This interest on the part of the Gestapo "Musician" explained to Jim by the fact that he recently handed over to the United States the text of a letter from the former Kaiser to the officers' union, which contained criticism of Hitler. Jim, sensing something was wrong, advised me to be careful and leave my connections alone for 2-3 weeks. An experienced intelligence officer had no doubt that the "Musician" came to the attention of the Gestapo. He wrote to the Center: "Flick-Stegger devotes a lot of time to journalism. So he will not become an intelligent scout. Because of his purely American carelessness and self-confidence, he can let me down too. At the moment, it is necessary to postpone the arrival of the "general" (i.e. Berman. - Auth.) in Berlin for 3 weeks or a month and temporarily stop working with Flick-Stegger until new instructions from the leadership are received.

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And only now the residency decided to use its most reliable agent, Breitenbach, a responsible officer of the Gestapo, who had more than once averted trouble from intelligence officers, to check "Musician".

The results were stunning. The Gestapo dossier on Flick Steger, obtained through Breitenbach, stated: "Flick Steger has been under the supervision of the Gestapo for a very long time. The state of his affairs is monitored by military intelligence (Abwehr), to which all the data obtained as a result of his "development" are sent. Abwehr shows particular interest in this case. The Flick-Stegger case was requested by Göring. When dealing with Flick Stteger, you need to be especially careful, as he works for all parties.

In the Gestapo case against "Musician", it was also said that in Berlin he had a wide range of connections among high-ranking officials. In the list of his connections under the heading "personal", "Musician", in particular, indicated: "Hitler is well acquainted with him since 1929. Provided him with various services of a private nature. Göring has known him very well since 1928. I often visit him at home, often he receives me in the service. On the whole, the Musician's list of contacts testified to his great interest in the position in the army, special services and in the military industry. Under the heading "scientific connections" it listed: Karl Hoffmann (gases), Flamm (submarines), Fritz Lange and Arno Brasch (nuclear fission), Schlenk (scientific consultant of the Reichswehr), Hansen (stratospheric aircraft).

Even before the Nazis came to power, "Musician" organized a meeting of the famous American newspaperman Hurst with Hitler and his press secretary Hafstaengl. In 1932, he brought Hitler into contact with the American ambassador in Berlin.

The Gestapo materials also mentioned that "Musician" was connected with the USSR embassy in Germany, in particular, he repeatedly met with the press chief of the embassy, adviser Vinogradov. The Gestapo also drew attention to the fact that in the fall of 1933 he arranged for Vinogradov to meet with Alfred Rosenberg in one of the restaurants. This meeting was monitored by Goering's intelligence service, the Forschungsamt. Goering competed with Rosenberg for influence over Hitler. At a meeting with Vinogradov, "Musician" convinced him of the need for rapprochement between the United States, Germany and Russia.

An analysis of the dossier showed that "Musician" was either an adventurer, or a provocateur, or, most likely, worked for one of the American intelligence services that were available under

departments of the US government. In any case, this was fraught with serious consequences.

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In addition, it was clear from the Gestapo dossier that the meeting of Flik-Stegeras with Jim at the Triumph restaurant on Kantstrasse, when the scout introduced Berman to the "Musician", was also recorded by Gestapo agents.

The information received by the residency indicated that "Musician" was in the field of view of two German special services at once - the Abwehr and the Gestapo, which drew attention to his connections with representatives of Soviet institutions. There was only one conclusion: with the "Musician" you need to stop all relations.

And then another of the senior counterintelligence officers invited Jim to his place and directly asked him: does he think that Flik-Stegger is working against the Germans? Did Flik Steger start a conversation with him about German secrets and did he try to get them from his connections? The nature of the questions was not in doubt - it was a failure.

A few days later, Jim's interrogation was repeated. This time they tried to find out from him who was the third with him and Flick-Stegger in the restaurant and whether this third was a "Russian general". Jim replied that it was one of Flick-Stegger's American acquaintances, whose name he did not know. Jim was openly monitored. However, no matter how great the danger was, Breitenbach's timely warning about it left the Soviet intelligence freedom of maneuver and exit from the dangerous game without great losses.

On this occasion, an illegal resident in Berlin V.M. Zarubin reported to the Center: "Outwardly, Jim is calm and does not seem to be nervous..." In order to localize the failure, Zarubin suggested that the Center take Jim to another country with the help of his own connections. Such a combination was carried out. Jim left Germany without serious damage to the Berlin illegal residency. And the fact that it was B.D. Berman, the "Russian general", the Germans never managed to establish. The "Russian trace" was lost by them.

A few years later, Deputy Head of Foreign Intelligence M.S. Kedrov, having approved the decision to archive the file-form on "Musician" - Flick-Steger, wrote: "The material contained in the file is relevant, since it reveals the methods of counterintelligence work of the Gestapo and Abwehr, teaches a lesson in incorrect recruitment and successful, together with the localization of the failure beyond the cordon.

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#### Unexpected turn

In the life of any person, sometimes unforeseen, acute situations arise that require composure, the ability to make the only right decision in a matter of minutes, which can prevent the irreparable. For a scout operating in a hostile environment, the price of such "moments of truth" is almost equal to the cost of his own life. Sometimes behind the decisions taken are the fates of colleagues and those who have considered it their duty to assist our intelligence, guided by high ideals of humanism and morality.

... Alfred Meissner finished drinking tea. The day at work turned out to be difficult, and, having come home, he, without taking off his SS uniform, sat down at the table. After hot tea, Alfred felt his body relax and felt something like bliss. The sudden knock on the door caused him annoyance. He reluctantly got up from his chair, went out into the hallway, opened the door and was taken aback. On the threshold stood the one whom he did not expect, and hardly ever wanted to see.

Erich, buddy! What fates?! Meissner exclaimed. "Since you're here, come in, sit down," Meissner said after a slight pause. - Tell me how long and how

Did you end up in Berlin by fate?

Albrecht Erich Tacke, an illegal Soviet intelligence officer who arrived in Germany on a passport in the name of a foreign citizen, also did not expect to see his old acquaintance in the form of an SS.

Takke and Meissner met in the 1920s in the Urals. Erich Tacke, a German communist, an employee of the Comintern, then helped his countryman get a job in one of the Soviet institutions. They met as families. Meissner was constantly short of money, and Takke often lent it to him. And now he sees his former associate in the uniform of the SS.

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"I am here on vacation," he answered, according to his legend, to Meissner's question. – I got tired of trading in Shanghai and was drawn to my native places. While I'm staying at the hotel, I want to look around, and then I'll see. Three years have passed since we saw each other for the last time, and what striking changes," he threw a meaningful look at Meissner's uniform. - Explain, if possible, what kind of metamorphosis happened to you, and what does it mean? - Takke once again kept his eyes on the SS uniform.

– When I returned to Germany, I realized that the ideas of National Socialism were close to me, and in 1932 I joined the National Socialist Party. Then he was accepted into the service of the SS, in that part of it, which controls the Ministry of Aviation, "Meissner replied.

Feeling that this did nothing to reassure Takke, Meissner hastened to assure:

- I highly appreciate our long-standing friendship, Erich, and I have not forgotten how you helped me more than once in difficult times. I'm still your friend and you don't have to be afraid of me.

Making an effort, Takke smiled and said that he hoped to see Meissner again, to talk about the past years, but for now he had to return to himself. He did not specify exactly where.

"I'll be glad," Meissner seemed sincerely.

On the way, glancing around to see if he was being followed, Takke pondered the meeting with Meissner and could not help but reproach himself for being too hasty.

Erich Takke was not a novice in intelligence and had been abroad for several years as an illegal immigrant. He was born in 1894. On the line of the Comintern he worked in Berlin. In the early 1920s, he was recommended to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army. He left for Moscow and was accepted into the service of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (RU RKKA), where Erich worked for a little over a year. In 1924 he was transferred to the INO OGPU. After graduating from the intelligence school, Takke was sent to China. Together with him in China was his wife - Yunona Iosifovna Chingor, a Pole who was involved in the work of residency in Harbin as a photographer. Juno was resourceful and courageous, did an excellent job with the assigned work, helped her husband in his activities. The Takke couple had a young daughter. In September 1934, E. Takke and his family were sent to Berlin with a special task - to acquire agents in the military intelligence and secret police. At the same time, Meissner, whose position was not exactly known, was considered primarily as a possible "gunner" and "installer".

Takke prepared a detailed telegram to the Center about how the meeting with Meissner went, in which, in particular, he noted that, in his opinion, there was no danger of exposing him on the part of the "old friend". "Nevertheless," Takke wrote, "it is necessary as soon as possible

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decide whether I should recruit Meissner or whether I should leave the country. Due to debts, Meissner's financial situation is so sad that I have no doubt that

I will be able to recruit him by taking advantage of this circumstance. Directives are also needed in case the recruitment fails.”

After sending a telegram, Takke went to a mountain hotel, as according to legend he arrived in Germany for a vacation.

On October 15, 1934, Takke received a response from the Center recommending that communication with Meissner be continued and that his “development” be brought to the point of recruitment. Moscow believed that nothing extraordinary had happened so far and the events had not crossed the line of acceptable risk. Having received the approval of the leadership, Takke again went to Meissner, who accepted him as if there was no explanation between them and they parted as friends only yesterday. In the conversation, Meissner remarked, as if in passing, that if Takke left Berlin he would regret it. Together they, according to Meissner, could “combine” something. Takke drew attention to a casually dropped phrase, but he could only build various assumptions, since Meissner did not develop this topic. But the conversation that took place and the hint of “combination” prompted the scout to take a decisive step.

On October 28, 1934, he called on Meissner. After general phrases, Meissner, with a casual air, asked Takke for money to pay the overdue bill and another 150 marks to compensate for the party money he had spent on himself. It seemed to the scout that something more was hidden behind this than a simple request for a favor. Takke considered that the opportunity was convenient and it was time to persuade the former comrade to cooperate.

“I only have 100 marks with me, and I will gladly help you. But you could always have much more to pay off all obligations. Once you remember that you were once a communist, and you could now do me a favor by giving me information about what is going on at your work.

Meissner frowned, although he did not refuse the money offered. What he said didn't come as a complete surprise to Takke, though he was hoping for a more definite answer.

“Erich, I fully trust you as a friend, but I must say that the material burden that weighs on me will never make me deviate from my duty. As long as I adhere to the current political views, which I have already spoken about, your proposal is not subject to discussion. This conversation,” Meissner added, “will be kept absolutely secret.

Meissner's failure meant recruitment failed. In the depths of his soul, Takke reproached himself for not preparing for the recruiting conversation more thoroughly and relying only on the former communist

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Meissner's religious beliefs, if he had any at all, as well as personal relationships. However, the deed was done and now it was necessary to determine what consequences the disruption of the recruitment action would entail. If Meissner managed to turn into a 100% Nazi, then the worst could be expected.

The scout reported the situation to the Center. The leadership of foreign intelligence, having comprehensively analyzed the results of the recruiting conversation, came to the conclusion that not all the possibilities for continuing the “development” of Meissner had been exhausted and that the attempt should be repeated.

The head of the illegal residency V.M. Zarubin, informed of the arrival of a scout acting independently, received the following instruction from Moscow: “To suggest Takke to remain where he is. Do not refuse to meet with Meissner, providing him with financial assistance if he asks for it. Do not show that Takke is frightened by his refusal, so that he himself does not begin to blackmail us.

Assessing the complexity of the situation and the importance of acquiring a reliable source in the SS apparatus, the Center decided to involve the "legal" foreign intelligence station in Berlin, headed by B.M. Gordon, to the further "development" of Meissner. The intelligence leadership informed Gordon about the current situation with Meissner and expressed the opinion that the situation was not so dramatic as to succumb to panic, flee the country and stop promising, according to the leadership, "development". "The Meissner institution," the resident noted in a telegram, "is of exceptional interest to us. Of course, we should not refuse the opportunity to penetrate there through it. We are waiting for your installation on Meissner.

Moscow, no doubt, took into account that Gordon's residency had a group of agents of installers who could secretly collect information on the specified person. Information obtained in this way would help intelligence to determine the direction of the most effective work with Meissner. (In the language of intelligence officers, "development" refers to the study of individuals in case of possible recruitment into agents. Agents, in turn, are divided into a number of categories depending on their capabilities. Agents-"installers", in particular, specialize in "leads", i.e. obtaining information about persons of interest to intelligence, both for recruitment and for other purposes.)

Gordon, who has long worked in the security agencies and proved to be a skilled operative and a capable organizer, went abroad for the first time. He had already become accustomed to the new environment for him and successfully managed the "legal" residency in Berlin, acquiring valuable connections. The new task of the Center was not easy. He instructed one of the residents of the residency to urgently meet with "Aktione

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rum", an agent engaged in "installations" and having for this purpose two or three professional detectives from among the retired former employees of the local police. The "installation" on Meissner was carried out with high quality and on time. She already confirmed information known about him.

The Center instructed Takka to move from the hotel to a private apartment and to inform Meissner about this, emphasizing that he had decided to stay in Germany for a longer time than he had originally intended. This was done in order to convince the SS officer that his "friend" was not at all embarrassed and was ready, as before, to continue meetings.

The Takke and Meissner families spent the Christmas holidays together in Magdeburg - not far from Berlin, on the picturesque banks of the Elbe. Takke did not stint on Christmas gifts, and Frau Meissner was delighted with them. "We should meet more often as families, as in the old days," she said at the table, turning to her husband and Erich. The Takke couple spent a lot of money and effort to ensure that the festive table was full of dishes and good wines. Well-fed and tipsy, Meissner asked Takke to lean over to listen to something very important. According to Meissner, he does not just serve the Ministry of Aviation, but serves in Goering's intelligence service - Forschungsamte, in the South-East section, which deals with issues of the USSR, Poland and Romania.

The message about this, sent to Moscow, aroused great interest among the leadership of foreign intelligence, and it immediately responded to this information. Penetration into the counterintelligence and intelligence agencies of Germany was considered one of the main tasks.

Deputy Chief of Intelligence B.D. Berman considered it expedient to express his views on working with Meissner and the illegal resident Zarubin in order to draw his special attention to this "development". "Thakke's case with his friend is moving forward successfully," Berman said. - So far, there are no fears for his fate, especially for the fate of your group. Of course, as always, extreme caution must be exercised in such work, Berman warned, in order to insure oneself against any surprises.

However, the head of the illegal residency, Zarubin, who already knew about Takk, did not agree with the positive assessment of Meissner's "development", noting that it was impossible to get close to him on an ideological basis, and he would take money as a kind of payment for the security of our

scout. In the opinion of the illegal resident, Takke's relationship with Meissner is unlikely to go further than "gentleman's" and it would be better for another operative to get down to business.

Zarubin's opinion prompted the Center to revise the plan for further work with Meissner and make appropriate adjustments to it. According to the new plan, Takke was to gradually withdraw

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out of the game and hand over Meissner to another scout who would take a fresh look at the matter. He will owe nothing to Meissner. While Meissner remains loyal to Takke, the latter, under a convenient pretext, will introduce him to K.I. Seeley, an operative for a "legal" residency. Seeley was given the task, during several meetings, to try to determine the possibility of recruiting Meissner. In the meantime, Takke's wife will leave Berlin, and by the time Meissner is recruited, Takke himself will also leave. As conceived by the Center, such a plan guaranteed the safety of the illegal intelligence agent and his family. In case of failure of Scilly, who had an official cover - "diplomatic immunity", the damage to intelligence would be minimal.

A corresponding instruction regarding Meissner was sent to B.M. Gordon in February 1935.

But unexpectedly, the illegal resident was summoned to an emergency meeting by a well-informed responsible officer of the Gestapo Breitenbach. He said that on March 7, 1935, the 2nd department of the Gestapo, which was engaged in the fight against communism, received a message from the Forschung Samt, according to which a case of operational "development" was opened. The report, in particular, stated that Erich Takke, who had arrived from China on a six-month vacation and maintained contact with an NSDAP member, SS officer Alfred Meissner, was suspected of espionage. Erich Takke has funds in a Zurich bank. There, in Zurich, he met with the German communists. Meissner himself had been to the USSR before and met the aforementioned Takke there.

It was obvious that Meissner could not write anything like this or tell his colleagues about it. It was in his best interest to keep his relationship with Takke a secret. Probably, part of the information was obtained from the agents of the German counterintelligence, the other was collected by the Gestapo through visual observation.

This meant that Takke became the object of the "development" of the German counterintelligence and he was in mortal danger.

There was no doubt that Takke and his wife were obliged to leave Germany as soon as possible, and to do so discreetly. The solution of this problem was entrusted to the illegal residency. She quickly coped with it - the Takke spouses safely left Germany.

Later, information came from Breitenbach, which said that the National Socialist Party had long been watching Meissner. He was not trusted, as he was suspected of belonging to the Communist Party of Germany. Observation revealed his acquaintance with Takke. Meissner was supposed to be expelled from the NSDAP because he was considered "a swindler and

dishonest person."

The Gestapo's check of Takke at his hotel address yielded no results. At this time, the scout was already far from Berlin.

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The story of these events is only a small episode in the hard work that Soviet intelligence carried out before the war in the camp of the future enemy. The bold and very risky "development" of an SS officer, which initially promised to acquire a source of valuable information in the secret services of Nazi Germany, was not crowned with success due to circumstances.

The professionalism of the scouts made it possible to avoid failure, to save positions and people to continue important work for the Motherland. The latter was especially important, since the secret services of fascist Germany - and this is clearly seen in the example of the Meissner case - possessed high skill, and the system of Hitler's political investigation was, without exaggeration, total in nature. Only patriots who piously believed in the rightness of their cause, people with a warm heart, could resist such an enemy. Such were Erich Takke and his wife Juno, who, like many other intelligence officers, fell victim to repression in the late 1930s.

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#### Encounter battle "Janissary"

In the early 1930s, the Center set the residency in Berlin the task of infiltrating the local intelligence services, including the German army intelligence service, the Abwehr. It is easy to set a task, but how to accomplish it? After all, I had to start from scratch. We needed primary clues given to employees of the special services. And here a chance helped, if the tireless search and professional attention of a scout to the facts of the surrounding reality, which another would pass by without noticing anything, can be called a chance.

An employee of the Berlin residency K.I. Seelie regularly visited one of the central Berlin restaurants, which was supposed to be used by local intelligence agencies. And so Karl Ivanovich, who bore the pseudonym Nikita in intelligence, drew attention to the fact that the restaurant waiter often talks on the phone, obviously trying not to attract attention to himself. Waiters in such establishments, as a rule, are agents of local special services. Is the waiter talking to an employee of one of them? Nikita managed to spy on the phone number being dialed. Checking through agents showed that this number belongs to a certain Ver. Vera's installation was carried out through reliable agents. And finally, good luck. Ver turned out to be a senior member of the counterintelligence division of the Abwehr, a major in rank. Nikita was entrusted with a plan for further work on Ver and penetration into the Abwehr through him. Such an assignment to the scout was not given by chance. He was no longer young, having gone through a harsh life school, and was considered one of the most experienced professionals in residency.

K.I. Silli, a Hungarian by nationality, was born in 1893 into the family of a railroad worker. He fought in the Austro-Hungarian army on the side of Kaiser's Germany, but quickly surrendered to the Russians.

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In 1918 he joined the Bolshevik Party. Since 1920 - in the bodies of the Cheka, took an active part in the fight against banditry. In 1931 he was sent to serve in foreign intelligence. Worked in residencies in Germany, Austria, Turkey. He recruited a number of valuable agents and gained a reputation as an experienced recruiter. (In 1937 he was repressed. Fully rehabilitated posthumously in 1956.)

Nikita began by carefully studying Ver's environment. Soon he managed to find out that Egon Gessling, who was the liaison of the "Estonian", an agent of the Berlin residency, a former officer of the tsarist army, was in close contact with Major Ver. The plan of "development" took shape by itself: using the "Estonian", to study Vera through Gessling and, depending on the results, decide on the issue of bringing an agent or operative to Vera. The Center approved such an action plan.

The results of Vera's study exceeded all expectations. He turned out to be an employee of a specially created unit to work from Germany in countries of interest to the Abwehr. The unit had an unusual name: "Home Chapel" and, in essence, was one of the reconnaissance units of the Abwehr. It was headed by Richard Protze. He was Vera's immediate superior.

The acquaintance of the "Estonian" through Egon Gessling with Ver took place. But to one of the meetings with the "Estonian" Ver unexpectedly brought his boss Protze, who carried out a genuine interrogation of the Soviet agent. Protze was interested in the Estonian's connections, especially outside of Germany. And no matter how hard the "Estonian" tried to evade Protze's questions, in order not to arouse suspicion, he had to name some of his acquaintances. The attention of Protze, in particular, was attracted by a former general of the tsarist army living in Berlin.

Right there, in the presence of Vera Protze, he suggested that "Estonets" cooperate with the Abwehr. At the same time, he said: "Germany is interested in the military situation in Poland, and you should try to find out about this through your friends in Estonia and Finland." "Estonian" evaded answering.

An interesting situation arose: our residency brought their agent to Ver, counting on "development" and penetration into the Abwehr agent network. And the leadership of the Abwehr decided to use the "Estonian" that appeared in its field of vision. Well, it happens. The interests of the two intelligence agencies clashed. The advantage of our residency was that it had the initiative and knew who it was dealing with in the person of Vera and Protze, while the Abwehr did not know that they had contacted an agent of the Berlin residency of Soviet intelligence.

Our scouts decided to use their advantage to the end. But since it became clear that we were talking about the "development" of the Abwehr staff members - Vera and Protze, only on the "Estonets"

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could not be relied upon. In this case, a more experienced hand was required. It was decided that K.I. should go to Vera through the Estonian. Seeley and try to conduct his recruiting "development".

On August 10, 1935, Nikita wrote to the Center: "As long as we do not have such an agent as Breitenbach in the Abwehr, we are forced to look for an answer to all our doubts in the process of work. Therefore, I think that since we got into this matter, we should not cut it off half way, but should go to a conversation with Ver ... I think that I should meet with Ver here or in Prague ... We already in the first conversation with Ver, we can see through his intentions, since we know something important about him: about his network among Russian whites, we know about his connection with the Polish "developments" of the Abwehr and that he interrogated our "Estonian". I think that there is a plan to talk to him at least once, even if he is a double, in order to shed light on the whole thing ... "

On August 28, 1935, Nikita met Ver in Prague, to whom he introduced himself under the surname Nikitin. On the same day he wrote to the Center: "Ver is indeed one of the most knowledgeable workers of the Abwehr. He declared his consent to give us everything that interests us. It will cost us dearly." The Abwehr officer, Major Ver, was given the pseudonym "Janychar" in Soviet intelligence.

This meeting lasted 5 hours. Ver told Nikita that, in his opinion, National Socialism had led Germany into a dead end from which there was no way out. He stressed that he had agreed to cooperate with us, since he did not rule out that he might have to leave Germany.

According to Ver, in Nazi circles they look askance at him, because they cannot forgive him for not joining the NSDAP. As long as he works in the Abwehr, nothing threatens him. But if something happens, there will be no mercy from the Gestapo, which keeps him in sight.

Returning to Moscow, Nikita reported on some specific data received during the conversation with Ver on the work of the Abwehr against the USSR and proposed a plan for further work with him. For the next meeting, Verom selected 38 facts known to the INO about the activities of the Abwehr, which Ver could not have been unaware of. This list was later expanded to 68 items, of which the head of the INO identified 11 questions for direct posing to Ver.



However, we had to proceed very carefully. In his analysis of the operational situation surrounding this recruitment, Nikita noted: "We must assume the worst, namely that Protze is acting behind Vera's back and that they are supplying us with disinformation and will hide the work of the Germans from us. At the same time, Nikita pointed out further, there is no doubt that Ver possesses valuable information of a military and military-technical nature ... but in the first period of work we will have to limit ourselves exclusively to materials of a counterintelligence nature, since

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only in this area can we carefully check it and be convinced of its sincerity.

The second meeting between Nikita and Ver took place in Copenhagen on October 6 and 7 of the same 1935, where Ver was summoned by a conditional letter. Nikita sent information to the Janissary about his connections among the white emigration to the Center. However, it did not arouse much interest, and the head of the INO A.A. Slutsky, suggested at the next meeting to work on other connections of the "Janychar" in the Abwehr, listed in the existing plan. On Nikita's telegram from Copenhagen, he imposed a resolution: "To Berman, Scilly. It is necessary before the next trip to firmly agree on our position towards the Janissary in order not to leave it.

The next meeting of Nikita with the Janissary was scheduled for April 1936, but the agent did not appear. For reasons unknown to us, Nikita was also unable to come to the emergency meeting in Stockholm in May. Instead of him in Stockholm, Janissary was hosted by the resident in Sweden Baevsky Artem Matveyevich - Gaib. Previously, he worked with Nikita in Berlin. Prior to this meeting in early May Gaib from the Center was sent a letter from Nikita for the Janissary. It said that he could not travel abroad and authorized Gaib to be his representative. At the same time, the Center sent Gaib a brief description of the Janissary. The Center allowed Gaib to give him a cash advance if the "Janissaries" reacted positively to Nikitin's letter and reported interesting factual data.

Gaib's meeting with "Janychar" took place in Stockholm on May 24, 1936. "Janychar" read Nikitin's letter, agreed to continue cooperation with us, but asked not to transfer it to a third party. Having received money for the materials handed over to them, the Janissaries, however, expressed dissatisfaction with the limited size of the amount.

According to the preliminary assessment of the Center, the materials received from the Janissary turned out to be of little value, which Gaib told the agent at a meeting on June 21, 1936. The latter replied that he did not always have the opportunity to provide materials of great value. Gaib reimbursed the Janissary only for travel expenses. The agent, having accepted the money, asked for the next meeting to be held in August, since he and his boss Prosche would alternately be on vacation until that time.

Due to the fact that the meetings with the "Janissary" in August-November were of little effect, Gaib in a personal letter to Nikita suggested that they temporarily refrain from further meetings. "I believe," Gaib wrote, "that your arrival for final negotiations with the Janissary would be inexpedient."

At the beginning of January 1937, Gaib notified the Center that he was summoning the Janissary to a meeting on February 7, since, on the one hand, there should not be a big break in work, and on the other hand, he could still report something or interesting.

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By this meeting, Gaib was sent a letter from Nikita to "Yanychar", in which an analysis of the information received from him in 1936 was given. In particular, it said: "Mr. Ver, you are an experienced scout. You know exactly what they want from you, and you also know who you are dealing with. We don't want to play cat and mouse. We speak to you on behalf of our

state and carefully weigh the meaning of our words. We have no interest in putting your personal safety at risk."

I read the letter of Nikita "Janychar" with interest and during the conversation suggested the following option in order to intensify his work: he would tell his superiors that he had a "source" in one of the Scandinavian or Baltic countries, giving information about the USSR. Abwehr will undoubtedly be interested. And then it will be possible to find out what issues and persons the Abwehr deals with.

Gaib regarded this proposal of the "Janissary" with great suspicion. In response to this, the Center, in a letter dated July 1, 1937, suggested to Gaib that the Janissary be summoned to Stockholm and offered to go to Moscow for final negotiations with our leading comrades. If the "Janichar" agreed, Gaib had to issue him documents for entry into the USSR and accompany him to Moscow.

Fulfilling this instruction from the Center, Gaib summoned the Janissary to Stockholm on July 11, 1937, but he was able to arrive only on July 18, and Gaib himself had already left the country by that time. Our intelligence did not make any more attempts to meet with the Janissary. Thus ended the story of the recruitment of "Janychar" - an employee of the counterintelligence department of the Abwehr, Major Ver. This rather banal "development" of the Berlin residency might not have deserved the attention of the reader, if not for one circumstance.

The trophy documents captured during the defeat of Germany provide a unique opportunity to look at these events with new eyes. As it turned out, Ver submitted detailed reports about his meetings with Nikitin to the leadership of the Abwehr. The Abwehr, in turn, informed the Gestapo about them. The reports, however, do not mention what Ver himself told Nikitin. It is interesting to note that in the report to the Gestapo, the Abwehr did not name the name of his collaborator who contacted the Soviet intelligence officer. Each special service jealously guarded its achievements. But the Abwehr document also lists the names of four German intelligence agents who previously worked in Russia (Berg, Niedermeier, aka Siebert, Schmidt and Kleinov), about whom Ver, on the instructions of Nikitin, had to collect information.

On November 6, 1935, from the Gestapo, signed by Heydrich Canaris, a letter followed to the Abwehr with the following content: "Thank you for sending a very interesting report ... I ask you to continue to send me reports about the actual or alleged connections of the OGPU with the relevant people".

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In response to this, on December 12, 1935, Vera sent a new report to Heydrich about a meeting with Nikitin in Stockholm on November 24, 1935. It said: "Nikitin's tactics were the same as before, although he apparently decided to put aside plan problematic and theoretical questions in order to have time to work out "practical" questions. However, since he could always be switched "by chance" to questions of a general nature, I had enough opportunities to sidestep the most difficult and complex issues and "lead him by the nose", giving him the meager information that can be was to give him.

So Ver reported to his superiors. However, as evidenced by documents stored in the archives of the SVR, in reality, Nikitin managed to obtain from the Abwehr man interesting information about the situation in Germany and the activities of the Abwehr.

Canaris also noted that Nikitin was interested in information about Gestapo agents being introduced into the circles of the Communist Party of Germany. He would also like to receive data on the structure of the party intelligence - SD, in order to compare them with previously received information.

On January 23, 1936, another report came to Heydrich from the Abwehr about Ver's meeting with Nikitin in Stockholm on January 5. The document stated that Ver named Italian anti-fascists who are interested in Berlin, reported on the arrest in Prague of several emigrants from Russia,

having connections in Berlin, and then turned the conversation to groups of Ukrainian nationalists that interested him.

Nikitin, referring to the opinion of the leadership in Moscow, stated that the information given so far by the agent, although it corresponds to reality, is, unfortunately, too insignificant. Nikitin added that if the agent wanted to really get down to business, he would be rich. Nikitin, they say, was specially instructed to inform him about this.

This report also states that Nikitin gave the task of finding out who the German agents are in Russia, which of the Russians are working for Berlin, and in what line all this is goes.

On December 22, 1936, the following document passed from the Gestapo to Canaris: "In your letters dated October 26 and December 12, 1936, I received interesting reports about the conversations of one of the Abwehr employees with Nikitin that took place in Copenhagen and Stockholm. In accordance with the agreement, I have so far limited myself exclusively to familiarizing myself with the progress of the case, assuming that further materials will come from the relevant sources. Please let me know if I can count on receiving further reports in order to coordinate my tactics accordingly.

Canaris sent an intelligence report to Heydrich "About the meeting with the Soviet consul in Stockholm on February 28, 1937". In a denunciation

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In this article, the contents of Vera's conversation with Gaib and Nikitin's letter are described in detail and quite accurately. At the same time, it is indicated that the next meeting should take place no later than in 6-7 weeks. The report was accompanied by a list of employees of the Soviet embassy in Stockholm.

There are no other reports of "Janychar" about meetings with Nikitin in the Gestapo dossier. But his name continues to appear in this dossier. Thus, on June 4, 1937, the Gestapo was instructed to compile a brief overview of all reports received so far about Nikitin. In mid-July, such an annotation was reported to the leadership of the Gestapo, who left a resolution on the document: "The matter requires further monitoring. A decision cannot yet be made." Thus, working with the Janissary, Nikita did not give any reason for the Abwehr to actively work against himself personally and against the residency of our intelligence. The oncoming battle of the Janissary did not take place.

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"Friend" of Hitler

In the report on the work of intelligence for 1939-1941, stored in the archives of the SVR, the head of intelligence Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, reporting to the People's Commissar on the state of affairs and the main directions of activity for the future, considered it necessary to highlight the work with the anti-Hitler opposition. "Anti-Hitler opposition circles within Germany and abroad are being developed," he reported. Contact has now been established with one of the representatives of these circles, "Drugo", and agreement in principle has been obtained for joint work."

..January is not the best time of the year in Shanghai. The huge city is pierced by cold winds from the ocean, often the streets of the city are flooded with rain and snow. On a bad day in January 1939, Soviet intelligence officer Nikolai Tishchenko went out into the street, tightly wrapping his leather raglan. He was in a hurry to meet with "Heinrich" - one of the German advisers to the head of the Kuomintang regime, President Chiang Kai-shek. Tishchenko and the agent met, as agreed, on the Lanfou embankment and went into a French restaurant. There were few visitors. We ordered bouillabaisse soup from Marseille, a thick, golden-red stew made from seafood. Shrimps, oysters, sea bears and hedgehogs caught from the bottom of the tureen made up the second course. White wine soothed a larynx burned with pepper. At the end of the meal - coffee and

cognac.

"Heinrich" told Tishchenko that, probably, all German advisers to Chiang Kai-shek would soon be recalled to Germany. Apparently, Hitler does not consider the Kuomintang leader a reliable and promising ally, and Germany itself needs specialists, especially of a high class, to strengthen the Wehrmacht. According to "Heinrich", among Chiang Kai-shek's advisers, Captain Walter Stennes, head of Chiang Kai-shek's personal bodyguard, stands out for his courage and purposefulness.

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Stennes, "Heinrich" remarked, was just as afraid of returning to Germany, where he might be persecuted and even killed. If possible, he would "prefer to visit the Soviet Union".

This was a disguised request for political asylum in the USSR, and Tishchenko decided to clarify:

- For what purpose does Stennes want to come to the USSR? Why will the Nazis persecute your friend in Germany?

Heinrich shrugged slightly.

- The reasons can be very different. Stennes was a friend of Hitler in his youth and knows all his ins and outs very well. Since then, much has changed, and Stennes has become a sworn enemy of Hitler. The captain has extensive connections among the German opposition and is ready to do everything to overthrow the Nazi regime. Unlike Hitler, who craved personal power, Stennes dreams of a new sovereign and powerful Germany.

- Does Hitler know the views and intentions of Stennes?

"Enough to kill him immediately.

Returning to the residency, Nikolai weighed every word of the agent, trying to understand how true his information was.

His experience N.S. Tishchenko accumulated for many years. He was born in 1886 in the Kyiv region into a peasant family. As a teenager, he worked at the enterprises of Krasnoyarsk. In 1918-1921 he served in the Red Army, then in the frontier units. From 1923 to 1954 he was on operational work in foreign intelligence units. He went on a long-term business trip to Mongolia as an instructor of internal troops. From 1938 to 1939 and from 1942 to 1947, officially holding a diplomatic post, he worked in China, maintaining contacts with valuable agents. In 1954 he retired due to years of service and health reasons.

Once again, after carefully considering everything, Tishchenko sent a cipher telegram to Moscow, in which he outlined the content of the conversation with "Heinrich", his opinion about Stennes. "I ask you to check Walter Stennes according to the records of the Center," Tishchenko finished, "and express your views on the advisability of establishing contact with him."

In Moscow, the intelligence officer's message aroused great interest. By order of the head of intelligence P.M. Fitin, cases were raised in Germany and a certificate was drawn up for V. Stennes.

It turns out that intelligence had long kept Stennes in sight as one of the possible leaders of the anti-Hitler opposition.

According to the documents, Stennes was born in 1896. He took part in the First World War, showed bravery in battles and was awarded military decorations. He was predicted to have a brilliant career in the General Staff, but he unexpectedly abandoned it and in 1921 joined the Berlin police, where he commanded a company of special forces.

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values. In 1922-1923, Stennes was one of the organizers of the "Black Reichswehr", an illegal military organization created in circumvention of the Versailles Peace Treaty, which infringed on the sovereignty of Germany.

In 1920, Stennes met Hitler at Frau Bechstein's salon in Berlin, where the future Fuhrer spoke to a group of German politicians. In the spring of 1923, Stennes finally joined Hitler and set about organizing assault troops in Berlin and northern Germany. The number of attack aircraft was about 36 thousand well-armed people. Stennes joined the National Socialist Party and became the Fuhrer of the NSDAP of Northern Germany.

Being related to Chancellor Brüning and the Cardinal Bishop of Cologne, he established close relations with the leadership of influential German centrist parties and became close to Catholic circles.

In the summer of 1931, friction began between Stennes and Hitler. Stennes, relying on dissatisfied stormtroopers, demanded the implementation of the National Socialist ideals promised by Hitler. He refused to obey Remus, appointed by Hitler as the chief of staff of the assault troops. Stennes was removed from his posts. Then he, with a part of the stormtroopers loyal to him, captured the printing house of the Goebbels newspaper and a number of other institutions in Berlin.

Enraged Hitler sent Goering with a detachment of people loyal to him to pacify Stennes' stormtroopers. Goering crushed the rebellion and asked the Führer what to do with Stennes.

Hitler was in no hurry with the reprisal, because he wanted to use Stennes in his own interests, and even with emphasized generosity suggested that he forget the "accidental quarrel." Not the last role was played by the fact that Hitler expected to maintain the support of Brüning, who patronized Stennes, and the business circles behind him.

Stennes did not accept Hitler's proposal. Instead, he began negotiations with various German associations, in particular with Ludendorff's Tannenberg Union, the opposition Nikisch group, large industrialists - Mannesmann, Rechling, Erhard, and the conservatively minded Rechberg brothers, who demanded to ensure the stability of the situation in Germany. Erhard loaned Stennes a decent amount of money for this purpose, which allowed him to start publishing his own newspaper, Workers, Peasants, Soldiers. Stennes created the National Socialist Revolutionary Union.

In the elections to the Reichstag, Hitler won an impressive victory and on January 30, 1933 became Chancellor of Germany.

Erhard refused further funding for the Stennes organization, which he had in mind just in case, in reserve. Now this need has disappeared.

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Nevertheless, Stennes still remained a threat to Hitler. Up to 12 thousand people united around him, ready to go to the end. He was still popular in officer circles and among NSDAP veterans.

Hitler decided it was time to get rid of Stennes. In May 1933, he was arrested by the Gestapo and taken to the headquarters on Prinz-Albrechtstrasse, where he was subjected to severe abuse by the jailers. Several times he was taken out into the yard, put face to the wall and staged execution. It is hard to say how it would have ended if Goering had not intervened, this time on the side of Stennes. Goering, like Stennes, fought in the First World War and treated him as a worthy German officer. Stennes was released and allowed to leave Germany. From the end of 1933, he worked under contract in China in a group of German advisers to Chiang Kai-shek.

... The certificate that lay before the head of Soviet intelligence reproduced step by step the main events from the life of Stennes and gave an idea of his political views and personal qualities.

After reviewing the information collected, Fitin sent a cipher telegram instructing Tishchenko to establish direct contact with Stennes and, if he wants to leave for the Soviet Union, to provide him with the necessary assistance.

The saying "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" seems to fall into the category of eternal truths.

On March 14, 1939, Tishchenko met with Stennes at his apartment. The conversation began with probing positions.

How do you assess the current international situation? Stennes asked suddenly.

"As you can see, we are living in a period of a major war that has essentially begun," the scout answered after thinking.

Stennes was satisfied with the answer.

- Hitler told his generals that when Austria and the Sudetenland were captured, none of the great powers would oppose Germany. Unfortunately, he was right. With the tacit approval of the great powers, something terrible is happening. I consider it my duty to warn you that Germany is actively preparing for a war against the USSR. My information is based on reliable data.

What motivates you to be so open? You understand that I have to ask this question," Tishchenko said.

"I am currently non-partisan," Stennes replied. – My main goal is to overthrow Hitler and create a democratic Germany, but not communist or socialist. Neither the communists nor the socialists will simply be able to hold on to power. At the same time, power will be strong only when there is political freedom and equality in the participation of parties in elections.

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- I understood: the purpose of your life is to destroy the Hitler regime.

"But not only that. When Hitler is overthrown, it is necessary, taking into account the peculiarities of the current world situation, to conclude an alliance, some kind of agreement between Germany, the USSR and China. This alliance will become the basis of their successful economic development, without any territorial claims from any side, Stennes emphasized.

From further conversation, Tishchenko found out that, according to Stennes, work against Hitler and the anti-Hitler movement in Germany should begin with the army, since Hitler could be the cause of a new world war, disastrous for Germany. With its beginning, according to Stennes, the leaders of the German anti-Hitler emigration should create a government of the new Germany and seek its international recognition. At the same time, it is necessary to form, for example, a German legion of anti-fascists, which, together with the allies, would take part in the armed struggle against the Nazi regime.

There was a lot of common sense in Stennes' plans, and Tishchenko listened attentively to his interlocutor.

"My duties as an adviser to Chiang Kai-shek include," Stennes went on to say, "also the direction of his intelligence. Here I am exchanging information with intelligence officials from the USA, Britain and France. I could, on a "gentlemanly" basis, share information with the Soviet Union, but without disclosing my sources of information. My experience is that this will be the most

safe for everyone, especially those who trust me and get information for me.

- We need allies in the fight against Hitler, and in your person we see a like-minded person and friend. What do you want in return? We have a business conversation, and my question, I hope, does not look out of place.

- For everything that I will pass on to you, I ask only one thing: if necessary, help me to travel to Europe through the USSR, when the time comes for this.

Moscow carefully analyzed the content of Tishchenko's conversation with Stennes. Everyone agreed that this was an open expression of the consent of the German adviser to cooperate with intelligence in the name of destroying the Hitler regime. The offer, apparently, was sincere.

At Lubyanka, a personal file was opened against Stennes, coded as "Friend." The case was of special secrecy and was issued only with the permission of high authorities.

Successfully started relations between foreign intelligence and the "Friend", however, suddenly broke off soon after. There are no documents in archival files that could shed light on this.

incomprehensible phenomenon.

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On November 25, 1940, Dolbin, a resident of Soviet intelligence in Tokyo (since there were no other options), was sent an instruction, signed by Beria, to find Stennes and restore communication. At the end of December, Dolbin met with "Drug", who declared that he was glad to resume contact, the absence of which weighed him down and led him to unhappy reflections. He would still like to visit the Soviet Union, but the conditions are not yet ripe.

Reporting to Moscow about the meeting with the "Friend", Dolbin proposed to take into account the forthcoming passage through Moscow to China of Stennes' spouse. She could, under the pretext of "illness", stay in the capital of the USSR, and Stennes would visit her.

Beria summoned the deputy head of intelligence, P.A. Sudoplatov and asked him what he thought about Dolbin's proposal and what the visit of "Friend" to Moscow might bring.

Sudoplatov considered it expedient to carry out this operation and convinced Beria of this.

In order to carry out the planned operation, a representative of the Center, Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubin, left for Shanghai after the New Year.

The "friend" received Zarubin at a villa located in the French quarter of Shanghai, where he settled in the spring of 1940.

Tall, elegant, in a jacket and khaki breeches, Stennes met the Moscow guest on the threshold of the villa and invited him to go into the salon. Zarubin easily agreed with Drug on creating conditions for his arrival in Moscow. Stennes wrote a note to his wife asking her to stay in Moscow, recommending Vasily Mikhailovich as his good friend in China, who would explain everything else to her.

At the same time, the material assistance offered by Zarubin from our side was resolutely rejected by Stennes and nearly offended him.

"I agree to cooperate with you in accordance with my convictions, and not for the sake of obtaining money," said "Friend" with a slight frown. "I'm not a communist, and I don't think I ever will be. But whoever I am, I will always and by all means fight against Hitler, and that is why I am with you."

— We consider our relations as allies in the fight against a common enemy. Therefore, we are like-minded people, - Zarubin specified.

"Now that Hitler is winning one victory after another," the "Friend" returned to political questions, "it is impossible to start anything serious in Germany itself. But after severe defeats, the mood in Germany may change not in favor of Hitler.

- When can this happen? Zarubin asked.

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The "friend" was silent for a long time, and then answered:

- Whatever the outcome of the current battles in Europe, Hitler will not stop and will definitely oppose the USSR. It is important to penetrate Hitler's plans in order to be able to paralyze them in time. At present, it is in the interests of the USSR to help China, which is "forging" Japan's ground forces. Then the latter will not be able to help Hitler in resolving European affairs, as the German chancellor wants.

"Germany and Japan are allies under the Anti-Comintern Pact and strive to act in concert," Zarubin said.

— Not all is well in German-Japanese relations. Hitler, Stennes remarked, should be put under pressure if possible, then he will act more prudently.

The "friend" apparently implied that Germany's foreign policy difficulties would strengthen opposition to Hitler inside the country.

He told Zarubin that, according to the information of a high-ranking official who had recently arrived from Germany, the military and economic offensive against the USSR was practically prepared. It is scheduled for the end of May 1941. All the highest military and civilian circles in Germany believe that the war with the Soviet Union will last no more than three months. Hitler intends to seize the Donbass and Ukraine, thus providing the German industry with coal and iron. If the war with Britain ended before the autumn of 1940, the circles mentioned would consider it possible to reach an agreement with the USSR without armed conflict.

"Do you believe it, Stennes?"

"It goes against Hitler's whole logic, but that's what they say. Personally, I think that Germany's war against the Soviet Union will turn into a catastrophe for the Nazis.

On February 23, 1941, Zarubin transmitted the information he received from Drug to Moscow, adding that the agent could not yet leave for the USSR. "In conversations with me," wrote Zarubin, "Stennes persistently asserted that Hitler was fully prepared for war with the Soviet Union. He warns us, and we must draw the appropriate conclusions from this."

Following this report, Zarubin reported to Moscow that the Tokyo correspondent of the newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung, Richard Sorge, who had arrived in Shanghai, had also informed Drugu about the extreme tension in Soviet-German relations and the inevitability of an armed conflict in the coming weeks. Naturally, "Friend" did not know that Sorge was sending his messages directly to Moscow.

Saying goodbye to Zarubin, "Drug" said that, proceeding solely from ideological motives, he agreed to inform the USSR (previously it was only about "gentleman's" relations) on the most important political issues and asked to give him a liaison for this purpose.

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V.M. Zarubin, having fulfilled the assignment given to him, returned to Moscow. The Great Patriotic War broke out, and Stennes could not leave for the USSR.

Along with acute current issues, intelligence did not stop monitoring the development of the internal political situation in Germany, the opposition and its possible actions. On December 20, 1941, intelligence prepared an analytical note, in which, in particular, it was noted that the opposition group headed by Colonel General Beck was the most determined in terms of its goals and objectives, influence among the military. She advocates an immediate end to the war, the liberation of the territories occupied by the Wehrmacht, except for Austria and the Sudetenland, for a just peace, but not a new Versailles, and the preservation of Germany within the borders of 1939. The internal structure of Germany should be similar to the democracies of the Scandinavian countries. "Friend" was connected with Beck, and the intelligence leadership took this circumstance into account in their plans for the future.

During the war, Rogov, an operative of the legal residency in Shanghai, who officially held the position of a TASS correspondent, periodically met with Drug. The "friend," as he promised Zarubin, informed Rogov on important issues of German-Japanese relations, on the policy of Germany and Japan towards China, and, which was especially valuable, whether Japan would oppose the USSR. Information "Friend" was highly appreciated in Moscow.

At a meeting with Rogov at the end of January 1942, "Friend" announced the arrest in Japan of a group that included Sorge.

- Are those arrested accused of having links with the USSR? Rogov asked.

- Do you already know this? asked Stennes, slightly surprised.

— No, I can't say anything definitive about this yet. But the well-known anti-Sovietism of the Japanese suggests that they will try to attribute everything to "Russian espionage."

The friend was silent. When the pause was unforgivably prolonged, he calmly said:

"The Japanese can arrest me here too.

A detailed cipher telegram about Rogov's conversation with "Drug" and about the arrest of Sorge went to Moscow on January 22, 1942. The head of intelligence, Fitin, after reading it, expressed the opinion that "Drug" should be taken to the USSR. But in higher spheres this proposal did not find - holders.

... Even before the surrender of Japan in World War II, the Center received a message from China from one of our agents regarding Stennes. The cipher telegram suggested that Stennes might be involved in the work of the Free Germany and Free Officers organizations. Someone from senior management, without putting his signature, across the message wrote in a flourish:

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"The source overestimates the personality of Stennes. He is no longer such a major figure that his place of residence influences the politics and relations of states."

The "friend", not feeling supported, expressed doubts to Rogov about the expediency of his return to Germany.

At the beginning of 1947, at a meeting with Rogov, "Friend" said that the Americans had long offered him to work for them in German intelligence and had even included him in the list of repatriates leaving for Germany. The "friend" flatly refused to have any dealings with the Americans, and in 1948, with the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, he left for the island of Taiwan. Through his wife, he sent a note to Rogov with a Berlin address in case contact was renewed when he did return to his homeland.

It was not until the early 1950s that Stennes arrived in Germany and settled with his sister in the British zone of occupation. His wife received a large inheritance after the death of her father and traveled to Berlin to formalize her rights. From the end of 1951, "Drug" began publishing a weekly newsletter on foreign and domestic policy issues, which was distributed among major industrialists and bankers. The goal pursued by Stennes was the economic revival of Germany and its complete rejection of militarization. He actively restored old and started new political ties.

One of the West German magazines attacked Stennes with a series of articles, accusing him of trying to create a "social imperial" party in Germany, and also allegedly being an agent of the GDR security service.

Representatives of the apparatus of the authorized KGB of the USSR in Berlin held several familiarization meetings with the "Friend". At the same time, Stennes declared that he was ready to continue cooperation with Soviet intelligence on a "purely German basis", acting, he explained, in the national interests of Germany.

The Center rejected Stennes's idea of working together on a "German national basis", and the KGB apparatus of the USSR in Berlin cut off contact with him in 1952.

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Spring in Geneva

In the spring of 1936, the tourist season in Geneva started early. The weather was sunny and warm, and tourists from Germany, France, England, the USA and other countries filled the hotels that had been empty a month ago, slowly strolling along the shores of Lake Geneva, admiring the fountains and white swans majestically gliding over the water surface.

Diplomats and officials were also added to Geneva in connection with the meetings of various commissions in the League of Nations. Diplomatic receptions followed one after the other in large hotels. The revival "was felt in restaurants and shops. The Swiss did everything to ensure that the service was at the highest level.

In the morning, all the cafes in the city center were filled with visitors. We had breakfast, drank coffee, soft drinks. By 10 o'clock the wave of tourists subsided. At this time, local regulars and foreigners appeared at the tables, who had nowhere to hurry.

On that clear spring morning, a man of about 40 years old, above average height, in an elegant gray suit entered the door of one of these cafes at exactly 10 o'clock. He slowly took a newspaper from the shelf and went to a vacant table by the window. After ordering coffee, which he immediately paid for, he seemed to be completely absorbed in reading the newspaper. It was easy to identify a business person by his appearance and demeanor; a cup of coffee and an update from the morning paper seemed to be part of a daily, strictly observed ritual. After 5 minutes, a young woman in a white dress appeared in the cafe. She sat down at an empty table and ordered a coffee with cream and a cake. The eyes of the man and woman met. She unhurriedly opened her purse, took out her lipstick and a small mirror, tinted her lips, then quickly put everything into her purse. Then she looked back at the man in gray. He was holding a newspaper in front of him, but his eyes, over the top of the newspaper, were fixed on her. She realized that the signal had been received.

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After about 15 minutes, the woman called the waiter and began to pay. The man got up, put the newspaper on the shelf and walked slowly towards the exit. On the street, he strolled along a row of shops and paused for a while at the window with toys. Slowly examining the plush animals, he managed to look around the street and make sure that the lady was 40 meters behind him. When he reached the crossroads, the man turned into a quiet lane and then went out onto another street, opposite the bookstore. Entering it, he stopped at the stand of book novelties and

began to examine them, watching through the window the situation on the street and how "Elsa" was approaching the store, an important source of Soviet intelligence, who arrived as part of a German delegation at a meeting of one of the commissions in the League of Nations as a technical officer. The man in the gray suit, Fyodor Karpovich Parparov, was a resident of one of the illegal Soviet intelligence stations in Germany.

Here, in the store, "Elsa" was supposed to hand over to the scout copies of the cipher telegrams sent to Berlin after the first two meetings of the commission.

There were few people in the store, the visitors delved into the books placed on the shelves. "Elsa" walked around the store, chose some detective and began to pay. Parparov went up to one of the stands, opened a book standing there, removed from it the package that Elsa had discreetly enclosed, and began to carefully look through other publications. The materials for which the intelligence officer arrived in Geneva have been received. Parparov discussed the places of transmission of information with Elsa back in Germany, before traveling to Switzerland.

The German delegation stayed in Geneva for two weeks. During this time, Parparov met with "Elsa" three times and received copies of documents that were sent to Berlin or received from the German Foreign Ministry in the form of instructions and instructions.

Fyodor Karpovich established contact with Elsa through one of his German assistants, who knew about her anti-fascist sentiments. Careful at first, personal contact with "Elsa" began to develop: she was interested in discussing issues of current politics with this outstanding person. At first, "Elsa" from time to time shared fragmentary information that she became aware of while working at the Foreign Ministry. But then, under the influence of Fyodor Karpovich, she began to act more actively, it came to handing over copies of secret documents. In the end, she began to convey extremely valuable information, which was highly appreciated at the Center.

Fedor Karpovich conducted intelligence work in Germany for a long time. And before that, like many of his peers, he went through a difficult path through the revolution, the Civil War, severe and hungry post-war years.

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He was born in 1893 in the city of Velizh, Pskov province. He began his career at the age of 14 as an apprentice at a timber export office in Riga, then worked as a clerk in a bank. In 1919, he voluntarily joined the Red Army, was an ordinary Red Army soldier, then political inspector of the 5th Army, commissar of the division headquarters, commissar of engineering troops. At this time, he met General D.M. Karbyshev, who was at the head of the engineering troops of the army, and worked with him until his departure from the front. Due to illness, in 1920 he was demobilized and sent to the People's Commissariat for Education, where he worked as deputy head of the administrative department. At the same time he studied at the law department of Moscow State University, which he successfully graduated in 1924.

In 1925, Parparov entered the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and soon left for Germany to work in the Soviet trade mission. At work abroad, he proved to be a competent, proactive specialist. In 1930, he was asked to go to work in intelligence.

They had to work from illegal positions. He had to resign from the trade mission and settle permanently in Germany. At that time, such a legend looked natural. The flow of emigrants from Russia has not yet dried up, and the authorities of many European countries were very loyal to this.

The operation to settle in the country was a success. Parparov, his wife and son received a residence permit in Germany as stateless persons, then through connections he obtained a passport from one of the countries of Eastern Europe and, in order to secure a more stable position for himself, "accepted" the citizenship of a small Latin American country. For the German authorities it looked

a normal phenomenon: many immigrants from Russia took the citizenship of other states and acquired foreign documents. Some even managed to obtain German citizenship.

To stay and work in the country, it was necessary to organize a reliable cover. To this end, Parparov opened an export office in Berlin. Then he created several branches of the company in a number of countries in Western and Eastern Europe, as well as in Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

Evaluating the initial period of work, the Center made the following conclusion: "The program of acclimation has ended. She is brilliantly done. He himself is a serious and experienced scout. Has the ability to travel around the country. We plan to entrust him with communication with the most valuable agents. It should be used to complete the recruitment of individuals whose preliminary work with completed."

The center soon formed an intelligence group under the leadership of Parparov, which was then deployed into a separate

denture. 403

Parparov obtained the most valuable information through Elsa. Some secret materials came to Parparov literally from the desk of Reich Chancellor Hitler.

Among other things, "Elsa" received a number of reports about the activities of prominent German military intelligence officers, including Admiral Canaris. Of particular interest were materials on Canaris' visit to Tallinn in the summer of 1937 and in the spring of 1938 to establish contacts between the German and Estonian military intelligence services, data on the progress of cooperation between these bodies directed against the USSR, as well as documents on the conduct of observations from one of Estonian islands behind the maneuvers of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet, about German military preparations in Finland and the Baltic states, about an Abwehr agent in the Czech General Staff, etc.

During the first half of the 1930s, the volume of materials received from Elsa exceeded 3,000 sheets. Moscow highly appreciated her activities. The description of the Center stated: "<...accepted in the highest diplomatic circles... constantly visiting Geneva and Paris. Has access to official documents (cipher telegrams, reports, diplomatic and personal correspondence of members of the delegation). Meets with diplomats, officers of the Reichswehr - members of the delegation and messengers.

The last proof of the honest work of the source can be the copy of the top secret instruction given by Hitler to the German delegation in Geneva on the position that Germany should take at the conference, which we received from him by last post.

When the situation in Germany deteriorated sharply, the Center instructed Parparov to concentrate all his efforts on working with Elsa.

In 1937, Parparov was sent to Holland in order to assess the opportunities that appeared there for organizing intelligence work in Germany.

Arriving in Amsterdam, Fyodor Karpovich got acquainted through a resident of the "legal" residency with materials on "Robert", who lived as an emigrant in Holland. From the documents it was clear that "Robert" was a spy for one of the Western countries and was working on Germany. In connection with sharp disagreements with his resident, he resigned two years ago and remained permanently in Amsterdam.

After assessing the situation, Parparov decided to establish contact with him.

After some time, relations became friendly, and "Robert" spoke about his former work in intelligence. It turned out that he was in contact with agents working on the military

technical issues. After careful analysis of the data reported

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"Robert", and his return to work for Soviet intelligence, he restored contact with his former agents and began to supply Parparov with important information. The materials of "Robert" covered mainly the construction of military ships, airfields and landing sites. The information was accurate and highly valued by the Red Army Intelligence Industry.

Parparov's characterization for 1937 stated: "Parparov's work was fruitful, an excellent recruiter by his vocation, courageous, cultured, and has a winning appearance. He speaks German, English and partly French and Spanish. He gave us some good, serious deeds that have not lost their significance even now."

However, successful work was interrupted due to the recall of Parparov in early 1938 to Moscow. The reason for it was the betrayal of a military intelligence officer who knew Parparov. After arriving at the Center, Fedor Karpovich worked for some time in its structure. However, the fate of many outstanding intelligence officers of the 1930s did not bypass our hero - on May 27, 1938, Parparov was arrested. As he was explained, the reason for the arrest was the joint work with the arrested employees of the INO Gordon and Silly, as well as the recommendations that Deribas and Smirnov, who had already been repressed by that time, had given him for work in intelligence. It was not until June 1939 that the investigation file was closed "due to the lack of corpus delicti."

Upon his release, Fyodor Karpovich repeatedly turned to the leadership of the NKVD, offering to restore contact with the sources who were in touch with him. However, no response was received. Through the personnel department, he was offered to get a job in the national economy.

Until 1940, Parparov worked as a legal adviser at one of the factories in Moscow. Then he was again invited to work in intelligence. At the end of 1940, when Germany's preparations for the war against the USSR were in full swing, Parparov was given the task of leaving illegally to meet Elsa. The goal is to obtain information concerning the preparation of Germany for a war in the East.

The task was completed. "Elsa" reported on the concentration of the German army in the southeast direction and transmitted other information. Of particular importance was the information that Germany was building up its troops on the Yugoslav border, which, as is known, were then brought into this country to suppress a popular uprising. (This somewhat delayed the time of Hitler's attack on the USSR)

Active work with Elsa continued until the spring of 1941. Communication with her was interrupted due to the outbreak of the war.

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Looking ahead, we note that after the end of the war in 1945, an active search for Elsa was undertaken. Intelligence intended to find out her situation and provide material assistance if necessary, since Germany was going through hard times after the defeat in the war. After numerous attempts, we finally managed to find a relative of "Elsa", who said that as a result of a shell shock received during the bombing, she was in a hospital in the American zone of occupation in a hopeless condition. Elsa died soon after.

At the end of 1940 and at the beginning of 1941, Parparov, from a legal position, carried out the task of the Center in the Baltic. The war found him in Lithuania. His family was also with him. We had to evacuate under continuous bombing and under the fire of German tanks. With great difficulty we reached Moscow. Having passed military training, he received a new task. Your front, the intelligence chiefs told him, is behind the front line. He had to go to Switzerland and from the territory of this country to organize work to collect information in Germany.

It was decided to go to Europe through the eastern states, in particular through Iran. It was supposed to use for this purpose the passport of one of the Latin American countries acquired by him in due time. The scout had to extend the document, since it had already expired. However, the embassy refused to renew the document. It was also not possible to use other opportunities to travel to Switzerland. Fallback options have not been developed.

In April 1943, Parparov was recalled to Moscow and sent to work in the 4th department of the NKGB of the USSR, which was engaged in reconnaissance and organization of sabotage work in the territory occupied by the enemy.

In 1944, Fyodor Karpovich, as a major specialist in Germany, was transferred to the Main Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees. A special place was given to work with the former commander of the 6th German Army, Field Marshal Paulus.

The field marshal belonged to the elite of the German generals, participated in the development of the Barbarossa plan, was familiar with the military-theoretical concepts and practical plans of the German high command. Parparov managed to establish normal relations with the field marshal, discussed various military issues with him, which was taken into account when developing forecasts for the development of events in various sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Great importance was attached to working with Paulus after the end of the war, during the preparation for the Nuremberg trials, at which Paulus was to testify for the prosecution. By this time, he joined the Anti-Fascist Union of German Officers, and then the National Committee of a Free Germany.

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In preparation for the process, the field marshal worked hard on materials related to the development of plans for unleashing a war in Europe, the seizure of France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, etc., the development and implementation of the Barbarossa plan.

Fedor Karpovich helped in the selection of materials that interested Paulus. This allowed the latter to successfully speak at the Nuremberg trials.

As a token of gratitude for this help and assistance in getting acquainted with the life of the peoples of the Soviet Union, its culture and history, he presented Fyodor Karpovich with two paintings painted by himself. Few people know that Paulus was not only a major military figure, but also a good artist. One of these paintings, donated by the son of Fyodor Karpovich, is now in the Museum of the Russian Army.

In connection with the repatriation of German prisoners of war from the USSR, on October 24, 1953, Field Marshal Paulus issued a statement to the Soviet government, which included the following words: "Before I leave the Soviet Union, I would like to tell the Soviet people that I once came to their country in blind obedience as an enemy, now I leave this country as her friend.

Reading the statement of Paulus in the newspaper in the family circle, Fyodor Karpovich remarked that he was pleased with the change that had taken place with the field marshal, and was pleased that he had made a contribution to this matter.

After the war, Parparov participated as a member of working groups in the preparation of the Potsdam Conference, the Nuremberg trials and events related to the organization of the activities of the occupation authorities.

Here he met his son, whom he had not seen since 1941. The war scattered them on different fronts. Lev Fedorovich fought near Stalingrad, was wounded, and by the end of the war ended up in Berlin. Here, during the Potsdam Conference, they met.

For a long time, father and son walked along the streets of Berlin, through familiar places, recalling the anxious pre-war days. After all, Lev was in Germany with his parents and left for Moscow in 1938.

when he was already in his fourteenth year. Although he did not know that his father was a Soviet intelligence officer, he guessed that he was engaged in some dangerous anti-fascist work.

Recalling his meeting with his father in Berlin, he said: "Imagine the joy shining in my father's eyes. To go through such hell and stay alive is unbelievable. And where to meet – in Berlin, in the fascist lair, where my father's fight with the fascists began in the early 1930s."

Fyodor Karpovich was not only a talented intelligence officer, but also a good friend, he treated his wife Raisa Iosifovna with great tenderness. He was not a poet, but he often wrote love poems to her. All

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they have not been preserved in the main archive, but they can be judged by the last poem written by him a few days before his death.

sand jet in the clock

It's fading away a little.

Madam, angel, my wife,

That death drives me on the road! Death drives me out of the house, wife, Force will not help here.

She drives the soul from the body,

The soul withered from fear.

Alas, you can't help with a tear and a prayer, At least cry, at least break your hands! Neither the body with the soul, nor the husband and wife can be saved from separation by anything!

In the mid-1950s, Parparov fell seriously ill. The scout knew that his days were numbered. He died in 1959.

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At the dawn of atomic espionage

The discovery by Lord Rutherford in 1919 of the ability of atoms of one chemical element to transform into atoms of another as a result of irradiation with alpha particles (the nuclei of helium atoms) captured the imagination of physicists. With the deepening of research in the field of nuclear physics, the prospect of obtaining an atomic explosive and creating a formidable weapon on its basis arose. Since 1940, all work in this area has been classified.

Soviet scientific and technical intelligence in the 1930s did not pass by these achievements, although it could not yet draw any far-reaching conclusions...

Berlin. Summer 1931. On the platform of the Berlin Schönefeld station, a tall, thick-built man got off the train that arrived from Moscow. It was the director of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology, Academician A.F. Ioffe. The Leningrad scientist arrived in Berlin at the invitation of the German physicist Dr. Lange.

The Lange laboratory, as well as the institute headed by Academician Ioffe, was engaged in work on the creation of high-energy particle accelerators of the order of 20 and 50 million volts.

Getting acquainted with the laboratory of Dr. Lange, Ioffe drew attention to a young, slender man who spoke Russian well. It turned out to be engineer Herbert Muravkin, who came to Berlin from Russia back in 1924 with his father, a Soviet citizen. Muravkin in Berlin

completed his education, received an engineering degree, and then a doctorate in physical and technical sciences. Having got to know Muravkin better and convinced of his deep knowledge and talent, Ioffe promised the young man a subsidy of 300 marks per month while he was in Germany, and when the work on the creation of the first generator was completed, he invited him to his institute for position of senior engineer. However, due to legal obstacles—Muravkin was not a foreign citizen—Ioffe was unable to secure the promised subsidy in the USSR.

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From Muravkin, the academician learned that Dr. Lange's laboratory was working on the creation of high-power generators under contracts with two major German firms, AEG and IG Farbenindustrie. In the Soviet Union, in addition to the Leningrad Institute, the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology dealt with the problem of such generators. Muravkin also told Ioffe that both German firms expressed their readiness to cooperate with both institutes, but only on the condition that they purchase their equipment, and the inventions of Soviet physicists were patented in the name of AEG and IG Farbenindustrie. As for Muravkin personally, the AEG refused to sign a contract with him because of his Soviet citizenship.

Deputy resident of foreign intelligence in Berlin on the scientific and technical line G.B. Ovakimyan, unlike Ioffe, managed to obtain a subsidy from the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry for Herbert Muravkin and offered cooperation. Muravkin gave his consent and began to regularly introduce G.B. Hovakimyan with the materials he received at German institutes.

After Ovakimyan's departure from the country, contact with Muravkin was provided by residency officer Vyacheslav and senior group of scientific and technical intelligence Philip. Materials came from Muravkin, which were highly appreciated at the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology. In September 1932, these materials were handed over to the head of the communications department of the Red Army, which then financed the creation of a 2.4 million volt accelerator in Kharkov. In the same September 1932, Pravda published a report from the Kharkov Institute of Physics on the implementation of fission of the atom.

Intrigued by this publication, Dr. Lange directly asked Muravkin: "Do you know by what method the atom was split in Kharkov – according to ours or according to English?" (In America at that time such scientists as Milliken, Tuve, and Lauritz were also working on this problem, but with less powerful accelerators.) Muravkin replied that he only knew what had been published in the press. To this, Lange remarked: "It is unlikely that Kharkov did it on its own. I suspect there is someone involved here."

This statement by Lange naturally disturbed the Center. Therefore, in November 1932, intelligence chief Artuzov turned to the Economic Directorate of the OGPU with a note stating: "In order to preserve the source in the AEG, we consider it necessary to take measures to protect the Kharkov Institute from possible AET intelligence, and in particular - to the protection of the materials of our source, set out in manuscripts and drawings in his handwriting. Additional materials on the high-voltage generator are attached herewith.

Apparently, in order to encrypt our source, the leading Kharkov physicist A.I. Leipunsky wrote to Dr. Lange in the autumn of 1932: "There are only three laboratories that seriously  
zani

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are used to study the atomic nucleus at high voltage. This is your laboratory, Cockcroft's laboratory in England and ours. It is highly desirable that the above-mentioned laboratories work in constant close contact." In the same letter, Leipunsky promised to facilitate Lange's trip to Kharkov. Before that, Dr. Lange, at the invitation of Ioffe, visited Leningrad.



Lange himself, despite his suspicions, was interested in retaining Muravkin as a laboratory employee and actively continued to support him. In the official reference to Muravkin, Lange wrote: "Dr. Herbert Muravkin has been participating in the work of the institute for about two years in the creation of a high-energy charged particle accelerator for research in the field of nuclear fission and cancer radiation therapy. At the same time, he has proven himself well in all respects and to a large extent contributed to the implementation of this project, so that his further activity in this area is undoubtedly caused by the interests of the cause."

However, in the middle of 1933, the police presidium of Berlin demanded that Muravkin prove his loyalty to Germany, threatening expulsion otherwise. Such a demand was due to the fact that even in his student years Muravkin connected himself with the Esperantist society, and at the all-German congress of this society in 1932 he represented its left, pro-communist wing. The intercession of Lange, who visited the police presidium, did not help either. In April 1933 Muravkin returned to the Soviet Union. Before leaving, he handed over to the residency his latest materials on the acceleration of high-energy particles.

In Moscow, employees of the technical department of the Economic Department of the OGPU had a detailed conversation with the scientist. During this conversation, Muravkin stated that "I would like to work at an institute that is the most adapted and provided for the entire complex of generation and utilization of high voltage currents. A powerful impulse generator with taps should be built there for use in military affairs, medicine, agriculture and chemistry. These considerations of Muravkin, an employee of the Research and Development Department of the Center K.A. Dunts stated in the report, asking the authorities for instructions on where to send Muravkin to work.

Muravkin spent the autumn days of 1933 in Moscow, visiting exhibitions and theaters with interest. Worried about the thought of the parents who were still in Germany, about the political situation there.

In early November 1933, Muravkin was enrolled in the Research Institute of Communications and Electromechanics of the Red Army for "work on ultra-high voltages and the atomic nucleus." In this regard, Muravkin was received by M.P. Tukhachevsky, who perfectly understood the significance of atomic energy. He assisted in the relocation of Muravkin's parents from Berlin to Moscow.

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But the Research Institute of the Red Army turned out to be unsuitable for the work planned by Muravkin. Then he himself turned again to Tukhachevsky, who suggested that Muravkin create all the necessary conditions for his work at the Leningrad Electrophysical Institute (LEFI). At LEFI, Muravkin was actively involved in the work, but due to organizational troubles, he did not receive support from the leadership of the institute, and in May 1935 he was dismissed from the institute altogether, and his group was disbanded.

K.A. Dunts and Deputy Chief of Intelligence B.D. Berman had to work hard to return Muravkin's scientific archive from LEFI. After his dismissal, an employee of the special department of this institute, in response to their request, wrote: "A significant part of the materials is of no scientific value. In addition, the materials are rough drafts and carelessly compiled, which makes it impossible to understand them. Yes, Muravkin is unlikely to deal with them himself. In general, these materials can be destroyed to a large extent without damage. Muravkin is only making noise with them."

Muravkin's dismissal from LEFI coincided with the time when a group of physicists led by Landau at the Kharkov Institute were being persecuted for dealing with "the irrelevant problem of the fission of the atomic nucleus." Although, according to intelligence, it was at this time that the Americans became interested in the same Lange and his colleagues.

As for Muravkin, having received his archive from LEFI, he asked K.A. Duntz to supply him with materials from the California Institute of Technology and Princeton University

to get acquainted with the level of American works on the same topic.

On September 26, 1935, the Economic Directorate of the OGPU prepared a letter for Muravkin to LEFI, which stated: "INO GUGB considers it possible to restore Muravkin to work at LEFI and allow him to work on top-secret work in the field of damaging rays". Signing this letter, Deputy Chief of Intelligence Berman wrote with a red pencil: "I consider it not only possible, but also necessary for the cause to use Muravkin in his specialty." However, Muravkin still did not get into LEFI.

The archive of foreign intelligence has preserved A.A. Slutsky, a reference to Muravkin dated April 1936 stating that there is no information compromising him. Time for the unemployed Muravkin dragged on too slowly. Finally, he was helped to get a job at the All-Union Energy Institute in Moscow.

There was a difficult period associated with distrust of people, especially those who had lived abroad for a long time. Six months later, Muravkin was arrested by the NKVD. His further fate is not known.

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Hans-Heinrich Kummer - scientist, patriot, anti-fascist

At the end of November 1942, Anatoly Markovich Gurevich, a resident of military intelligence in Kent, transmitted from Brussels to the Center valuable information received from Schulze-Boysen, one of the leaders of the Berlin anti-fascist organization. Gurevich ended up in Berlin as a result of an agreement reached between the leadership of foreign intelligence and the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. Among the information reported by the Berlin anti-fascists was the information that "German pilots have the same gas masks as the infantry." The Soviet command was well aware of these gas masks, the inventor of which was an engineer, doctor of technical sciences Hans-Heinrich Kummer.

In 1933, the German patriot, anti-fascist Kummerov expressed his readiness to conduct intelligence activities in favor of the Soviet Union. In notes written by him on January 24, 1943 in the Plötzensee hard labor prison and found there after 1945, he explained his decision as follows: ... This behavior, position, mode of action has organically emerged in communist and sympathetic circles since the communist worldview found its home in Russia. It was about promoting its technical development and equipping it militarily to protect it from neighbors who frankly greedily looked at this rich, promising country, whose population consisted of wonderful people, ideal in their worldview, but still weak in the field of technology and etc. To this end, their friends all over the world helped their Russian associates with deed and advice, passing on to them all the necessary knowledge, and especially information about weapons that could and should have been used to attack Russia, and military secrets related to the preparation of this attack. . Protection and defense were (then, in any case

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case, of course) a self-evident task, given the primitive level that the country inherited from the tsarist regime. "... Friends of Russia with a clear conscience, following their ideals, began to send to her the technical secrets of military firms, which are driven only by the interests of their own gain. So did I ... We all knew that they would never be used against peaceful peoples (for example, our own), but would serve only for defense, which is morally justified.

Kummerov, a talented scientist, intellectual, optimist by nature, found the meaning of life in the fight against the Nazis. He was the son of a Privy Councilor, a professor and head of the Provincial Board of Schools. After leaving school, Hans-Heinrich Kummer studied at the Berlin

University of music history and philosophy, since 1923 he studied at the Berlin Higher Technical School. In 1927 he received a degree in engineering, in 1929 he became a doctor of science. At the same time, he entered the plant of the Gazglulicht-Auer-Gesellschaft joint-stock company in Oranienburg, near Berlin. Subsequently, the highly gifted engineer served in the design office of the Leve-radio AG company, which during the years of fascism carried out important military orders. In addition, he collaborated in the Imperial Biological Bureau of Agriculture and Forestry.

The contract with the firm "Auer" expired in 1932, and Kummerov was not going to renew it. He was disgusted by the narrow mercantilism and callousness of the company's owners, who used the engineering talent of their employee for unbridled enrichment. As a professional, Kummer was already known outside of Germany, and he was offered work by the French and Japanese. However, the thirty-year-old engineer preferred Russia. He made no secret of his intention to go to a country that struck his imagination and find there an application for his remarkable abilities and ideas. He even visited the USSR embassy in Berlin to find out the procedure for obtaining entry into the Soviet Union. At the embassy, fate brought him into contact with a young foreign intelligence officer, G.B. Ovakimyan, a chemical engineer by education, Doctor of Technical Sciences. Hovakimyan and Kummerov quickly found a common language and made the most favorable impression on each other. Ovakimyan reported to Moscow about the establishment of contact with Kummerov, about the important data received from him on the composition of chemical warfare agents and suggested that he be called "Filter" in the correspondence. In operational correspondence, the pseudonym was assigned to Kummerov.

Moscow highly appreciated the actions of the residency to expand information capabilities and the materials received from the "Filter". In connection with the departure of the operative and the transfer of Kummerov to another intelligence officer, the next meeting with him was scheduled only for the second decade of October 1933.

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However, on the eve of the meeting, Kummerov and his acquaintance sent a note to the commission for trips to the USSR under the embassy, stating that he had been searched, but counterintelligence did not find anything incriminating. Nevertheless, the residency was engaged in a careful check of the incoming signal and ascertaining the position in which the valuable source turned out to be. Even before receiving the final results of the check, Resident Berman, in a personal letter to the head of foreign intelligence, expressed an opinion on the advisability of temporarily suspending contact with the "Filter". Moscow regarded the position of the resident as too cautious. At the end of November, he was answered: "We consider it expedient, if the circumstances of the case allow, that you meet with the "Filter". This could be done after a preliminary check and establishment of whether he was really arrested and what he is doing now."

Fulfilling the instructions of the Center, a valuable source of the residency, who worked in the Gestapo, on December 5, 1933, found the following entry in the documents of the police presidium of Berlin, referring to Hans-Heinrich Kummerov. "Kummerov, while living in Oranienburg, met the writer Vladimir Gossman, who publishes the German-Russian newspaper Moskauer Nachrichten with his brother. The writer will travel to Soviet Russia in the near future. He advised Kummerov to also move to Russia, where extensive industrial construction was taking place. After that, Kummerov decided to give up his job at the Auer enterprises, but he did not take his documents from the firm. He spoke quite openly about his intention to leave for Russia with those around him. One of the firm's typists reported this to the administration, presenting Kummerov's behavior in a tendentious light. For this reason, the administration became suspicious of Kummerov, who may be engaged in industrial espionage. In turn, the administration put the police on their feet."

The special wariness of the administration of the Auer company was explained by the fact that it carried out military orders for the Nazis. In Moscow, they thought about the information received. On the one hand, they testified that the obstacles to the development of relations with the "Filter"

No. But the resident's earlier sent personal letter about the arrest of the source made them cautious.

Two years have passed. A new resident arrived at the "legal" residency, having his own way of looking at the situation and the tasks facing him. Almost simultaneously, he received messages from three reputable sources that characterized Kummerov positively. An opinion was expressed about the expediency of establishing contact with him. Based on this information, Moscow instructed the residency to double-check what the police and the Gestapo currently know about Hans-Heinrich Kummerov. November 28, 1935  
leader

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illegal residency through his capabilities in the Gestapo found out and reported to the Center:  
"Kummerov is known to the police and counterintelligence only for his inventions. There is nothing against him." Active work with a valuable source of information was resumed.

The residency operative Mikhail summoned Kummerov for a meeting. He came with samples of the components of a gas mask being put into production by order of the German army. He himself was the author of this novelty. Mikhail asked: "How much will it cost?", referring to the payment to the source of remuneration for such an unexpected and generous gift. "Filter" named the amount of 40 thousand marks, referring to the cost of the invention. Michael was horrified by this figure. From the expression on his face, the scientist realized that there was a misunderstanding. "I give you my invention, as a friend of Russia, free of charge," he said. "The only thing I ask is that in Russia they know about me and, if necessary, I could find asylum with you."

He promised to inform Mikhail in detail about some new chemical warfare agents, their production technology, as well as means of protection against them. The source promised to write a detailed note about all this by the next meeting. "Probably," Kummerov noted, "the information about experiments on animals with the use of chemical warfare agents and methods of treatment for their damage, which one of my acquaintances is engaged in, will also be of interest?" Mikhail replied that this would be a valuable addition to the promised report.

Kummerov's confidant was his friend Erhard Tomfor, assistant director of Leve-radio AG, which carried out orders from military departments. He was not only a highly qualified specialist, but also a resolute opponent of fascism. He himself organized acts of well-thought-out sabotage that disrupted the production of military products of the concern. Like Kummerov, he was not a communist. At the same time, being a well-educated German intellectual, he understood the significance of the struggle against fascism.

On the basis of the information received from Tomfor, Kummerov informed the representative of foreign intelligence that German scientists and technologists were hard at work on the creation of devices of the "radar" type for determining the flight altitude of an aircraft based on radio waves reflected by it, an acoustic torpedo, and radio communication devices for tanks. Through his connections in scientific and technical circles, Kummerov also received information about the development in Germany of technology for the production of synthetic gasoline and rubber.

In 1936-1937, a young intelligence officer A.M. met regularly with Kummerov and supervised his activities. Korotkov, who arrived at the position of an employee of the trade mission. The trade representative Kandelaki, having met Korotkov in the post-war years at one of the official receptions, remarked to him: "I did not expect, Alexander Mikhailovich, that

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at that distant time you were engaged in such risky and important business under my nose. I would never have thought you were capable of such a thing!" "Alas, Ivan Fyodorovich, even now I cannot initiate you into these past affairs," and added: "Conspiracy, you understand."

Having received a new urgent assignment, Korotkov left for another country, essentially mothballing his connection with Kummerov. Neither the residency nor the Center had trained personnel to continue cooperation.

In intelligence and in the life of individual intelligence officers, the most unexpected turns often occur. In early September 1940, A.M. Korotkov again ended up in the Berlin "legal" residency. The resident applied to Moscow with a request to allow A.M. Korotkov "as an old acquaintance who is passing through Berlin" to meet with Hans-Heinrich Kummerov. It was necessary to find out what his position was, what opportunities he had, how he was set up. Soon the meeting approved by the Center took place. Kummerov was glad to see an old friend, with whom he spoke frankly about everything that worried him. He still lived in the suburbs of Berlin with his wife, they had a child, which brought great joy to the spouses. The scientist worked in a company that developed means for the destruction of agricultural pests. In May 1939, Kummerov said, he was summoned to the Gestapo about a story related to his desire to leave for the USSR, as he was an employee of the Gazglulicht-Auer-Gesellschaft company, which carried out military orders. Having rechecked the already known information and found nothing reprehensible in Kummerov's behavior, the Gestapo left him alone.

He keeps in touch with several old friends, first of all with E. Tomfor, who is still his like-minded person. In conclusion, Kummerov declared that he was ready, as before, to help us.

Having received Korotkov's report on the meeting with "Filter", the leadership of foreign intelligence offered to select an employee to contact him, but not yet involve him in active intelligence activities. From January 1941, the young operative Egor began to meet regularly with Kummerov. "Filter" gave him information about pesticides produced by German enterprises, which at that time were a closed topic in the country. In March 1941, Kummerov told Yegor that the Gestapo had searched his apartment after he placed an advertisement in a newspaper for the sale of some old things. The Gestapo probably took this as Kummerov's prearranged signal for his foreign correspondents. In Moscow, they were inclined to regard the information received as confirmation that the "Filter" continues to be under the supervision of the Gestapo, since it is a carrier of valuable information.

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Since the beginning of the war, meetings with Kummerov were interrupted. In January 1942, the data on the "Filter" and the conditions of appearance were communicated to the resident in Stockholm in order to send a reliable liaison to him from Sweden. In February, an agent of the Stockholm residence "Istorik" went to Germany, met with Kummerov and talked with him in accordance with the instructions of the Center. According to him, the German source received him with joy and said that he had recently worked at a radio factory. He is hardly suspected of anything, since he did not notice any surveillance of himself. The "Historian" asked "Filter" whether he could host people illegally arriving in Germany. The source replied that this was practically impossible, since the village where he settled is small and all the inhabitants know each other. The mood of the Germans, according to Kummerov's observations, is depressed. But there are no open manifestations of protest, and there are no signs of an approaching social explosion. The actions of German aviation against Great Britain became less effective, as the British use radars in the air defense system. As regards the use of chemical weapons by Germany in the war, it is unlikely that she will now take the risk of taking this step. By the same token, there are no signs of preparation for it yet. The new weapon, on which Hitler places great hopes, is the 150-mm projectile, which has been used by the Germans on the Eastern Front for about a month now. Kummerov reported data on his device and tactical specifications.

The Center decided to improve communication with the "Filter" and use its information capabilities more actively. For this purpose, the agent "Beck" abandoned in Berlin was given the password and conditions of communication with the source by radio. But, unfortunately, "Beck" to this

time was already arrested by the Gestapo and acted under control. The insidious trap of the German counterintelligence slammed shut. In December 1942, following orders from the Gestapo, "Beck" reported to Moscow by radio that he had allegedly called Kummerov twice to no avail. On the third time, his wife allegedly answered the phone and answered that her husband was "mobilized into the army" at the end of September.

At this time, Hans-Heinrich and Ingeborg Kummerov, as well as E. Tomfor, had already been arrested and subjected to severe interrogations by the Gestapo investigators. Kummerov tried to take all the blame on himself and avert the threat from his wife and friend, while there was the slightest opportunity for this. In his notes, secretly written in the Plötzensee prison, he wrote: "I tried, as long as it seemed expedient, to cover for him (i.e., Erhard Thomfort) and received my fair share of beatings, slaps, etc. for this. The accompaniment was vicious swearing, growling, poking, throwing against the wall, etc., as well as threats of even worse measures."

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In order to break the resistance of the anti-fascist and untie his tongue, the investigator threatened that with further denial, Kummerov's wife would be executed before his eyes. The Gesta Povtsy fulfilled their promise by beheading Ingeborg Kummerova on the guillotine. On December 18, 1942, Hans-Heinrich Kummer was sentenced to death by an imperial military court. Three times he made attempts to commit suicide, but obliging executioners saved him in order to finally hang him on February 4, 1944. On May 13, 1943, according to the verdict of the court-martial, E. Tomfor was also executed.

In 1969, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the proclamation of the GDR, a group of German anti-fascists was awarded Soviet government awards for their assistance to the Red Army and their contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Among those awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was the name of Dr. Hans-Heinrich Kummerov, a courageous fighter for justice and a better life on earth.

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"Red Chapel"

1935-1941

There is hardly a European country in which one way or another they would not write about the group of German anti-fascists "Corsican" - Arvid Harnack and "Sergeant" - Harro Schulze-Boysen, inaccurately referred to as the "Red Chapel". In the intelligence institutions of the West, the well-known French publicist Gilles Perrault argues, the "chapel" is studied as an organization representing a fusion of the anti-fascist Resistance with elements of intelligence activities, which has achieved amazing results on the whole. At the same time, the majority of printed speeches devoted to the Red Chapel suffer from one-sidedness and incompleteness. This, apparently, is explained by the fact that for a long time information about it was drawn mainly from the memoirs of German counterintelligence officers who fought against the "chapel" and persecuted its members as their sworn enemies.

The archive of Soviet intelligence on this subject remained closed until recently, as well as the safes of the special services of the United States and Great Britain.

So what is the "Red Chapel"? With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Morse code of numerous anti-fascist groups and illegal Soviet residents went on the air and sounded like a powerful orchestra. The underground radio operators were called "pianists" by the Gestapo. To capture them, a special division (Sonderkommando) of the Gestapo, the "Red Chapel," was created, which united both of them into one common file-form coded by the name of this team. Over time, the Gestapo bloodhounds were forgotten, and her opponents, who fell into the clutches of counterintelligence, began to be called the heroes of the "chapel". At the same time, the meaning of the word completely changed and became synonymous with stamina and courage. Among the anti-fascists persecuted by the Sonderkommando

In Germany, one of the first places is rightfully occupied by the group of Harro Schulze-Boysen and Arvid Harnack.  
For the sake of mastering

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In order to save Germany from the oppression of fascism, the members of the "chapel" exposed themselves to mortal risk and accepted the crown of martyrdom. But their sacrifices were not in vain. They contributed to the approach of the collapse of the Third Reich and showed the whole world that in addition to people who were silently submissive and blindly believing in the Fuhrer, there were Germans actively fighting for a new, democratic Germany. Different in political views, religion, origin, position in society, the participants of the "Red Chapel" in Germany belonged to various initiative groups of the Resistance. The assertion that they were all sent from a single foreign center and that the Soviet military intelligence officer Leopold Trepper was allegedly their leader is erroneous.

The Berlin group of Arvid Harnack and Harro Schulze-Boysen went into voluntary cooperation with representatives of the Soviet foreign intelligence in order to obtain assistance in waging an effective struggle to overthrow Hitler's tyranny. If anyone offered them money for this, they would indignantly reject such a deal. The German patriots came out on the side of the Soviet Union, a state that, in their opinion, was striving for the implementation of the principles of social justice. The ideas of socialism that originated in the West, in particular in Germany, were close and understandable to the German intelligentsia, united around Harnack and Schulze-Boysen. Hitler in their eyes was the destroyer of everything humane, democratic, progressive.

Relations between anti-fascists and representatives of the Soviet intelligence were in the nature of a partnership. This explains, in particular, the fact that the "Corsican" and "Sergeant" group, although it solved important reconnaissance tasks, was not a classic unit of secret assistants to a foreign power. Communication with the group was maintained through the "legal" foreign policy intelligence station in Berlin until Hitler's attack on the USSR.

This essay, without claiming to be an exhaustive coverage of the topic of the "Red Chapel", suggests first of all dwelling on little or completely unknown aspects of its activities. For the first time, we are talking about the Soviet people who took part in this complex and important operation, their hard work, achievements, as well as the mistakes and miscalculations made, including by the intelligence leadership.

Standing behind the window curtain, Mildred watched the fascists celebrate their arrival at  
authorities.

— What to do, Arvid? she asked her husband in confusion. - How to live now?

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"We need to take refuge in the provinces for a while," Arvid Harnack put his arm around Mildred's shoulders. — When the upsurge of passions subsides a bit, we will return to the capital. Let's start gathering strength. Let's fight for Germany.

- Could we?

- I'm sure it is. We will also have reliable friends who will help us.

The appointment of Hitler as Chancellor of Germany in 1933 aggravated the situation in the country. Fascism sought by terror to completely destroy the democratic and progressive forces of the German people. The seemingly complete triumph of fascism in the country posed an urgent task for the foreign intelligence of the USSR: to reach out in Germany to opposition forces capable of opposing Hitler, to find out what their position is, whom they unite, which one they adhere to.

strategies and tactics, what are the intentions of the Hitlerite leadership in domestic and foreign policy. To do this, it was necessary to find ways to penetrate the upper echelons of power.

..Boris Moiseevich Gordon, head of the consular department of the USSR Embassy in Berlin, often stayed at work in the evenings. Gordon was the head of the "legal" residency of the NKVD and had to not only organize the receipt of classified information, direct the work of employees, but also see its prospects.

Once Gordon invited the first secretary of the embassy, Alexander Girshfeld, to his place.

After talking a little about the weather, health, the situation in Germany, Gordon asked bluntly:

- Alexander, you know the situation in the Third Reich well. Perhaps you have friends among the Germans?

- Yes of course. Who are you specifically interested in?

Gordon considered the answer for a minute.

- Decent Germans attract me first of all. Or rather, anti-fascists. I understand that after what happened in the country, the Germans learned to hide their true thoughts. But such an experienced person as you, I hope, knows how to understand with whom he is dealing?

- Boris Moiseevich, when I arrived in Germany in 1932, I met a young smart guy Arvid Harnak. He comes from a professorial family, but grew up without a father, in need. At the age of 23 he received the degree of doctor of jurisprudence. He continued his studies in the USA, from where he returned with his charming wife Mildred, an American of German origin, Doctor of Philology. At the age of 30, he completed his thesis on "The Pre-Marxist Labor Movement in the United States", earning a Ph.D. What do you think? His views, as far as I know, were at first

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nationalist-bourgeois coloring, but education and life experience led him to Marxism, made him a friend of the Soviet Union.

— You can be a scientist, an educated person and not see anything around. Scientists are often distracted.

"Not Harnack. He is extremely active and very observant. Due to his position - and he works in the Ministry of Economy - he is very knowledgeable on almost all issues. Officially, he is not a member of the KKE," Hirschfeld continued. — However, on behalf of the party, Harnack participated in the creation of the Union of Intellectual Workers, a legal mass organization of progressive intellectuals. In addition, he conducts propaganda on the study of the Soviet planned economy, organized the corresponding society ARPLAN and a study tour of German engineers and economists to the USSR.

Gordon listened to Hirshfeld with interest. It seems that Arvid Harnak is exactly the right person.

- Alexander, in my opinion, it is necessary to meet with Arvid and talk in detail. We have a limited choice for a meeting: the secret apartment of the embassy or the apartment of a professor. I think it's safer to meet at Harnack's, after warning him that you will come with a friend. If I'm wrong, I listen to objections.

- There will be no objections. It remains to notify Harnack.



At the beginning of August 1935, at the apartment of Dr. Harnack, Gordon and Hirschfeld agreed that Harnack (henceforth "Corsican") would, together with his Soviet friends, fight against the dictatorship of fascism, for democracy, and to prevent the war started by the Nazis against the European peoples and the Soviet Union. .

"Everything that I have heard completely coincides with my desires. My consent to a joint struggle is dictated by love for the Motherland and trust in comrades-in-arms in the struggle. I hope that our work will bring positive results," assured Arvid Harnak.

At the next meeting, Gordon raised the issue of working on a strictly conspiratorial basis, stopping the advertising of anti-fascist activities and caution in personal behavior before the Corsican. On the recommendation of a Russian friend, Harnack joined the National Socialist Party. He was supposed to become outwardly one hundred percent "Nazi" and be known in their circles as his man. In 1935, Harnack became government and then senior government adviser in the imperial ministry of economics. From the reference fund of the ministry, he could receive information about any sector of the country's economy and military production. He received invaluable information, which he passed on to Moscow. In the Center, this information has always been highly appreciated.

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The anti-fascist struggle, together with the Corsican, was led by his close and devoted friends: Adam Kukhof ("The Old Man"), a prominent writer and playwright, and his wife Greta Kukhof ("Kahn"). She studied in the USA at the same time as Arvid and met the young Harnack couple.

Through Professor Hebele, who also shared anti-fascist views, and the Kukhof "Corsican" spouses, he met the "Foreman" - Harro Schulze-Boysen, senior lieutenant, head of the fifth report of the reconnaissance headquarters of Marshal Goering's aviation. The close relationship between these anti-fascists served as the basis for the emergence in the underground of one of the most active cells of the anti-Hitler Resistance.

Carefully checking, B. Gordon held periodic meetings with the "Corsican".

Thanks to connections with members of the High Command of the Ground Forces, the Committee for the Four-Year Plan for the Militarization of the German Economy, the Imperial Chamber of Commerce, the leadership of the IG Farben concern, as well as with employees of the Institute for Military and Economic Statistics, the Corsican was aware of important issues. owls of the preparation of the Reich for aggression and informed the USSR in advance of them.

In 1937, Gordon was called to Moscow. He had a dark premonition, but he carefully concealed it. Saying goodbye to the Corsican, Gordon asked not to forget him if he was delayed, and to inform him about changes in the country. Arvid Harnak promised and did not let go of Gordon's hand for a long time.

In Moscow, the resident was arrested. Gordon was slandered by a petty, envious person who had once been offended by him. The donation came in handy. Gordon was recommended to work in Berlin by intelligence chief A.Kh. Artuzov. A reprisal began against the intelligence leadership, and this fact surfaced, interpreted as Gordon's close connection with the enemy group. A special court of the Troika sentenced him to death by firing squad. Today, the name of the brave and talented intelligence officer has been returned from oblivion and has become known to his compatriots.

Gordon's recall essentially decapitated the residency, which was on the rise at that time. It consisted of up to a dozen scouts who had interesting and important sources of information. For example, Karl Behrens is a designer-designer. Coming from a working-class family, a communist, he worked at the AEG-Turbine military plant. Harnack introduced Behrens to a foreign intelligence officer. Imbued with anti-fascist sentiments and sympathy for the USSR, Behrens provided intelligence with valuable data from the military experimental station of the Ministry of Aviation.

Erwin Gerts is an aviation colonel, head of the counterintelligence service of the Ministry of Aviation. Pilot by profession. Length

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worked in journalism for a long time. After coming to power in the country, the Nazis did not join them, but agreed to serve in aviation, where he made a career. In his heart he remained a democrat, a German patriot. On this basis, he became close to the "Starshina" and passed on valuable information to him. From the "Sergeant" information came to the "Corsican" and then to Moscow.

Günter Weisenborn is a German radio editor and a journalist by profession. He became close friends with Harro Schulze-Boysen on the basis of active rejection of National Socialism, militarism and the search for new ways of developing Germany. He was an active assistant to Schulze-Boysen, obtaining political information in the Ministry of Propaganda and in journalistic circles.

After Gordon's departure, the residency was headed by A.I. Agayants is a young, but by that time already quite an experienced scout. And again fatal bad luck. In December 1938 Agayants died on the operating table. The perforation of the stomach ulcer proved to be fatal for him.

Until September 1939, the Berlin residency did not have a resident. The Center did not have enough personnel, experienced intelligence officers were destroyed during the repressions. In September 1939, a new resident was finally appointed to Berlin. But the choice was unsuccessful. A.Z. Kobulov, the protégé of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria, is not well educated (a five-year education plus accounting courses), ambitious, and for a long time worked in modest financial and economic positions in small institutions and enterprises in Transcaucasia. On the advice of his elder brother Bogdan, Beria's deputy, he joined the security services and, with the support of his brother, made a rapid career. In 1939, without any experience in intelligence work, he found himself at the head of one of the most important points of the NKVD abroad - in Berlin.

Before leaving Moscow, Kobulov was received by the head of foreign policy intelligence, Commissar III rank P.M. Fitin. The conversation was formal, protocol. A conversation was held with the head of the German direction P.M. Zhuravlev, one of the most experienced operational intelligence officers. Both parted without a feeling of sympathy: Pavel Matveyevich's conversation with the arrogant Kobulov left a cloudy residue in his soul.

Barely looking around the place, Kobulov energetically set to work. Promiscuity in establishing contacts and talkativeness attracted the attention of the head of the Gestapo department "4-D" Standartenführer Likus, who instructed to begin its development. According to the Gestapo records, Kobulov was listed as a resident of Soviet intelligence.

P.M. Zhuravlev, feeling unkind, tried to intervene in the course of events, to call on Kobulov to discipline and secrecy. Get ready

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Zhuravlev began to coordinate the draft instruction to Berlin prepared on this account with the higher leadership, which found the instruction to the Berlin resident unnecessarily harsh (they knew who was behind him) and softened the text.

When Kobulov became convinced that he had been warned, albeit in a delicate form, he lost his temper and addressed a personal letter to the head of intelligence, Fitin.

The resident complained that he had heard rumors that Deputy Chief of Intelligence P.A. Sudoplatov and P.M. Zhuravlev unreasonably criticize his work behind his back. Such chatter should be put to an end, he suggested to Fitin. In the same letter, Kobulov asked for a cash subsidy, citing length of service and local high cost.

The leadership of foreign intelligence transferred the Reichsmarks due to Kobulov, but came to the conclusion that the work of the residency could actually be improved only by sending an experienced and knowledgeable operative to Berlin. The most suitable candidate was A.M. Korotkov.

In April 1940 Korotkov arrived in Berlin. After some time, he resumed meetings with the Corsican, and later with the Petty Officer. Valuable information was obtained from them about Germany's preparations for war against the USSR. Kobulov wished to meet with the "Corsican", using Korotkov as an interpreter. Having informed Moscow about the planned meeting, Amayak Zakharovich heard in response not very polite: "Do not go to the meeting with the Corsican".

At the same time, Korotkov's meetings with the Corsican were suddenly interrupted due to unforeseen circumstances. Illegally sent to Berlin, operative officer Chervonnaya, fluent in German and provided with genuine German documents, was ambushed by the Gestapo at the apartment of the agent to whom she was going with the task. Much of this story was unclear. The Center was alerted by the fact that Chervonnaya knew several agents with whom Korotkov held meetings. Was it by chance or did one of the agents set up Chervonnaya and now wants to provoke Korotkov? There was no unequivocal answer, and Moscow ordered Korotkov to arrive at the end of the autumn of 1940 for consultations, freezing his communications for the time being.

In Moscow, Korotkov was eagerly awaited.

- How do you assess the intelligence and operational situation in the country? - asked the deputy chief of intelligence, the curator of the Berlin point P.A. Sudoplatov.

- One gets the impression that the Germans are intensively preparing for a military action against the USSR. This can be seen in the changing tone of propaganda, the behavior of officials, the activation of counterintelligence,

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intensive mode of operation of the headquarters of the High Command of the Ground Forces.

— What do you think about the failure of Chervonnaya?

"Most likely it was a coincidence," Korotkov answered. — I carried out verification activities, but they did not reveal an increased interest of the Gestapo in me, and also did not reveal suspicious moments in the behavior of our sources.

Do you think it's a fatal accident?

— Yes, nothing more.

"Anyway, continue watching, do not lower your vigilance," said Sudoplatov. — And now about the sources you mentioned. The Center is seriously considering how to turn the residency towards a deeper penetration into the Nazi structures, the economy, the central departments, the intelligentsia and the military circles. Here is a plan for the development of our relations with the Corsican, prepared with my direct participation and agreed with the intelligence chief P.M. Fitin. The plan was reported to L.P. Beria and received his approval. Do you understand what that means?! Take the document, study it carefully and accept it as a guide to action.

Getting acquainted with the plan, Korotkov drew attention to the fact that out of 10 of its points, part of it concerned mainly the clarification of data on acquaintances of the Corsican. Other questions related to ensuring the security of Soviet foreign institutions in Germany and seconded Soviet citizens. "The task is undoubtedly important, Korotkov understood this well. But isn't it too great a luxury to use such a valuable source of information in this direction?! And does he have the opportunity to do so?" - said the scout. Finally, the last part of the task consisted of informational questions, including those on the internal political situation in

country, contradictions and strife "at the top", about the opposition forces, the state of the economy, as well as the foreign policy of the Reich.

Were there other problems in the assignment? Of course, yes: the 4th item in the work plan was the verification and specification of information received from the source about the military preparations of Germany in relation to the USSR; in the 7th, it was recommended to find out how Germany expects to use the economic resources of the USSR in the "economic plan" in the event of military operations.

Probably, if we evaluate the tasks of the plan from modern positions, then these points should have become fundamental in all work with the Corsican. However, each time has its own logic.

Under the signatures of Fitin and Sudoplatov, Korotkov carefully signed the document "read" and put the date - December 24, 1940.

Returning to Berlin in January 1941, Alexander Mikhailovich hurried to meet with the Corsican. Both were delighted to meet

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and Korotkov asked about the latest news. The Corsican, by the way, said that he visited the "Club of the Rich" in order to maintain his authority in official circles and find new sources of information.

"But I did not notice that any of the members of the club crossed the line of official, protocol relations and expressed something new, important, not yet known. However, this is not the place where they express their true moods and views. As for the Union of Knowledge Workers, through which we study people and influence them, its number has recently increased. Now the Union has approximately 60 members.

Korotkov looked at the Corsican in surprise. He never imagined that during the time when there were no meetings with Arvid, the organization would grow so much. This was an undoubted plus for the expansion of the anti-fascist resistance movement. From the standpoint of Korotkov the scout, this posed additional problems.

- In such a mass of people it is not difficult to see a provocateur. Don't you think so, Arvid?

— No, Alexander. The Union is accepted only after a thorough check and on the recommendation of two of its members. We are building up the potential of the anti-fascist struggle.

- If possible, briefly tell us about what your intellectual group is doing now.

- I'll try to do it. The union consists mainly of democratically inclined intelligentsia, although in its ranks there are representatives of the military, the aristocracy, workers who hate Nazism and believe in the revival of Germany. Marxism is studied in an accessible form, the situation in the country is analyzed, and the lies of Goebbels' propaganda are exposed.

Having advised the "Corsican" to be extremely careful in dealing with members of the Union, Korotkov stressed that he was not going to interfere - this is a personal matter for Harnack and his friends. It is enough if he informs him about the important decisions of the Union.

The Corsican reported that the High Command of the Ground Forces had ordered a map of the USSR's industry for the Wehrmacht. This, in his opinion, revealed the intentions of the Nazis and indicated the goals that they wanted to capture or destroy.

Korotkov immediately reported to the Center about the meeting with the Corsican.

Every day from the Corsican and his friends - Harro Schulze-Boysen, Adam Kukhof, the spouses Kurt and Elisabeth Schumacher and others - there was information convincing that the flywheel of the preparation of Hitler's aggression against Russia was spinning more and more. In particular, Harro Schulze-Boysen obtained data from the Air Force headquarters,

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bombing of Leningrad, Kyiv, Vyborg, and other objects on Soviet territory, about the completion of the preparation of the army for an attack on the Soviet Union. Specific information required an adequate assessment and appropriate action. Korotkov, on the other hand, was warned not to fall for Anglo-American, and possibly German disinformation.

Korotkov was confident in the reliability of the obtained data and the sincerity of his sources. On March 10, 1941, he reported to the Center:

"The Corsican called for an urgent meeting and said that the deputy head of the Lange-Litke Institute of Military Economic Statistics had informed him that the Wehrmacht General Staff hoped to break the resistance of the Red Army within the first 8 days. The occupation of Ukraine would deprive the USSR of its main industrial base. The Caucasus and the Urals will be torn away (it is supposed to reach them on the 25th day from the start of hostilities). The attack is dictated by considerations of Germany's military advantage over the USSR.

A week later, Korotkov received new confirmation from A. Harnack that "preparation for a strike against the USSR had become obvious." The residency reported this personally to the People's Commissar for State Security Merkulov.

For its part, the leadership of foreign intelligence regularly reported to the top Soviet leadership the data coming from the Corsican and Starshina. But in them, along with priceless grains of truth, serious warnings about an impending catastrophe, information of the opposite nature slipped through. This was constantly thought about in the Center, especially since the spring of 1941, when the situation began to worsen. The leadership of the People's Commissariat and foreign intelligence came to the conclusion that it was expedient to relieve A. Harnack from all his sub-sources. He himself had to deeply understand the materials coming directly into his hands. And with sub-sources it is better to establish direct contacts with security officers and, along the way, clarify and concretize dubious places. A corresponding order from the head of intelligence, Fitin, went to Berlin. If this requires the help of the "Corsican", do not refuse it, and explain to him the measures taken by the complication of the situation and the need to strengthen the secrecy in work, taking into account the possible emergence of a state of emergency. He, apparently, himself feels in what direction the development of events is going.

Korotkov thought for a long time about the indication of the Center, about what words to find so that A. Harnack would not get the impression that he was being pushed aside. It is very necessary, and the work of anti-fascists is inconceivable without it.

As Korotkov expected, the "Corsican" on the whole was sympathetic to the request to introduce him to the "Sergeant-Major".

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- It can be done. But there are two difficulties. Harro is practically never at home. He is in a barracks position at Göring's Air Force Headquarters near Potsdam. He also does not know what and how happens to the information he transmits. I will invite him to my place next Wednesday, and you introduce yourself, say, as a person who is connected with the Russians and supplies them with the collected data. I am afraid that admitting that his information came into your hands may cause him a state of shock.

But the "Corsican" obviously underestimated his closest friend, who had long been aware of whom he was helping.

Preparing for the meeting with the "Starshina", Korotkov once again looked through the available materials.

Harro Schulze-Boysen was about thirty years old. He came from an aristocratic family and was the great-nephew of the famous Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the founder of the German Navy. Harro's father commanded a warship in the First World War, and during the Second World War he was chief of staff of the occupation troops in the Netherlands. Harro graduated from the school of military navigators. In 1936, Harro married the granddaughter of the Prince of Eulenburg, Libertas Haas-Haye. Marshal Goering, the second person in the state, knew Libertas as a teenager. Therefore, he was not very surprised when she informed him of her marriage and asked him to pay attention to her husband. At the direction of Goering, Harro was enrolled in the aviation headquarters, despite objections from the Gestapo, where a dossier had been filed against him since his studies as a person maintaining "reprehensible connections" with the communists. In the Ministry of Aviation, Harro was appointed head of the report, who was engaged in the analysis and processing of reports from the German air attaches. It was here that he got acquainted with the other side of the ministry's activities aimed at unleashing the WAR.

Korotkov and the "Sergeant" met at the apartment of the "Corsican" as long-familiar like-minded people. Harro found a way to show that he guessed who was in front of him, and is glad to meet a Russian intelligence officer. He willingly agreed to meet with Korotkov, but said that in practice this could only be done through Arvid Harnak.

The Center did not assume the complexity of the connection with the "Starshina", but instructed Korotkov to find out if Harro could film documents in the service and hand them over in undeveloped film.

— Alas, Alexander, — answered the "Sergeant Major", — it is practically impossible. There is no suitable premises for this, no time, and it is difficult to endure, since we are kept at the headquarters for weeks.

"So there is no possibility in the present and in the future?" - said Korotkov.

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"Absolutely," the Chief confirmed. "But I will do everything possible so that the plans and intentions of the Nazis are not secrets, so that they can be successfully fought against.

"If Harro says that he will do everything to defeat Nazism," said Arvid Harnak, "then there can be no doubt that he will do everything in his power for this.

— Well, let's work together and look for new opportunities. And now, friends, it's time to say goodbye, - Korotkov shook hands with Arvid and Kharro.

"See you, Alexander," the Corsican escorted Korotkov to the door.

Now Korotkov should have resumed direct contact with Karl Behrens, a fitter and master of art casting by profession. He went through a difficult political path: at first, believing the fascist demagogy, he joined the NSDAP and one of its assault squads, but soon there was a sobering up and a break with the Nazis.

They remembered him

it's for life...

While studying Marxist theory in a circle led by Mildred Harnack, he attracted her attention with diligence and rich life experience. Mildred decided to introduce Behrens to her husband, whom he also made a positive impression on. The "Corsican" brought Berens to B. Gordon, who entrusted him to the care of Belkin, the residency operative. Between him and Berens, now "Radiant", friendly relations were established. They often argued about the future of Germany, and Behrens expressed his confidence that there would be forces in the German people capable of opposing the fascist dictatorship. From "Radiant" came valuable

information. But soon Belkin left for Spain, and no one came to replace him: there were not enough people in intelligence, it was 1937.

Carl Behrens accepted with satisfaction the restoration of contact with him. He told Korotkov that he worked at the AEG-Turbine military plant, kept in touch with the illegal party cell of the plant and provided moral support to his comrades.

"I didn't do anything else, because there was no one to consult with.

Behrens informed Korotkov in detail about the position of the firm and the mood of the workers and employees. Reporting the results of the meeting with him to the Center, Korotkov expressed the opinion that the information possibilities of the source had now narrowed. But, given the experience of underground work, long-term connection with us, honesty and reliability, it would be possible in the future to use him as a radio operator of the Berlin group. The Center agreed with Korotkov's opinion.

Fulfilling instructions from Moscow, Korotkov often wondered what the "Corsican" must experience, whose best friends were "taken away" under various pretexts. Outwardly, he remained impenetrable,

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and nothing could be guessed from his face, but what was going on in his soul? Korotkov reassured himself that, as an experienced underground worker and staunch anti-fascist, Corsican could not but understand and disagree with the expediency of the measures being taken. It seems that this was indeed the case.

- When will you, Alexander, be introduced to Adam Kukhof? asked the Corsican at the meeting.

Korotkov understood that a cheerful tone and understanding are not easy for Arvid, but he does not dramatize personal experiences, proceeding primarily from the interests of the case.

— Thank you, Arvid, for everything you have done in the name of the common struggle against fascism. As for Kukhof, we'll meet at your place, if you don't mind, next Tuesday.

The "old man" - Adam Kukhof - was the son of a Rhenish manufacturer. Studied political economy, German studies and philosophy. He has long gravitated towards the theatre, drama and journalism. His book "The German from Bayencourt" and the play "Ulenspiegel" became a notable phenomenon in German literature and dramaturgy. Life experience told him that Nazism was short-lived. He watched with sympathy the developments in the USSR, gradually becoming his friend. The "Starik" wrote a lot for the underground anti-fascist newspaper "Inner Front", compiled anti-Hitler leaflets.

In a conversation with Korotkov, Kukhof stated:

"As a German patriot who stands for a democratic and peace-loving German state in the future, I agree, Alexander, to help the USSR in order to wring Hitler's neck as soon as possible and put an end to his aggression.

Adam mentioned that he has quite a few friends who share similar anti-fascist beliefs:

— These are mostly actors, directors, playwrights and journalists. Among them stands out my school friend Adolf Grimme. He held a prominent position in the Weimar Republic, dispersed by the Nazis. He is an ardent opponent of the "Nazis" and opposes their domination. I know that he belongs to the illegal organization of Carl Friedrich Gerdler! and Admiral Canaris (Chief of the Abwehr), who are preparing the overthrow of Hitler with the help of the military.

Korotkov had heard of the existence of such an organization. Adam's message interested the scout:

What is this anti-fascist group doing, what is its position, who are its allies? Is it possible for you, Adam, to obtain information about the position of Gerdler-Canaris?

Grimme maintains some relationship with Gerdler. For a long time he asked me for the book "The German from Bayencourt" with an autograph. This will be a convenient occasion to meet and renew acquaintance, at the same time and talk about business.

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- Fine. Adam, I would be grateful if you would give me your famous book as a present. One more question. Let it not seem strange to you. I know that your anti-fascist activities take up a lot of your time. At the same time, you need to support a family - a wife and a child. Can I help you?

With large dark eyes, the "Old Man" looked attentively at Korotkov.

— Thank you, Alexander, for your willingness to support. But my wife and I - she is a journalist - work hard and do not live in poverty. If funds are required for the fight against the fascists, I will not hesitate to ask you for them.

- Well, agreed. And it's time for me to leave. I know your address and phone number, we will contact you as soon as possible, Adam. Farewell," and Korotkov said good-bye to Harnack and Kukhof in a friendly manner.

The message of the residency about the exit to A. Grimme and about the beginning of development through it Gerdler was considered useful at the Center, but they noticed that the scouts were in too much of a hurry and everything still needed to be deeply understood. But even now it was clear that after the "Old Man" had collected the necessary information about Grimm, it would be possible to switch to direct contact with him.

The division of the Corsican group and the establishment of a direct connection with its sub-sources, however, did not lead, however, to the fact that it became easier for the Center to verify the information received from Berlin and to give them objective assessments. For some reason, the most important and interesting information was called into question, and misinformation was often taken at face value. Probably people preferred to hear what they wanted to hear.

"An unexpected blow is possible," Korotkov warned "Sergeant-Major", who warned Moscow. - Whether any demands will be put forward by the German side in this case is unknown. The first strikes by German aircraft will be made against the nodes of Murmansk, Vilna, Bialystok, Chisinau, the aircraft factories of Moscow and its environs, the ports of the Baltic, the White Sea-Baltic Canal, railway lines in the direction of the borders and bridges. According to the "Sergeant", in the event of a war, it would be necessary to respond with a counterattack against the Nazis. Soviet aviation could have bombed the Romanian oil fields, the railway junctions of Koenigsberg, Berlin, Stettin. A blow through Hungary was to cut off Germany from the Balkans.

This message alarmed the Center. The leadership of foreign intelligence did not dare to report it to the top leadership of the country and sent it to the RU of the General Staff of the NPO of the USSR. Military intelligence officers, experiencing the pressure of an atmosphere of general uncertainty, replied that the recommendations received looked like a provocation. But they immediately made a reservation that the source, apparently, spoke from the bottom of his heart.

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Such an assessment was incomprehensible to Korotkov. It was obvious that the Center, for reasons known to him alone, did not fully trust his German friends even at the moment when the life and future of the country were at stake.

At the same time, despite doubts, starting from March-April, the Center took measures to create illegal residencies in Berlin in case of war, with direct radio communication with Moscow.



Radio communications were to become the means by which the anti-fascist underground workers could inform Moscow, and also maintain, if necessary, contacts with other resistance groups in various regions of Germany and beyond.

At the end of April 1941, Merkulov, in a conversation with Fitin, emphasized that the situation required urgent measures to transfer the most valuable agents to direct communication with Moscow and create several illegal residencies with their own walkie-talkies, ciphers, and material resources. In the event of a break in the current connection, they could independently continue their activities, informing the Center about this.

"It is especially important," Merkulov emphasized, "to develop conditions for communication with sources and provide for a replacement for the Corsican, if it suddenly—and this should by no means happen—fails. To call each source, a special password must be drawn up, as well as a password in case of a sudden departure from the country of Korotkov. Did you understand everything?"

— Yes, Vsevolod Nikolaevich.

- Do it!

Returning to his room, Fitin called the head of the German direction.

— Well, Pavel Matveyevich, we need to prepare the Berlin group for work in emergency circumstances. Prepare instructions for Berlin. Let them decide who will be able to perform the duties of a radio operator. Send a memo about the organization of radio communications in illegal points. In the meantime, I hope they will deliver the radio equipment promised by the management from the warehouse.

Zhuravlev took a document from Fitin with a resolution from the leadership.

- It will be done, Pavel Mikhailovich.

At the beginning of May 1941, Korotkov was instructed to continue formalizing relations with individual members of the Corsican group and to select three or five people who would be connected to Harnack's radio.

The task took time, and it became less and less. But Korotkov didn't think about that. Difficulties seemed to add strength and energy to him. When meeting with the Corsican, he spoke about the need to master new forms of communication, explaining that this follows from the deteriorating situation. Harnack saw it himself.

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"But, unfortunately, Alexander, I don't have anyone in mind who could become a radio operator.

"What about Carl Behrens?"

"Good idea, but we need to think more. Tomorrow I will give the final answer.

The next day the Corsican came upset.

"I have been thinking about Behrens for a long time and I believe that he is not suitable for the role of a radio operator. Behrens has a large family and small children. If something happens, I will reproach myself all my life for causing them grief and suffering.

— Well, Arvid, what do you say about Kurt Schumacher?

Harnack breathed a sigh of relief.

- I know him. Confident in him. I think it will do, as long as you understand the radio business.

- We will teach you the technique.

As soon as Korotkov reported to the Center on the work done, he was urgently summoned to a meeting by the Corsican. The "Sergeant" came with him.

— Bad news, Alexander. Schumacher's army has just been mobilized.

This was a very unpleasant surprise.

"Apparently, this issue cannot be resolved without my intervention," the "Starshina" came to the rescue. - I propose the candidacy of Hans Coppi. He is relatively young, but already has rich experience in the underground struggle, a communist. In the Neukölln district of Berlin, he leads the Komsomol organization. A strong and reliable person - I vouch.

- Yes?! Arvid, do you know him, can you add anything?

No, this is the first time I hear this name.

"Unfortunately, this complicates matters. We cannot trust our connections to an unfamiliar and unverified person," Korotkov drew his eyebrows together.

"I guarantee that Hans Koppi will not let us down. He has been underground for a long time, like his wife Hilda, and they proved their loyalty by deeds. But he really is not familiar with radio engineering. But he is persistent and persistent in achieving his goal.

Korotkov thought about the possible consequences of such a solution to the problem.

"I agree," said Korotkov. - We will immediately agree on a connection with him: we will call him on behalf of "Shtralman from Vienna". Arrange a meeting with him no later than tomorrow. I want to make sure with my own eyes what kind of person he is, and instruct him in the necessary way.

The Corsican and the Chief nodded silently.

The radios and other means promised by the Center were obviously late. The equipment arrived only at the end of April - beginning of May. The luggage contained two walkie-talkies in containers suitcases with pi

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battery power. Portable radio transmitters could work in the apartments of the upper floors of houses, in the field, in the forest, from the surface of the water. The range of the radio reached one thousand kilometers. The host base was equipped in the Brest region. Among the unpacked boxes were pocket receivers and transmitters powered by 110-220 volts. "A strange thing," thought Korotkov, "and how to use it? And no, there are no instructions for it. What a surprise! As for the host base on the Soviet-Polish border, then, apparently, the Red Army is not going to retreat and will beat the enemy on his own territory, as was then sung in songs. But can a low-power, battery-operated radio set provide stable radio communication between the Corsican group and the Center?" This thought did not leave Korotkov. "Moscow knows better," he decided in the end.

He carefully prepared to hand over the radio to the anti-fascists. We agreed in advance on the place and time of the meeting. Greta, the wife of A. Kukhof, was supposed to take the radio. She had her own special method of holding secret meetings. Most underground workers in such cases try to look nondescript, to merge with the surrounding background. But this woman was not like that. She chose the most elegant dress and went to the meeting as to a holiday, as to a date. The men turned around after her, and it never occurred to anyone that she was an underground worker. Gathering all her will and endurance, she hurried on an important matter.

Korotkov got out in good time with his "suitcase" into the garden of the embassy, went into its depths and jumped over the fence. Dropping to the ground, Korotkov sat down, holding the radio in his hands. He dusted himself off, walked through the streets to the subway. Changing the route on the subway several times, he made sure that there was no "tail" behind him, and got off at the Hindenburg park in Wilmersdorf. Greta Kukhof, as soon as she saw Alexander Erdberg (as Korotkov introduced himself to his German partners), breathed a sigh of relief. Her mood lifted. She returned home in a calm mood. At the first opportunity, I handed over the fiber case to other hands. Again a tense road, again shaking complex equipment.

Not for a single day did the residency stop extracting information. The anti-fascist Resistance group "Corsican" - "Sergeants" reported more and more alarming data about the completion of Hitler's preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union. On June 16, 1941, a telegram left Berlin for Moscow, warning that German aggression could begin any minute.

At the direction of intelligence chief Fitin, the information was immediately reported to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov.

In particular, it said:

"A source working at the headquarters of the German aviation reports:

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All German military preparations for the preparation of an armed uprising against the USSR are completely completed and a strike can be expected at any time ...

The objects of German air raids are primarily: the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories that produce individual parts for aircraft, as well as car repair shops.

Hungary will take an active part in the hostilities on the side of Germany. Some of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, are already on Hungarian airfields...

A source working in the German Ministry of Economy reports that the appointment of the heads of the military economic departments of the "future districts" of the occupied territory of the USSR has been made ...

... At a meeting of business executives destined for the "occupied territory" of the USSR, Rosenberg also spoke, who stated that the concept of "Soviet Union" should be erased from the geographical map."

As P.M. wrote later in his memoirs, Fitin?, the next day Stalin summoned him and Merkulov to his place. Without inviting them to sit down, leaving them to stand at the door of his office, Stalin silently paced along the table, smoking his pipe and looking at the People's Commissar of State Security and the head of intelligence, as if studying and wondering in his mind whether these people understood the complexity and severity of the situation. Finally, Stalin stopped right in front of them and, looking into Fitin's face, said:

– Comrade head of intelligence, you don't need to tell me the content of your message. I read it. Explain where and how your source gets information? Do you believe him and why? Can you vouch for his honesty and sincerity?

Stalin, without looking up, looked into Fitin's eyes and listened attentively. Fitin, having overcome his inner excitement, explained in detail that the source is a staunch anti-fascist and therefore shares the information he receives with the residency. His information is usually confirmed, and intelligence has no doubts about him.

Stalin walked along the table without saying a word. Returning to Merkulov and Fitin, he stopped, dragged on his pipe, blew out the smoke and said:

– There is only one German who can be trusted unconditionally, and that is Comrade Wilhelm Pieck. Check everything carefully and report again.

On the way back, Merkulov asked Fitin what he thought about what Stalin had said. Fitin was in no hurry to answer, and Merkulov answered himself:

- Probably, Comrade Stalin meant that only the German communists should be trusted.

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It was necessary to immediately respond to Stalin's remark and take appropriate measures. Merkulov ordered that intelligence urgently compile a list of all the reports of the "Corsican" and "Sergeant", which contained information about the aggression being prepared by Germany. Since the beginning of 1941 alone, more than a hundred such telegrams have accumulated in the Center, and their list took up eleven neat typewritten pages.

It remained to send the document to Berlin and demand confirmation from the residency.

But events outstripped the intentions of the intelligence leadership.

June 22, 1941 came. Everything that Corsican and Sergeant reported about became a tragic reality.

The "calendar" of Corsican messages remained in the file and is stored in the SVR archive. The last instructions about the activation of the underground, the anti-fascist Resistance, went to Berlin.

The war cut off the direct contacts of A.M. Korotkov with "Corsican" and "Foreman". But the heroic group of anti-fascists managed to convey extremely valuable information to Moscow. About how it happened, about the tragic and glorious fate of the "Red Chapel" conversation ahead.

' Karl Friedrich Gerdler (1884-1945) - German politician. In 1930-1937 he was the mayor of Leipzig, in 1931-1935 he was an imperial adviser on prices, in 1937 he was an adviser to the large German electrical concern Bosch RG. He hoped to overthrow Hitler with the help of a conspiracy of the military opposition. After the assassination attempt on Hitler by Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg on July 17, 1944, he managed to avoid arrest, but was later captured by the Gestapo and executed.

? Collection of commemorative materials of the KGB (archive of the SVR).

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The last flight of the Black Bertha

Around 10 pm on May 10, 1941, in the sky over Scotland, Hitler's deputy for the party, Rudolf Hess, turned off the engine of his Messerschmitt-110 and jumped out of the cockpit with a parachute. The landing was not entirely successful - Hess injured his leg and was soon taken to the nearest farm under the protection of Jack Peterson and Robert Gibson, members of the local self-defense squad. Before the estate of the Duke of Hamilton, where Hess traveled, it was about twenty miles.

Hess's life was full of dramatic events. During World War I he fought in the regiment of the future Field Marshal von List. He was wounded three times, once very seriously - in the lung, and lay in the hospital for three months. Despite being wounded, he achieved his cherished goal — he became a military pilot. In 1919, Hess was sentenced to death by the court of the Bavarian Soviet Republic and escaped by a miracle. In 1921, when the National Socialists expelled Hitler from

party and publicly tore up his party card, Hess managed to convince them and achieve the restoration of the future Fuhrer in the party ranks.

Since then, Hess and Hitler have become inseparable. Contemporaries said that these were not even two people, but one. In the circles of the Nazi Party, the dark-haired Hess was called "Black Bertha" behind his back, referring to his appearance and penchant for sexual perversions. Under this nickname, he also appeared in the affairs of foreign intelligence.

The closeness of Hitler and Hess was cemented by writing during the imprisonment in Landsberg after the failure of the Munich Putsch, the Nazi program book *Mein Kampf*. Although Hess typed on a typewriter mainly under the dictation of the Fuhrer, most likely it was he who introduced the ideas of "geopolitics" into the book, which were learned at one time from her "father", Professor Karl Haushoffer.

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Hess enjoyed Hitler's practically unlimited confidence. On September 1, 1939, the day the Second World War began, Hitler declared in the Reichstag:

"If anything happens to me during this struggle, then my first successor will be comrade Goering. If something happens to Goering, then his party comrade Hess will be his successor. You will then be obliged to show towards them the same blind trust and obedience as towards me.

Naturally, the flight of such a person to Great Britain - to the enemy - during the war should have caused and, of course, caused a sensation.

Officially, the leadership of the National Socialist Party announced the disappearance of Hess only on May 12th. The report stated that "Hess, despite being banned from flying due to illness, took off from Augsburg on May 10 at 6 p.m. and has not returned to this day. The letter left by Hess testifies, in view of its incoherence, to the presence of signs of a mental disorder, which makes one fear that Hess has become a victim of insanity. It was further suggested that Hess must have crashed. On May 13, the British authorities reported that Hess had landed in Scotland, and Nazi propaganda immediately put forward the version that "this idealist fell victim to one of his obsessions," namely, "to reach an agreement between England and Germany." The British, on the other hand, bent the line that Hess fled as a result of disagreements and a split in the leadership of the National Socialists.

While the warring countries were practicing disinformation, and the world press was arguing about whether a madman could make a completely sensible speech at a "labor holiday" and in a week alone make a difficult journey of 900 miles in a plane of the latest design, At the same time, without forgetting to attach an additional tank of fuel to it, foreign intelligence received the first message about the purpose of the arrival of Hitler's deputy in England. It was brief and said the following:

"According to Senchen, Hess, upon arriving in England, stated that he intended first of all to turn to Hamilton, an acquaintance of Hess from joint participation in the 1934 air competitions. Hamilton belongs to the so-called Cleveland clique. Hess remarked to Kirkpatrick, the first official of the Back Alley who identified Hess, that he had brought peace proposals with him. The essence of the peace proposals is still unknown to us."

"Senchen" is the pseudonym of Soviet intelligence officer Kim Philby. Back alley in secret correspondence was called the British Foreign Office. The message was dated May 14, 1941. This meant that Philby, after subtracting the time he spent on

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a meeting with his source and an operation to liaise with the residency, as well as to transfer the information he received to Moscow, had information on May 11-12. At that time, the essence of the peace proposals brought by Hess was not known even to his direct captors. But for Soviet intelligence, Philby's message sounded like a signal that foreshadowed the danger of a possible collusion between London and Berlin. A resolution was superimposed on the cipher telegram: "Telegraph to Berlin, London, Stockholm, America, Rome. Try to find out the details of the proposals".

Kim Philby was one of the first to respond to Moscow's request. Already on May 18, a message came from London:

"According to information received by "Senchen" in a personal conversation with his friend Tom Dupree, deputy head of the Department of Foreign Affairs:

1. Until the evening of May 14, Hess did not give us any valuable information to the British.
2. During the conversations of British military intelligence officers with Hess, he claimed that he had come to England to conclude a compromise peace, which should stop the increasing exhaustion of both warring parties and prevent the final destruction of the British Empire as a stabilizing force.
3. According to Hess, he continues to be loyal to Hitler.
4. Beaverbrook and Eden visited Hess, but this is denied by official reports.
5. In a conversation with Kirkpatrick, Hess declared that a war between two northern peoples is a crime. Hess considers that there is a strong anti-Churchill party in England which stands for peace, and with his (Hess's) arrival it will receive a powerful stimulus in the struggle for peace.

Tom Dupri, when asked by "Senchen" whether he thinks that an Anglo-German alliance against the USSR would be acceptable for Hess, replied that this is exactly what Hess wants to achieve.

There were also reports from other sources. "Git" transmitted from the USA: "Hess arrived in England with the full consent of Hitler to begin negotiations for an armistice. Since it was impossible for Hitler to propose an armistice openly without damaging German morale, he chose Hess as his secret emissary." "Yun" telegraphed from Berlin: "Head of the American Department of the Ministry of Propaganda, Eisendorf, said that Hess was in excellent condition, flew to England with certain tasks and proposals from the German government." "Frankfurt", referring to a conversation with a general from the High Command of the Wehrmacht, reported that "Hess's action is not an escape, but a mission undertaken with Hitler's knowledge to offer peace to England." In in

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formation received from Extern in Berlin, it was said: "Hess was sent by Hitler to negotiate peace, and if England agrees, Germany will immediately oppose the USSR."

Thus, telegram after telegram, message after message, a mosaic picture of what was behind the "flight" of Hess was formed. It was not the impulse of a madman, it was not an attempt to get away from Himmler's intrigues. This was the realization of the secret plan of the Nazi leadership to make peace with England on the eve of the attack on the Soviet Union and thereby avoid a war on two fronts.

Naturally, the question arises: why did the British government neither accept nor reject Hess's proposals? Why didn't the British government on the eve of Hitler's attack on the USSR publicly announce Germany's aggressive plans? Kim Philby, with his inherent ability for analysis, at the very beginning of the story with Hess, gave such an assessment of the situation. The already mentioned communication of May 18 stated:

"Senchen believes that now the time for peace negotiations has not come, but in the course of the further development of the war, Hess may become the center of intrigues for concluding a compromise peace and will be useful for the peace party in England and for Hitler."

Philby looked into the water, and the intrigue was already being developed when he wrote his message. By May 23, it took the form of a directive to the British intelligence service MI6 to launch a disinformation campaign against the Soviet government using the "Hess case". The Foreign Office informed the British Ambassador to the USSR Stafford Cripps about the essence of this action as follows:

message:

"Through secret channels we are reporting that Hess's flight is indicative of the growing dissension due to Hitler's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union and that if this policy is continued, Hitler will insist on short-term agreements, knowing that he will be forced to abandon this course and break any promises it may have already made to the Soviet Union. So in the end the position of the Soviet Union will be worse than it was at the beginning. It turns out that they lost potential friends, made concessions and, in their weakened state, were left alone with Hitler.

Even against the backdrop of the confusing and contradictory information that came to the Kremlin before the German attack on the Soviet Union, the words "lose potential friends" and "be left alone with Hitler" could be perceived unambiguously as a threat to conclude a peace agreement between England and Germany. which will untie the last hand in the East. This is how the Soviet leadership took the news of the unusual "visit" of Hitler's deputy to Great Britain. Renowned historian William

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Shearer wrote in this regard in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* that while Churchill was "puzzled" by Hess's arrival in Scotland, Stalin was "extremely suspicious." Stalin's suspicions at such a critical time, Shearer wrote, increased not in relation to Germany, although it was there that an attack on the Soviet Union was being prepared, but in relation to England. The appearance of Hess in Scotland convinced Stalin that Churchill was secretly colluding with Hitler, intending to give Germany the same freedom to strike at the Soviet Union as had been given to Germany so that she could attack Poland and Western Europe. Information coming from London from trusted sources also could not help but increase the suspicion of the Soviet leader.

There is a curious document in the "Black Bertha" case that sheds light on the secret side of the events connected with Hess' "escape". This is an intelligence message from the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR, sent to the leadership of the country in October 1942. It's worth it to reproduce it FULLY:

"Perfect. secret

State Defense Committee of the USSR Comrade Stalin Comrade Molotov

The head of Czech military intelligence, Colonel Moravec, told the NKVD resident in London the following:

The popular belief that Hess flew to England unexpectedly is incorrect. Long before the flight, Hess had a correspondence on this subject with Lord Hamilton. In this correspondence, all issues of organizing the flight were discussed in detail. However, Hamilton himself did not take part in the correspondence. All Hess's letters addressed to Hamilton did not reach the addressee, but the Intelligence Service received, where the answers to Hess were also compiled on behalf of Hamilton. In this way, the British managed to lure Hess to ENGLAND.

Colonel Moravec also stated that he personally saw the correspondence between Hess and Hamilton. According to Moravec, in Hess's letters the plans of the German

governments associated with the attack on the Soviet Union.

The same letters contained well-reasoned proposals on the need to end the war between England and Germany.

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In conclusion, Colonel Moravec stated that the British thus have written evidence of the guilt of Hess and other Nazi leaders in preparing an attack on the USSR

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L. Beria)

Reason: telegram from London No. 450 dated 10/21/42.

Colonel Moravec willingly and honestly helped Soviet intelligence, although he, like the entire Czechoslovak government in exile in London, was under the tutelage of the British. The Czech colonel's information was reliable. It fully confirmed the information that Soviet intelligence had previously received about Hess's contacts with the British side before his flight to Scotland.

In Nazi circles, Rudolf Hess was known as an Anglophile. From a racial point of view, he considered the British "northern brothers of the Germans" by blood. According to British and American diplomats who were familiar with Hess, they had no problems getting information about the state of affairs in Nazi Germany. The former head of political intelligence of the Nazis, Walter Schellenberg, stated in his memoirs that even an employee of the British special services was surrounded by Hess for many years. In the pre-war years, Hess, as one of the Nazi leaders, met with many prominent political figures in England: the Duke of Hamilton, the newspaper king, Lord Rothemire, the Duke of Windsor, the aide-de-camp of the English king, Captain Roy Feyers.

After the outbreak of the war, Hess's already established sympathy for England and the opportunities he had as head of foreign party organizations of the National Socialists (in fact, as head of party intelligence) created excellent conditions for maintaining covert contacts with the British. On the other side of the English Channel there were also people who were sympathetic to the Nazis.

It was on the group of these people, united in the so-called "Cleveland clique", that Hitler and Hess staked in their attempts to make peace with England. In a conversation with Yvon Kirkpatrick, Hess, setting out his intentions, stated: "I believed that there was a strong desire to make peace here, and I am convinced that if I return to Germany and tell the Führer that you are ready to get rid of from Churchill, he would agree to make peace on the condition that England adhere to the "hands off Europe" policy. I believed that through Hamilton I would find access to a strong party that wanted peace, which would help me return to Germany in two or three days. To Kirkpatrick's question: "Perhaps you think that the duke could do something to ensure that England made peace with Hermas

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niei" Hess replied: "Of course. He can go to the king and tell him about our plans for war with the Bolsheviks, then the king could make peace with us."

Hess's firm belief in helping the "peace party" and even the British monarch himself, the participation of British intelligence in organizing secret "correspondence" between Hess and Hamilton involuntarily suggests that the flight of "Black Bertha" to Scotland was the result of a rather cunning operation of the British special services to lure the Deputy Fuhrer into a trap set in front of him.



But not only. Hess's flight was conceived by Berlin in parallel with the action planned by Schellenberg to kidnap the very Duke of Windsor, who was mentioned among Hess's acquaintances. It was about the former King Edward VIII (1894-1972). Marriage to a twice-divorced American forced him to leave the throne. The duke liked authoritarian methods of government. Repeatedly he made visits to Nazi Germany. One of the photographs captured him next to Hitler.

During the duke's stay in Spain and Portugal, Hitler's agents organized approaches to the former king, advising him to wait for the return to his homeland, which the British authorities sought in connection with the outbreak of the world war. The plans of the Nazis included his abduction and export to Germany. He could serve as a trump card for the Nazis as a contender for the return to the British throne with the help of the Germans.

Here is how Hitler outlined his plans to use the Duke of Windsor in secret notes:

"The final victory of Germany will mark the beginning of a policy of lasting reconciliation with England. The German protégé, the Duke of Windsor, will be King. They will conclude a treaty of friendship with him for all time. Ribbentrop, relieved of his office as Reich Foreign Minister, will become Plenipotentiary and Counselor of the English King and will receive the title of English Duke." The British managed to persuade the obstinate duke and return him to his native land. Himmler's associate Kersten testifies to the same thing that was to form the basis of the agreement between Germany and England. As the Reichsfuehrer SS told Kersten, "Germany is not going to deprive England of the status of a great power. England must be one of the cornerstones of the new German Europe." And not only England, but also the USA. According to Kersten, Himmler outlined the deal proposed by Hitler (through Hess): the spaces of the Soviet Union "should be dismembered and placed under the leadership of Germany, as well as Great Britain and the United States, after our nations are united with Hitler. Germany will then control the areas up to the Ob. England should get the area between the Ob

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and Lena. The Americans are the regions east of the Lena, including Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk.

Apparently, Hess negotiated with the British about this. And not without success. In any case, the delay with the opening of the second front coincided with Berlin's demand not to interfere with Hitler's "Eastern campaign" until he had won. The content of the negotiations is still secret.

It is no coincidence that the British authorities classified archival materials related to the flight of Hess for a long time, more than half a century after the flight of the Black Bertha, the British authorities prefer to keep such information in the deepest secrecy.

It is possible that even in the British intelligence itself, which "prepared" letters to Hess on behalf of Lord Hamilton, there were people who sympathized with the supporters of peace with Germany and played a very dangerous game in order to leave Russia face to face in the upcoming fight against Hitler.

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Portrait of the "Lyceum student"

Top secret

Fuhrer's Headquarters 12/18/40

(From Directive No. 21 Plan Barbarossa)

"The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia in a short campaign even before the war against England is over. Preparations for the implementation of the plan should begin now and be completed by May 15, 1941.

It must be of decisive importance that our intentions to attack are not recognized."

In early January 1941, the US Trade Attache in Berlin, Sam Woods, sent an urgent telegram to the State Department, the essence of which was only one phrase: "According to reliable German sources, Hitler is planning an attack on Russia this spring." After reading this message, the then US statesman Cardell Hull reacted to it with a certain amount of skepticism.

Hull picked up a special phone that connected the State Department with the FBI and asked the all-powerful chief of the American detective police, Edgar Hoover, what he thought about the contents of the telegram received from Berlin.

"I don't think it's a bluff," Hoover boomed into the phone. "My guys watching the German embassy have already reported something similar to me a couple of times. But I don't want to get involved in the affairs of the Reds. Let it be their problem.

Thank you Mr Hoover. You cleared my doubts," the Secretary of State replied politely. "Now we know what to do, and we will act.

Message from the duty officer of the embassy about the urgent summons of Ambassador Konstantin Umansky to the US State Department

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Chilo of a Russian diplomat. "What's the matter? Why all of a sudden such urgency?" - asked questions  
ambassador.

Umansky was ushered into the office of Deputy Secretary of State Sumner Wallace.

"I will be completely frank with you, Mr. Ambassador. What you are about to learn is of great concern to President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, on whose behalf I am meeting with you. Information has been received from Berlin that affects the fundamentals of security not only of your country, but of the whole world. Here is its content.

Wallace handed the ambassador a slip of paper.

It was March 20, 1941.

"Mr. Umansky turned pale," Wallace later wrote in his memoirs. "He was silent for a while and then simply said: 'I am fully aware of the seriousness of this message and will immediately bring to the attention of my government the contents of our conversation.'"

The war with Nazi Germany was already on our doorstep, and this greatly worried many world leaders, even those who were very far from sympathizing with the communist regime.

Two weeks after Sumner Wallace's conversation with Umansky, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill instructed the Ambassador in Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps, to deliver a secret letter to Stalin personally. The British Prime Minister reported on the concentration of selected German divisions on the Soviet-German border. However, the British ambassador was inexplicably slow to carry out the responsible task of his prime minister. Now the reasons for this behavior have become known: Cripps tried to clarify the date of the German attack on the USSR.

Signals of great trouble and alarm came to the Moscow Kremlin and from Scandinavia. Alexandra Kollontai, the Soviet ambassador to Sweden, literally bombarded the NKID of the Soviet Union with reports of an imminent and imminent war with Germany.

"According to the information of the General Staff of the Swedish Armed Forces, Germany has completely completed the deployment of its armies on the proposed Eastern front of hostilities," Kollontai wrote in one of the telegrams to Moscow.

"Germany is ready to block the Baltic ports of the USSR and bring German ships into them, followed by an amphibious landing," her other urgent message said.

And finally: "The German attack on the USSR is not a matter of the next few days, but a matter of hours..."

Having written this last phrase on a cipher blank, Kollontai asked the secretary to urgently invite Ivan Andreevich Chichaev, a resident of foreign intelligence in Sweden, who worked under the guise of an embassy adviser, to see her.

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The conversation between the ambassador and the resident immediately took on a businesslike character.

– Ivan Andreevich, my friend, things around our state borders are very bad. You yourself obviously know this. The ominous brilliance of German bayonets, even from the Russian side, is already visible to the naked eye. Moscow is silent, as if it has taken water in its mouth. The TASS statement of June 14 that the Germans are not going to attack our country," Alexandra Mikhailovna continued, "is pure bluff or something completely beyond my understanding... Maybe there is some data on your line ?

"I am in exactly the same position, Alexandra Mikhailovna," Chichaev answered. - As your comrade and friend, I will say that I have the same information about the intentions of Germany to attack us. I do not receive a response to my telegrams to the Center.

"Or maybe it's better for you to ask your people's commissar about the current situation directly? Kollontai asked thoughtfully.

- But as? - Chichaev said with a puzzled shrug.

– Directly! Alexandra Mihailovna repeated and added: "A private steamer leaves for Riga this evening. Through my connections, I will book two seats for you and your wife on it. So go and, without wasting time, get ready for the road. You haven't been on vacation this year, and you seem to have asked me about it, have you? - Alexandra Mikhailovna said with a sly glance at the resident. - That's fine. Agreed! Now let's get on the track.

Many, many years later, talking about his work with Alexandra Mikhailovna, I.A. Chichaev recalled this episode: "If I had stayed in Stockholm then for only a few hours, that would be it: the borders would have been closed. Already on the approach to Riga in the outer roadstead, our ship tried to intercept a German torpedo boat, but the Swedish flag over the ship, apparently, puzzled the captain of the torpedo bomber, and at the last moment he turned aside. It was early morning on June 21, 1941. Exactly one day remained before the start of the invasion of the German divisions in the USSR ... "

Did the NKVD foreign intelligence station in Berlin know about the imminent danger? Did the then resident A. Kobulov sound the alarm bells, who, according to his instructions from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, was supposed to "inform the Center about the situation in Germany, its military plans and economic situation"? Did he use quite reliable agents among high-ranking functionaries of the Third Reich to obtain information about Germany's preparations for a jump to the East?

Documents and information materials of that time do not give an unambiguous answer to the questions posed. On the one hand, secret telegrams from Berlin indicated that war between [Germany and the USSR could not be avoided (warnings from the anti-fascist group

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Harnack and Schulze-Boysen), on the other hand, conflicting dates were given for the start of the invasion: May 14, June 11, June 17, June 22, "midsummer". The sophistication of Hitler's disinformation was not only to hide for as long as possible the fact that the German military machine was preparing for active operations in the spring or summer of 1941 (it was practically impossible to do this), but also to confuse the Soviet leadership by telling him, with on the one hand, disinformation reports about the goals and objectives of such training, and, on the other hand, several "absolutely reliable" dates for the beginning of the invasion of the USSR, as they passed, the Soviet leadership had to become more and more convinced of the unreliability of the intelligence data received.

The cunning trick was apparently successful, and Goebbels noted with satisfaction in his diary that "our rumor-mongers did a really good job in those days."

There were also obviously subjective reasons for the shortcomings of the information work of the Berlin residency, which was headed by A. Kobulov (Zakhar). His qualifications as a "professional intelligence officer" clearly did not correspond to his position.

A. Kobulov's information to the Center, which had the main task not to arouse L. Beria's displeasure, corresponded to the mood prevailing in the Kremlin and contained information that was only of relative interest in terms of warning about possible aggression.

At first, Beria's protégé was recommended to "deeper" into the essence of the events taking place in Germany, then they suggested "intensifying efforts" to acquire new sources of information, and even delicately advised him to "learn the art" of political analysis and forecasting of events. In June 1940, he was summoned to Moscow for a talk with the leadership, but all was in vain. Kobulov was impenetrable, and his faith in the "patronage of Lavrenty Pavlovich" was boundless.

"I heard that the intelligence leadership was dissatisfied with Zakhar's work and they simply gave up on him," he wrote in a personal letter addressed to P.M. Fitin. – Perhaps this chatter should not be given any importance, but when it comes to responsible comrades with whom I personally maintain business contact, such corridor conversations should not take place. Please take action to put an end to such

gossip."

The head of intelligence, apparently, did not begin to spread anywhere else about Zakhar's business qualities. The document was sent to the archive, away from sin.

Hmayak Kobulov heeded the exhortations of the Center to "intensify efforts" to acquire new sources of information... and on the tragic stage of the Berlin political theater for 10 months before

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On the fateful day of June 22, the figure of a young Latvian journalist from the newspaper Brive Zeme, Orests Berlinks, appeared.

The first mention of an elegant, tall, athletic-looking young man with sparse blond hair slicked back lay on the desk of the head of Soviet intelligence in Moscow at the very beginning of August 1940. An urgent message from Zakhar from Berlin said that he met through a TASS correspondent, an employee of the residency Filosofov, with a Latvian emigrant well versed in politics. Berlinka was left "penniless"

after the newspaper he represented at the German Foreign Ministry ceased publication, and he himself found himself in "forced emigration." Zakhar reported to the Center that his new acquaintance, twenty-seven-year-old Orest Berlinke, "soberly assesses the establishment of Soviet power in the Baltics", makes a "very favorable impression" with his manners and good knowledge of the German language, and is ready to share with Moscow what he has received in German circles. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information. Zakhar promised in the next few days to have a "more detailed" talk with Berlinke about "the prospects for his further journalistic activities in Germany" and "recruit him if the opportunity arises", assigning him the secret nickname "Lyceum student".

As it turned out later, the "lyceum student" from the very beginning informed the press bureau of the German Foreign Ministry about his acquaintance with Filosofov and his request to inform about current affairs. The Germans recommended that the Latvian continue contact with the Russians and keep them constantly informed. They promised to supply him with information that the "Lyceum student" would pass on to "Soviet friends." Since Zakhar himself knew almost no German, he conducted all his work with the Lyceum Student through Filosofov, whom he used as a translator.

Already on August 15, 1940 (i.e., 10 days after the first acquaintance), another telegram from Zakhar left Berlin for Moscow. Two words determined its capacious content: "The Lyceum student is recruited." Then came his brief biography, written by Zakhar personally from the words of Orest Berlinke. Born in the family of a doctor in September 1913. He studied at the 1st Real Gymnasium in Riga ("which I brilliantly graduated from in 1933"). He passed a competitive examination for the Faculty of Chemistry at the University of Riga, but accidentally got a job as an interpreter in the editorial office of the Brive Zeme newspaper, because he knew three European languages well. "In general, I was a very energetic worker," the "Lyceum student" told about himself, "and very quickly began to advance in the service, although I was not interested in politics. The offer to become the newspaper's own correspondent in Berlin came as a "great surprise", but I accepted it without hesitation. Now I am at a crossroads, I don't know what to do, but there is no more money, "the newly minted secret agent summed up his simple confession to Zakhar. Telegram from

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Berlin ended with Zakhar's proposal to use the "Lyceum student" to obtain secret political information about the state of affairs in Nazi Germany with the payment to the "agent" of a significant amount in German marks every month.

In the Center they grabbed their heads. Such hasty recruitment without the slightest attempt to understand the identity of the "agent" did not bode well. The intelligence chief instructed to study the agent's biography in detail, check his connections, contacts, find out, if possible, the facts of his life hidden by Berlinke. A strict order was sent to Berlin: "Since relations with Lyceumist are only being established and he has not yet been tested in the performance of our tasks, we suggest that you exercise reasonable caution in working with him and in no case transfer him to communication to any other operative worker of the residency".

There were no clairvoyants at the Center, but there were smart, cautious and experienced professionals who had repeatedly encountered dangerous situations. But this was a special case. Information from Berlin went "up" directly, as a rule, bypassing experienced specialists and analysts. Kobulov boasted of this more than once, in particular in conversations with the "Lyceum student".

It seems that Stalin, under the influence of disinformation about the inevitability of the impending German landing on the British Isles, very favorably perceived the information of the "Lyceum Student" about such a large-scale Nazi operation. Obviously, he wanted to take wishful thinking.

Only after six long years, in May 1947, did some details of the Lyceum student's case become known. They were revealed during interrogation by Siegfried Müller, who since 1937 served in the Berlin branch of the Gestapo. By order of one of the leaders of the RSHA (General Directorate of Imperial Security), he was assigned to work in the 4-D unit, which conducted special

arrangements for foreigners accredited in Berlin. Here is what Muller told the Soviet investigator during interrogation on May 21, 1947:

"Question: And what, the Gestapo could not at that time find approaches to the Soviet embassy in Berlin?

Answer: Not really. We managed to establish that Kobulov, an adviser to the Soviet embassy, was conducting intelligence work in Germany. In August 1940, Kobulov was set up by a German intelligence agent, the Latvian Berlinke, who, on our instructions, supplied him with disinformation materials for a long time. Berlinke told me that he had succeeded in gaining Kobulov's confidence, that the latter even told Berlinke that he had sent all the reports personally to Stalin and Molotov. Obviously, all this allowed Hitler to consider Kobulov as a convenient opportunity to send disinformation to Moscow, in connection with which he personally engaged in

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this question and the materials intended for transfer to Kobulov. The practice was as follows: Ribbentrop prepared these materials, then reported them to Hitler, and only with his sanction were the materials transferred to agent Berlinke, who delivered them to Kobulov.

...But let's get back to working with Lyceum Student. The worried Center tried, using the crumbs of information about Berlinke, to compile at least an approximate mosaic portrait of the "valuable" agent Kobulov. The Latvian friends of Moscow undertook to verify every fact of the Lyceum student's biography and give their opinion about it. Literally within a few days, it was possible to establish that the "Lyceum student" was by no means a Russophile, and even more so, not a "pro-Soviet personality". He was often met in the circle of German settlers in Latvia, and all his closest friends were crazy about the successes of the "great Fuhrer".

A telegram was sent to the Berlin residency with the phrase "out of turn": "We have received information that Lyceum student is supposedly anti-Soviet. While in Latvia, he tried to spread the ideas of National Socialism there. We have obtained the information from a trustworthy source. You should keep them in mind when dealing with the "Lyceum student".

But where is it! Kobulov believed in his "star" and brushed aside repeated warnings from the Center. In the meantime, such messages continued to arrive in Moscow, for example:

"As Kleist, a responsible officer of the Ribbentrop bureau, stated in a personal conversation with me [the Lyceum student], the Germans expect to destroy England within three weeks. Kleist said that preparations were also in full swing for the Nuremberg Congress of the NSDAP, which would be a peace congress, since "the overthrow of English rule is certain." The representative of Ribbentrop's bureau also noted that Molotov's conversations with Hitler made "the best impression" on the latter. Hitler, on the basis of negotiations with the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union had absolutely serious intentions regarding friendly relations with Germany.

The unprecedented disinformation campaign unleashed by Berlin, in which the "Lyceum student" played far from the last violin, confused many. Hitler personally ordered that information be widely disseminated through all channels that "the concentration of troops against Russia is the greatest military act of disinformation of the enemy in history and is only intended to divert attention from the last preparations for the invasion of England." This order of Hitler was allegedly contained in his order of February 6, 1941. It also stated that before the end of the regrouping of troops, the activity of aviation and navy in the English Channel should be intensified in order to "create the appearance of an upcoming attack supposedly this year to the British Isles. Happened from time to time and inform

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macia, which, according to Zakhar, should have simply intrigued the leadership of the then Lubyanka:

"The trip of V.M. Molotov to Berlin," Kobulov hastened to inform the Center, "is an event of immense importance and consequences. This is the beginning of a "new era" (the words of Envoy Schmidt, spoken on November 9, 1940 in a narrow circle in a foreign press club in Berlin, as the resident reported. - Ed.). All the dangerous moments of German-Russian relations have been passed, and from now on it can be hoped that Russia has finally fully understood its position in the new world order and that in this way all major political problems have been practically solved. England will not change the situation. It will be destroyed within two or three weeks."

One May evening in 1941, the silence of the entrance to the house where A. Kobulov lived was broken by the sound of heels. Looking around, the young man hurriedly approached the door and pressed the bell button. It was quiet outside the door for a moment, and then unhurried footsteps could be heard. "Who is there?" - I heard a common question in such a situation. "It's me, Mr. Kobulov. For God's sake, I'm sorry! I'm just for one minute."

The door chain jingled. The evening guest quickly slipped through the brightly lit gap and, as if forgetting why he had come, for some reason suddenly froze at attention. He reeked quite a bit of alcohol.

"Forgive me for disturbing you, Mr. Kobulov, but the matter with which I have come is urgent. Tomorrow morning, a team of journalists will be formed, which, on the instructions of the Ministry of Propaganda, is going to France. I was promised a place in this team.

- Well, what am I doing here? Zakhar grimaced in displeasure. - The Ministry of Propaganda of Dr. Goebbels has its own tasks, and I have mine.

"But isn't it interesting, Mr. Kobulov, that your friend will visit the French border territory occupied by the German army?"

- Why not interested? It is even very interesting to travel at the expense of the imperial eagle.

- No, I will pay my money, or rather, yours, Mr. Kobulov. And you promised me a raise from three hundred Reichsmarks to five hundred, - the Lyceum student mumbled a little audibly.

Literally a couple of days later, the cryptographer brought Kobulov the decrypted text of an urgent telegram. Already the first line of the text infuriated him: "The Lyceum student's information contains a lot of water and very few facts," he read. "In addition, the information contains many inaccuracies, contradictory and dubious data, and also abounds in commonplaces," the Center's telegram continued. - "Lyceum student" draws its information

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from persons intended by the German state apparatus to "feed" the press. As for the trip of the "Lyceum student" to France, which the German authorities are specially organizing for foreign journalists, the question arises: will the trip of the "Lyceum student" to France turn out to be more useful for Germany than for us?

The next morning Zakhar was awakened by a knock on the door. Hastily throwing on a bathrobe, he ran to the door. In front of him (in his apartment!) was the "Lyceum student" again. His rumpled face expressed complete despair.

The "lyceum student" was looking for at least a spark of sympathy and condescension in Zakhar's eyes. And... found. The tactic of tearful repentance, worked out at night with the Gestapo, completely worked ~ and after a few minutes the "friends" were sitting in the living room with a cup of morning coffee. "Valuable" agent Zakhara reported to his boss specially prepared information, which we present in full, as it was once stated in a telegram to the Center by Kobulov himself.

"The Lyceum student called Gustav Celminsh the leader of the Latvian fascists in Germany. The agent allegedly came to him, but did not find him. He promised to repeat his visit to the Latvian "Führer" in order to find out more about his connections and entourage...

Next time," Kobulov summed up the telegram, "I will give him 500 marks each. He deserves it."

Apparently, this was one of the last, if not the last, meeting of Zakhar with the "Lyceum student". In any case, in the personal file of Berlinks, his receipts "I received it in full. Willy Krantz" was not found ...

The post-war fate of the "Lyceum student" developed in a peculiar way. Some curious documents have been preserved in the materials of his "case". Here is one of them.

"From the protocols of interrogation of Siegfried Müller, b. in 1916 in Stuttgart and arrested by Soviet counterintelligence in 1945.

After the beginning of the offensive of the German troops on the Eastern Front, I came to the SS Colonel, a former employee of the German intelligence Likus. I wanted to find out the possibilities of further use of Berlinks and get acquainted with his latest report. Berlinks' report outlined the content of his conversation with Kobulov, who, according to Berlinks, asserted that the Soviet government did not want war with Germany.

On Berlinks' report, Hitler wrote one word "liar" in red pencil, and verbally ordered the arrest of Berlinks. Apparently, he, according to Hitler, became a dangerous witness to the behind-the-scenes game in which he, Hitler, had a hand in it.

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"Question: Was Berlinke arrested?

Answer: No, it wasn't. The question of Berlinks' arrest was somehow hushed up, and then, as I know, he was secretly transferred to Sweden, where he continued to conduct intelligence work in favor of Germany.

Information requiring verification about the fate of one of the Gestapo accomplices was not stale on the desk of the head of the counterintelligence unit of the Center. She was reported to the intelligence leadership, and an instruction went from Moscow to the residency:

"We ask you to find out where the former Gestapo agent Orest Berlinke, correspondent for the Latvian émigré newspaper Brive Zeme and a number of other Latvian émigré publications currently lives. He worked in Germany in 1939-1941 and was accredited to the press office of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His age is 35 years old. Signs: height 170-175 centimeters, blond, bright eyes, athletic figure. He dresses well, is fond of cars, plays chess, cards, smokes expensive cigarettes. Telegraph immediately upon receipt of the requested information. His last home address is in Berlin..."

Answers from most of the "points" were not long in coming. Most often they were extremely brief: "No"; "Was not"; "Did not live." And even the Berlin residency was extremely laconic: "Berlin, August 2, 1945 Berlinke Orest lived at the address you indicated until 1941. His whereabouts have not been established at this time."

The fate of another "hero" of the essay, the patron and mentor of the Lyceum Student, turned out to be more certain. In 1953, Amayak Kobulov, together with the former ambassador to Berlin V.G. Dekanozov and Beria himself was arrested. Proximity to Beria played a role. This time - fatal. After a quick trial, the case of "espionage" by Dekanozov, Kobulov and some other persons was transferred to a special group of the Special Conference, which sentenced them to death.



In the "intelligence headquarters" on the eve of the war

In early January 1941, the head of foreign intelligence, commissioner of the 3rd rank P.M. Fitin called for a report from the head of the German department, senior major P.M. Zhuravlev. The conversation was long and serious, it was about the development of Soviet-German relations. Apparently, in the near future, Germany intended to start a war with the Soviet Union. But when exactly, with what forces and in what place - this had to be seriously worked on. In the spring of 1941, the leadership of foreign intelligence instructed the intelligence units of the territorial bodies of the NKGB and the border guards to purposefully collect intelligence data in relation to the German army. On April 10, 1941, an order was sent to the Berlin residency to intensify the extraction of information about Hitler's intentions and plans to start a war against the USSR. In cipher telegram No. 54 dated April 10, 1941, the resident in Berlin, in particular, was recommended: "... on questions of aviation to puzzle the "Foreman". Through the "Swede" to find out the deployment of German units in Romania, through the "Spaniard" to obtain information about the personnel of the Air Force. Instruct "Corsican" to collect information about the situation in the military chemical industry, using the capabilities of the "Turk" for this. Obtain military-technological novelties through the Grek. Get information about the state of the navy through the "Italian". Orient Breitenbach to clarify the location of German military units and the construction of fortifications on the border adjacent to the territory of the USSR.

Intelligence took all measures not to miss "Day X" - the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union. The directive of 10 April played a role here. However, it sometimes seemed to the country's leadership that the information received was unconvincing and did not fully reveal the enemy's plans.

On June 17, 1941, Stalin ordered the People's Commissar for State Security V.N. Merkulov and P.M. Fitin to check the disturbing telegram from Berlin, which warned of the possibility of a German attack at any moment, since all preparations for this were completed, and report back on the results. A similar order was also issued to Berlin, but the outbreak of war made it useless.

Nevertheless, a generalizing document was prepared on the very eve of the war. Famous scout 3.I. Rybkina recalled how he was preparing: "We were provided with all the information material from all residencies. And we sat. Zhuravlev and I did not get out of the office. Moreover, they looked at personal files, looked at how trustworthy the source could be, how previous information was confirmed, and so on. They did everything to leave carefully sifted and verified.

On the text extracted from the archive, the resolution was preserved: "Vol. Zhuravlev. Keep to yourself. 22.VI. P. Fitin.

P.M. Zhuravlev understood well the significance of the document, which represented one of the first attempts of the Center to prepare an analytical note. There was an urgent need to create an information and analytical unit in the intelligence structure (it was created in December 1943).

This document, tentatively titled "Calendar of the Corsican and the Petty Officer" (i.e., by Arvid Harnack and Harro Schulze-Boysen), is almost 11 pages of small typewritten text. It lists the dates of receipt of messages with the most important information from the Berlin anti-fascists. The document clearly confirms that the Berlin foreign intelligence station day by day tracked and reported to the Center data that testified to the growing threat to the country, shows how closely they reflected reality and what assessment they received from the leadership. Among the sub-sources of informants, we see the general director of a large factory, who had connections among high-ranking

the military, a responsible officer of the High Command of the Armed Forces, the head of the Military Economic Institute under the Committee for the Four-Year Plan for the Military and Economic Training of Germany, supervised by Goering; Solme, referent of the All-German Chamber of Commerce; Egmont Tsekhlin, professor of the higher party school of the NSDAP, leading economist of the chemical concern IG Farbenindustrie; Lyangelitka, Deputy Head of the Institute for Military and Economic Statistics; Gregor, liaison officer with the Foreign Ministry at Goering's headquarters; Lebrand, head of the eastern department in Rosenberg's foreign affairs department, who also dealt with intelligence; Holzhausen, officer of the Air Staff; lieutenant colonel Geiman, head of the Russian department of headquarters

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aviation; Erwin Hertz, Chief of Air Staff. The scope of sources was quite wide. With some of these individuals, our sources maintained trusting relationships based on common anti-fascist views and humanistic ideas. As for other high-ranking representatives of the party-state apparatus and the military, they, having access to the secrets of Germany, shared them with the "Corsican" and "Sergeant" during business or semi-official conversations, seeing them as patriotic Germans.

Judging by the "Calendar of the "Corsican" and "Sergeant"", foreign intelligence received information from Berlin about the increase in the pace of Germany's preparations for the attack, about the transfer of Wehrmacht units to the East for this purpose, their concentration and deployment along the entire perimeter of the Soviet border, an increase in the flow of echelons with military cargo heading to Poland, the conscription into the army of people who knew the Russian language, the issuance of maps of the USSR border zone, reconnaissance flights of German aircraft over Soviet territory and the identification of ground targets for air strikes (iron - ny roads, transport hubs - Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, aircraft factories, ports, airfields of Soviet aviation, etc.). From the data obtained, the main features of the strategy and tactics of the German army were formed, hoping to lure the Soviet armed forces into an unfortified border zone and inflict a lightning, crushing blow on it.

Hitler, assessing the correlation of forces between the two countries, not without reason believed that military superiority at that moment was on the side of Germany and it should have been realized no later than the first half of 1941. It could be lost over time, and the blitzkrieg to the East could not take place. This is, in general terms, the essence of the messages of the "Corsican" and "Sergeant" from October 1940 to June 1941.

Z.I. Rybkina, recalling this period, wrote: "Then there were a lot of reports that the war was coming. It was talked about everywhere and by everyone. We received information about this even from Australia, practically from all sides. True, in all reports of the war, various dates were indicated, up to the point that it could begin on May 1! .. "

The deeper and more thoroughly you get acquainted with the intelligence data for 1940-early 1941, the more obvious the fact becomes that the Soviet leadership could not ignore its warnings about the impending aggression, confirmed by other secret services and foreign policy departments of the USSR.

It is appropriate to note that, as many intelligence officials who worked in those years believed, the level of its effectiveness could obviously have been higher if intelligence had not been paralyzed by mass repressions. She barely recovered from them by 1940.

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The leadership of Nazi Germany prepared a carefully thought-out plan of disinformation activities, formalizing it as additional directives to the Barbarossa plan. The introduction of the enemy into confusion was carried out at the level of the state policy of the Third Reich, in the development of the main directions of disinformation and their

Implementation was attended by Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop. Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, signed directives on disinformation work in the troops twice.

Disinformation was carried out in various ways, for example, by spreading false, but at first glance plausible rumors in circles where they could become the property of foreign agents; by organizing diversionary military manoeuvres, troop movements, engineering works, holding directed meetings, signing orders and directives that give a false interpretation of events taking place in Germany and abroad.

At the first stage of preparations for an attack on the USSR, German disinformation was aimed at giving at least a semblance of an explanation for the movement of troops to the East and their concentration near the Soviet borders, to create the impression that England was still the main enemy of Germany. Penetration into the Balkans was presented as an attempt to prevent the entry of British troops, military construction - as ordinary economic work, and the transfer of military units to the East - as a desire to save them from endless bombardments by British aircraft, to give the troops the opportunity to rest before the upcoming operation "Sea Lion". - Invasion of Great Britain.

So, on April 30, 1941, the country's leadership was informed by information received from one of the most reliable sources of the Berlin residency - "Corsican" - that "Germany plans to solve food problems by expanding economic ties with the USSR, presenting requirements for to the Soviet Union on a significant increase in the supply of raw materials and coercion up to the use of force. At the beginning of May, the same "Corsican" reported that the concentration of German troops near the borders of the USSR was a means of waging war on nerves in order to induce the Soviet government to accept the German demands. The report of another valuable source of the residency ~ "Starshina" was similar, which stated that, although the attack on the USSR was not removed from the agenda, the Germans would first present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding to increase exports to Germany, and the presentation of an ultimatum will be preceded by a war of nerves.

It should be added that other states, especially Great Britain, also engaged in disinformation, pursuing their own political and military goals.

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All these "hindrances" and informational "noises" seriously distorted the ongoing events and made it difficult to understand them. However, it would be a mistake to overestimate the role of disinformation, since the Soviet side still basically unraveled the manipulations of the Germans and did not follow their lead.

Receiving valuable information from London, Paris, Rome and other Western countries, the intelligence as a whole figured out the plans of Nazi Germany. A significant role was played by the "legal" residency in Berlin and its assistants - "Corsican" - Dr. Arvid Harnack, senior adviser to the German Ministry of Economy, and "Sergeant" - senior lieutenant of the German aviation headquarters Harro Schulze-Boysen.

Comrade-in-arms of the "Corsican" and "Sergeant" in the anti-fascist struggle Greta Kukhof, who was in the dungeons of the Gestapo and liberated by units of the advancing Red Army, in her memoirs in the postwar years claimed that Arvid Harnack asked close friends (if anyone of them will survive) to try to find out why Moscow allegedly did not trust his information and did not prepare for war.

Having in front of you the "Calendar" taken from the archives of the SVR, we can say that the information of the "Corsican" about the preparation of Germany for the attack did not go unnoticed. At least most of the information received from the "Corsican" and "Sergeant", and not only them, was positively assessed and reported by intelligence to the top leadership of the USSR.

For the help rendered to the Red Army in the defeat of fascist Germany, the anti-fascists Arvid Harnak and Harro Schulze-Boysen were awarded the Soviet Orders of the Red Banner (posthumously).

## Conclusion

When it comes to the work of Soviet foreign intelligence in the pre-war years, first of all, a logical question arises: to what extent did it inform the country's leadership about the impending aggression from Nazi Germany? Readers of this volume will probably already have their own opinion on this matter.

As the archive of the SVR shows, the threat of war from Germany since Hitler came to power has been the focus of intelligence. Its main efforts were aimed at obtaining information about the diplomatic, military, scientific and technical preparations for an attack on our country.

During the period when the Nazis were in power, foreign intelligence of the USSR received a large amount of information about the militarization of the German economy, which was proceeding at a rapid pace, including with the help of the United States and leading European powers, about the reconstruction of the army, the construction of military aviation, surface and underwater military fleets. - comrade, mass production of weapons. Intelligence recorded such organizational measures of the Nazis as the centralization of the administrative and economic structure of the country's governance, the transfer of the economy to a military footing, the creation of a department for the mobilization of industry and foreign trade in the German Ministry of Economy, the forced assignment of workers to military enterprises of defense importance. Extensive information was collected and reported to the leadership of the country on the ideological preparation of the German population for the upcoming war.

Documents from the pre-war years stored in the foreign intelligence archive testify to the fact that, long before the start of the aggression, intelligence knew and warned the country's leadership of the imminent danger. A year before the Great Patriotic War, foreign intelligence received data on Germany's military preparations for a war against

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THE USSR. The first information about the transfer of German troops from France to the Soviet borders was received in early July 1940, even before Hitler signed the instruction to develop the Barbarossa plan. Exactly one month after the capitulation of France, on July 22, 1940, Hitler decided to continue the offensive to the East, without waiting for the end of hostilities against England, and instructed to develop a plan of aggression against the USSR in such a way that its implementation would begin no later than the second half of June. 1941. Under the code name "Barbarossa", such a plan was developed by the end of the year and signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940.

Intelligence failed to obtain this document, but it knew of Hitler's intention to attack the Soviet Union. On the same day that Hitler signed the Barbarossa plan, he delivered a speech to young graduate officers in Sporth Hall, in which he called on them to take part in the "great historical event" - the elimination of "injustice" when "60 million Great Russians own 1/6 of the globe, and about 90 million Germans huddle on a piece of land." Hitler made it clear that the officers sitting in the hall would soon take part in the war against the USSR. Although this event was organized as strictly secret, the Berlin residency found out about it the next day and reported the content of Hitler's speech to the Center.

Numerous information that Soviet foreign intelligence received at that time made it possible to confidently conclude that military preparations carried out both in Germany itself and its allied countries, and directly on the borders of the Soviet Union, are being carried out in accordance with adopted political decision, with a single, carefully developed plan. Information about Hitler's speech on December 18, 1940 confirmed this.

In the report of the head of intelligence P.M. Fitin on the work for 1939-1941 in the section "From the most valuable materials obtained during this time by agents", the first paragraph is: "Information on the preparation by Germany of an armed uprising against the Soviet Union". "The essence of the information boils down to the fact that Goering gave an order to transfer the Russian Department of the Aviation Headquarters to the active part, developing and preparing military operations; on a large scale, studies of the most important bombing sites on the territory of the USSR are being carried out; maps of the main industrial facilities are compiled; the question of the economic occupation of Ukraine is being developed.

The report contains generalizations of data obtained by intelligence through intelligence on military development, concentration of troops and strengthening of the economic and military-political positions of fascist Germany in Romania, Finland, Slovakia, the Protectorate (occupied Czech Republic), the Governor General (occupied Poland).

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sha), in the Balkans, in Iran and Afghanistan adjacent to the Soviet Union.

And although the word "war" was not mentioned in Fitin's report, the totality of intelligence obtained speaks for itself and leaves no doubt: we are talking about Germany's large-scale preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

Military preparations do not always end in war. They may also be used to threaten the use of force to gain some advantage. Soviet intelligence had to solve this problem in order to deal with the true plans of Germany. At the last stage of preparations for an attack on the USSR, German propaganda increasingly began to promote the thesis that military preparations near the borders of the Soviet Union were aimed simply at putting pressure on it, forcing the Soviet government to accept German demands of an economic and territorial nature, which Germany allegedly intends to put forward in the form of an ultimatum in the near future. Information was widely disseminated in various circles (very close to reality) that Germany was experiencing an acute shortage of raw materials and food, that fuel and grain would hardly be enough for the winter, and that without solving this problem at the expense of Ukrainian bread and oil Caucasus Germany will not be able to defeat England.

This was insidious misinformation. It seemed to explain the numerous data of Soviet intelligence about military preparations near the borders of the USSR and introduced a certain amount of logic into the seemingly absurd actions of the Germans in preparing for a war against the Soviet Union until the end of the war with England. In addition, the idea of the threat of the use of force in order to present ultimatum demands fit well into the aggressive policy of fascist Germany pursued before.

Foreign intelligence considered the military preparations of the Germans as carrying a direct threat to the security of states. However, whether the attack would be carried out suddenly or whether the Germans would first present an ultimatum and, by threatening the use of force, would achieve their demands - intelligence did not have a clear answer to this question. It failed to penetrate so deeply into the political plans of the enemy.

In order to answer this question, a deep analysis of the entire set of incoming data was required, which could only be done by a specialized information and analytical service. In those years, there was no such unit in foreign intelligence. She began to master the methodology of intelligence analysis, but did not yet have a sufficient number of relevant specialists. All this came later. Then intelligence

did what she could

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In the conditions of the approaching war, on the basis of the available intelligence information, it was necessary to predict the most probable alignment of forces in the world in the event of a German attack on the USSR

First of all, it was necessary to avoid mistakes in analyzing the positions of the two most powerful powers of the capitalist world—England and the USA. It was also important to know the position of Japan.

Foreign intelligence had information that Hitler was also concerned about the same issues. She knew from a reliable source that the purpose of Hess's flight to England was to convince the British of the advisability of concluding an armistice and maintaining neutrality in the event of a war between Germany and Russia. And that would mean the neutrality of the United States.

Soviet intelligence drew the attention of its leadership to the information received from reliable agents about Hitler's statement to the highest officer corps, designed for the Americans and the British: "Roosevelt and Churchill are preventing me from doing what I want to do in their own favor. I have plans that will not hurt the interests of America and England.

Intelligence also managed to obtain information that Japan did not intend to immediately follow [Germany] to attack the Soviet Union and at first would take a wait-and-see attitude.

The incoming information testified that Hitler tried by all means to present the USSR as an "aggressor" and at least achieve its international isolation in the coming war.

This allowed the country's leadership to pursue a flexible foreign policy, promote the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition, and ultimately ensured the historic victory of the peoples of the world over German fascism.

Intelligence also knew about the approximate timing of the start of aggression. Yes, the timing of a possible attack in intelligence reports was different, but they all fell on the first half of 1941, and this fact in itself was already evidence of the inevitability of the impending threat. Immediately before the attack, intelligence also found out its exact date - June 22, 1941.

Thus, on the eve of the war, Soviet foreign intelligence reported to the leadership of the country extensive and varied information, from which it was clear that the country was inevitably facing the mortal danger of aggression by fascist Germany. Of course, intelligence did not have, and indeed could not have, comprehensive information about the preparation of aggression against our country. Not a single intelligence service in the world can know absolutely everything. But what our intelligence was able to learn about the impending military threat in the pre-war years can be called a feat without exaggeration. Working in the most difficult conditions of a shortage of experienced intelligence personnel, weakened by repression, she managed to do the seemingly unbelievable: to reveal Hitler's plans, to obtain reliable information about his preparations for a campaign against the USSR

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Truth is always known in comparison. The notorious Allen Dulles, who is very far from sympathy for our country, one of the founders of the Cold War, in his book *The Art of Intelligence* wrote, referring to the work of Soviet foreign intelligence on the eve of the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union and the period of the war, that fresh The data that Soviet intelligence officers obtained through secret operations represented the kind of material that is "the dream object of any intelligence service in the world."

Assessing the activities of Soviet foreign intelligence on the eve of the war, one can answer the above question with confidence. Yes, she honestly and wholeheartedly fulfilled her patriotic duty to the Motherland, to the people.

## APPLICATION

Declassified documents from the archive of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service relating to the activities of foreign intelligence in the pre-war period

Documents No. 1-8, 19-21 by foreign intelligence are published for the first time. Documents No. 9-18 were published in the collection Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table. Intelligence and counterintelligence on the preparation of German aggression against the USSR March-June 1941" (M.: Publishing House of the association "Mosgor-arkhiv", 1995).

#### #1 ANGLO-GERMAN NEGOTIATIONS IN BERLIN Summary

Recordings of conversations about the Anglo-German negotiations that took place in the chancellor's palace in Berlin on March 25th and 26th, 1935'. In attendance: From the United Kingdom: Sir John Simon, Foreign Secretary: Mr. Eden, Lord Privy Seal? Sir Eric Phipps, His Majesty's Ambassador to Berlin. Mr. Streng, Foreign office. Mr. Wigram, Foreign office. From Germany: Herr Hitler, Chancellor and "Leader" Baron von Neurath, Minister for Foreign Affairs°. Mr. von Ribbentrop, Special Commissioner for Disarmament Affairs. Herr von Kotze, private secretary to Baron von Neurath. Mr. Schmidt, translator.

Sir John Simon indicated that he wished to present to the Chancellor the views of His Majesty's Government on the situation. It believes that the future of Europe can go in two directions: either in the direction of universal cooperation to ensure a lasting peace

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or to the division of Europe into two camps and the isolation of some countries on one side and the unification of other countries on the other. It would like to. to do everything in his power, backed by cooperation with Germany, to ensure that the first path is chosen.

British circles, however, were extremely disturbed by a number of German actions - her withdrawal from the League of Nations, the developments connected with the Austrian question, and the recent unilateral statement regarding Germany's now accelerated rearmament measures. As a result of these events, public opinion in Britain had some doubts and was anxiously trying to determine what the actual direction of German policy was. The British population, however, is not anti-German; examples can be cited in this regard regarding reparations, the evacuation of the Rhineland, the declaration of equal rights and the settlement of the Saar problem.

Herr Hitler said that he wanted to assure Sir John Simon and Mr Eden that the German Government and the German people were happy to have them here. He sees in this visit the opportunity for the first time to reach mutual understanding through direct negotiations.

Herr Hitler further emphasized that the first and only important objective of his policy was to restore the well-being of a people who had suffered great calamities. Restoration is conceived by him in three directions – economic, political and spiritual. This policy is in accordance with the powers which he has received from the German people. It would be completely wrong to believe that there is a dictatorship in Germany that does not take into account the will of the people.

The German Government sincerely strives to ensure that the development of events in Europe follows the path of solidarity and cooperation. At the same time, he is forced to point out that the experience of the past 15 years must be recognized as bitter. He is almost ready to argue that such cooperation was essentially impossible due to the lack of fair equality between the parties.

Indeed, true solidarity requires that the goals of a country's policy do not represent a danger to other countries or an attempt to encroach on their existence. The goals of German policy in its new political conception do not pose a danger to anyone. National Socialism does not seek expansion. It arose as a result of severe trials of the German people and is intended for distribution only among

the German nation, and not outside German territory. At the same time, in other countries there are a number of other theories and ideas that are designed to attract the sympathy of other peoples. This is one of the most serious threats to solidarity and cooperation in Europe. The German government did not take a single step that could be interpreted as a territorial threat in relation to another country.

With regard to the feeling of unrest in England referred to by Sir John Simon, Herr Hitler pointed out that the said first steps were necessary for the moral rehabilitation and restoration of the German people.

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The decision to leave the League of Nations was approved by 94% of the German population. He is convinced that Britain, under similar circumstances, would have done the same, and certainly would not have returned to the League at all.

Turning to the question of Austria, the Chancellor pointed out that Germany did not and had never threatened Austria. He, however, cannot forget the fact that Germany cannot cooperate with a government which, both at home and abroad, offends the German government and German ideals.

The same applies to Lithuania. Germany does not want conflict with Lithuania. But Germany cannot be expected to look on calmly as a small country oppresses 100,000 Germans whose only misfortune is that they were born Germans.

With regard to armaments, Germany was accused of violating the Treaty of Versailles. If he had been chancellor in 1919, he would never have signed such a treaty. He would rather die. He never concealed his point of view on this matter and always promised that he would free the German people from these obligations.

Sir John Simon thanked the chancellor for his full and clear presentation of the situation. He must at the same time state unequivocally that the British people understand Germany very well and that is why they are so eager to find some basis for cooperation with her on the basis of true equality.

## EAST PACT®

Sir John Simon stated that he wanted to outline the position of the British Government on the Eastern Pact.

When the Eastern Pact proposal was first put forward last summer, the British government made it clear that it had many objections to it. The original proposals have been modified to some extent. After that, the British government changed its position and spoke in favor of concluding such a pact; British ministers in Berlin today would be delighted to hear from the Chancellor how Germany views the projected pact, which includes three elements: non-aggression, consultations, mutual

help.

Mr. Hitler raised the question of which countries could take the lead in declaring war on other countries in this part of Europe. It is impossible to imagine that the Baltic countries could declare war on Russia or that Poland would declare war on Russia. Germany will also never declare war on Russia.

However, he does not have the same certainty about Russia. He believes that there is currently a trend towards aggression in Russia. Given the connection between the idea of Bolshevism and the political objectives of Russia, as well as its military and economic power, it seems to him that it is more likely that Russia will start the war rather than other countries.



The German government is confident that security in Eastern Europe could be increased through the conclusion of non-aggression pacts; and it took the lead with respect to Poland; it would extend the conclusion of these non-aggression pacts to other countries, except

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Lithuania. Ego does not mean that he wants war with Lithuania, but he cannot conclude a non-aggression pact with a country that threatens the existence of German national minorities. If the guarantor countries forced Lithuania to comply with the rule of law, then the obstacle on the part of Germany to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Lithuania would be removed.

Mr. Eden pointed out what the Chancellor had said about the danger of Bolshevism. It seems to the British ministers that the danger of communism is a matter of domestic rather than international order. There is no doubt that the communist leaders would like other countries to join their worldview, but they are unlikely to go to war over this. But if such a danger existed, would not the agreement proposed by the British be the best means for strengthening solidarity in Europe?

Great Britain in this matter is interested in ensuring such a solution to the problem in Eastern Europe, which would be no less effective than the Locarno agreement! .

Herr Hitler replied that when he spoke of the Russian danger, he did not mean to say that the cooperation and solidarity of Europe were superfluous. He firmly believes that one day this cooperation and this solidarity will be urgently needed for the defense of Europe against the Asiatic and Bolshevik danger. He believes that Russia sees in Germany the fighter of Europe against this danger, just as Germany sees in Poland a bulwark against this danger.

Mr. Eden asked if the Chancellor was prepared in principle to conclude a bilateral pact with Lithuania. If ready, the British Government would take appropriate steps to force Lithuania to fulfill its obligations.

Herr Hitler gave an affirmative answer.

After that, he turned to the issue of consultations; he said that the German Government was ready to agree to consultations as part of the Eastern Pact in case of difficulties.

As regards the point on mutual assistance, this is precisely where all the difficulties lie. The practical application of the principle of mutual assistance depends on which country will be regarded as the aggressor. There will never be unanimity on this point, because during the last 15 years a system has developed in which, during a dispute between two countries, everyone takes the side of the stronger and forces the weaker to submit. Consequently, on the basis of the proposed pact of mutual assistance, he might be forced to lead the German people to war in the event that other countries argue with each other, not knowing which power is guilty and which is innocent. The situation is aggravated by the fact that in the east of Europe there are groups of countries with problems that are difficult to understand. Here there are opportunities for conflicts, the cause of which is even difficult to foresee.

Indeed, what is meant by this system of mutual assistance? It is assumed that Germany, under certain circumstances, will receive help from Russia against France, or else she will receive help from France against Russia. But it should be clear to everyone that not a single German will want to accept help from Russia. The Germans are more afraid of Russian help than French attacks.

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If Germany could obtain assurances of assistance from Great Britain, this would be welcomed by the whole country and the British troops would be warmly welcomed on German territory, but this can by no means apply to Bolshevik troops. He says this as someone who has come across Bolshevism in Germany.

If he invited the Bolsheviks to his place to defend Germany, it would be tantamount to opening a vessel at the front containing the bacilli of the plague. The goal is to destroy the enemy, but these bacilli will also destroy his own army.

Besides, he could not suggest to the National Socialist to fight for Bolshevism. This would be tantamount to asking the pope or the Catholic Church to send their monks to preach in favor of Buddhism or Mohammedanism.

He cannot sign such an agreement. He believes that the British government will understand this.

Sir John Simon indicated that he fully understood Mr. Hitler's proposal for a multilateral non-aggression pact and consultations, and Mr. Hitler had already explained why Germany could not participate in a pact for mutual assistance in the East. But assuming that it would be possible to conclude a multilateral pact of non-aggression and consultations, is it not possible that some of the other parties to this multilateral agreement would want to conclude separate agreements on mutual assistance among themselves, without Germany taking on assume such commitments to help? What would Germany have done if such a situation arose?

Mr. Hitler said that such an idea, in his opinion, was dangerous and could not be approved. If a group of countries within the framework of the Eastern Pact concluded a separate agreement on mutual assistance, then this would be an exact repetition of the pre-war system. It would no longer be a general system, but within the wider system there would be separate interest groups. It is unlikely that in the event of a conflict between a member of the first group and a member of the second group, an impartial decision could be made. This would be an exact repetition of the military alliances of the pre-war period. Although these alliances were called defensive, yet they led to the spread of the world fire and to the world conflict.

The German Government believes that it would be most correct to conclude a general pact containing obligations of non-aggression and consultations, as well as an obligation not to render assistance to the aggressor. This would be sufficient if the participants had confidence in the signatures on the pact.

Sir John Simon said that he understood from Baron von Neurath that the German Government intended to put before His Majesty's Government more detailed proposals on the question of the Eastern Pact. He would like to express the hope that the German Government will in the near future also communicate its answer to the French Government.

Baron von Neurath recalled that the French government had sent in its objections to the first reply of the German government on the question of concluding the Eastern Pact on the basis of the principles that had just been enumerated by the Chancellor. The German Government will under no circumstances agree to undertake obligations of mutual assistance. agreed

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Mutual aid agreements are, in fact, nothing more than military alliances. If Germany had acceded to the pact on such terms, then she would simply have given sanction to the conclusion of a Franco-Russian alliance.

Sir John Simon made it clear that he did not intend to recommend any course of action towards the French note. He, of course, has no right to intervene, but it only seemed to him that sending a German reply to the French Government would help clarify the situation, whatever the nature of that reply.

## AUSTRIA

Mr. Eden pointed out that the German Government did not appear to be satisfied with the latest reply received from the French Government. He believes that the German government approves in principle of the conclusion of the Central European Pact, but encounters difficulties in practice. It is the desire of His Majesty's Government that these practical difficulties be overcome, and the sooner the better.

Herr Hitler declared that he would like to express some thoughts on the general prospects of the Austrian problem. The populations of both countries are of the same origin, and until 1866 both countries constituted a single political entity, although they were under different sovereignties. He has no doubt that, if free voting were possible, the people of Austria would be in favor of close association, if not complete unification with Germany.

He must note, however, that the thought of annexing Austria, of depriving her of her right to self-determination, or of forcing Austria into any kind of alliance with Germany, does not occur to anyone in Germany. Germany does not for one moment allow the thought of violating the inviolability of Austrian territory or of imposing any other regime on Austria.

Baron von Neurath noted that Germany did not object in principle to the idea of the Central European Pact, but she only had doubts about its practical implementation. One of the main difficulties is the question of defining the principle of non-intervention. The answer received by [Germany] to this question is not clear. The German Government believes that it must now await further proposals from those who originally proposed the pact.

Herr Hitler declared that he would be glad if a precise definition of the principle of non-intervention could be found. He could bring here several hundred communist criminals sent from Russia to Germany, who were trained in the use of explosives and in throwing bombs. Between 400 and 500 such persons are kept in German prisons. When the communist center in Germany was discovered, military maps were found there, drawn up by officers of the General Staff to prepare for the civil war in Germany. All this was sent from Russia, as well as the money.

Mr. Eden said that he fully admits the existence of these terrorist organizations. But it would be a pity if, on this basis alone, the countries refused to conclude the Central European Pact.

Sir John Simon replied that he preferred to leave the initiative to those countries that had taken it first.

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Mr. von Ribbentrop recalled that the British Government had undoubtedly paid serious attention to this problem. Could Sir John Simon say what the views of the British Government are on this matter.

Sir John Simon declared that His Majesty's Government would like a policy to be pursued which would ensure the integrity and independence of Austria. However, His Majesty's Government cannot treat Austria in the same way as, for example, Belgium, i.e. to a country that is in the closest neighborhood to Great Britain".

Herr Hitler replied that he could fully agree with such a thought. He is convinced that the draft agreement in its present form would arouse objections not only from Germany, but also from other countries. The project now put forward is in fact acceptable only for France and Italy; for countries that are interested in this issue only indirectly and unilaterally. According to the German government, the Austrian question was created artificially. It would therefore, of course, wish to please other Governments with regard to this matter and to contribute to its settlement. But, according to Germany, the Austrian problem does not exist at all. Why should Germany guarantee the independence of Austria when such a guarantee is not considered necessary in relation to other countries?

The Germans see no benefit in the pact. Germany does not understand why special guarantees are needed, since she has no intention of threatening the independence of Austria. (Sections of the talks concerning armaments and the reasons for Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations have been omitted from the publications.)

## CONCLUSION

Sir John Simon recalled that the British Ministers felt somewhat disappointed that no greater agreement could be reached in those two days than had been reached.

Herr Hitler wishes to assure the British Ministers that the German Government has taken great satisfaction from this opportunity for free and frank negotiations.

Herr Hitler also expressed his gratitude to the British Government for its loyal efforts in the question of the Saar plebiscite and in all other matters in which it has taken such a generous stand towards Germany."

He asks them not to conclude from everything they hear that Germany is not ready to cooperate in building solidarity in Europe. He expressed the hope that the British ministers saw the difficulty of the position of the German government: it is trying to raise the country, which for 16 years lived in a state of moral depression. It is trying to raise the country to the same level of equality as other nations.

Accepting the legacy left by past German governments, Herr Hitler resolved to liquidate it honestly and sincerely. If he has to conclude international agreements, they will not be concluded on behalf of the past Germany. Herr Hitler will not sign anything that he cannot accept, but if he makes a commitment he will never break it.

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#2 Top secret

The 7th department of the GUGB NKVD received the following intelligence message from New York:

At a cabinet meeting on January 29, 1937, Roosevelt announced that his talks with Runciman were preliminary; they may later lead to an agreement. Runciman emphasized that he had arrived as a special representative of the British Prime Minister Baldwin, but not on behalf of the Cabinet, and only upon his return did Baldwin inform the Council of Ministers of his final intentions. Roosevelt noted that in his negotiations, Runciman, however, often referred to the cabinet talks. The content of the main part of the negotiations was devoted to the question of the neutrality of the United States, for London expects war no later than 1938, and if it is not possible to obtain war materials from the United States, then it is necessary to immediately start building large factories in England, France and Czechoslovakia. England is already building two large military factories, but this is not enough. Roosevelt told Runciman that America was making efforts to remain neutral as long as possible. If there is an armed conflict between democracy and fascism, America will do its duty. If the question is about the war that will cause

Germany or the USSR, then it will take a different position and, at the insistence of Roosevelt, America will maintain its neutrality. If the USSR finds itself under the threat of German, purely imperialist, i.e. territorial, aspirations, then the European states will have to intervene, and America will take their side. In the Asian war, America will remain neutral as long as American interests are not directly affected. The seizure by Japan of a large Chinese territory without the consent of China should be considered a violation of American interests. Runciman spoke in the sense that every attack by the fascists or their vassals on the USSR would be based on imperialist motives. Runciman declared that a European war could not be carried out without the moral and financial assistance of the United States.

Runciman also raised the issue of Roosevelt's intervention in Spanish events, to which the latter replied that the government would only take a definite position on this issue if both sides in Spain refused to intervene or asked for cooperation in an arbitration court. The cabinet knows that it personally would like to support the supporters of the government; he never understood the behavior of France in this matter and fully recognizes the correctness of the position of the USSR. In the event of war, he would facilitate US intervention. In this case, he will approve the convening of a conference of powers in America or somewhere in Europe.

Deputy early 7th Department of the GUGB NKVD Major of State Security (Shpigelglas)

Right: Start. 1st sector of the 7th department of the GUGB lieutenant of state security

(Traffen) 474

No. 3 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR TO THE CC AUCP(b) AND THE SNK OF THE USSR OF August 28, 1939

We are told from Paris the following data of August 23 on Hitler's negotiations with

Englishmen:

"Halifax? and the British ambassador in Berlin are invited to Hitler for important negotiations. They were instructed to agree to any negotiations, except supposedly concessions at the expense of Poland.

According to data from August 24, the French General Staff insists on immediately starting hostilities, believing that time is on the side of Germany. While England and France are losing prestige, Germany is getting new reserves of raw materials and foodstuffs at the expense of the USSR, and new concessions are useless.

According to the French ambassador in Moscow, the non-aggression pact expresses only the desire of the USSR to have freedom and independence from groups. On the contrary, the ambassador in Berlin, Coulondre, considers the pact the beginning of the economic and diplomatic rapprochement between Germany and the USSR, which can allegedly expand on "the ideological basis of anti-capitalism, self-determination of peoples, especially colonial ones, and other things."

Central archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation

Top secret

The 7th department of the GUGB of the NKVD received by telegraph a brief text of a document emanating from the US State Department.

Dodd Hull (Washington). (U.S. Ambassador to Berlin)

No. 4 TELEGRAM No. 1639 January 8, 1937

Last week Polish Prime Minister Beck gave a definite assurance that Poland had no agreement with the USSR allowing, in case of war, the passage of its troops and planes through Polish territory. Confidential reports held by the commander

ground forces of Germany, Fritsch, convince the leaders of the Reichswehr that Germany is not in danger from the USSR for a number of years and that the weapons of the USSR are intended not for offensive, but for defensive actions.

In my opinion, Germany does not want war at this time. A person close to the Reichswehr declares that pro-Soviet sentiments are growing in the army. Hitler and the radicals still hold the idea of the need for expansion to the East. Goering is inclined to take the side of Fritsch and Schacht. Von Hassel warns against too much confidence in Mussolini.

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In the last conversation, von Neurath told me that the American policy of isolation increases the war danger: if the US were the arbiter, Berlin would find it possible

obey.

Deputy early 7th Department of the GUGB NKVD Major of State Security (Shpigelglas)

NK-8 is correct: Beginning. 1st sector of the 7th division GUGB lieutenant of state security

(Graflén)

Top secret

The 7th department of the GUGB of the NKVD received by telegraph a brief text of a document emanating from the US State Department.

#5 #24 January 27, 1937

The British Ambassador to the United States, Lindsay, in a conversation with Secretary of State Hull, declared that the British Government wished to use every opportunity to inform the US Government of events in England and other parts of the world. Perhaps Mr. Hull is interested in the results of Eden's meeting with the French Foreign Minister Delbos, during which they drew up a joint general plan of action for determining the foreign policy of England and France in the near future. This plan is as follows:

1. A new attempt will be made to reach a full agreement with Berlin. This was the purpose of Eden's speech, which was to be followed, about a week later, by a similar speech by the French Foreign Minister.
2. On the issue of relations with Berlin and other European countries, support for Italy is emphasized. This provision (Italy's support) is considered secured, whether or not the first paragraph is fulfilled.

It is likely that Göring, by meeting again, helped bring Mussolini closer to Hitler, although a generous loan offer, in the current financial difficulties in Italy, could tip the scales considerably in the other direction. Under these conditions, a loan of one or two billion lire may be allocated.

3. This briefly concerns the basis of cooperation with the USSR, which is to act in full agreement with London and Paris. Moscow must clearly understand that the USSR must not make individual statements in the field of international politics, thereby hindering the fulfillment of the plans of its democratic friends when it is to its advantage. This has been repeated far too often in connection with the Spanish events, and the tension created by it is too dangerous to be allowed to endure.

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repetition. London and Parikh, in turn, will agree to consult with the USSR as an equal partner on all important questions of preserving European peace. If the impossibility of cooperating with Berlin on the basis of the aforementioned provision is proved, then the German Government will have to be forced to come to an agreement by applying more stringent measures. If all other methods prove unsuccessful, then England will consider the proposal of a general and strictly controlled boycott of all German industry. If the USA joined France, England, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and one or several Balkan states in energetic actions directed against German trade, fascist Germany could be forced to abandon its aggressive policy.

Lindsay agrees with the Foreign Secretary that Hitler is not yet ready for war. Reports coming from abroad to London indicate that the question of the shortage of raw materials in Germany is in fact much more acute than is known. The same sources report growing discontent among the peasantry and the middle classes. There seems to be no way out of this impasse into which Hitler has placed German industry.

Deputy early 7th Department of the GUGB NKVD Major of State Security (Shpigelglas)

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(Traflen)

Top secret #6

The 7th department of the GUGB NKVD received the following intelligence data from Berlin:

US Ambassador to Paris Bullitt spent 2-3 days in Berlin on his way back from Poland. He stated that he would like to see Göring, although this was not in accordance with normal diplomatic procedure. The Italian ambassador in Berlin, Attolico, who is a close friend of Bullitt, strongly insists on such a meeting, so he (Bullitt) does not consider it possible to refuse. Bullitt's conversation with Goering lasted several hours. Bullitt did not share the nature of this conversation with anyone. The only thing he said was that Goering asked him if the US would act if Germany took over Czechoslovakia and Austria. According to Bullitt, he replied that if Germany began hostilities in these countries, the United States would have to consider making a speech as well. Bullitt added that Goering was much more interested in the question of the attitude of the United States towards Germany than in any other question. According to American diplomatic circles in Berlin, Bullitt traveled to Poland to persuade Beck to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. He is stubborn and persistent

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works conservative circles in France against the USSR, referring to his long experience in order to convince them.

Beginning sector of the 7th department of the GUGB NKVD captain of state security

(Wraith)

No. 7 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE CC AUCP(b), SNK USSR NPO USSR and NKVD USSR dated March 6, 1941

Message from Berlin

According to information received from an official of the Committee for the Four-Year Plan, several members of the committee received an urgent task to make calculations of the stocks of raw materials and food that Germany could receive as a result of the occupation of the European part of the Soviet Union.

The same informant reports that Colonel General Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Land Army, is counting on unconditional success and lightning-fast occupation by the German troops of the Soviet Union, and above all of Ukraine, where, according to Halder, successful operations will be facilitated by the good condition of the iron and highways. The same Halder also considers the occupation of Baku and its oil fields to be an easy task, which the Germans supposedly will be able to quickly restore after the destruction from hostilities. Halder believes that the Red Army will not be able to provide adequate resistance to the lightning-fast offensive of the German troops and the Russians will not even have time to destroy the reserves.

As regards the Committee's calculations under the four-year plan regarding the economic effect of such an operation, these calculations supposedly give a negative forecast.

According to information received from an employee of the headquarters of the High Command, Colonel Becker, head of the economic department of the headquarters, also received the task of compiling similar calculations from the General Staff.

Colonel Becker's calculations, on the contrary, prove the high economic effect that will be obtained as a result of military operations against the USSR.

Central archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation

No. 8 FROM THE MESSAGE OF THE NKGB OF THE USSR TO THE CC AUCP(b) AND THE SNK OF THE USSR, March 11, 1941

March 6 this year The British Ambassador Cripps called a press conference attended by British and American correspondents Chollerton, Lovell, Cassidy, Duranty, Shapiro and Magidov.

Warning those present that his information was confidential and not to be used for publication, Cripps issued the following statement...

Soviet-German relations are definitely deteriorating, and Vyshinsky's statement on the Bulgarian question is very significant in this respect.

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research institutes. This statement is very strong and is the first open expression of dissatisfaction of the USSR with Germany. A Soviet-German war is inevitable. Many reliable diplomatic sources from Berlin report that Germany is planning an attack on the Soviet Union this year, probably in the summer. There is a group in the German General Staff advocating an immediate attack on the USSR. Until now, Hitler has been trying to avoid a war on two fronts, but if he is convinced that he cannot make a successful invasion of England, he will attack the USSR, since in this case he will have only one front.

On the other hand, if Hitler becomes convinced that he cannot defeat England before America can help her, he will try to make peace with England on the following terms: the restoration of France, Belgium and Holland and the capture of the USSR

These terms of peace have a good chance of being accepted by England, because both in England and in America there are influential groups who want to see the USSR destroyed, and if the position of England worsens, they will be able to force the governments to accept the Hitlerite peace conditions. In this case, Hitler will very quickly attack the USSR.

Another reason why the Soviet-German war must begin this year is that the Red Army is constantly growing stronger, while the power of the German army, if the war with England drags on, will be weakened. Therefore, it is more profitable for Hitler to try to break the Red Army before its reorganization is completed.



Answering questions, Cripps stated that the German General Staff was convinced that Germany was capable of capturing the Ukraine and the Caucasus, all the way to Baku, in two to three weeks. The same opinion is shared by Dill\*, who gives a low estimate of the combat effectiveness of the Red Army.

According to Cripps, he told Eden and Dill that the Red Army was much better than they thought it was, and was getting stronger every day.

Central archive of the FSB of the Russian Federation

№9 NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR V.N. MERKULOV TO THE CC AUCP(b), SNK and NKVD OF THE USSR WITH THE TEXT OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE ENGLISH FOREIGN MINISTER A. IDEN TO THE ENGLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR S. KRIPPS ON GERMANY'S INTENTIONS TO ATTACK THE USSR

No. 1312/M April 26, 1941

Top secret

We are sending the text of Eden's telegram No. 365 of April 18, 1941, addressed to the British Ambassador to the USSR Cripps, in response to Cripps-

\* Dill John Greer - Chief of the Imperial General Staff of Great Britain.

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sa for No. 377 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England dated April 17 of this year, received by the NKGB of the USSR from London undercover.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: message from London nos. 2721 and 2724 of 23 [U41

Text of Eden's telegram No. 365 of April 18, 1941, addressed to the British Ambassador to the USSR Cripps, in response to Cripps' telegram No. 377 to the British Foreign Office of April 17 of this year:

You will find my point of view on the Baltic question in my telegrams Nos. 353 and 358, which you have already received. As for the general issue in the Anglo-Soviet negotiations, then, taking advantage of the visit to me on April 16 of this year. Soviet Ambassador, I gave him the following:

a) in our opinion, Germany's military ambitions are unlimited and now or in the coming months include an attack on the USSR;

6) in a conversation with the Yugoslav prince-regent Paul in Berchtesgaden, Hitler spoke out against the USSR and Turkey in the sharpest tone;

c) there is much other evidence of Hitler's determination to defeat the USSR

In the face of such a situation, it seems desirable to us to have a candid discussion of the relations between our two countries and to decide whether there is any possibility of rapprochement.

Maisky said several times that the Soviet government had already demonstrated its desire to improve relations with a series of small gestures, but the Soviet government met with our negative behavior in such a matter as the repatriation of the Baltic sailors. I replied that I meant something much more and asked if I was right that the Soviet government considered the issue of the Baltic states as the main stumbling block between us. The Ambassador agreed with this and said that if this obstacle were removed, progress could be possible. I told him that I could not discuss issues in such a

on the basis that if an agreement is reached on this question, only then will the Soviet government reconsider its relations with us. On the contrary, if we provide for any of our concessions on this issue, then they can only be part of an agreement, for the conclusion of which the Soviet government, for its part, will have to make an appropriate contribution. It is not at all necessary that we will ask anything for ourselves, but at least we can assume that the USSR, in its own interests, would help our friends like Turkey, for example, in the matter of supplying military materials to the Turks.

The Ambassador suggested that we formulate our requests and at the same time indicate what we are ready to do ourselves. I promised to think about it, but at the same time made it perfectly clear that we would not envisage only a unilateral gesture on our part. The ambassador agreed with this, saying that Stalin was of the opinion that the policy of the Soviet

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Governments must be built on the basis of reciprocity. In conclusion, I told him that I would now reconsider the entire problem of Anglo-Soviet relations and would either ask him to meet with me in the near future or send you instructions to develop the matter.

You must be guided by this in conversations with Molotov.

I'm asking the US government if their policy can be harmonized with ours, and I'll let you know the results shortly.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. Z os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 903-906. Certified copy.

No. 10 NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY V.N. MERKULOV TO THE CC AUCP(b), SNK and NKVD OF THE USSR WITH AN AGENT REPORT ON GERMANY'S ATTACK PLANS ON THE USSR COOPERATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF WITH THE FINNISH, ROMANIAN, HUNGARIAN AND BULGARIAN HEADQUARTERS AND ON THE ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AVIATION FITNESS

No. 1416/M May 1, 1941 Top secret

The NKGB of the USSR sends an undercover message received from Berlin about plans for a German attack on the Soviet Union.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: telegram from Comrade Zakhar? according to the "Foreman" No. 2904 dated 30.GU. 1941

Message from Berlin

The source "Sergeant Major", working at the headquarters of the German aviation, reports:

1. According to the information received from the liaison officer between the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the headquarters of the German aviation Gregor, the question of Germany's action against the Soviet Union has been finally decided and its beginning should be expected from day to day. Ribbentrop, who until now was not a supporter of action against the USSR, knowing Hitler's firm determination in this matter, took the position of supporters of an attack on the USSR.

2. According to information received at the aviation headquarters, in recent days there has been an increase in activity in cooperation between the German and Finnish general staffs, expressed in the joint development of operational plans for

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tiv USSR. It is assumed that the Finnish-German units will cut through Karelia in order to retain the Petsamo nickel mines, which are of great importance.

The Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian headquarters turned to the Germans with a request for the urgent delivery of anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, which they needed in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.

The reports of the German Aviation Commission, which visited the USSR and the Air Force Attaché in Moscow, Aschenbrenner, made an overwhelming impression at the Aviation Headquarters. However, they expect that, although Soviet aviation is capable of inflicting a serious blow on German territory, nevertheless, the German army will quickly be able to suppress the resistance of Soviet troops, reaching the strongholds of Soviet aviation and paralyzing them.

3. According to information received from "Leibrandt", who is an assistant on Russian affairs at the foreign policy department of the NSDAP, Gregor's message is confirmed that the issue of speaking out against the Soviet Union is considered resolved.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1028-1030. Certified copy. Published: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1990, No. 4, p. 212, 213.

Ÿ11 NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY V.N. MERKULOV IN THE CC OF THE AUCP(b), SNK, NKO AND NKVD OF THE USSR WITH AN AGENT REPORT ON THE SITUATION WITH THE STRATEGIC RESERVES OF GERMANY

No. 1420/M May 1, 1941

Top secret

An undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from Berlin is being sent.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: message "Frankfurter"! 8 No. 141 dated 28.1U.1941 Message from Berlin

a meeting was held at which the question of the situation with rubber, gasoline and bread was discussed:

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a) the need of the military department for rubber is determined at 6,000 tons per month. The existing two synthetic rubber plants produce together 4,000 tons of synthetic rubber.

The shortage of rubber is supposed to be covered by importing natural rubber from French Indo-China through Japan and the USSR. Japan will produce rubber purchases ostensibly for its own needs and then transport it through the USSR to Germany;

6) intensive air operations of the German army and the war in the Balkans extremely depleted gasoline reserves. The situation with gasoline has become so complicated that the Germans intend to speed up the attack on Iraq at all costs in order to occupy the oil sources. For this purpose, there is currently an intensified transfer of German troops to Libya through Italy and a concentration of troops in the Balkans. The attack on Iraq is supposed to be carried out from Egypt and through Turkey, or by transferring troops through the Dodecanese Islands and further by sea along the Turkish coast. Rumors are circulating in high command circles that in the event of a successful offensive against Iraq, an offensive will be launched against the USSR - into the Caucasus from Turkey and into Ukraine from the west;

c) Germany's grain reserves will be exhausted by autumn. The new harvest will not be able to meet the consumption of 1942, therefore, plans are being developed for the upcoming operation against the USSR in order to tear Ukraine away.

2. According to information received by a source in the headquarters of the German armed forces, on the Soviet-German border, in the region of Lvov and Przemyśl, as well as in the protectorate and Slovakia, 20 divisions of the so-called "fast army", fully motorized, are concentrated.

The military command for this army hastily selects from other parts of the soldiers and officers who know the Russian language.

3. Recently, the German port of Kiel has been subjected to frequent and intensified bombardment by British aircraft. There is not a single undamaged street in the city, on some up to a dozen houses were destroyed. As a result of the bombings during the Easter week from 13 to 20 April in Kiel, 400 people were killed and 20,000 people were left homeless. It was mainly the workers' settlements around the shipyards that suffered. The state shipyard is disabled.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1037-1040. Certified copy.

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№12 NOTE OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY V.N. MERKULOV IN THE CC OF THE AUCP(b), SNK AND NKVD OF THE USSR WITH AN AGENT REPORT ON THE PLANS OF GERMANY IN RESPECT OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ABOUT HITLER'S SPEECH PROVIDED TO THE OFFICERS OF THE GERMAN ARMY

No. 1450/M 5 May 1941

Top secret

Are we sending an undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from Berlin?

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: telegram from Berlin No. 147 dated May 1, 1941 Message from Berlin

1. A source working in the German Ministry of Economy reports.

The press assistant at the Ministry of Economy, Krol (who is also one of the editors of the journal "Dinst aus Deutschland"), in a report made at a meeting of responsible assistants of the ministry, concerning the Russian question, stated that "Germany will demand from the USSR to act against England on the side of the powers "axes". As a guarantee that the USSR will fight on the side of the "Axis" to the decisive end, Germany will demand from the USSR the occupation by the German army of Ukraine and, possibly, also of the Baltic states"?

These measures, according to Krol, are necessary for Germany, because in the near future decisive actions of the German army against the Suez Canal will begin, therefore Germany needs calm in the east.

Morwede, Terneden's deputy on the Four Year Plan Committee, told a source that Germany's action against the USSR was vital for Germany to ensure peace in the world.  
east.

2. A source working at the headquarters of the German aviation reports:

On April 29, Hitler, in a speech delivered at the Sport Palace to young graduate officers, the contents of which were not published in the press, stated:

"In the near future, events will occur that many will find incomprehensible. However, the measures that we are planning are a state necessity, as the red mob raises its head over Europe."

This information was obtained by the source from several officers, but is subject to additional verification.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 56, l. 1157-1159. Certified copy.

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No. 13 NOTE OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY V.N. MERKULOVA I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV AND L.P. BERIA WITH AN AGENT MESSAGE CHARACTERIZING GERMAN-FINNISH RELATIONS

No. 1515/M May 8, 1941

Top secret

Sending an undercover message?!, received by the NKGB of the USSR from London.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: message from London No. 3032 dated 4.U. 1941 Message from London

In the summary of British intelligence materials for the week from 20 to 27 April 1941, in the section "Germany and Finland", it is reported:

An officer of the Finnish General Staff at the end of March this year. said that the Finnish headquarters had the following opinions:

1. In the event of a German-Russian conflict, Germany will make every effort to involve Finland in the war against the USSR.
2. The Germans will immediately launch an attack on the Murmansk region, using their divisions from Northern Norway for this purpose.
3. The German naval and air forces will assist the Finnish army stationed in the southern part of Finland.

At the end of March, German officers stated several times in the Finnish General Staff that Soviet-German relations would enter a critical phase in May of this year.

It was established that during the Easter holidays in Rovaniemi negotiations were held between the officers of the German and Finnish General Staffs. During these negotiations, the forthcoming maneuvers were discussed, the theme of which would be the advance from Rovaniemi to Tornio and Kem.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1178, 1179. Certified copy.

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No. 14 NOTE OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY V.N. MER-KULOVA I.V. STALIN V.M. MOLOTOV AND L.P. BERIA WITH A MESSAGE OBTAINED BY AN AGENCY ABOUT GERMANY'S DESIRE TO CLAIM PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH THE USSR ABOUT

## THE ANTI-SOVIET POLICY OF THE ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT AND GERMAN-FINNISH RELATIONS

No. 1612/M 14 May 1941

Top secret

We are sending an undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from Berlin.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: message from Berlin No. 156 dated 9.U.1941 based on the materials of the "Sergeant", "Corsican" and "Old Man" ??.

Message from Berlin

A source at the German Air Headquarters says:

1. At the German Aviation Headquarters, preparations for the operation against the USSR are carried out at the most accelerated pace. All data indicate that the performance is scheduled for the near future. In conversations among staff officers, May 20 is often referred to as the date for the start of the war with the USSR. Others believe that the speech is scheduled for June. In the same circles they say that first Germany will present an ultimatum to the Soviet Union? demanding more exports to Germany and the rejection of communist propaganda. As a guarantee of the fulfillment of these requirements, German commissars should be sent to the industrial and economic centers and enterprises of Ukraine, and some Ukrainian regions should be occupied by the German army. The presentation of the ultimatum will be preceded by a "war of nerves" in order to demoralize the Soviet Union.

According to the observations of the source, the Germans are concentrating all available manpower, weapons and transport on the Soviet border.

Recently, the Germans have been trying to keep the preparations for the war against the USSR in complete secrecy: measures are being taken to stop the spread of rumors about the upcoming war and to cover up the preparatory work. Appropriate measures are being taken in this direction by the German representatives in Moscow.

According to the source, most of the German officers, as well as some circles of the National Socialist Party, are clearly opposed to the war with the USSR

In these circles, the war against the USSR is considered an insane undertaking that could lead Hitler to collapse.

2. Despite the note of the Soviet government, German planes continue to fly to the Soviet side for the purpose of aerial photography. Now

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photographing takes place from a height of 11 thousand meters, and the flights themselves are made with great care. The squadron that takes aerial photographs of the Soviet territory is called "Ruvelstaffel", after the commander of the squadron, Ruvel. The squadron's location is Oranienburg, near Bremen, where it is listed as a test squadron.

high-altitude flights.

Z. Antonescu recently?' sent a memorandum to Hitler and Goering, in which he proves the need for a German attack on the USSR in the spring of this year. As arguments, the memorandum states that Germany needs to secure for itself a raw material and food base, which is Ukraine, the need to acquire access to Chernoye

sea; to prevent the Bolshevik danger, which increases with the increase in the military and industrial power of the USSR. This memorandum also emphasizes that the beginning of hostilities against the USSR in the spring will enable Germany to harvest the Russian fields.

4. The Rumanian General Staff continues to receive information reports about the military preparations of the USSR, and these messages are clearly intended to convince Germany of the need for a preventive action against the USSR and the ease of this war. One of the latest reports from the Rumanian General Staff indicates that recently large peasant uprisings took place in Bessarabia, which were suppressed by the forces of the Red Army.

5. The German military attache in Finland sent a message to his headquarters stating that in connection with an article in the Pravda newspaper about the landing of German troops in Finland and similar reports in English newspapers, he was approached by the Chief of the Finnish General Staff. According to the latter, Finland regards these English messages as a disapproval of the Finnish policy by the British, which may also have a negative impact on Swedish-Finnish relations, since English influence is still strong in Sweden.

Having stated these considerations, the Chief of the Finnish General Staff asked the German military attache to convey his request to the German military authorities that German troops be sent to Finland only in necessary cases and that their sending be carefully disguised.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1277-1280. Certified copy.

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ÿ15 NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR V.N. MER-KULOVA I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV AND L.P. BERIA WITH THE EXTRACT FROM THE REVIEW OF THE ENGLISH INTELLIGENCE, OBTAINED BY AN AGENCY, ON THE ACTIVATION OF THE ANTI-SOVIET POLITICS OF GERMANY

No. 1749/M 19 May 1941

Top secret

We are sending an excerpt from the next review of British intelligence materials for the week from May 4 to May 11, 1941. The message was received by the USSR NKGB from London undercover?5.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: message from London No. 3430 dated 16.U.41.

An excerpt from the latest review of British intelligence materials for the week of May 4-11 this year.

Under the general heading "German Plans and Prospects", the section of the USSR states:

A special source reports the continued transfer of German troops from the Balkans to Poland and the heavy concentration of German troops in East Prussia. The same source said that by May 15 all construction of military roads in Poland and in the Memel region should be completed. Anti-Soviet propaganda is intensifying among the Russian civilian population and the Red Army. Former Russian officers in the Ukraine and the Baltic countries, who are in contact with German agents, are conducting a rumor campaign. In anticipation of a possible attack on Russia, various measures are being taken to organize unrest in Ukraine and in the Baltic countries, so that appeals to the Germans for help could follow from there. This source's information about the Baltic states is confirmed by other reports from Riga that anti-Soviet activity in Latvia is being directed from Germany, where the anti-German Latvian organization "Regkopsgis" has now settled.

Data from Riga confirm the information about the gathering of Lithuanian and Estonian pro-fascists in Germany. One of Himmler's associates stated that war with Russia might break out sooner than expected, and that in this case the German plan would be:

1. The rapid capture of Moscow and the creation of a new government there.
2. The organization by this new government of a civil war against the Bolsheviks with the material assistance of the Germans.
3. Creation of national governments in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic countries for political and economic cooperation with Germany?5.
4. Pressure on Finland to force her to undertake a war of "vengeance" against the USSR.

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According to Polish intelligence, there are differences between the army and politicians in Germany on this issue: the military are in favor of a war against the USSR, while the politicians insist on negotiations.

Politicians led by Ribbentrop prove that in negotiations Germany will achieve everything she wants, i.e. participation in the economic and administrative control of Ukraine and the Caucasus. A peaceful solution will give Germany more than the administration of a conquered territory devoid of the Soviet administrative apparatus.

At the end of April, Hitler had not yet made a definite decision as to which of the two methods should be applied.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1373-1377. Certified copy.

№16 NOTE OF THE USSR PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE OF STATE SECURITY V.N. MER-KULOVA I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV and LP. BERIA WITH THE TEXT OF THE CONVERSATION, OBTAINED BY AN AGENT POINT, ON THE GERMAN PLANS FOR WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION

No. 1856/M 25 May 1941

Top secret

May 19 this year In a conversation with a source from the NKGB of the USSR, the "lyceum student" said the following:

Germany has now concentrated about 160-200 divisions on the Soviet border, equipped with a large number of tanks and aircraft, of which there are about 6,000. War between the Soviet Union and Germany is unlikely?7 although it would be very popular in Germany, while the present war with England is frowned upon by the populace. Hitler cannot take such a risk as war with the USSR for fear of violating the unity of the National Socialist Party. Although the defeat of the USSR in the event of war is beyond any doubt, nevertheless, Germany would have to spend about 6 weeks on the war, during which the supply from the East would stop, it would take a long time [to] establish the organization of the supply of Germany and during this time England, with the help of America, would have been greatly strengthened. Summer would be lost for Germany, and a hungry winter would come again.

German military forces assembled on the frontier must show the Soviet Union the determination to act if it is forced to do so? Hitler hopes that Stalin will become more accommodating in connection with this and stop all intrigues against Germany, and most importantly, give more goods, especially oil.



The Soviet Union also has enormous forces on the border with Germany - an army of 4,000,000, but this army does not in the least frighten Germany. It fears only that the consequences of the war will inevitably be so destructive for the Soviet Union, that the economy will be so disorganized that it would take a very long time to restore order. Germany would not benefit immediately from this war with the Soviet Union.

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The main misfortune of the USSR from the military point of view is the complete absence of capable officers. World history, perhaps, knows no other example of such a poor management of military operations, such as took place, for example, during the war between the Soviet Union and Finland. And if, nevertheless, the Soviet Union finally won, then there is no military merit in this. Simply put, they threw so much steel per square kilometer that they broke everything, while at the end of the war the enemy had nothing to shoot with. With Germany, such a maneuver is inapplicable, there is enough to answer with. At the same time, the Germans now have such brilliant generals as Brauchitsch, Keitel, Rommel, Liszt, and others, who equal, if not even surpass, the best military leaders in world military history. The Russians generally had few good military leaders, except for Suvorov and partly Kutuzov, although the plan for the war of 1812 was, in fact, the plan not of Kutuzov, but of two German generals who were in the service of Alexander the First. The Russians wanted to give Napoleon a battle in Poland, but the Germans warned that Napoleon would be able to defeat any Russian army in open battle. The only thing he won't be able to win is the Russian winter. It took a lot of work to persuade Alexander to obey the advice of the Germans. As a result, undeserved fame fell on Kutuzov.

The Soviet tanks operating in Finland were of incredibly poor quality and often broke down on the way. Even in the Baltic states, where there was no war, all the roads were filled with broken tanks during the occupation of the Baltic by the Red Army. Is it possible to fight German tanks with such equipment, which are not afraid of thousands of kilometers of Sahara sands?

The Soviet-Finnish war also showed that the Soviet aircrew did not know how to fight. The Finns had a maximum of 200 airplanes, and from the Soviet side 2500 participated, which still could not disable the Finnish fleet and failed to disorganize the transport. And look what the Germans did in Yugoslavia and Greece?

In the event of a war with Germany, the capital of the USSR would have been transferred to Sverdlovsk. This is Stalin's plan. The German plan is to destroy first of all all power plants in European Russia, which is quite easy to do, since they are relatively large and there are not many of them. Dneproges would be the first to fly into the air. Large industry would come to a halt in a few days; agriculture would also very soon experience enormous difficulties, since it is now based on the use of tractors, and they would not have enough fuel, since Baku and, probably, Grozny would have been on fire on the very first day of the war. The rest of the fields still produce very little oil. For the rapid destruction of Baku, the Germans use the territory of Iraq.

The German plan for the war with the Soviet Union was elaborated in the most detailed way. The maximum duration of the war is ~ 6 weeks. During this time, Germany would have taken possession of almost the entire European part of the USSR, but would not have touched the government in Sverdlovsk. If Stalin would then have been able to save the socialist system in the rest of the USSR, then Hitler would not have interfered with this.

The most interesting thing is that even the military circles of Finland drew up a plan to conquer the Soviet Union with the assistance of German troops and that they would also need 6 weeks for this!

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Who exactly is the author of this plan - "Lyceum student" did not say, but made a remark that the military in general like to make plans. He cited the example of Moltke: the latter seemed to be reading a book at the time when he was informed that France had declared war on Prussia. Moltke, not

looking up from reading, he grunted: "The war plan is in the 5th box on the right side, take it from there!"  
The military, said the Lyceum student, must have a plan ready just in case.

According to the Lyceum student, the German army also has such "things" as Skoropadsky and others, which it keeps in its pocket ready just in case, but their suitability is rather doubtful.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

CA FSB, f. Z os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1500-1504. Vacation.

Ÿ17 NOTE People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR B.Z. Kobulova I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV AND L.P. BERIA WITH A MESSAGE RECEIVED BY AN AGENT MET ABOUT THE INTENTION OF GERMANY TO START WAR WITH THE USSR IN THE 2nd HALF OF JUNE 1941

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No. 1983/M 30 May 1941

Top secret

Sending an undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from London??,

Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Kobulov

Reason: message from London No. 3705 dated 27.U.41. Message from London

The Japanese Consul General in Vienna on May 9, 1941 reported the following to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

The German leaders now understand that in order to provide Germany with raw materials and products for a long war, it is necessary to seize the Ukraine and the Caucasus. They are accelerating their preparations in order to provoke a conflict, probably in the second half of June, before the harvest, and hope to complete the entire campaign in 6-8 weeks. In this regard, the Germans postpone the invasion of England.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. Z os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1651-1652. Certified copy.

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Ÿ18 NOTE People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR B.Z. Kobulova I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV AND L.P. BERIA WITH AN AGENT REPORT ON THE DECISION OF GERMANY TO ATTACK THE USSR INDICATING THE INITIAL MAIN STRIKES

No. 2215/M 12 June 1941

Top secret

We are sending an undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from Berlinazo,

Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Kobulov

Reason: message from Berlin No. 4115 dated 11.1.41. Message from Berlin

A source at the German Air Headquarters says:

In the leading circles of the German Ministry of Aviation and in the headquarters of the aviation they say that the question of the German attack on the Soviet Union has been finally decided?! Will they be presented

preliminary any demands to the Soviet Union are unknown, and therefore the possibility of a surprise strike should be reckoned with.

Goering's main headquarters is moved from Berlin, presumably to Romania. On June 18 Goering is to report to the new location of his headquarters. The air forces of the second line by the same date should be transferred from France to the Poznan region.

Negotiations on joint actions between the German, Finnish and Romanian General Staffs are being carried out in an accelerated manner.

Finnish pilots also take part in daily reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory.

According to the documents passing through the hands of the source, it is clear that the objects of the main attack should initially be Murmansk, the Murmansk railway, Vilna, Bialystok, Chisinau, and that the German command will seek to bypass from the north, from East Prussia, and from the south, from Rumania, to create pincers that will gradually close in order to encircle the Red Army, located on the border of the General Government.

Additionally, aircraft factories in Moscow and its environs, the ports of the Baltic Sea and the Belomorsky Canal are also planned by the aviation headquarters as objects of bombardment.

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1853-1855. Certified copy. Published: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. - 1990. - No. 4. - S. 216.

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No. 19 NOTE OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE FOR STATE SECURITY V.N. Merkulova I.V. STALIN, V.M. MOLOTOV AND L.P. BERIA WITH AN AGENT REPORT ABOUT GERMANY'S READINESS TO ATTACK THE USSR WITH INDICATION OF OBJECTS OF BOMBING AND APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS ON THE FUTURE OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORY

No. 2279 / M June 17, 1941

Top secret

We are sending an undercover message received by the NKGB of the USSR from Berlin.

People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov

Reason: the message of the "Foreman" and "Corsican" No. 4261 and 4262 of 16.1.41

Message from Berlin

A source at the German Air Headquarters says:

1. All German military measures to prepare for an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time??.
2. In the circles of the aviation headquarters, the TASS message of June 6 was perceived very ironically. They emphasize that this statement cannot have any significance.
3. The objects of German air raids will primarily be: the Svir-3 power plant, Moscow factories producing individual parts for aircraft (electrical equipment, ball bearings, tires), as well as car repair shops.

4. Hungary will take an active part in hostilities on the side of Germany. Some of the German aircraft, mainly fighters, are already on Hungarian airfields.

5. Important German aircraft repair shops are located: in Königsberg, Gdynia, Graudenz, Breslau, Marienburg. Aircraft engine workshops Milicz in Poland, in Warsaw - Ochachi and especially important in Heiligenkeil.

A source working in the German Ministry of Economy reports that the appointment of the heads of the military economic departments of the "future districts" of the occupied territory of the USSR has been made, namely: Amonn, one of the leading employees of the National Socialist Party in Düsseldorf, has been appointed for the Caucasus, for Kiev - Burandt, a former employee of the Ministry of Economy, who until recently worked in the economic department in France, for Moscow - Burger, head of the Economic Chamber in Stuttgart. All these persons are enrolled in military service and left for Dresden, which is a collection point.

For the general management of the economic administration of the "occupied territories of the USSR," Schlöterer, head of the foreign department of the Ministry of Economy, who is currently in Berlin, was appointed.

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The Ministry of Economy says that Rosenberg also spoke at a meeting of business executives destined for the "occupied territory of the USSR", who stated that "the concept of the "Soviet Union" should be erased from the geographical map"?

Head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR Fitin

CA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1914-1916. Certified copy. Published: News of the Central Committee of the CPSU. - 1990. - No. 4. - S. 221.

Copy of the Soviet secret

No. 20 TsKVVP (6b) to Comrade STALIN SNK USSR Comrade MOLOTOV

At the same time, I am sending an undercover message received from Berlin.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (L. Beria)

Copy of the Soviet secret

According to information received by the source from the assistant of the Headquarters of the German Aviation Command, Goering is more and more inclined to conclude an agreement with England and America due to the difficulties that have arisen in the war with England and the deterioration of further prospects for the war. The main difficulties lie in the fact that, due to the prolongation of the war, the economic situation in Germany is significantly deteriorating.

According to information received from a reliable source in Berlin, the attempts of the Germans to negotiate with the Americans were expressed in the fact that at a breakfast arranged for the American embassy in Berlin by Goering's closest aides - Marshal MILCHOM and Colonel-General UDET, the latter, in a conversation with the American military attache PEYTON made it clear to him that Germany would like to negotiate with America.

According to the same informant, the TASS denial regarding the presence of German troops in Bulgaria produced the impression of a bombshell in the German Air Ministry. GOERING ordered the transfer of the "Russian abstract" of the Ministry of Aviation to the so-called active part of the aviation headquarters, which develops and prepares military operations. The Aviation Headquarters issued an order to conduct reconnaissance flights on a large scale over the territory of the USSR in order to reconnoiter the border

strip, including Leningrad, by photographing and compiling accurate maps. Aircraft equipped with improved cameras will fly over the Soviet border at high altitude.

Right: Deputy early 5th sec. GUGB NKVD USSR (Sudoplatov)

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Owls. secret ý21 REFERENCE

The following is reported from the Shanghai residency in the HESSA case:

In the circles of the German opposition in Shanghai, it is believed that the HESS, not sharing the development of the war in the present direction, arrived in England with a proposal of a special peace only between England and Germany, which would not affect other countries and issues related to Nolsa, Czechoslovakia, Balkan countries, etc.

It is alleged that the British, having become acquainted with important information received from HESSA, asked the United States whether they would enter the war at all, without specifying the exact date. The British demanded an allegedly immediate answer, declaring that if the US answer was negative, then England would conclude a special peace on the conditions indicated above. It was on this issue that the US ambassador in London traveled to Washington, and it is assumed that he himself had previously talked with HESS.

The US response is unknown.

Great importance is attached to the fact that both sides are silent in the HESSA case and he has not even been officially expelled from the party, and if we assume that HITLER may be behind this case, then we are talking about some tremendous importance of the game.

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On March 25-26, 1935, British Foreign Secretary J. Simon and Lord Privy Seal A. Eden paid a visit to Berlin and held talks with Hitler, Neurath and Ribbentrop. This was the first meeting of British leaders directly with Hitler since he came to power.

The meeting discussed the situation in Europe, which arose as a result of Hitler's policy of open refusal to comply with the restrictive provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty.

At this meeting in Berlin, top British leaders personally made it clear to Hitler that Britain was by no means opposed to a German revision of the Versailles system and the realization of its territorial claims in the east of Europe, subject to Hitler's guarantee of British interests. In connection with John Simon's visit to Berlin, the British government decided to send a delegation to Moscow and Warsaw to discuss issues related to the tension that had arisen in Europe. On March 28-29, 1935, I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and M.M. Litvinov with A. Eden. The Soviet leaders declared that, in view of the aggressive aspirations of fascist Germany, the USSR considered it necessary to continue to seek the conclusion of the Eastern Pact (see note 8). Eden's attention was drawn to the policy of connivance pursued by the British Government with regard to the rearmament of Germany, which could have dangerous consequences for Britain itself. "Hitler," declared the Soviet leaders, "putting forward Eastern expansion at the present time, wants to trap the Western states and get them to sanction his armaments. When these weapons reach the level desired by Hitler, the guns can start firing in a completely different direction" (Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR. - T. 18. - M., 1970. - S. 246-248). A. Eden kept silent about the real content of J. Simon's talks with Hitler in Berlin.

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Simon John Allsbrook (1893-1954), British statesman and politician, diplomat. In 1931-1935 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, pursued a policy of rapprochement with Germany. At the General Conference on Disarmament of 1932-1934, he spoke out against the Soviet proposals for general disarmament, in support of Germany's demand for equality in armaments, which meant the rearmament of a potential aggressor. At the Stresa Conference in 1935, convened to discuss the issue of violations by Germany of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, opposed the application of any sanctions in relation to it. In 1932, he achieved the denunciation of a trade agreement with the USSR, tried to prevent the conclusion of an agreement on mutual assistance between the USSR and France. During the Second World War, he actively opposed the opening of a second front in Europe. Eden Anthony (1897-1977), British statesman and diplomat. Member of the House of Commons 1923-1957. 1926-1929 Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1931-1933 Parliamentary Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 1934-1935 Lord Privy Seal, 1935 Minister without Portfolio for the League of Nations, 1939-1940 - Minister of Dominion Affairs, in 1940 - Minister of War, in 1940-1945 - Minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1951-1955 - Deputy. Prime Minister - Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the years 1955-1957 - Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Hitler (Schicklgruber) Adolf (1889-1945), Reich Chancellor of Germany in 1933-1945, Fuhrer of the NSDAP.

Neurath (more correct and common spelling - Neurat) Konstantin (1873-1956), German statesman and diplomat. In 1932-1938 he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, he provided diplomatic preparations for the Nazi aggression in Europe. As one of the main war criminals at the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946), he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Released in 1954.

Ribbentrop Joachim (1893-1946), statesman, diplomat of Nazi Germany. He joined the Nazi Party in 1930 and actively contributed to the establishment of a fascist dictatorship in Germany in 1933. Since 1934 - head of the foreign policy department of the National Socialist Party, head of a special bureau engaged in espionage in the field of foreign policy. In 1936-1938 he was the German ambassador to England. In 1938-1945 he was the German Foreign Minister. As one of the main war criminals, he was sentenced to death at the Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946) and hanged.

In October 1933, Germany defiantly withdrew from the Geneva Conference on Arms Reduction and Limitation. At the same time, the Nazis announced their withdrawal from the League of Nations. These actions seriously alarmed the political circles and the public of European countries, since they actually meant that the fascist leadership of Germany was openly embarking on the path of war.

Draft agreement on mutual assistance between the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania against aggression from Nazi Germany. The idea of the Eastern Pact was put forward at the beginning of 1934 by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, L. Barthou, during a discussion with Soviet representatives of the international situation that had developed as a result of the demonstrative withdrawal of Nazi Germany from the League of Nations, its withdrawal from the disarmament conference (October 14, 1933) and accelerated preparations for war. The Soviet government supported the idea of concluding such a pact. The Soviet Union and France offered to involve Germany in this treaty as well, in order to deprive her of any reason to claim that the Eastern Pact pursued the aim of encircling her. France was not supposed to participate in the pact. She had to conclude a separate agreement with the USSR on mutual assistance.

Readiness to join the Eastern Pact was declared by Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. At the same time, Latvia and Estonia agreed to join the pact only if Germany and Poland participated in it. English government about

conditioned its support for the pact by including Germany not only in a regional mutual assistance treaty, but also in a Franco-Soviet treaty. The USSR and France agreed to this.

The idea of collective security in the form of concluding the Eastern Pact was not implemented due to the negative attitude of Germany and Poland towards it. The Hitlerite government declared that Germany's participation in the Eastern Pact was impossible until her complete equality in armaments was recognized.

This refers to the German-Polish declaration of 1934 on the non-use of force (also known as the non-aggression pact). Declaring their commitment to the idea of peace, the parties pledged not to resort to the use of force to resolve disputed issues. In fact, the Declaration became one of the major milestones on the road to the Second World War, as Germany and Poland, which signed it, rejected the principles of collective security. After temporarily neutralizing Poland, Germany seized Austria and Czechoslovakia. On April 29, 1939, Germany denounced the Declaration, and on September 1, it attacked Poland, unleashing the Second World War. The Locarno Treaties of 1925 were prepared at the conference of the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and France, as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia, held on October 5-16 in Locarno (Switzerland), signed on December 1 in London. The Locarno Accords actually meant Germany's first step, taken with the encouragement of British diplomacy, towards the revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919.

The main document concluded by Germany, France, Belgium, Great Britain and Italy is the Rhine Pact on the inviolability of the German-French and German-Belgian borders and the preservation of the demilitarized Rhine zone; Britain and Italy acted as guarantors of the pact. Germany made no commitments regarding its eastern borders.

In 1936, Nazi Germany, which managed to extract all the benefits from the Locarno Treaties, terminated them and remilitarized the Rhineland.

A very important statement. J. Simon clearly makes it clear to Hitler that England will not intercede in defense of the sovereignty of Austria. The way to the Anschluss was thus open to fascist Germany.

This "generous position towards Germany" was clearly demonstrated by England during the international conference in Stresa, which took place after the meeting of J. Simon with Hitler on April 11-14, 1935. The Stresa conference was convened to discuss the situation in Europe, due to Germany's violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 and to develop a common position towards Germany. Great Britain, France and Italy participated in the conference. They adopted a declaration condemning Germany's violations of the military provisions of the Treaty of Versailles only in the most general form. The issue of sanctions against Germany in the event of new violations of its obligations, raised during the discussion, did not receive support due to the negative position of Great Britain. This undermined the significance of the adopted declaration. Halifax Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (1881-1959), Earl, British statesman and diplomat. In 1938-1940 he was British Foreign Secretary, one of the active supporters of the policy of "appeasement" of Nazi Germany on the eve of World War II.

The information was received in London from a foreign intelligence agent, Liszt. Due to his position, he had access to state secrets of great importance. He actively collaborated with the "legal" NKGB residency in London. Soviet intelligence appreciated the information he obtained.

Zakhar is the pseudonym of A. Kobulov, who from 1940 to 1941 led the NKGB residency in Berlin.

Knowing about the quantitative superiority of Soviet aviation, the Germans hoped to eliminate it by bombing airfields. They also believed that the flying skills of German pilots exceeded the training of Soviet pilots, and on

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on this basis, they hoped to secure air superiority. The demonstration before the German representatives of the power of Soviet aircraft factories and new types of aircraft, thus, did not give the Soviet side the expected result in restraining Hitler's aggressive intentions.

"Leibrandt" - a referent for Russian affairs at the foreign policy department of the NSDAP, one of the information sources of the "Starshina".

"Frankfurter" (Eikof Karl) - German naval intelligence officer, worked in the USSR as an engineer at a shipyard. Until 1936, he collaborated with the security agencies of the USSR. After a five-year break, in April 1941 it was decided to resume contact with him. According to the Berlin residency, Frankfurter worked with her in good faith.

Information came from valuable sources of the Berlin "legal" residency of the NKGB of the USSR "Corsican" and "Sergeant".

"Corsican" - Arvid Harnak (1901-1942), active anti-fascist, one of the leaders of the organization "Red Chapel". In 1924 he received a doctorate in law from the University of Jena. In 1925 he studied at the London Institute of Economics, in 1926-1928 - at the University of Wisconsin (USA) as a fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation. Upon his return to Germany, he defended his doctoral work in philosophy. From 1935 to 1942 he worked in the German Ministry of Economics. In 1935, he began cooperation with a representative of the "legal" residency of the NKVD-NKGB in Berlin in order to jointly fight to overthrow the fascist regime. He possessed high business qualities and the ability to find a common language with a variety of people. On the recommendation of intelligence, Harnack joined the Union of Nazi Lawyers. This paved the way for his admission to the NSDAP. In the eyes of the Nazis, Harnack became his own person and was promoted through the ranks: he was appointed state adviser to the Ministry of Economics. Documents relating to the secret economic and trade agreements of Germany were brought to him for signature. On September 7, 1942, he was arrested along with his wife, and a few months later he was executed by the verdict of a court-martial.

For the first time in a public speech, Krol used the disinformation thesis about Germany's alleged intention to present ultimatum demands of a territorial and economic nature to the USSR. Our source in this case fell under the influence of disinformation and became its "transmission link". Documentary information obtained from Liszt (see note 14).

"Old Man" ~ the son of a Rhine manufacturer, a well-known writer and playwright in Germany in the 30s, an old friend and like-minded person of The Corsican. He had connections in government circles, among liberal-minded politicians, and among the creative intelligentsia. Collaborated with the residency for ideological and political reasons.

Disinformation about the circumstances of the start of the war also got into the message - this is the notorious preliminary ultimatum of Germany to Russia, only after which the hostilities supposedly unfold.

Antonescu Ion (1882-1946), fascist military dictator of Romania from September 1940 to August 1944. After the abdication of the throne in September 1940 by King Carol II, power in Romania



was completely in the hands of Antonescu, who by that time had become prime minister and appropriated the title of conductor - head of state.

In October 1940, German troops entered Romania. A month later, Antonescu's government joined the tripartite pact of the Axis powers. Antonescu reduced Romania to the status of a German colony. The Romanian government took over the maintenance of the German army, which was preparing an attack on Yugoslavia and the USSR on the territory of Romania.

25 The information came from Liszt (see note 14). 26 Plans for waging war against the USSR are partially revealed: the rapid capture of Mo

squash and the use against the Bolsheviks of the nationalists of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states (see note 14).

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27 The Lyceum student's opinion about the "low probability" of a war between Germany and the USSR was of a disinformation nature, but outwardly it seemed plausible, since in this case Germany would be forced to fight on two fronts.

28 The "lyceum student" tried to explain the concentration of German troops on the Soviet border by measures allegedly taken in response to the movement of the Soviet Army to the western borders.

29 Documentary information obtained from the source "Tony", who was part of the famous London Five.

3 Information received from the "Foreman" (see note 19).

31 Ten days before the start of the Great Patriotic War, information was received about the final decision on the issue of the German attack on the Soviet Union, which could happen suddenly. The propagandized thesis about the "ultimatum" of Germany to the USSR is called into question.

3? 5 days before the start of the Great Patriotic War, foreign intelligence received reliable information about Germany's intention to attack the USSR any minute,

33 Having familiarized himself with the intelligence report, Stalin on the same day summoned the People's Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov and head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina. The conversation was conducted mainly with Fitin. Stalin was interested in the smallest details about the sources. It seemed to Fitin that he had fully and accurately told about the Corsican and the Petty Officer and explained why intelligence trusted them. Stalin asked, however, to clarify once again and double-check this information. The result was a document prepared on June 20, 1941 by foreign intelligence and known as the "Calendar of messages of the Corsican and the Petty Officer from September 6, 1940 to June 16, 1941." It collected all the main messages that warned of the upcoming war, indicating from whom and when the informants received this information. But on June 22, the Calendar, having been in the hands of Merkulov, was returned by Fitin to the head of the German intelligence department P.M. Zhuravlev with the resolution: "To Zhuravlev. Have it for yourself. P.F. 22. Ugh.

Foreword

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